> 


. .   ill!!     ;     ' ,.  . 


•  • " : .-     : 


. 


american 


EDITED    BY 


JOHN  T.  MORSE,  JR. 


American  £tate£men 


JOHN  O.  CALHOTJN 


BY 

DR.  H.  VON  HOLST 


BOSTON 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  :  11  EAST  SEVENTEENTH  STBEET 


1882 


Copyright,  1882, 
BY  HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  &  CO. 

All  rights  reserved. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge : 
Stereotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  0.  Iloughton  and  Company. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  L 

PAOl 

YOUTH  .  ...         I 


CHAPTER  IL 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 18 

CHAPTER  in. 
SECRETARY  OF  WAR 88 

CHAPTER  IV. 
VICE-PRESIDENT .        62 

CHAPTER  V. 
THE  SENATE .      104 

CHAPTER  VI. 
SLAVERT *     .        .        .        .      124 

CHAPTER  VH. 
UNDER  VAN  BUREN     .  ....      184 


VI  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER 
TEXAS    ..........      222 

CHAPTER  IX. 
OBBGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAB     .  261 


JOHN  O.   CALHOTIN". 


CHAPTER  I. 

YOUTH. 

LIFE  is  not  only  "  stranger  than  fiction,"  but 
frequently  also  more  tragical  than  any  tragedy 
ever  conceived  by  the  most  fervid  imagination. 
Often  in  these  tragedies  of  life  there  is  not  one 
drop  of  blood  to  make  us  shudder,  nor  a  single 
event  to  compel  the  tears  into  the  eye.  A  man 
endowed  with  an  intellect  far  above  the  average, 
impelled  by  a  high-soaring  ambition,  untainted 
by  any  petty  or  ignoble  passion,  and  guided  by 
a  character  of  sterling  firmness  and  more  than 
common  purity,  yet,  with  fatal  illusion,  devoting 
all  his  mental  powers,  all  his  moral  energy  and 
the  whole  force  of  his  iron  will  to  the  service  of 
a  doomed  and  unholy  cause,  and  at  last  sinking 
into  the  grave  in  the  very  moment  when,  under 
the  weight  of  the  top-stone,  the  towering  pillars 
of  the  temple  of  his  impure  idol  are  rent  to 
their  very  base,  —  can  anything  more  tragical 
be  conceived  ? 
1 


2  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

That  is,  in  a  few  lines,  the  story  of  the  life 
of  John  C.  Calhoun.  In  spite  of  his  grand  ca 
reer,  South  Carolina's  greatest  son  has  had  a 
more  hapless  fate  than  any  other  of  the  illus 
trious  men  in  the  history  of  the  United  States. 
With  few  exceptions  it  is  probable  that  the  read 
ers  of  these  pages  will  consider  this  a  strange 
or  even  an  absurd  assertion,  and  thereby  them 
selves  will  furnish  another  proof  of  its  truth. 
Alexander  Hamilton,  America's  greatest  polit 
ical  genius,  has  been  obliged  to  wait  three  quar 
ters  of  a  century  to  have  a  statue  erected  to  his 
memory,  and  then  it  had  to  be  done  by  his  own 
offspring.  Calhoun  has  not  had  to  Complain  of 
the  same  neglect,  though  nobody  could  have 
been  justly  accused  of  ingratitude  if  this  honor 
had  not  been  vouchsafed  to  him ;  for  he  has  no 
claims  upon  the  gratitude  of  his  country,  al 
though  his  name  will  forever  remain  one  of  the 
foremost  in  its  records.  But,  in  common  with 
Alexander  Hamilton,  he  is  still  waiting  for  the 
only  monument  worthy  of  his  memory,  a  biog 
raphy  which  does  him  full  justice ;  and  lie  will 
probably  have  to  wait  much  longer  for  such  a 
memorial,  —  cere  perennius,  —  which  indeed,  it 
is  not  unlikely,  may  never  be  erected.  As  yet 
it  is  hardly  possible  to  pass  an  unbiassed  judg 
ment  upon  him,  because  the  wounds  of  the  ter 
rible  conflict,  in  which  he  was  during  the  life- 


YOUTH.  3 

time  of  a  whole  generation  the  acknowledged 
leader,  have  not  fully  healed,  and  therefore  those 
passions  have  not  completely  died  away  which 
were  engendered  by  the  catastrophe  in  which 
that  conflict  ended.  Meanwhile,  it  becomes 
every  day  more  difficult  really  to  understand 
that  struggle.  Even  the  present  generation, 
which  has  grown  into  manhood  since  the  civil 
war,  hardly  realizes  that  it  is  not  a  soul-stirring 
romance,  but  sober  history."  The  next  genera 
tion  will  find  it  easier  to  form  an  "adequate  con 
ception  of  the  life  of  the  ancient  Indians  and 
Egyptians  than  of  that  of  their  own  grandfa 
thers  ;  for  there  is  no  other  instance  in  all  the 
history  of  the  world,  where  the  civilizations  of 
two  different  ages,  with  their  antagonistic  prin 
ciples  and  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling,  have 
been  so  intricately  interwoven  as  in  the  United 
States  during  the  times  of  the  slavery  conflict. 
It  is  only  the  part  played  by  Calhoun  in  this 
conflict  which  puts  him  into  the  very  first  jank 
of  the  men  who  have  acted  on  the  political 
stage  of  the  United  States,  though  he  has  done 
enough  else  to  secure  for  his  name  a  permanent 
place  in  the  annals  of  his  country. 

As  the  years  roll  on,  the  fame  of  Daniel 
Webster  and  Henry  Clay  is  gradually  growing 
dimmer,  while  the  name  of  Calhoun  has  yet 
lost  hardly  anything  of  the  lurid  intensity  with 


4  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

which  it  glowed  on  the  political  firmament  of 
the  "United  States  towards  the  end  of  the  first 
half  of  this  century.  Nor  will  it  ever  lose 
much  of  this.  The  fact  is  easily  explained, 
though  it  may  seem  strange  to  the  superficial 
student.  The  number  of  Calhoun's  admirers 
in  his  later  years  was  insignificant  in  compari 
son  with  the  enthusiastic  hosts  who  knew  no 
more  powerful  charm  than  the  captivating  voice 
of  the  eloquent  Kentuckian,  and  to-day  it  will 
>  not  be  seriously  questioned  that  Webster  was 
C  intellectually  more  than  the  peer  of  Calhoun. 
Neither  of  the  three  can  lay  claim  to  the  name 
of  a  statesman  in  the  highest  acceptation  of  the 
term  without  more  than  one  qualifying  restric 
tion,  but  Calhoun  is  certainly  less  entitled  to  it 
than  either  of  his  great  rivals.  Moreover,  these 
had  so  many  peculiar  traits  of  character,  habits, 
and  fancies,  that  their  lives  are  a  rich  source  of 
pleasant  anecdotes ;  and  from  the  background 
of  the  general  historical  development,  their  fig 
ures  spring  forth  in  bold  relief  with  a  vividness 
equalling  that  of  Washington,  Jefferson,  and 
John  Adams.  Of  Calhoun  the  man,  on  the 
contrary,  but  very  little  is  to  be  told.  Even 
his  contemporaries,  with  perhaps  the  exception 
of  his  nearest  neighbors,  did  not  know  much  of 
his  doings  as  a  private  individual,  or  at  least 
do  not  seem  to  have  thought  them  of  sum- 


YOUTH.  b 

cient  interest  to  be  handed  down  to  posterity. 
Whether  his  private  correspondence,  which  is 
still  withheld  from  the  public,  will  throw  much 
light  on  this  side  of  his  life,  cannot  ^be  told. 
I  have  to  state  with  regret  that,  according  to 
my  information,  not  very  much  is  to  be  ex 
pected.     I  was  assured  in  Charleston,  by  an  , 
intimate  younger  friend  of   Calhoun,   that  he  ^ 
had  not  been  in  the  habit  of  carefully  preserv 
ing  his  private  letters,  and  that  many  of  his  « 
papers,  which  are  at  present  intrusted  to  Mr.  I 
Hunter  of  Virginia,  were  lost  during  the  civil  *' 
war.     However  that  may  be,  the  newspapers  of 
the  times  and  the  published  private  correspond 
ences  of   his  co-actors  tell  hardly  anything  of 
the  personal  relations  and  the  home-life  of  the 
man,  whose  slightest  public  act  was  watched 
with  interest  by  the  whole  nation.     We  hear  - 
that  he  was  a  just  and  kind  master  to  his  slaves, 
that  he  was  possessed  of  an  uncommon  conver-  i 
sational  talent,  and  that  he  exercised  an  especial  | 
fascination  upon  young  men.    This  is  about  all. 
From  the  historical  standpoint  it  is,  of  course, 
deeply  to  be  regretted  that  we  are  so  little  in 
formed  about  the  every-day  life  of  so  remark 
able  a  man;  and  yet  one  cannot  help  feeling 
at  the  same  time  a  certain  satisfaction  that  we 
learn  no  more  about  it.     There  is  no  better 
proof  of  the  personal  purity  of  a  public  man 


6  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

than  the  complete  stillness  of  all  gossipping 
tongues,  among  friends  as  well  as  foes.  The 
consequence  of  this  silence  is,  however,  that  so 
soon  as  the  grave  closes  over  such  a  public  per 
sonage,  the  figure  begins  to  assume  a  shadowy 
appearance.  A  well-read  student  of  the  history 
of  the  United  States  may  often  easily  imagine 
himself  seated  next  to  Webster  and  Clay  at  the 
social  board,  or  walking  with  them  in  the  lanes 
of  their  farms,  though  he  may  have  been  born 
after  their  eyes  had  been  closed  forever.  But 
no  one  who  has  not  actually  grasped  Calhoun's 
hand  and  looked  into  the  depth  of  those  steady 
and  keen  eyes,  will  ever  be  tempted  to  indulge 
for  a  single  moment  in  such  an  illusion  with 
regard  to  him.  Twenty  or  thirty  years  hence 
there  will  not  be  a  single  person  left  to  whom 
he  is  or  ever  has  been  fully  a  man  of  flesh 
and  bone.  The  Representative,  the  Secretary 
of  War,  the  Vice-President,  the  "  great  Nulli- 
fier,"  the  Senator,  our  posterity  like  ourselves 
may  be  perfectly  acquainted  with ;  but  the  Cal- 
houn  off  the  political  stage,  the  Calhoun  who 
ate  and  drank  like  other  mortals,  who  laughed, 
chatted,  and  sorrowed,  who  enjoyed  life  and  bat 
tled  with  its  small  and  great  cares,  is  long  ago 
dead,  and  no  pen  will  ever  be  able  to  recall  him 
to  life  in  the  same  sense  in  which  Webster  and 
Clay  still  are  and  will  remain  alive  so  long  as 


YOUTH.  7 

the  American  people  cherish  the  memory  of 
their  great  men. 

Yet  it  is  unquestionably  true,  as  it  was  as 
serted  before,  that  the  name  of  Calhoun  already 
conveys  a  much  more  definite  idea  to  the  Amer 
ican  people  than  that  of  either  Webster  or 
Clay,  and  that  this  difference  will  be  steadily 
increased  in  his  favor.  The  simple  explana 
tion  of  this  remarkable  fact  is,  that  Calhoun 
is  in  an  infinitely  higher  degree  the  represen 
tative  of  ;\n  idea,  and  this  idea  is  the  pivotal 
point  on  which  the  history  of  the  United  States 
has  turned  from  1819  to  nearly  the  end  of  the 
first  century  of  their  existence  as  an  indepen 
dent  republic.  From  about  1830  to  the  day  of 
his  death,  Calhoun  may  be  called  the  very  im 
personation  of  the  slavery  question.  From  the 
moment  when  he  assumes  this  character,  his  fig 
ure  towers  far  above  all  bis  contemporaries,  even 
Jackson  not  excepted ;  while'up  to  that  time  he  v 
is,  in  spite  of  his  uncommonly  brilliant  career, 
only  an  able  politician  of  the  higher  and  nobler 
order,  having  many  peers  and  even  a  considera 
ble  number  of  superiors  among  the  statesmen 
of  the  United  States.  These  introductory  re 
marks  seem  necessary  in  order  to  justify  the 
brevity  with  which  we  are  compelled  to  treat 
the  youth  of  Calhoun  and  the  first  period  of  his 
public  life. 


8  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

In  1733  James  Calhoun  is  said  to  have  emi 
grated  from  Donegal  in  Ireland  to  tlie  United 
States.  He  first  went  to  Pennsylvania,  then 
settled  on  the  Kanawha,  in  Virginia,  and  at 
last,  in  1756,  removed  to  South  Carolina.  In 
1770  his  son  Patrick  married  Martha  Caldwell, 
the  daughter  of  a  Presbyterian  emigrant  from 
Ireland.  John  Caldwell  Calhoun,  the  third  son 
of  Patrick  alfd  iviartna,  was  born  marcn  18, 
1782,  in  the  Abbeville  District,  South  Carolina. 
Though  his  father  died  while  lie  was  still  a  boy, 
the  ardent  temper  of  the  zealous  revolutionary 
patriot  seems  to  have  exercised  a  marked  influ 
ence  on  the  formation  of  the  character  of  the 
son.  John  remained  with  his  mother  on  the 
farm.  There  he  led  a  quiet  and  simple  life,  for 
his  father  had  left  the  family  in  very  modest 
circumstances.  No  opportunity  was  offered  him 
to  attend  regularly  a  good  school,  and  his  sol 
itary  rambles  in  the  woods  had  to  serve  in 
lieu  of  systematic  instruction.  Being  from  his 
early  childhood  of  a  meditative  turn  of  mind, 
the  youth  learned  to  think  before  his  memory 
had  become  burdened  with  the  thoughts  of  other 
people.  This  defective  education  in  his  boy 
hood  made  itself  felt  through  his  whole  life. 
In  spite  of  the  diligence  with  which  he  applied 
himself  later,  for  some  years,  to  his  books,  the 
stock  of  positive  knowledge  which  he  had  to 


TOUTS.  9 

fall  back  upon  was  never  large,  and  the  peculiar 
kind  of  narrowness  which  is  inseparable  from 
onesidedness  was  among  the  most  prominent 
traits  in  his  mental  and  moral  structure.  But 
what  he  lacked  in  breadth  of  view  he  fully 
made  up  by  penetrating  intensity,  bold  inde 
pendence  of  thinking,  and  a  keen  instinct  for 
the  true  nature  of  the  things  whicli  fell  within 
the  limited  circle  in  which  his  mind  moved. 

Calhoun  had  completed  his  eighteenth  year, 
when  he  began  an  uninterrupted  course  of  sys 
tematic  strrdy  in  order  to  fit  himself  for  the 
higher  walks  of  life.  Under  the  direction  of 
his  brother-in-law,  Dr.  Waddel,  a  Presbyterian 
clergyman,  he  prepared  himself  for  college,  and 
after  two  short  years  he  was  able  to  enter  the 
junior  class  at  Yale.  In  1804  he  was  graduated 
with  high  honors,  and  then  devoted  himself  for 
three  years  to  the  study  of  law,  spending  eight 
een  months  of  the  time  at  the  law  school  at 
Litchfield,  Connecticut.  Of  much  more  im 
portance  than  the  often-repeated  story,  that 
while  at  Yale  he  had  been  declared  fit  and 
likely  to  become  some  day  President  of  the 
United  States,  is  the  unmistakable  fact  that 
his  prolonged  sojourn  in  New  England  exer 
cised  a  marked 'influence  upon  the  formation  of 
the  political  opinions  which  he  held  in  the  be 
ginning  of  his  political  career. 


10  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

*  Having  returned  to  Abbeville,  he  began  to 
.j  practis~e~lsw;  btrt  it  does  not  appear  that  the 
public  were  especially  eager  to  avail  themselves 
of  his  services  as  an  attorney  and  counsellor, 
nor  that  he  distinguished  himself  in  any  case 
of  importance.  A  man  of  his  general  ability 
and  uncommon  logical  acuteness  could  not  have 
failed  to  acquire  a  prominent  standing  in  this 
calling  if  he  had  devoted  himself  to  it  with 
his  whole  energy.  Yet  he  would  undoubtedly 
never  have  become  a  great  lawyer,  because  he 
was  not  objective  enough  to  examine  his  prem 
ises  with  sufficient  care,  while  he  built  his  argu 
ment  upon  them  with  undeviating  and  most 
incisive  logic,  thereby  frequently  arriving  at 
most  shocking  conclusions  with  nothing  to  stand 
upon  except  a  basis  of  false  postulates.  More- 
1  over,  such  natures  never  attain  greatness,  unless 
they  pursue  an  aim  which  fills  the  whole  head 
and  heart  with  the  force  of  a  burning  passion, 
a  frame  of  mind  into  which  but  few  men  can 
be  put  by  the  common  law ;  and  of  these  few 
Calhoun  certainly  was  not  one.  He  was  a  born 
leader  of  men,  and  nature  had  destined  him 
for  a  political  career.  While  at  college  the  ex 
citing  questions  of  the  day  had  engrossed  his 
whole  attention,  and  the  intelligence  and  ear 
nestness  with  which  he  discussed  them  proved 
that  he  would  try  to  have  a  hand  in  shaping 


YOUTH.  11 

the  events  of  the  future.  Sooner  and  in  a 
higher  degree  than  he  himself  had  probably 
dared  to  anticipate,  this  wish  was  to  be  ful 
filled. 

He  had  barely  had  time  to  get  again  familiar 
with  the  surroundings  of  his  youth,  when  he 
was  sent  by  his  district  to  the  sta,te  Legislature. 
The  stage~was"too  small  to  draw  the  eyes  of 
the  nation  upon  the  young  man,  but  it  was  the  s 
right  place  to  prove  his  fitness  for  a  larger  one.    ft 
In  1811  he  was  elected  a  member  of  Congress,  " 
aitd—wr  the  same  year  he  married  his  cousin,       / 
Floride  Calhoun.     She  was  possessed  of  a  mod 
est  fortune,  which  enabled  him  to  steer  with  all       . 
sails  set  into  the  open  sea  of  politics.     On  ]£&r 
vember  4  he  took  his  seat  in  the  House  oTTtep- 
resentatives,  having  previously  removed  to  Bath 
on  the  Savannah. 


CHAPTER  II. 

HOUSE  OP  KEPRESENTATIVES. 

THE  times  were  most  favorable  for  a  clever 
and  ambitious  young  statesman  to  make  a  bril 
liant  dgbut.  The  policy  of  commercial  restric 
tions,  with  which  Jefferson  and  Madison  had 
tried  to  force  England  and  France  to  respect 
the  rights  of  neutrals,  had  signally  failed.  The 
party  in  power  had  not  the  candor  and  moral 
courage  to  acknowledge  that  it  had  stumbled 
into  grave  mistakes,  but  it  was  apparent  that 
it  could  no  more,  for  any  length  of  time,  pur 
sue  its  old  course.  If  the  great  European  war 
should  last  much  longer  —  and  there  was  no 
prospect  of  its  speedy  termination  —  the  United 
States  would  evidently  be  forced  to  abandon 
all  half-hearted  and  two-edged  measures,  and  to 
adopt  a  clear  and  decisive  policy.  It  was  per 
haps  impossible  to  satisfy  the  commercial  States; 
but  thus  much  was  certain,  that  their  dissatis 
faction  was  too  great  and  too  well-founded  to 
permit  an  expectation  that  they  would  jog  on 
with  impunity  in  the  old  ruts.  Nor  would  either 
the  honor  or  the  vital  interests  of  the  Union 


HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  13 

allow  that  it  should  bow  its  head  in  meekness, 
and  receive  with  folded  arms  the  stripes  which 
the  belligerent  powers  were  pleased  to  lay  on 
its  back.  Whatever  might  be  resolved  upon 
and  done,  it  was  sure  to  raise  a  great  clamor 
among  a  considerable  portion  of  the  people ;  yet 
something  must  be  done,  and  in  such  circum 
stances  the  race  generally  is  to  the  swift  and 
the  battle  to  the  strong. 

It  was  a  coincidence  of  the  utmost  impor 
tance  that  the  ranks  of  the  revolutionary  pa 
triots  had,  by  this  time,  become  so  thinned 
that  the  representatives  of  a  new  generation 
could  grasp  the  helm  without  having  to  en 
counter  the  opposition  of  long  acknowledged 
authority.  It  so  happened,  also,  that  among 
these  new-comers  on  the  political  stage  there 
were  some  exceptionally  young  men,  possessed 
of  a  much  higher  order  of  talent  than  most  of 
their  seniors.  So  the  leadership  of  the  nation 
in  this  great  crisis  fell  into  the  hands  of  untried 
and  inexperienced  men,  who  had  hardly  reached 
maturity,  yet  were  fully  conscious  of  their  own 
power  and  worth,  and  who  were  impelled  by  a 
high-toned  pride  and  ardent  patriotism,  and 
urged  on  by  the  glowing  visions  of  an  un 
bounded  ambition.  It  was  therefore  to  be 
expected  that,  true  to  the  nature  of  hot-blooded, 
daring,  and  self -rely  ing  youth,  they  would  ad- 


14  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

vise  the  cutting  of  the  Gordian  knot  which  the 
silver-haired  sages  of  the  Revolution  had  vainly 
tried  to  disentangle.  At  which  side  of  it,  in 
their  opinion,  the  stroke  of  the  sword  should 
be  dealt,  could  not  be  doubtful  from  the  first. 
In  spite  of  Napoleon,  the  majority  of  the  peo 
ple  had  not  yet  entirely  lost  the  enthusiastic 
sympathy  awakened  by  the  French  Revolution, 
and  the  services  rendered  by  France  to  the 
United  States  in  the  war  of  independence  were 
still  unforgotten.  On  the  other  hand,  the  old 
wounds  which  had  been  inflicted  by  the  blows 
exchanged  with  England  had  not  quite  ceased 
to  rankle ;  the  emancipated  daughter  smarted 
under  the  overbearing  haughtiness  of  the  moth 
er,  whom  she  had  once  forced  to  submit  to 
her  just  claims.  Then,  too,  above  all  else,  Na 
poleon's  violent  decrees  against  the  rights  of 
neutrals  were  to  a  considerable  extent  mere 
stage  lightnings,  while  the  English  Orders  in 
Council  told  with  terrible  effect  upon  the  com 
merce  and  the  general  prosperity  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  pretended  right  of  visitation, 
which  was  frequently  exercised  with  studied 
insolence,  cut  the  American  pride  to  the  quick. 
Prudential  reasons  of  great  weight  might  be 
urged  against  resenting  all  these  injuries  at  this 
time  with  powder  and  lead,  and  personal  inter 
est  as  well  as  party  spirit  would  surely  put  these 


HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  15 

reasons  into  the  strongest  light.  But  it  was  no 
less  certain  that  the  passionate  and  indignant 
appeals  to  the  counter-reasons  would  awaken  a 
loud  echo  in  numberless  bosoms,  since  every 
patriot  had  to  confess  to  himself  that  they  too 
had  great  weight. 

The  general  elections  for  the  Twelfth  Con 
gress  had  resulted  in  favor  of  the  war  party. 
It  was  pi-incipally  due  to  his  position  towards 
this  overshadowing  question  that  Henry  Clay 
owed  his  election  to  the  speakership ;  and  for 
the  same  reason  the  Speaker  awarded  the  sec 
ond  place  on  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela 
tions  to  the  new  member  from  South  Carolina. 
Mr.  Gralle*,  the  editor  of  Calhoun's  works,  as 
sures  us  that  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  mem 
bers  Calhoun  was  —  on  motion  of  Mr.  Porter 
of  Pennsylvania,  to  whom  the  Speaker  had  as 
signed  the  chairmanship  —  unanimously  chosen 
to  preside  over  their  deliberations.  So  he  held 
from  the  first  the  place  which,  next  to  the 
speakership,  was  the  most  important  in  the 
House  of  Representatives. 

On  November  29,  1811,  the  committee,  to 
which  that  part  of  the  President's  message  re 
lating  to  foreign  affairs  had  been  referred,  sub 
mitted  its  report.  Although  the  report  was 
presented  by  Mr.  Porter,  it  seems  likely  that 
it  was  mainly  written  by  Calhoun.  The  essence 
of  it  was  contained  in  the  following  sentences  : 


16  JOHN  C.   CALHOUX. 

a  To  wrongs  so  daring  in  their  character,  and  so 
disgraceful  in  their  execution,  it  is  impossible  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  should  remain  indiffer 
ent.  We  must  now  tamely  and  quietly  submit,  or 
we  must  resist  by  those  means  which  God  has  placed 
within  our  reach. 

"Tour  committee  will  not  cast  a  shade  on  the 
American  name  by  the  expression  of  a  doubt  which 
branch  of  this  alternative  will  be  embraced ;  .  .  .  the 
period  has  arrived  when,  in  the  opinion  of  your  com 
mittee,  it  is  the  sacred  duty  of  Congress  to  call  forth 
the  patriotism  and  the  resources  of  the  country." 

The  report  concluded  with,  six  resolutions, 
•which  were  designed  to  give  effect  to  this  opin 
ion. 

So  the  first  act  of  Calhoun  on  the  national 
stage  was  to  sound  the  war-trumpet.  Hence 
forth  incessant  war,  war  to  the  bitter  end,  was 
to  be  his  destiny  to  the  last  day  of  his  life ; 
though  it  was  in  later  years  to  be  waged  not 
against  a  foreign  aggressor,  but  against  inter 
nal  adversaries,  against  the  peace  of  the  Union, 
against  the  true  welfare  of  his  own  section  of 
the  country. 

On  December  12  Calhoun  delivered  his  first 
set  speech  in  Congress,  defending  the  resolu 
tions  and  refuting  the  arguments  of  John  Ran 
dolph,  who  was  himself  a  member  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Foreign  Relations.  On  a  former 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  17 

occasion  Calhoun  had  addressed  to  the  House 
a  few  remarks  on  a  question  of  little  impor 
tance,  which  he  had  concluded  with  an  allusion 
to  the  diffidence  and  embarrassment  which  a 
young  man  necessarily  felt  in  speaking  to  the 
assembled  representatives  of  the  nation.  Now, 
however,  there  was  in  his  whole  tone  and  man 
ner  no  more  the  slightest  trace  of  such  a  feel 
ing.  He  did  not  speak  with  arrogance,  and 
still  less  was  there  anything  personally  offen 
sive  in  what  he  said,  or  in  the  manner  with 
which  he  said  it.  From  the  beginning  of  his 
public  career  he  observed  the  parliamentary 
proprieties  with  the  rigor  and  naturalness  of 
the  born  gentleman.  Often  did  he  prove  that 
he  could  wield  with  equal  force  and  dexterity 
the  trenchant  sword  and  the  massive  club,  but 
he  always  attacked  the  argument  of  his  adver 
sary  and  not  his  person,  and  he  was  never 
guilty  of  the  hectoring  and  bullying  tone  in 
which  so  many  of  the  Southern  politicians  in 
dulged  with  keen  relish.  From  the  first  he 
entered  the  lists  with  the  proud  conviction  of 
being  fully  the  equal  of  any  man,  and  he  al 
ways  spoke  in  the  weighty  tone  of  authority. 
Upon  him  the  shaking  of  Randolph's  long  fin 
ger  made  no  impression.  With  open  visor  he 
met  the  much-dreaded  antagonist,  and  though 
he  did  not  throw  him  to  the  ground,  yet  the 


18  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Virginian  came  out  of  the  fight  only  second 
best.  They  exchanged  many  a  tilt,  and  the 
ill-humor  with  which  Randolph  spoke  of  Cal- 
houn  in  his  private  correspondence,  shows  how 
much  he  felt  the  wounds  received  from  the 
lance  of  that  adversary. 

Calhoun  began  his  speech  with  the  open 
avowal  "  that  the  committee  recommended  the 
measures  now  before  the  House,  as  a  prepara 
tion  for  war;"  and  he  added,  "such,  in  fact,  was 
its  express  resolve,  agreed  to,  I  believe  by  every 
member,  except  that  gentleman  [Randolph]. 
.  .  .  Indeed,  the  report  could  mean  nothing  but 
war  or  empty  menace."  With  lofty  indigna 
tion  he  repelled  the  insinuation  that,  though 
there  was  adequate  cause  for  war,  the  people 
would  not  deem  their  violated  interests  and 
outraged  rights  of  sufficient  moment  willingly 
to  defray  the  costs  of  fighting  for  their  vindica 
tion. 

"  But  it  may  be,  and  I  believe  it  was  said,  that  the 
people  will  not  pay  taxes,  because  the  rights  violated 
are  not  worth  defending ;  or  that  the  defence  will 
cost  more  than  the  gain.  Sir,  I  here  enter  my  sol 
emn  protest  against  this  low  and  '  calculating  ava 
rice  '  entering  this  hall  of  legislation.  It  is  only 
fit  for  shops  and  counting-houses ;  and  ought  not  to 
disgrace  the  seat  of  power  by  its  squalid  aspect. 
Whenever  it  touches  sovereign  power,  the  nation  is 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  19 

ruined.  It  is  too  short-sighted  to  defend  itself.  It 
is  a  compromising  spirit,  always  ready  to  yield  a  part 
to  save  the  residue.  It  is  too  timid  to  have  in  itself 
the  laws  of  self-preservation.  It  is  never  safe  but 
under  the  shield  of  honor.  .  .  .  Sir,  I  am  not  versed 
in  this  calculating  policy  ;  and  will  not,  therefore, 
pretend  to  estimate  in  dollars  and  cents  the  value  of 
national  independence.  I  cannot  measure  in  shillings 
and  pence  the  misery,  the  stripes,  and  the  slavery  of 
our  impressed  seamen ;  nor  even  the  value  of  our 
shipping,  commercial,  and  agricultural  losses  under 
the  Orders  in  Council  and  the  British  system  of  block 
ade." 

With  equal  candor  he  answered  Randolph's 
question,  why  then,  if  all  this  was  so,  war  was 
not  declared  immediately :  "  Because,"  he  said, 
"  we  are  not  yet  prepared."  That  there  was 
any  danger  in  avowing  this  and,  at  the  same 
time,  using  the  threatening  language  employed 
by  himself  and  those  who  shared  his  views,  he 
denied ;  because,  he  said,  England  would  never 
be  provoked  into  beginning  hostilities  from  a 
fear  of  uniting  "  all  parties  here." 

After  this  speech  the  passing  of  the  resolu 
tions  by  the  House  could  not  be  understood 
otherwise  than  as  a  formal  announcement  that 
war  would  be  declared  so  soon  as,  in  the  opin 
ion  of  the  war  party,  the  country  should  be 
sufficiently  prepared.  So  far  as  it  depended 


20  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

upon  the  House,  the  great  question  was  virtu 
ally  decided,  and  the  war  party  pushed  vigor 
ously  on  towards  the  bloody  goal.  They  needed 
half  a  year  more  to  reach  it.  President  Mad 
ison  was  about  the  last  man  to  long  for  the 
laurels  of  "the  conquering  hero."  His  whole 
character  as  well  as  his  political  convictions 
made  him  exceedingly  loath  to  gratify  the 
wishes  of  the  young  Hotspurs,  who  neverthe 
less  dragged  him  along  by  a  strong  rope.  As 
Jefferson's  Secretary  of  State  and  as  President 
he  had  advocated  and  pursued  a  policy,  the 
legitimate  consequence  of  which  was  war.  He 
could  not  now  take  a  decided  stand  against  the 
war  party  without  acknowledging  that  this  pol 
icy  had  been,  from  beginning  to  end,  a  mis 
taken  one,  —  an  avowal  which  no  statesman 
will  easily  make,  and  which,  on  the  part  of 
Madison,  would  have  been  a  formal  renuncia 
tion  of  his  aspirations  for  a  second  term.  That 
was  the  vise  in  which  he  was  held  by  the  war 
party,  and  mercilessly  they  screwed  it  tightei 
and  tighter.  In  vain  he  tried  to  conciliate 
them  by  consenting  to  follow  their  lead  ;  they 
insisted  that  he  should  assume  the  full  respon 
sibility,  and  they  would  be  satisfied  with  noth 
ing  less. 

On  April  1  the  President  sent  a  message  to 
Congress,   recommending    an    embargo.      Mr. 


HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  21 

Grundy  said  that  he  understood  it  "  as  a  war 
measure,  and  it  was  meant  that  it  should  di 
rectly  lead  to  war,"  and  Calhoun  afterwards 
declared  "  its  manifest  propriety  as  a  prelude 
to  war."  Without  granting  to  the  opposition 
the  necessary  time  to  develop  their  views,  Con 
gress,  on  April  4,  passed  the  bill  laying  an  em 
bargo  on  all  vessels.  It  was  limited  to  sixty 
days  solely  because  those  who  held  the  destiny 
of  the  country  in  their  hands  were  fully  re 
solved  that  it  should  not  "  be  permitted  to  ex 
pire  without  any  hostile  measure  being  taken 
against  Great  Britain." 

It  was  not  due  to  the  President  that  this  an 
nouncement,  indirectly  made  by  Calhoun  on 
May  6,  was  not  fulfilled  to  the  letter.  Another 
message  laid  before  Congress  at  length  all  the 
wrongs  which  the  United  States  had  suffered 
for  so  many  years.  "  We  behold,"  it  said,  "  in 
fine,  on  the  side  of  Great  Britain  a  state  of  war 
against  the  United  States,  and  on  the  side  of  the 
United  States  a  state  of  peace  towards  Great 
Britain."  Therefore  it  was  now  incumbent  on 
Congress  to  decide  whether  force  should  be  op 
posed  to  force.  This  was  virtually  a  recommen 
dation  of  war.  In  the  name  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  Calhoun  presented  a  report 
to  the  House,  advising  "  an  immediate  appeal 
to  arms,"  and,  at  the  same  time,  he  moved  that 


22  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

a  formal  declaration  of  war  should  be  issued 
against  Great  Britain.  On  the  following  day 
the  House  passed  this  to  the  third  reading,  after 
Randolph's  motion,  renewed  by  Milnor,  to  open 
the  doors,  and  Stow's  request  to  postpone  the 
final  action  to  the  next  day,  had  both  been  re 
jected.  Thus  the  majority  crowned  the  high 
handed  recklessness  with  which,  ever  since  the 
beginning  of  the  session,  they  had  bent  the  just 
claims  of  the  minority  under  their  imperious 
will.  In  later  years  Calhoun  learned  well 
enough  to  clamor  for  the  rights  of  the  minority, 
while  he  was  but  too  apt  to  forget  that  the  ma 
jority  also  had  rights,  and,  above  all  others,  the 
right  to  rule.  Perhaps  the  time  was  not  far 
distant  when  he  and  his  associates  would  have 
reason  to  rue  their  present  abuse  of  power,  for 
the  declaration  of  war  received  a  majority  of 
only  thirty  votes,  although  the  Democratic  ma 
jority  in  the  full  House  was  seventy. 

In  the  Senate,  the  defection  from  the  party 
even  threatened  to  become  fatal  to  the  wishes 
of  the  war  party.  On  motion  of  Mr.  Gregg,  of 
Pennsylvania,  the  bill  providing  for  the  decla 
ration  of  war  was  recommitted  by  a  majority 
of  four.  Not  until  June  17  did  a  sufficient 
number  of  reluctant  Democrats  yield  to  allow 
ihe  amended  bill  to  be  passed  to  a  third  read 
ing.  The  House  agreed  to  the  amendments  on 
the  following  day. 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  23 

A  few  days  after  the  declaration  of  war,  the 
House  took  up  the  question,  whether  and  how 
far  the  restrictive  policy  concerning  commerce 
should  be  abandoned.  The  Committee  on  Ways 
and  Means  reported  a  bill  for  the  partial  sus 
pension  of  the  Non-Importation  Act.  This  was 
not  deemed  sufficient  relief  in  the  States  on 
which  the  mistaken  policy  hitherto  pursued  had 
weighed  most  heavily.  Mr.  Richardson,  of 
Massachusetts,  moved  the  total  repeal  of  the 
whole  restrictive  system.  The  motion  was  not 
agreed  to  ;  but  when  it  was  renewed  the  fol 
lowing  day  in  a  modified  form,  rendering  the 
proposition  somewhat  less  sweeping,  the  casting 
vote  of  the  Speaker  was  required  to  carry  the 
day  against  the  opposition.  For  two  years  more 
the  pernicious  policy  was  persisted  in. 

Calhoun  had  separated  himself  on  this  im 
portant  question  from  the  majority.  He  ear 
nestly  advocated  the  repeal  of  the  Non-Im 
portation  Act.  His  obligations  as  a  party  man 
he  satisfied  by  denying  that  Jefferson's  and 
Madison's  policy  could  be  justly  charged  with 
pusillanimity,  —  a  compliment  the  more  empty, 
because  the  closing  remarks  of  his  speech 
proved  that  he  himself  was  not  convinced  of 
the  truth  of  the  assertion.  It  was  a  question 
not  of  motives,  but  of  policy,  and  as  to  that  he 
eaid  :  "  The  restrictive  system,  as  a  mode  of 


24  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

resistance,  and  a  means  of  obtaining  redress  of 
our  wrongs,  has  never  been  a  favorite  one  with 
me."  The  reasons  on  which  he  supported  his 
opinion  were  sound,  and  the  whole  manner  in 
which  he  treated  the  subject  was  that  of  a 
statesman  standing  on  sufficiently  elevated 
ground  to  take  in  the  whole  view,  and  not  to  be 
misled  by  petty  details.  On  the  past  he  be 
stowed  but  a  slight  glance,  very  properly  confin 
ing  himself  to  the  effect  which  the  maintenance 
of  the  old  policy  would  have  under  the  altered 
circumstances.  From  this  point  of  view,  he 
condemned  it  without  qualification  in  measured 
but  severe  terms.  "  With  no  small  mortifica 
tion,"  he  asked  those  who  had  supported  the 
war,  and  now  thought  its  success  dependent 
upon  the  continuation  of  the  Non-Importation 
Act,  whether  the  war  was  to  be  "  an  appendage 
only  "  of  this  act  ?  "  If  so,  I  disclaim  it.  It  is 
an  alarming  idea  to  be  in  a  state  of  war,  and 
not  to  rely  on  our  courage  or  energy,  but  on  a 
measure  of  peace."  The  assertion  that,  if  the 
Non-Importation  Act  should  be  continued,  a 
speedy  restoration  of  peace  might  be  relied 
upon,  he  declared  to  be  delusive  and  a  cause 
of  alarm,  for  "  it  will  debilitate  the  springs  of 
war.  .  .  .  We  have  had  a  peace  like  a  war.  In 
the  name  of  Heaven,  let  us  not  have  the  only 
thing  that  is  worse,  a  war  like  a  peace."  This 


SOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  25 

solemn  warning  was  certainly  not  out  of  place  ; 
but  if  it  was  necessary  to  utter  it  within  a  week 
after  the  declaration  of  war,  he  ought  to  have 
pondered  well  ere  he  did  his  best  to  push  the 
country  into  a  conflict  which,  whatever  it  might 
become  in  the  course  of  time,  was  originally  not 
a  national  but  a  party  war,  or  rather  a  war  of 
the  party  leaders. 

This  all-important  point  had  not  been  soon 
enough  taken  into  due  consideration,  either  by 
him  or  his  associates.  This  is  the  one  great 
blame  resting  upon  the  war  party,  which  even 
those  cannot  gainsay  who  otherwise  fully  ap 
prove  of  their  course.  The  whole  war  was  one 
uninterrupted  struggle  against  the  evil  conse 
quences  of  this  fact.  There  was  much  truth  in 
what  Calhoun  had  asserted  in  his  speech  on 
May  6.  It  was,  indeed,  to  a  great  extent,  the  sec 
ond  war  for  the  liberty  and  independence  of  the 
United  States,  but  it  was  irretrievably  vitiated 
by  its  party  origin.  How  the  ambitious  plans  of 
the  young  leaders  were  dashed  to  pieces  !  In 
stead  of  Canada  being  conquered,  the  time 
came  when  Calhoun,  with  tears  in  his  eyes,  had 
to  ask  the  assistance  of  Webster  to  pull  the 
government  out  of  its  financial  difficulties,  which 
had  come  to  such  a  climax  that  the  worst 
might  be  apprehended.  It  was  a  deep  humil 
iation.  Yet  where  is  the  American  patriot 


26  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

who  would  wish  to  erase  these  pages  from  the 
tablets  of  the  history  of  the  Union?  Much 
less  could  any  one  wish  to  miss  them  in  the 
career  of  Calhoun,  for  in  one  respect,  and  that 
the  most  important  one,  they  are  the  most  at 
tractive  and  satisfactory  in  the  record  of  his 
life.  There  is  at  this  time  nothing  of  sectional 
prejudice  and  narrowness  in  him.  He  stands 
on  the  broadest  national  ground,  and  his  polit 
ical  sins  are  mainly  due  to  the  impatient  ardor 
and  buoyancy  of  his  patriotism.  Undoubtedly 
he  pursues  the  aims  of  his  personal  ambition 
with  full  consciousness ;  he  does  not,  however, 
seek  its  satisfaction  at  the  expense  of  the  Union, 
but  by  promoting  what  he  is  fully  convinced 
that  the  interests  and  the  honor  of  his  country 
demand.  The  word  "  nation,"  which  Calhoun 
in  later  years  struck  from  the  political  and  con 
stitutional  dictionary  of  the  United  States  as 
having  no  basis  whatever  to  rest  upon,  either  in 
fact  or  in  law,  is  at  this  time  frequently  in  his 
mouth.  How  could  it  be  otherwise,  as  the  idea 
of  it  was  deeply  imbedded  in  his  heart  and 
constantly  occupying  his  mind?  His  solicitude 
for  the  national  interests  did  not  cease  with 
the  war,  nor  was  it  confined  to  objects  imme 
diately  connected  with  the  war  or  referring 
exclusively  to  the  relations  of  the  Union  to  for 
eign  powers. 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  27 

In  a  speech  delivered  January  31,  1816,  on 
a  motion  to  repeal  the  direct  tax,  he  drew  a 
sketch  of  his  views  concerning  the  lessons  to  be 
derived  from  the  experiences  of  the  war  as  to 
the  policy  which  the  United  States  ought  to 
pursue  in  future.  The  starting-point  of  his 
argument  was  the  assertion  that  "  future  wars 
with  England  are  not  only  possible,  but  .  .  . 
highly  probable,  —  nay,  that  they  will  certainly 
take  place,"  because  the  United  States  would 
"  have  to  encounter  British  jealousy  and  hos 
tility  in  every  shape ;  not  immediately  mani 
fested  by  open  force  or  violence,  perhaps,  but 
by  indirect  attempts  to  check  your  growth  and 
prosperity."  He  therefore  deemed  it  necessary 
gradually  to  prepare  for  this  emergency,  not 
only  by  increasing  the  military  forces  of  the 
Union,  but  also  by  systematically  developing 
those  germs  of  giant  strength  which  Providence 
had  bestowed  upon  and  intrusted  to  the  Amer 
ican  people.  "  As  to  the  species  of  prepara 
tion  ,  .  .  .  the  navy  most  certainly,  in  any  point 
of  view,  occupies  the  first  place.  It  is  the  most 
safe,  most  effectual,  and  cheapest  mode  of  de 
fence."  The  internal  strife  during  the  war 
would  have  lost  much  of  its  bitterness,  if  the 
majority  had  from  the  first  understood  this  ob 
vious  truth,  and  acted  accordingly.  The  viola 
tion  of  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  citizens 


28  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

of  the  States,  as  a  seafaring  people,  had  given 
rise  to  the  war,  and  yet  the  demand  of  the  New 
England  States  to  wage  it  principally  by  sea 
had  remained  unheeded,  until  experience  forced 
the  majority  to  acknowledge,  if  not  in  words,  at 
least  by  deeds,  that  for  once  the  opposition  was 
not  prompted  exclusively  by  local  interests  and 
a  factional  spirit.  If  the  party  had  listened  to 
the  advice  of  Calhoun  with  regard  to  the  wishes 
and  complaints  of  the  opposition,  the  animosity 
of  the  Northeastern  Federalists  would  never 
have  reached  the  pitch  to  which  it  finally  came. 
In  the  light  of  later  events,  it  is  one  of  the  most 
interesting  facts  in  the  life  of  Calhoun  that,  in 
the  course  of  the  war,  the  question  was  for  a 
while  seriously  discussed  in  New  England 
whether  the  people  of  that  section  should  not 
try  to  form  an  alliance  with  South  Carolina 
against  the  narrow  anti-commercial  policy  of 
Virginia  and  her  followers. 

The  above-mentioned  speech  also  contains 
the  first  declaration  in  favor  of  internal  im 
provements.  "  Let  us  make  great  permanent 
roads ;  not,  like  the  Romans,  with  views  of  sub 
jecting  and  ruling  provinces,  but  for  the  more 
honorable  purposes  of  defence,  and  of  connect 
ing  more  closely  the  interests  of  various  sections 
of  this  great  country."  It  is  true  that  Cal- 
houn's  immediate  object  in  this  is  also  the 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  29 

safety  of  the  country  in  future  wars ;  but  he  is 
not  only  gratified  that  the  building  of  roads 
will  incidentally  tend  towards  nationalizing  the 
Union  ;  he  urges  upon  Congress  the  measure 
because  it  will  have  this  effect.  Always  start 
ing  from  the  same  point,  he  furthermore  comes 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  national  government 
should  bestow  its  protecting  care  upon  the  in 
dustrial  interests  of  the  country ;  and  here,  too, 
he  expressly  states  that  other  reasons  also  should 
induce  Congress  to  adopt  this  policy. 

"  In  regard  to  the  question  how  far  manufactures 
ought  to  be  fostered,  it  is  the  duty  of  this  country, 
as  a  means  of  defence,  to  encourage  its  domestic  in 
dustry,  more  especially  that  part  of  it  which  provides 
the  necessary  materials  for  clothing  and  defence.  .  . . 
The  question  relating  to  manufactures  must  not  de 
pend  on  the  .abstract  principle  that  industry,  left  to 
pursue  its  own  course,  will  find  in  its  own  interests 
all  the  encouragement  that  is  necessary.  Laying  the 
claims  of  manufacturers  entirely  out  of  view,  on 
general  principles,  without  regard  to  their  interests, 
a  certain  encouragement  should  be  extended  at  least 
to  our  woolen  and  cotton  manufactures." 

It  is  remarkable  that  in  the  whole  speech 
there  is  no  mention  whatever  made  of  the  Con 
stitution.  The  thought  does  not  enter  his 
head  that  constitutional  objections  could  pos- 
eibly  be  raised.  The  reason  of  this  is  simply 


30  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

that  the  statesman  has  not  yet  been  trans 
formed  into  the  attorney  of  a  special  cause. 
He  proceeds,  as  a  matter  of  course,  from  the 
assumption  that  the  first  question  a  statesman 
has  to  ask  himself  is  not  what  is  constitutional, 
but  what  is  wise  and  politic,  unless  it  mani 
festly  contravenes  a  provision  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  to  take  it  for  granted  that  the  consti 
tutional  power  exists,  until  the  contrary  is 
proved.  As  the  people  have  not  been  created 
for  the  sake  of  the  Constitution,  but  the  Con 
stitution  has  been  established  by  the  people  to 
secure  and  further  the  welfare  of  the  people, 
this  is  the  only  rational  course ;  and  it  is  per 
fectly  safe,  since,  as  every  measure  is  sure  to 
meet  with  some  opposition,  any  constitutional 
flaw  with  regard  to  the  proposition  will  cer 
tainly  be  pointed  out,  if  it  can  be  discovered 
without  the  aid  of  a  microscope  and  hair-split 
ting  sophistries  of  pettifogging  lawyers.  Only 
when,  instead  of  the  national  interests,  the  in 
terests  of  the  slave-holders  had  become  the 
glasses  through  which  Calhoun  viewed  every 
thing,  he  began  to  search  the  Constitution  for 
the  power  to  do  what  he  had  once  recommended 
as  prudent  and  even  necessary,  and  then  he 
discovered  things  in  it  which  he  had  never 
dreamed  of  before;  nay,  its  general  spirit  un 
derwent  a  radical  change  in  his  eyes. 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  31 

On  January  8,  1816,  Calhoun,  as  chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  National  Currency,  re 
ported  a  bill  "  to  incorporate  the  subscribers 
to  the  Bank  of  the  United  States."  In  a 
speech  which  he  delivered  on  February  26,  in 
support  of  the  bill,  he  referred  to  the  constitu 
tional  question,  but  merely  in  order  to  state 
that  it  "had  been  already  so  freely  and  fre 
quently  discussed,  that  all  had  made  up  their 
minds  on  it."  So,  according  to  his  own  state 
ment,  he  had  most  deliberately  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  Congress  had  the  constitutional 
power  to  establish  a  national  bank.  Though 
this  has  necessarily  to  be  inferred  from  the  fact 
of  his  reporting  the  bill,  it  had  to  be  expressly 
stated  on  account  of  his  subsequent  attempts  to 
make  himself  and  others  believe  that  he  had 
been  compelled  by  the  financial  embarrassments 
of  the  government  to  waive  the  constitutional 
question.  That  these  embarrassments  exercised 
a  powerful  influence  upon  the  formation  of  his 
opinions  cannot  be  doubted,  but  even  in  regard 
to  the  expediency  of  the  measure  he  was  not 
solely  controlled  by  them.  "As  to  the  question 
whether  a  national  bank  would  be  favorable  to 
the  administration  of  the  finances  of  the  gov 
ernment,  it  was  one  on  which  there  was  so 
little  doubt,  that  gentlemen  would  excuse  him 
if  he  did  not  enter  into  it."  He  does  not  say, 


32  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

"  now,"  or,  "  under  the  present  circumstances," 
but  makes  a  general  statement  without  any  re 
striction  whatever.  *  There  is  nothing  astonish 
ing  in  this,  for  the  additional  strength  which  it 
was  supposed  that  the  national  government 
would  derive  from  the  bank  was  at  this  time 
no  cause  of  alarm  to  him ;  and  as  to  the  other 
political  and  economical  considerations  involved 
in  the  problem,  he  moved  as  yet  in  as  thick  a 
fog  as  the  whole  people.  The  fact  is,  that  with 
regard  to  all  the  great  economical  problems, 
which  were  soon  to  agitate  the  country  so 
deeply,  Calhoun  held  exactly  the  opposite 
ground  to  that  which  he  afterwards  occupied, 
on  the  constitutional  question  as  well  as  on  that 
of  expediency.  He  and  his  partisans  have  done 
their  very  best  to  invalidate  the  charge  of  in 
consistency,  but  they  have  not  been  able  to 
succeed ;  fo»  although  an  edition  of  his  speeches 
was  published  in  which  those  earlier  efforts 
were  omitted,  the  speeches  themselves  could 
not  be  wiped  from  the  records  of  Congress, 
and,  as  was  his  wont,  he  had  expressed  him 
self  too  plainly  and  explicitly  to  render  the  art 
of  subsequent  interpretation  of  any  avail.  One 
would  greatly  wrong  him  by  doubting  whether 
he  was  afterwards  as  sincere  as  now,  but  his 
sincerity  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  he  com 
pletely  reversed  his  position.  His  partisans 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  33 

have  paid  him  a  bad  compliment  by  asserting 
that  his  earlier  utterances  cannot  with  fairness 
be  called  upon  to  bear  witness  against  his  later 
doctrines,  because  they  were  but  his  first  im 
pressions,  put  before  the  public  without  due 
deliberation,  in  an  unguarded  manner,  on  the 
spur  of  some  particular  occasion.  Had  the 
House  of  Representatives  sunk  to  such  a  bot 
tomless  depth  that  it  followed  the  leadership 
of  a  young  zealot  who  did  not  know  how  to 
bridle  his  tongue,  but  on  the  gravest  questions 
of  the  day  babbled  out  the  first  thoughts  that 
happened  to  flit  through  his  giddy  brain  ? 
What,  then,  were  the  subjects  which  this 
chairman  of  most  important  committees  seri 
ously  reflected  upon,  if  not  these,  almost  the 
only  ones  on  which  he  deemed  it  worth  his 
while  to  make  long  speeches?  Moreover,  this 
unpardonable  levity  and  thoughtlessness  must 
have  lasted  a  long  while,  for  he  clung  to  these 
opinions  for  years,  frequently  repeating  them 
and  urging  them  upon  Congress  with  increased 
energy. 

His  speech  on  the  New  Tariff  Bill  (April  6, 
1816)  was  a  long  and  carefully  prepared  argu 
ment  in  favor  of  the  whole  economical  platform 
on  which  the  Whig  party  stood  to  the  last  day 
of  its  existence.  He  started  with  the  bold  prop 
osition  that  it  was  a  matter  of  "vital  impor- 


34  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

tance,  touching  .  .  .  the  security  and  permanent 
prosperity  of  our  country,"  to  afford  adequate 
protection  to  the  cotton  and  woollen  manufact 
ures.  Even  Henry  Clay  and  Horace  Greeley 
have  not  been  able  to  put  their  favorite  doc 
trine  into  stronger  language.  Nor  was  he  satis 
fied  to  have  the  fostering  care  of  the  govern 
ment  confined  to  these  goods.  His  final  aim 
was  the  industrial  independence  of  the  United 
States  from  Europe,  and  this,  he  thought,  could 
be  attained  by  protective  duties.  He  bitterly 
complained  of  the  unexpected  "apathy  and  aver 
sion  "  which  manifested  themselves  on  this  sub 
ject.  In  his  opinion  the  country  was  "prepared, 
even  to  maturity,  for  the  introduction  of  manu 
factures."  If  he  deemed  it  nevertheless  neces 
sary  to  assist  them  with  protective  duties,  it  was 
in  order  "  to  put  them  beyond  the  reach  of  con 
tingency."  There  is  not  one  word  in  the  whole 
speech  warranting  the  interpretation  that  he 
demands  only  momentary  aid  for  the  manufact 
ures,  which  had  been  stimulated  into  existence 
by  the  war,  and  would  now  inevitably  have  to 
succumb  to  English  competition,  if  they  should 
not  be  propped  up  by  artificial  means.  He 
advocated  a  "  system,"  to  which  the  only  well- 
founded  but  not  "decisive  objection"  was,  "that 
capital  employed  in  manufacturing  produced  a 
greater  dependence  on  the  part  of  the  employed 


HOUSE   OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  35 

than  in  commerce,  navigation,  or  agriculture." 
Though  this  was  to  be  regretted,  it  was  "  more 
than  counterpoised  "  by  other  "  incidental  po 
litical  advantages." 

"  It  produced  an  interest  strictly  American,  —  as 
much  so  as  agriculture,  in  which  it  had  the  decided 
advantage  of  commerce  or  navigation.  .  .  .  Again,  it 
is  calculated  to  bind  together  more  closely  our  widely- 
spread  republic.  It  will  greatly  increase  our  mutual 
dependence  and  intercourse  ;  and  will,  as  a  necessary 
consequence,  excite  an  increased  attention  to  in 
ternal  improvements,  a  subject  every  way  so  inti 
mately  connected  with  the  ultimate  attainment  of 
national  strength  and  the  perfection  of  our  political 
institutions." 

He  regarded  the  fact  that  it  would  "make 
the  parts  adhere  more  closely;  that  it  would 
form  a  new  and  most  powerful  cement,  and  out 
weigh  any  political  objections  that  might  be 
urged  against  the  system." 

In  a  speech  on  February  4,  1817,  on  a  bill  to 
set  aside  the  bank  dividends  and  bonus  as  a 
permanent  fund  for  the  construction  of  roads 
and  canals,  Calhoun,  for  the  first  time,  entered 
upon  an  extended  argument  on  the  constitu 
tional  question  with  regard  to  internal  improve 
ments.  The  objection  that  it  is  necessary  to 
secure  the  previous  assent  of  the  States,  within 
*he  limits  of  which  the  internal  improvements 


36  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

are  to  be  made,  he  declared  to  be  not  "  worth 
the  discussion,  because  the  good  sense  of  the 
States  may  be  relied  on.  They  will,  in  all 
cases,  readily  yield  their  assent."  Also  as  to 
the  power  of  Congress  he  is  so  explicit  that, 
when  he  afterwards  positively  denied  it,  his 
opponents  need  not  have  troubled  themselves 
about  an  argument  of  their  own  ;  so  far  as  he 
was  concerned  it  would  have  sufficed  to  read 
some  extracts  from  this  speech  :  — 

"  It  is  mainly  urged  that  the  Congress  can  only  ap 
ply  the  public  money  in  execution  of  the  enumerated 
powers.  I  am  no  advocate  for  refined  arguments  on 
the  Constitution.  The  instrument  was  not  intended 
as  a  thesis  for  the  logician  to  exercise  his  ingenuity  on. 
[If  he  had  but  followed  the  example  of  the  Persian 
king,  and  charged  his  body  servant  to  repeat  to  him 
these  two  sentences  every  morning !]  It  ought  to 
be  construed  with  plain  good  sense  ;  and  what  can 
be  more  express  than  the  Constitution  on  this  point  ? 
...  If  the  framers  had  intended  to  limit  the  use  of 
the  money  to  the  powers  afterwards  enumerated  and 
defined,  nothing  could  have  been"  more  easy  than  to 
have  expressed  it  plainly.  .  .  .  But  suppose  the  Con 
stitution  to  be  silent,  why  should  we  be  confined  in 
the  application  of  moneys  to  the  enumerated  powers  ? 
There  is  nothing  in  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that  I 
can  perceive,  why  it  should  be  so  restricted ;  and  the 
habitual  and  uniform  practice  of  the  government 
coincides  with  my  opinion.  ...  In  reply  to  this  uni- 


HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES.  37 

form  course  of  legislation,  I  expect  it  will  be  said 
that  our  Constitution  is  founded  on  positive  and  writ 
ten  principles,  and  not  on  precedents.  I  do  not  deny 
the  position  ;  but  I  have  introduced  these  instances 
to  prove  the  uniform  sense  of  Congress  and  the  coun 
try  (for  they  have  not  been  objected  to)  as  to  our 
powers ;  and  surely  they  furnish  better  evidence  of 
the  true  interpretation  of  the  Constitution  than  the 
most  refined  and  subtle  arguments.  Let  it  not  be 
argued  that  the  construction  for  which  I  contend 
gives  a  dangerous  extent  to  the  powers  of  Congress. 
In  this  point  of  view  I  conceive  it  to  be  more  safe 
than  the  opposite.  By  giving  a  reasonable  extent  to 
the  money  power,  it  exempts  us  from  the  necessity 
of  giving  a  strained  and  forced  construction  to  the 
other  enumerated  powers." 

Thus  he  was  not  only  the  champion  of  the 
constitutionality  of  internal  improvements,  but 
he  boldly  avowed  latitudinarian  principles  with 
regard  to  the  general  construction  of  the  Con 
stitution.  It  was  a  rather  remarkable  coinci 
dence  that  this  was  the  last  great  speech  which 
he  delivered  as  a  member  of  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives.  He  was  called  to  act  on  another 
stage,  where  less,  or  no,  opportunity  was  offered 
to  develop  his  views  on  these  subjects  before 
the  whole  people,  but  there  is  no  proof  lacking 
that  he  adhered  to  them  for  some  time  longer. 


CHAPTER   III. 

SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

ALTHOUGH  Calhoun,  in  a  speech  delivered 
on  January  17,  1817,  had  deprecated  the  feel 
ing  which  made  "  the  very  best  talents  of  the 
House,  men  of  the  most  aspiring  character, 
anxious  to  fill  the  departments  or  foreign  mis 
sions,"  he  himself,  less  than  two  months  after 
wards,  readily  accepted  a  place  in  Mr.  Monroe's 
cabinet  as  Secretary  of  War.  The  duties  of 
his  office  stood  in  no  direct  relation  to  the  eco 
nomical  policy  of  the  federal  government,  but, 
as  he  was  anxious  to  see  his  views  adopted,  he 
had  no  difficulty  in  laying  them  again  before 
Congress.  A  resolution  of  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  of  April  4,  1818,  had  called  on 
him  for  "  a  plan  for  the  application  of  such 
means  as  are  within  the  power  of  Congress,  for 
the  purpose  of  opening  and  constructing  such 
roads  and  canals  as  may  deserve  and  require 
the  aid  of  government,  with  a  view  to  military 
operations  in  time  of  war."  His  report  of 
January  14,  1819,  began  by  laying  down  the 
sound  and  broad  principle  that, 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  39 

"a  judicious  system  of  roads  and  canals,  con 
structed  for  the  convenience  of  commerce  and  the 
transportation  of  the  mail  only,  without  any  refer 
ence  to  military  operations,  is  itself  among  the  most 
efficient  means  for  '  the  more  complete  defence  of  the 
United  States.'  Without  adverting  to  the  fact  that 
the  roads  and  canals  which  such  a  system  would  re 
quire  are,  with  few  exceptions,  precisely  those  which 
would  be  required  for  the  operation  of  war,  such  a 
system,  by  consolidating  our  Union  [!],  and  increas 
ing  our  wealth  and  fiscal  capacity,  would  add  greatly 
to  our  resources  in  war." 

He  then  traced  in  general  outlines  a  vast 
plan  of  roads  and  canals,  concluding  his  argu 
ment  with  the  following  significant  remarks :  — 

"  Many  of  the  roads  and  canals  which  have  been 
suggested  are  no  doubt  of  the  first  importance  to  the 
commerce,  the  manufactures,  the  agriculture,  and  po 
litical  prosperity  of  the  country,  but  are  not,  for  that 
reason,  less  useful  or  necessary  for  military  purposes. 
It  is,  in  fact,  one  of  the  great  advantages  of  our 
country,  enjoying  so  many  others,  that  whether  we 
regard  its  internal  improvements  in  relation  to  mili 
tary,  civil,  or  political  purposes,  very  nearly  the  same 
system,  in  all  its  parts,  is  required.  ...  If  those 
roads  or  canals  had  been  pointed  out  which  are  neces 
sary  for  military  purposes,  the  list  would  have  been 
small  indeed." 

In  a  report  of  December  3,  1824,  "  on  the 
condition  of  the  military  establishment,"  etc., 


40  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

he  recurred  once  more  .to  the  subject  with  the 
same  explicitness  and  emphasis.  There  is 
therefore  no  reason  to  suppose  Mr.  Nathan 
Sargent  guilty  of  exaggeration,  when  he  writes 
that  in  June,  1824,  "  Mr.  Calhoun  spoke  of  his 
projected  improvements  and  the  great  benefits 
that  the  country  would  derive  from  them  with 
a  warmth,  earnestness,  and  enthusiasm  which 
indicated  that  his  whole  soul  was  in  *  the  sys 
tem  '  he  had  projected."  After  he  had  ex 
changed  the  Secretaryship  of  War  for  the  Vice- 
Presidency,  at  a  public  dinner  given  in  his 
honor  in  the  Pendleton  District  on  April  26, 
1825,  the  following  toast  was  received  with 
great  enthusiasm  :  "  Internal  improvement  : 
guided  by  the  wisdom  and  energy  of  its  able 
advocates,  it  cannot  fail  to  strengthen  and  per 
petuate  our  bond  of  union."  Again,  on  May 
27,  1825,  at  Abbeville,  on  a  similar  occasion,  he 
himself  said,  "  I  gave  my  zealous  efforts  to  all 
such  measures :  .  .  .  a  due  protection  of  those 
manufactures  of  the  country  which  had  taken 
root  during  the  period  of  war  and  restrictions  ; 
and  finally,  a  system  of  connecting  the  various 
portions  of  the  country  by  a  judicious  system 
of  internal  improvement."  With  the  approval 
of  South  Carolina,  he  still  pointed  with  satis 
faction  and  pride  to  his  agency  in  promoting 
what  she  and  he  were  soon  so  decisively  to  con- 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  41 

demn  as  impolitic,  unjust,  dangerous  to  the  in 
dependence  of  the  States,  and  unconstitutional. 
In  later  years,  Calhoun  would  have  given 
much  if  he  could  have  torn  these  leaves  from 
his  book  of  record  as  a  Representative  and  as 
Secretary  of  War.  Else  these  were  the  bright 
est  and  happiest  years  of  his  public  life,  though 
the  first  premonitory  gusts  of  the  storms  which 
were  to  rage  through  all  the  rest  of  it  began 
while  he  held  the  latter  office.  Many  of  his 
friends  and  admirers  had  with  regret  seen  him 
abandon  his  seat  in  the  legislative  hall  for  a 
place  in  the  President's  council.  They  appre 
hended  that  he  would,  to  a  great  extent,  lose 
the  renown  which  he  had  gained  as  a  member 
of  Congress,  for  they  thought  that  the  dialectic 
turn  of  his  mind  rendered  him  unfit  to  become 
a  successful  administrator.  He  undeceived 
them  in  a  manner  which  astonished  even  those 
who  had  not  shared  these  apprehensions.  The 
Department  of  War  was  in  a  state  of  really 
astounding  confusion  when  he  assumed  the 
charge  of  it.  Into  this  chaos  he  soon  brought 
order,  and  the  whole  service  of  the  department 
received  an  organization  so  simple  and  at  the 
same  time  so  efficient  that  it  has,  in  the  main, 
been  adhered  to  by  all  his  successors,  and  proved 
itself  capable  of  standing  even  the  test  of  the 
civil  war.  Niles's  "  Register  "  said  0:1  March 
27,1824:  — 


42  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

"  Judging  from  the  various  reports  that  all  of  us 
have  seen  from  the  "War  Department,  the  order  and 
harmony,  regularity  and  promptitude,  punctuality  and 
responsibility,  introduced  by  Mr.  Calhoun  iu  every 
branch  of  the  service,  have  never  been  rivalled,  and 
perhaps  cannot  be  excelled ;  and  it  must  be  recol 
lected  that  he  brought  this  system  out  of  chaos. 
Never  was  the  business  of  any  department  in  such 
a  state  of  perfect  confusion  as  that  now  under  his 
charge  at  the  time  when  he  was  placed  at  the  head 
of  it.  The  open  or  unsettled  accounts,  of  all  sorts, 
must  have  amounted  to  nearly  fifty  millions  of  dol 
lars.  How  great  was  the  labor  to  cleanse  this  Au 
gean  stable !  But,  mightily  supported  by  the  acute 
and  indefatigable  Mr.  Hagner,  the  old  and  filthy  ac 
counts  are  nearly  disposed  of." 

Calhoun  himself  said,  with  just  pride,  in  a 
report  to  the  President,  "  The  result  has  been 
that,  of  the  entire  amount  of  money  drawn  from 
the  Treasury  in  the  year  1822  for  the  military 
service,  including  the  pensions,  amounting  to 
$4,571,961.94,  although  it  passed  through  the 
hands  of  no  less  than  two  hundred  and  ninety- 
one  disbursing  agents,  there  has  not  been  a 
single  defalcation,  nor  the  loss  of  a  cent  to  the 
government."  And  the  principal  employees  of 
the  department,  in  taking  leave  of  him  in  a 
short  address  (February  28,  1825),  bore  the 
following  testimony  to  his  administration  • 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  43 

*'  The  degree  of  perfection  to  which  you  have 
carried  the  several  branches  of  this  department 
is  believed  to  be  without  parallel.  .  .  .  From 
these  (your  personal  character  and  private  vir 
tues)  have  proceeded  the  harmonious  inter 
changes  which  have  made  the  burden  of  de 
tails  with  which  the  undersigned  are  charged 
comparatively  light." 

Neither,  on  the  other  hand,  were  severe  criti 
cisms  lacking.  John  Quincy  Adams  writes  in 
his  Diary :  — 

"  The  truth  is  that  of  the  reforms  in  the  War  De 
partment  while  he  [Calhoun]  was  at  its  head,  the  most 
important  was  the  reduction  of  the  army  from  ten 
thousand  men  to  six  thousand  men,  utterly  against 
his  will,  against  all  the  influence  that  he  could  exer 
cise,  and  to  his  entire  disapprobation ;  and  all  the 
other  changes  of  organization  were  upon  plans  fur 
nished  by  Generals  Brown  and  Scott,  and  carried 
through  Congress  chiefly  by  the  agency  of  John 
Williams,  of  Tennessee.  Mr.  Calhoun  had  no  more 
share  of  mind  in  them  than  I  have  in  the  acts  of  Con 
gress  to  which  I  affix  my  signature  of  approbation." 

Even  the  most  thorough  examination  of  the 
records  of  the  War  Department  would  probably 
not  clearly  show  whether  and  how  far  the  lat 
ter  assertion  is  true.  For  argument's  sake, 
however,  it  may  be  granted  that  it  is  true  to  the 
letter.  Would  that  really  deprive  Calboun  of 


44  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

all  merit  in  the  reforms  ?  Is  it  not  one  of  the 
most  indispensable  qualities  of  a  statesman  to 
know  where  to  go  for  advice,  and  to  follow  wise 
counsels  ? 

Others  were  not  satisfied  with  denying  that 
the  reforms  were  due  to  the  initiative  of  the 
Secretary.  We  read  in  the  same  Diary,  under 
date  of  June  2,  1822,  that  General  D.  Parker 
said  to  the  writer,  "The  management  of  the 
War  Department  had  been  inefficient  and  ex 
travagant,  which  was  very  susceptible  of  dem 
onstration."  The  reproach  of  extravagance  was 
not  wholly  without  apparent  foundation.  Cal- 
houn  very  properly  considered  himself  in  duty 
bound  to  advocate  and  promote  the  interests 
of  the  army  in  every  way  not  incompatible 
with  the  true  interests  of  the  United  States, 
and  as  to  these  he,  with  equal  propriety,  refused 
to  accept  the  amount  of  money  to  be  spent  as 
constituting  the  principal  consideration.  The 
best  is  the  cheapest,  though  the  first  outlay  is 
larger.  In  private  life  this  maxim  is  nowhere 
better  and  more  commonly  understood  than  by 
the  people  generally  in  the  United  States.  The 
American  politicians,  however,  partly  for  dema 
gogical  purposes  and  partly  from  honest  stupid 
ity,  up  to  this  day  but  too  frequently  consider 
it  an  absurdity,  though  they  are  in  other  re 
spects  lavish  to  the  verge  of  criminality  with 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  45 

the  public  money.  Calhoun  fully  understood 
that  with  regard  to  great  public  interests  the 
miser's  policy  is  the  worst  extravagance.  It 
was,  perhaps,  not  quite  so  certain  as  Adams 
thought,  that  the  reduction  of  the  army  was 
really  a  "  reform,"  and  the  Secretary  undoubt 
edly  deserved  much  praise  for  taking  a  decided 
stand  against  those  who  wanted  to  screw  down 
the  rations  and  the  wages  of  the  privates,  and 
to  some  extent  even  those  of  the  officers,  to  the 
lowest  possible  point. 

As  to  "  abuses  "  in  other  respects,  it  is  too 
much  to  say  that  Calhoun  is  absolutely  blame 
less.  In  one  important  instance  he  has  laid 
himself  open  to  the  charge  of  unfair  dealing 
in  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  a  treaty 
with  an  Indian  tribe.  Upon  the  whole,  how 
ever,  he  advocated  a  policy  towards  these  wards 
of  the  nation,  which  it  would  have  been  well 
for  all  the  parties  concerned  to  adopt  and  pur 
sue  with  undeviating  honesty.  Even  in  our 
days  his  Indian  reports  might  be  profitably 
studied  with  regard  as  well  to  the  cardinal 
mistakes  committed  in  the  Indian  policy  as  to 
what  ought  to  be  done.  To  those  who  try  to 
lift  the  responsibility  for  the  hapless  fate  of 
the  Indians  from  the  shoulders  of  the  American 
people,  and  allege  a  decree  of  Providence,  the 
following  testimony  of  Calhoun  will  be  unsa 
vory  reading :  — 


46  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

"  As  far,  however,  as  civilization  may  depend  on 
education  only,  without  taking  into  consideration  the 
force  of  circumstances,  it  would  seem  that  there  is  no 
insuperable  difficulty  in  effecting  the  benevolent  in 
tention  of  the  government.  It  may  be  affirmed,  al 
most  without  qualification,  that  all  the  tribes  within 
our  settlements  and  near  our  borders  are  even  solic 
itous  for  the  education  of  their  children.  "With  the 
exception  of  the  Creeks,  they  have  everywhere  freely 
and  cheerfully  assented  to  the  establishment  of  schools, 
to  which,  in  some  instances,  they  have  contributed. 
The  Choctaws,  in  this  respect,  have  evinced  the  most 
liberal  spirit,  having  set  aside  $6,000  of  their  amnesty 
in  aid  of  the  schools  established  among  them.  The 
reports  of  the  teachers  are  almost  uniformly  favor 
able,  both  as  to  the  capacity  and  docility  of  their 
youths.  Their  progress  appears  to  be  quite  equal  to 
that  of  white  children  of  the  same  age,  and  they  ap 
pear  to  be  equally  susceptible  of  acquiring  habits  of 
industry.  At  some  of  the  establishments  a  consider 
able  portion  of  the  supplies  are  raised  by  the  labor  of 
the  scholars  and  the  teachers.  With  these  indica 
tions,  it  would  seem  that  there  is  little  hazard  in  pro 
nouncing  that,  with  proper  and  vigorous  efforts,  they 
may  receive  an  education  equal  to  that  of  the  labor 
ing  portion  of  our  community." 

Whether  his  theorizing  propensities  had  any 
thing  to  do  with  his  taking  such  a  favorable 
view  of  the  capability  and  the  desire  of  the  In 
dians  to  raise  themselves  out  of  the  darkness 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  47 

and  sloth  of  their  savage  state  need  not  here 
be  inquired  into.  In  judging  this  question  Cal- 
houn  \vas,  at  all  events,  a  sufficiently  matter-of- 
fact  man  to  see  that,  in  spite  of  this  supposed 
natural  capability  for  becoming  civilized,  their 
actual  civilization  was  impossible  so  long  as  the 
leading  principle  of  the  Indian  policy  hitherto 
pursued  was  not  abandoned  :  — 

"  The  political  relation  which  they  hear  to  us  is  hy 
itself  of  sufficient  magnitude,  if  not  removed,  to  pre 
vent  so  desirable  a  state  from  being  attained.  We 
have  always  treated  them  as  an  independent  people ; 
and  however  insignificant  a  tribe  may  become,  and 
however  surrounded  by  a  dense  white  population,  so 
long  as  there  are  any  remains  it  continues  indepen 
dent  of  our  laws  and  authority.  To  tribes  thus  sur 
rounded,  nothing  can  be  conceived  more  opposed  to 
their  happiness  and  civilization  than  this  state  of 
nominal  independence.  It  has  not  one  of  the  ad 
vantages  of  real  independence,  while  it  has  nearly  all 
the  disadvantages  of  a  state  of  complete  subjugation. 
The  consequence  is  inevitable.  They  lose  the  lofty 
spirit  and  heroic  courage  of  the  savage  state,  without 
acquiring  the  virtues  which  belong  to  the  civilized. 
Depressed  in  spirit  and  debauched  in  morals,  they 
dwindle  away  through  a  wretched  existence,  a  nui 
sance  to  the  surrounding  country.  Unless  some  sys 
tem  can  be  devised  gradually  to  change  this  relation, 
and  with  the  progress  of  education  to  extend  over 
them  our  laws  and  authority,  it  is  feared  that  all  ef- 


48  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

forts  to  civilize  them,  whatever  flattering  appearances 
they  may  for  a  time  exhibit,  must  ultimately  fail. 
Tribe  after  tribe  will  sink,  with  the  progress  of  our 
settlements  and  the  pressure  of  our  population,  into 
wretchedness  and  oblivion.  Such  has  been  their  past 
history,  and  such,  without  this  change  of  political  re 
lation,  it  must  probably  continue  to  be." 

Who  would  to-day  venture  to  deny  that  the 
main  error  of  the  Americans  in  dealing  with 
the  Indian  problem  is  here  pointed  out  with 
the  utmost  clearness,  and  that  subsequent  his 
tory  has  fully  borne  out  these  assertions  ?  With 
the  same  keen-sightedness  with  which  Calhoun 
discerned  the  causes  of  the  evil,  he  also  found 
the  means  for  its  gradual  cure  :  — 

"  Preparatory  to  so  radical  a  change  in  our  relation 
towards  them,  the  system  of  education  which  has  been 
adopted  ought  to  be  put  into  extensive  and  active 
operation.  This  is  the  foundation  of  all  other  im 
provements  [?].  It  ought  gradually  to  be  followed 
with  a  plain  and  simple  system  of  laws  and  govern 
ment,  such  as  has  been  adopted  by  the  Cherokees,  a 
proper  compression  of  their  settlements,  and  a  division 
of  landed  property.  By  introducing  gradually  and 
judiciously  these  improvements,  they  will  ultimately 
attain  such  a  state  of  intelligence,  industry,  and  civil 
ization  as  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  complete  exten 
sion  of  our  laws  and  authority  over  them." 

It  is  not  probable  that  Mr.  Schurz  has  ever 


SECRETARY  OF  WAR.  49 

read  this  long-forgotten  report,  but  whoever  has 
been  acquainted  with  it,  and  has  also  paid  some 
attention  to  the  Indian  policy  of  Mr.  Hayes's 
Secretary  of  the  Interior,  must  have  been  struck 
by  the  coincidence  of  the  views  of  South  Car 
olina's  great  doctrinarian  and  of  the  modern 
"  theorist,"  who,  sixty  years  later,  has  dealt 
more  successfully  with  the  Indian  problem  than 
perhaps  any  other  man. 

Of  the  other  charges  brought  against  the 
management  of  the  War  Department,  but  one 
more  need  be  mentioned,  and  this  one  because 
it  had  a  long  history  and  made  considerable 
noise  at  the  time.  We  allude  to  the  so-called 
Rip-Rap  contract.  A  government  contract  for 
the  delivery  of  a  large  quantity  of  stones  at 
Old  Point  Comfort  had  been  awarded  to  a  cer 
tain  Elijah  Mix,  a  man  of  ruined  commercial 
reputation.  Calhoun  was  not  aware  of  this  fact 
concerning  Mix,  and  he  was  satisfied  that  the 
conditions  agreed  upon  were  as  favorable  for 
the  government  as  any  that  could  be  obtained 
at  the  time;  but  he  had  awarded  the  contract 
without  publicly  advertising  it,  as  the  law  re 
quired.  This  fact  became  known  when  Mix 
failed  to  fulfil  his  obligations,  and  the  House 
of  Representatives  prohibited  any  further  dis 
bursements  from  the  appropriation  made  for 
this  purpose.  This  untoward  occurrence  was 
4 


50  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  more  annoying  because  the  chief  clerk  of 
the  department,  a  brother-in-law  of  Mix,  had, 
with  the  knowledge  of  the  Secretary,  afterwards 
bought  a  part  of  the  contract.  Calhoun  had  not 
approved  of  his  doing  so,  warning  him  that  he 
would  expose  himself  to  disagreeable  insinua 
tions  ;  but  neither,  on  the  other  hand,  had  he 
forbidden  it,  since  it  was  not  "  illegal."  After 
Calhoun  had  become  Vice-President,  this  story 
was  revived  by  an  application  from  Mix  for  an 
other  government  contract.  Although  his  bid 
was  the  lowest,  it  was  refused,  because  the  his 
tory  of  the  Rip-Rap  contract  proved  him  to  be 
an  irresponsible  person.  In  the  course  of  these 
transactions  a  private  letter  from  Mix,  in  which 
he  charged  Calhoun  with  having  received  a 
share  of  the  profits  of  the  Rip-Rap  job,  found 
its  way  into  the  press.  Calhoun  thereupon 
(September  29,  1826)  addressed  a  letter  to  the 
House  of  Representatives,  "  claiming  investiga 
tion  by  the  House "  "  in  its  high  character  of 
grand  inquest  of  the  nation,"  at  the  same  time 
announcing  to  the  Senate  that  he  would  not  pre 
side  over  its  deliberations  until  the  vile  calumny 
had  been  duly  disposed  of,  —  two  steps  of  doubt 
ful  propriety,  and  if  not  unconstitutional,  at  all 
events  extra-constitutional.  The  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  might  easily  find  itself  left  with  no 
time  at  all  for  transacting  its  legitimate  busi- 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  51 

ness,  if  it  could  be  required  to  grant  the  claim 
of  every  government  official  of  a  certain  rank 
for  an  investigation  of  charges  privately l  pre 
ferred  by  any  private  individual ;  and  it  would 
be  strange  indeed  if  a  United  States  official 
had  the  right  to  refuse  to  attend  to  his  con 
stitutional  duties,  because  somebody  had  been 
pleased  to  calumniate  him.  If  the  Vice-Presi- 
dent  might  do  so  why  not  the  President,  the 
Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  President 
pro  tempore  of  the  Senate,  the  Speaker  of  the 
House, —  nay,  any  member  of  Congress?  Nei 
ther  of  these  objections  was  entirely  overlooked 
at  the  time,  but  the  House  nevertheless  ap 
pointed  a  committee  of  investigation.  Calhoun 
was  far  from  being  satisfied  with  its  proceed 
ings,  although  the  report  declared,  "  They  are 
unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  there  are  no 
facts  which  will  authorize  the  belief,  or  even  sus 
picion,  that  the  Vice-President  was  ever  inter 
ested,  or  that  he  participated,  directly  or  indi 
rectly,  in  the  profits  of  any  contract  formed  with 
the  government  through  the  Department  of 
War." 

No  decent  person  had  ever  doubted  that  such 
was  the  case.  The  whole  scandal  was  an  empty 

1  Calhoun's  assertion  that  the  accusation  had  been  accorded 
a  place  in  the  official  records  of  the  Department  of  War  was 
proved  to  be  wholly  unfounded. 


52  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

bubble,  but,  like  every  scandal,  it  was  filled  with 
mal-odorous  gases.  Calhoun  would  have  done 
well  to  treat  it  with  silent  contempt,  instead  of 
pricking  it,  for  neither  in  Congress  nor  out  of  it 
was  there  a  lack  of  persons  who  willingly  used 
against  him  everything  which  they  could  lay 
their  hands  on,  and  the  old  truth  semper  all- 
quid  hceret  applied  to  him  as  well  as  to  any 
other  person.  In  spite  of  the  praise  bestowed 
upon  his  administration  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  by  all  impartial  men,  many  members  of 
Congress  selected  just  this  department  as  the 
principal  butt  of  their  ill-humor.  John  Quincy 
Adams  writes  on  June  2,  1822,  "The  Presi 
dent  had  enough  to  do  to  support  the  Secretary 
of  War.  He  had  already  brought  himself  into 
collision  with  both  Houses  of  Congress  by  sup 
porting  him."  Though  these  animadversions 
were,  in  the  opinion  of  Adams,  not  wholly  un 
founded,  yet  he  was  far  from  thinking  them 
quite  justified.  This  latter  fact  is  the  more  to 
be  noticed,  because  Adams  cannot  be  considered 
an  entirely  unprejudiced  witness,  though  the 
stern  old  man  was  certainly  most  honestly  con 
vinced  that  he  judged  his  colleague  with  the 
strictest  impartiality  and  justice. 

Adams  leaves  us  in  no  doubt  about  the  true 
cause  of  these  attacks  upon  Calhoun  :  — 

"  There  was  a  time  during  the  last  session  of  Con- 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  53 

gress  when  so  large  a  proportion  of  members  was  en 
listed  for  Calhoun  that  they  had  it  in  contemplation 
to  hold  a  caucus  formally  to  declare  him  a  candidate 
[for  the  presidency].  But  this  prospect  of  success 
roused  all  Crawford's  and  Clay's  partisans  against 
him.  The  administration  of  his  department  was  scru 
tinized  with  severity,  sharpened  by  personal  animos 
ity  and  factious  malice.  Some  abuses  were  discovered, 
and  exposed  with  aggravations.  Cavils  were  made 
against  measures  of  that  department  in  the  execution 
of  the  laws,  and  brought  the  President  in  collision 
with  both  Houses  of  Congress.  Crawford's  news 
papers  commenced  and  have  kept  up  a  course  of  the 
most  violent  abuse  and  ribaldry  against  him." 

The  presidency  was  at  the  bottom  of  these 
acrimonious  bickerings,  and  though  Adams 
would  never  have  committed  the  slightest  con 
scious  wrong  in  order  to  secure  this  prize,  yet 
he  coveted  it  too  ardently  to  be  favorably  dis 
posed  toward  a  prominent  rival. 

The  estrangement  between  Adams  and  Cal 
houn  cannot  be  ascribed  solely  to  this  reason, 
but  nobody  who  has  the  least  knowledge  of  hu 
man  nature  will  doubt  that  this  must  have  had 
a  great  deal  to  do  with  it.  When  the  two 
statesmen  came  into  such  close  official  relation 
by  becoming  members  of  Mr.  Monroe's  cabinet, 
Adams  must  be  considered,  if  we  take  his  usual 
austerity  and  chilliness  into  due  consideration, 


54  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

to  have  spoken  almost  enthusiastically  of  his 
younger  colleague.  On  January  6,  1818,  he 
says,  "  Calhoun  thinks  for  himself,  indepen 
dently  of  all  the  rest  [namely,  the  other  mem 
bers  of  the  cabinet],  with  sound  judgment, 
quick  discrimination,  and  keen  observation.  He 
supports  his  opinions,  too,  with  powerful  elo 
quence."  For  several  years  this  good  opinion 
grows  ever  stronger :  — 

"  Mr.  Calhoun  is  a  man  of  fair  and  candid  mind, 
of  honorable  principles,  of  clear  and  quick  under 
standing,  of  cool  self-possession,  of  enlarged  philo 
sophical  views,  and  of  ardent  patriotism.  He  is  above 
all  sectional  and  factious  prejudices  more  than  any 
other  statesman  of  this  Union  with  whom  I  have  ever 
acted.  He  is  more  sensitive  to  the  transient  manifes 
tations  of  momentary  public  opinion,  more  afraid  of 
the  first  impressions  of  the  public  opinion,  than  I 
am." 

Thus  Adams  wrote  on  October  15,  1821 ; 
and  again,  only  twenty-five  months  later,  he 
says,  "  Calhoun,  who  in  all  his  movements 
of  every  kind  has  an  eye  to  himself ;  "  and 
on  the  2d  of  April,  1824,  "  Precedent  and 
popularity,  —  this  is  the  bent  of  his  mind. 
The  pi'imary  principles  involved  in  any  public 
question  are  the  last  to  occur  to  him.  What 
has  been  done  and  what  will  be  said  are  the 
Jachin  and  Boaz  of  his  argument."  As  Adams 


SECRETARY  OF  WAR.  55 

did  not  accuse  Calhoun  of  any  special  dishon 
orable  act,  this  change  of  opinion  is  certainly 
so  great  that  the  explanation  for  it  must  be 
partly  sought  in  the  last  sentence  of  the  follow 
ing  entry  in  his  Diary  (September  5, 1831) :  — 

"Mr.  Calhoun  was  a  member  of  Mr.  Monroe's 
administration,  and  during  its  early  part  pursued  a 
course  from  which  I  anticipated  that  he  would  prove 
an  ornament  and  a  blessing  to  his  country.  I  have 
been  deeply  disappointed  in  him,  and  now  expect 
nothing  from  him  but  evil.  His  personal  relations 
with  me  have  been  marked,  on  his  part,  with  selfish 
and  cold-blooded  heartlessness." 

It  is  well  known  how  much  inclined  Adams 
•was  to  charge  with  ingratitude  and  base  in 
trigues  those  with  whom  his  political  life  had 
brought  him  into  close  personal  contact ;  and 
furthermore,  that  the  real  experiences  which  he 
actually  encountered  in  this  respect  were  bad 
enough  to  sour  a  less  distrustful  and  sweeter 
temper  than  his.  Calhoun,  too,  he  did  not 
blame  without  reason,  and,  so  far  as  our  pres 
ent  sources  allow  us  to  judge,  by  far  the  larger 
part  of  the  responsibility  for  the  unkind  feeling 
between  the  two  rested  upon  the  Carolinian. 
Adams's  well-founded  complaints  against  Cal 
houn,  however,  chiefly  arose  after  the  presiden 
tial  contest  had  been  decided  for  this  time. 
Calhoun  professed  to  think  that  Monroe  should 


56  JOHN  C.   CALEOUN. 

be  succeeded  by  a  Northern  man,  and  declared 
that,  if  such  should  be  the  case,  his  first  choice 
would  be  Adams.  If  he,  nevertheless,  vigor 
ously  pushed  his  own  candidacy,  it  was,  as  he 
asserted,  because  he  thought  that  of  all  the 
prominent  candidates  Mr.  Crawford,  of  Georgia, 
had  the  best  chance,  and  him  he  would  oppose 
to  the  utmost  extent  of  his  power,  because  he 
not  only  had  no  high  opinion  of  his  talents,  but 
could  not  respect  him.  as  a  man.  So  far  as 
Calhoun  was  concerned,  the  war  was,  indeed, 
principally  waged  between  his  partisans  and 
those  of  Crawford.  "  As  Calhoun  stands  most 
in  his  [Crawford's]  way,"  says  Adams's  Di 
ary  on  May  2,  1822,  "  the  great  burden  of  his 
exertions  this  session  and  the  last  has  been 
against  the  War  Department ;  while  Calhoun, 
by  his  haste  to  get  at  the  presidency,  has  made 
a  cabal  in  his  favor  in  Congress  to  counteract 
Crawford's  cabal,  and  the  session  has  been  little 
more  than  a  violent  struggle  between  them  ; 
both,  however,  countenancing  the  insidious  at 
tacks  upon  the  Secretary  of  State." 

Calhoun  was  thrown  in  this  tussle  with  his 
crafty  colleague  of  the  Treasury.  The  same 
authority,  which  is  unimpeachable  on  this  ques 
tion,  says,  Calhoun's  "  projected  nomination 
for  the  presidency  has  met  with  hardly  any 
countenance  throughout  the  Union.  The  prin- 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  57 

cipal  effect  of  it  has  been  to  bring  out  Craw 
ford's  strength,  and  thus  to  promote  the  interest 
of  the  very  man  whom  alone  he  professes  to  op 
pose.  Calhoun  now  feels  his  weakness,  but  is 
not  cured  of  his  ambition."  Crawford,  how 
ever,  was  to  be  still  more  disappointed  than 
Calhoun,  and  so  far  as  the  struggle  between 
these  two  is  concerned  it  was  the  former  infi 
nitely  more  than  the  latter  who  could,  with  jus 
tice,  be  accused  of  double-dealing  and  an  unfair 
underground  warfare.  Yet  no  sincere  friend  of 
Calhoun  can  look  quite  undismayed  upon  this 
chapter  of  his  public  life.  The  presidential 
fever,  that  typical  disease  which  has  proved 
fatal  to  the  true  glory  of  so  many  statesmen  of 
the  United  States,  permeated  the  very  marrow 
of  his  bones.  His  ambition  did  not  betray 
him  into  any  dishonorable  act,  but  his  eye  be 
came  dimmed  with  regard  to  the  public  weal, 
because,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  the  fatal 
consideration,  what  effect  his  course  would 
have  upon  his  standing  as  a  candidate,  entered 
more  or  less  into  every  question.  His  blind 
admirers,  if  there  still  be  any  left,  will,  of 
course,  not  admit  the  truth  of  this  assertion, 
and  will  claim  that  to  him,  too,  the  celebrated 
saying  of  Henry  Clay  applies,  that  he  would 
rather  be  right  than  be  President.  The  cool, 
unbiassed  student  will,  indeed,  probably  come  to 


58  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

the  conclusion  that  there  was  not  much  differ 
ence  between  the  two  in  this  respect ;  but  if 
there  were  nothing  else  to  sustain  the  charge 
against  Calhoun,  it  would  be  sufficiently  proved 
by  the  influence  which  he  allowed  his  presiden 
tial  aspirations  to  exercise  upon  his  personal  re 
lations.  The  lofty  independence  of  mind  and 
truly  chivalric  spirit,  which  were  his  real  nat 
ure,  appear  blunted.  He  stoops  to  cover  with 
an  approving  and  admiring  smile  a  resentment 
which  is  lurking  in  a  corner  of  his  heart,  and  on 
the  other  side  to  break  off  all  social  intercourse 
with  old  and  highly  respected  associates,  merely 
because  others,  whose  good  services  he  wishes 
to  secure,  might  not  like  these  connections. 
The  champion  of  slavery,  who,  with  head  erect, 
flashing  eye,  and  the  deep-toned  voice  of  solemn 
conviction  and  apostolic  infallibility,  dares  the 
whole  civilized  world,  is  every  inch  a  man, 
though  a  sadly  mistaken  one ;  but  the  politi 
cian,  who  is  craving  with  thirst  for  the  presi 
dency,  is  like  Ulysses  before  the  suitors,  still 
a  hero,  but  with  the  beggar's  rags  of  human 
frailty  and  weakness  covering  the  "  divine " 
shoulders. 

Calhoun's  hopes  rested  mainly  on  his  popu 
larity  in  Pennsylvania,  the  grateful  affection 
of  the  army,  and  the  admiration  of  the  young 
men.  With  them  his  comparative  youth  was 


SECRETARY  OF   WAR.  59 

an  additional  claim  on  their  support ;  for  it  was 
on  account  of  his  age  that  his  career  seemed  to 
shine  with  uncommon  lustre.  With  his  elders, 
however,  this  was  one  of  the  principal  objec 
tions  against  his  being  already  put  at  the  head 
of  the  nation.  Joseph  Story  wrote,  on  Septem 
ber  21,  1823,  to  the  Hon.  Ezekiel  Bacon,  "  I 
have  great  admiration  for  Mr.  Calhoun,  and 
think  few  men  have  more  enlarged  and  liberal 
views  of  the  true  policy  of  the  national  govern 
ment.  But  his  age,  or  rather  his  youth,  at  the 
present  moment,  is  a  formidable  objection  to 
his  elevation  to  the  chair."  But  even  if  he  had 
stood  in  the  beginning  of  the  sixth  instead  of 
the  fifth  decade  of  his  life,  his  wishes  would 
probably  not  have  been  gratified.  The  whole 
movement  in  his  favor  was  premature,  and  had, 
at  this  time,  something  artificial  in  it.  There 
was,  after  all,  nothing  in  his  career  to  stir  up 
a  general  enthusiasm,  by  means  of  which  he 
might  have  ridden  on  the  crest  of  a  great  pop 
ular  wave  over  the  heads  of  all  his  competitors 
into  the  White  House.  The  mass  of  the  peo 
ple  were  in  a  sober  mood,  verging  upon  indif 
ference.  The  election,  therefore,  turned  much 
less  upon  principles  or  great  questions  of  policy 
than  upon  personal  predilections  ;  and  this 
being  the  case,  it  soon  became  evident  that 
Calhoun  had  no  chance  whatever.  Even  in 


60  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

Pennsylvania,  where  he  owed  his  popularity 
partly  to  the  vigor  with  which,  in  1816,  he  had 
advocated  a  protective  tariff,  he  was  dropped. 
The  Harrisburg  convention  nominated  Jack 
son,  but  gave  to  Calhoun  the  second  place  on 
the  ticket  as  candidate  for  the  vice-presidency. 
This  was  a  solution  of  the  question  with  which 
he  could  be  well  satisfied.  If  he  had  been 
from  the  first  the  weakest  candidate  for  the 
presidency,  he  was  undoubtedly  the  strongest 
for  the  vice-presidency ;  and  as  he  had  already 
been  spoken  of  for  the  first  place,  his  election 
to  the  second  would,  in  the  eyes  of  many  peo 
ple,  give  him  a  kind  of  equitable  claim  to  be, 
in  due  time,  elevated  "  to  the  chair."  Niles's 
"Register"  of  November  6,  1824,  said,  "He  is 
the  only  candidate  in  whose  favor  the  people 
have  moved,  and  the  voice  of  the  people  should 
always  be  respected."  Adams  had  already,  in 
the  preceding  February,  spoken  of  the  "  court 
ship  of  the  New  England  Federalists  by  Mr. 
Calhoun,"  and  of  "  the  newspapers  set  up  in 
Massachusetts  to  support  Mr.  Calhoun."  Web 
ster  wrote  to  his  brother  Ezekiel,  on  March  14 
of  the  same  year,  "I  hope  all  New  England 
will  support  Mr.  Calhoun  for  the  vice-presi 
dency.  If  so,  he  will  probably  be  chosen,  and 
that  will  be  a  great  thing.  He  is  a  true  man, 
and  will  do  good  to  the  country  in  that  situa 


SECRETARY  OF    WAR.  61 

fcion."  Webster's  hopes  were  not  disappointed. 
The  Jackson  and  the  Adams  parties  united  on 
Calhoun.  He  received  182  of  the  261  electoral 
votes,  and  among  these  were  all  the  New  Eng 
land  votes,  with  the  exception  of  those  from 
Connecticut  and  one  from  New  Hampshire. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

VICE-PKESIDENT. 

As  the  presidential  election  turned  out,  the 
combination  vote  by  which  he  had  been  chosen 
put  Calhoun  into  an  annoying  and  very  embar 
rassing  position  with  a  view  to  his  own  presi 
dential  aspirations.  Although  Jackson  had  re 
ceived  a  plurality  of  the  electoral  votes,  Adams 
was  elected  by  the  House  of  Representatives. 
That  the  House  was  perfectly  justified  in  doing 
this,  not  only  by  the  letter,  but  also  by  the  spirit 
of  the  Constitution,  no  person  can  deny  who  is 
possessed  of  common  sense  and  is  willing  to  use 
it.  Article  XII.,  section  1,  of  the  Constitution 
would  be  an  absurdity  if  the  House  were  morally 
obliged  to  choose  the  person  upon  whom  a  plu 
rality  of  the  votes  had  been  bestowed.  Besides, 
to  whom  would  the  preference  have  to  be  ac 
corded,  if  the  person  receiving  the  plurality  of 
the  electoral  votes  had  not  also  received  a  plural 
ity  of  the  popular  votes?  The  Jackson  parti 
sans,  however,  were  determined  to  seal  their 
ears  and  eyes  hermetically  against  every  sug 
gestion  of  reason.  They  declared  Adams's  elec- 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  63 

tion  to  be  an  outrage,  a  rebellion  of  the  ser 
vants  against  the  masters,  for  no  matter  what 
the  Constitution  said  and  required,  the  "  demos 
krateo  principle,"  as  Senator  Benton  expressed 
it,  with  a  somewhat  sorry  display  of  his  knowl 
edge  of  Greek,  had  been  trampled  under  foot. 
The  nomination  of  Henry  Clay,  whose  influ 
ence  had  given  the  decision  in  favor  of  Adams, 
for  Secretary  of  State  filled  the  cup  of  their 
wrath  to  overflowing.  The  cry  of  "  bargain  " 
was  raised,  and  though  it  was  proved  over  and 
over  again  to  be  a  base  calumny,  it  did  not  com 
pletely  die  out  until  long  after  Adams  and  Clay 
were  resting  in  their  graves. 

So  the  two  camps,  to  whose  union  in  his  be 
half  Calhoun  owed  his  elevation,  stood  arrayed 
in  deadly  conflict  against  each  other.  To  re 
main  neutral  between  them  was  to  put  himself 
between  anvil  and  hammer.  But  with  which 
party  was  he  to  side  ?  Justice  pleaded  for 
Adams,  ambition  spoke  eloquently  for  Jackson. 
Can  there  be  any  doubt  that  this  keenest  logi 
cian,  who  had  never  been  and  never  became  a 
fanatic  of  the  "  demos  krateo  principle  "  as  it 
was  now  understood  by  the  Jackson  party,  took 
a  correct  view  of  the  constitutional  question  ? 
In  1837,  in  the  debate  on  the  bill  for  the  admis- 
^sion  of  Michigan  as  a  State  into  the  Union,  he 
very  emphatically  reproved  his  adversaries  for 


64  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

an  argument,  according  to  which  "  the  author 
ity  of  numbers  sets  aside  the  authority  of  the 
law  and  the  Constitution."  And  he  added, 
"  Need  I  show  that  such  a  principle  goes  to  the 
entire  overthrow  of  our  constitutional  govern 
ment,  and  would  subvert  all  social  order  ? " 
But  from  the  beginning  it  was  evident  that  the 
majority  of  the  people  would  declare  for  Jack 
son.  To  support  Adams  was  therefore  to  post 
pone  to  a  remote  future,  if  not  to  renounce  al 
together,  the  realization  of  his  wishes. 

The  temptation  proved  too  strong  for  Cal- 
houn.  It  is  possible,  and  perhaps  not  unlikely, 
that  Adams  judged  him  too  harshly  in  attrib 
uting  everything  he  did  and  left  undone  to 
the  wish  of  undermining  the  administration. 
Thus,  for  instance,  it  seems  hardly  probable 
that  the  reason  for  Calhoun's  celebrated  deci 
sion,  which  denied  the  right  of  the  Vice-Pres- 
ident  to  call  a  Senator  to  order,  was  really,  as 
Adams  believed,  only  unwillingness  to  check 
Randolph's  violent  abuse  of  the  administra 
tion.  There  was  more  than  enough  of  the  doc 
trinarian  in  him  to  render  it  likely  that  he 
honestly  thought  this  power  would  be,  or  at 
least  could  lead  to,  an  abridgment  of  the  liberty 
of  speech.  This  much,  however,  is  certain: 
that  the  Vice-President  was  far  from  anxious 
to  sustain  the  political  credit  of  the  President 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  65 

nay,  though  he  knew  how  to  maintain  the  de 
corum  of  his  office,  he  was  in  fact  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  opposition.  Mr.  Nathan  Sargent 
relates  that  Calhoun  had  said  to  him  in  De 
cember,  1825,  or  January,  1826,  "  Such  was  the 
manner  in  which  it  [Adams's  administration] 
came  into  power  that  it  must  be  defeated  at  all 
hazards,  regardless  of  its  measures."  Charity 
bids  us  assume  that  he  deceived  himself  at  the 
time ;  but  when,  instead  of  ardent  desire,  bitter 
disappointment  became  his  constant  companion, 
whispering  its  suggestions  into  his  ear,  the  man 
and  the  statesman  would  have  been  ashamed 
to  have  this  sentiment  recalled  to  his  memory. 
For  a  while  it  seemed  as  if  Calhoun  had  not 
been  betrayed  by  his  ambition  into  a  miscal 
culation.  In  the  presidential  election  of  1828, 
Jackson  carried  everything  before  him,  and 
Calhoun  was  reflected  Vice-President  by  171 
electoral  votes.  As  it  was  understood  that 
Jackson  did  not  intend  to  be  a  candidate  for 
reelection,  Calhoun  was  apparently  more  likely 
than  ever  to  reach  the  goal  of  the  White  House. 
But  in  fact,  so  far  as  this  wish  was  concerned, 
his  star  had  already  passed  its  zenith.  The 
personal  relation  between  Jackson  and  Cal 
houn  was  no  longer  what  it  was  supposed  to 
be.  On  the  surface  the  waters  were  still  per 
fectly  smooth,  but  in  the  hidden  deep  they 


66  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

were  agitated  to  a  degree  boding  no  good  to 
either  Calhoun  or  the  country.  In  the  forma 
tion  of  his  cabinet  Jackson  had  recognized  the 
claims  of  Calhoun  to  his  consideration  by  in 
viting  Mr.  Branch,  of  North  Carolina,  Mr.  Ber- 
rien,  of  Georgia,  and  Mr.  Ingham,  of  Pennsylva 
nia,  to  seats  in  it.  Calhoun,  however,  thought 
himself  not  well  treated,  because  —  with  the 
exception,  perhaps,  of  Ingham  —  these  were 
not  the  men  he  had  wished  to  see  in  the  council 
of  the  President,  though  they  were  reputed  to 
be  his  fast  friends.  Yet  this  was  not  a  cause 
of  the  breach  which  was  soon  to  occur  between 
the  two  men,  but  merely  a  symptom  of  a  cer 
tain  coolness  and  an  incipient  mutual  distrust, 
antedating  the  inauguration  of  Jackson,  and 
originating  in  the  leading  political  question  of 
the  day. 

In  1824  the  tariff  question  had  deeply  agi 
tated  the  whole  country.  The  protectionists  had 
carried  the  day,  but  only  by  a  slender  majority, 
and  the  opposition,  especially  in  the  plantation 
States,  had  assumed  a  threatening  aspect.  Not 
only  the  expediency  and  justice  of  a  protective 
tariff  was  violently  contested,  but  also  its  con 
stitutionality  was  most  strenuously  denied.  The 
excitement  reached  such  a  height  that  the 
"Southron"  and  the  Columbia  "Telescope" 
advised  the  calling  of  a  congress  of  the  opposi 
tion  States. 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  67 

Calhoun  did  not  approve  of  the  passionate 
way  in  which  the  question  was  treated.  Yet 
in  the  summer  of  1825  he  declared  at  a  dinner 
given  in  his  honor  at  Augusta,  Georgia,  that 
"  No  one  would  reprobate  more  pointedly  than 
myself  any  concerted  union  between  States  for 
interested  or  sectional  objects.-  I  would  con 
sider  all  such  concert  as  against  the  spirit  of 
our  Constitution."  The  national  tendencies  still 
prevailed  with  him,  and,  as  has  been  proved 
before,  he  had  not  yet  forsworn  the  econom 
ical  tenets  which  he  had  so  zealously  defended 
for  years.  His  faith  in  them  had,  however, 
begun  to  be  strongly  shaken,  and  after  he  had 
once  entered  upon  their  reexamination  he  felt 
compelled  to  become  their  most  irreconcilable 
enemy. 

It  was  no  whim  or  "  gray  theory "  which 
caused  the  steadily  progressing  consolidation  of 
the  Southern  States  with  regard  to  the  econom 
ical  questions.  Slavery,  in  consequence  of  the 
enormous  development  of  the  cotton  culture, 
had  become  the  determining  principle  of  the 
whole  political,  economical,  and  social  life  of  the 
Southern  States,  and  a  protective  tariff  was  ab 
solutely  incompatible  with  the  interests  of  the 
slave-holders.  Indolence  and  a  certain  slovenli 
ness  pervaded  the  whole  life  of  the  South,  be 
cause  some  kinds  of  honest  labor  —  all  that  tha 


68  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

South  was  pleased  to  call  "  menial  services  "  — 
were  dishonored  by  slavery ;  and  thereby  all 
work,  except  the  "  living  by  one's  wits,"  had 
come  to  be  looked  upon  more  or  less  as  a  dire 
necessity,  instead  of  the  blissful  destiny  of  man. 
No  white  man  could  ever  lose  "  caste."  No 
matter  how  lazy,  poor,  ignorant,  and  depraved 
he  might  be,  yet,  by  virtue  of  the  color  of  his 
skin,  he  was  a  born  member  of  the  aristocracy, 
and  absolutely  nothing  could  deprive  him  of 
his  place  in  it;  for  the  gulf  which  separated  the 
whites  from  the  negroes  could  no  more  be 
bridged  over  than  that  between  heaven  and  hell. 
As  the  human  mind  is  constituted,  no  more 
powerful  incentive  could  be  offered  to  the  mass 
of  the  population  to  sink  deeper  into  nerveless 
shiftlessness.  The  middle  classes  are  the  back 
bone  of  every  civilized  community,  and  slavery 
prevented  the  formation  of  a  well-to-do,  intel 
lectual,  and  progressive  middle  class  more  effect 
ually  than  any  express  law  could  have  done. 
To  work  one's  way  up  from  the  lower  strata  of 
society  into  the  real  aristocracy  of  the  great 
land-owners,  that  is  the  great  slave-holders,  was 
an  enterprise  beset  with  almost  insuperable 
difficulties,  and  the  spirit  of  the  community 
did  not  encourage  the  undertaking  of  the  ardu 
ous  task.  The  greater  the  difference  between 
this  real  aristocracy  and  the  bulk  of  the  white 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  69 

population  actually  was  in  every  respect,  the 
more  the  former  was  forced  to  affect  absolute 
equality  with  the  lowliest  of  their  fellow-citi 
zens.  These  had  to  be  persuaded  that  their 
interests  were  identical  with  those  of  the  rich 
planters  ;  and,  as  they  had  in  fact  more  to  suffer 
from  the  effects  of  slavery  than  the  slaves  them 
selves,  this  could  only  be  accomplished  by  sys 
tematically  instilling  into  them  a  dull  self-con 
ceit  and  suicidal  arrogance,  which  mistook 
shreds  and  tatters  for  purple  and  ermine.  They 
looked  down  upon  every  other  form  of  civiliza 
tion  with  an  air  of  contemptuous  superiority, 
which  would  have  been  exceedingly  ludicrous, 
if  it  had  not  been  infinitely  sad.  That  was 
an  education  rendering  those  who  were  cursed 
with  it  eminently  fit  to  listen  to  political  dis 
cussions,  and  to  retail  the  pretentious  and  vain 
political  wisdom  that  had  been  showered  upon 
them  from  the  stump,  in  their  idle  neighborly 
chats,  but  making  them  bad  farmers,  while  un 
fitting  them  for  everything  but  farming.  The 
population  could  never  become  dense,  for  the 
slave,  who  had  to  work  without  the  spur  of 
self-interest,  tilled  the  soil,  in  spite  of  all  over 
seers  and  whips,  in  a  manner  which,  instead  of 
improving  it,  exhausted  it  in  the  shortest  pos 
sible  time.  Those  who  did  the  work  could 
afford  utterly  to  dispense  with  thinking,  and 


70  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

the  one  head  of  the  master  could  not  supply 
this  want,  nor  did  he,  in  most  cases,  even  try 
to  do  so.  More  and  more  it  became  the  rule 
that  the  planter  lived  on  credit,  eating  up  his 
crop  before  it  had  been  harvested  ;  and  if  he 
was  rich  enough  to  grow  richer,  the  surplus 
was  almost  invariably  invested  in  more  laud 
and  slaves.  What  did  it  matter  if  the  rich  soil 
was  speedily  turned  into  a  barren  waste  !  There 
were  boundless  tracts  of  land  of  still  richer  soil 
left  for  him  to  go  to,  with  his  "  hands." 

In  a  community  thus  constituted  there  is  lit 
tle  need  of  artisans,  and  still  less  of  efficient  and 
skilful  ones.  "  The  upper  ten  thousand  "  had 
the  means  to  supply  their  wants  from  any  dis 
tance  ;  with  the  mass  of  the  people  neither  the 
means  nor  the  wishes  extended  much  beyond 
the  necessaries  of  life  ;  and,  finally,  the  claims 
of  the  slaves  upon  life  were  confined  to  a  hut, 
coarse  raiment,  coarse  food,  and  the  coarsest  ag 
ricultural  implements.  The  artisan,  however, 
is  the  necessary  precursor  of  the  manufacturer. 
Where  the  standard  of  civilization  is  too  low  to 
require  a  numerous  class  of  laborers  skilled  in 
all  sorts  of  handiwork,  manufacturing  on  a  large 
scale  is  as  impossible  as  the  putting  up  of  the 
roof  before  the  building  of  the  walls  which  are 
to  support  it.  Moreover,  the  landed  aristocracy, 
which,  under  democratic  forms,  wielded  the 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  71 

whole  political  and  social  power,  could  not  but 
be  averse  to  the  development  of  a  middle  class 
such  as  the  North  and  all  Europe  —  with  the 
exception  of  the  southeastern  parts  and  Russia 
—  had  to  boast  of.  There  was,  in  later  years, 
much  talking  and  passing  of  resolutions  upon 
the  duty  and  necessity  of  bringing  about  the  in 
dustrial  and  commercial  development  to  which 
the  bounties  of  nature  had  evidently  destined 
the  South.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the 
spirit  which  animated  those  middle  classes  in 
the  North  and  in  Europe,  and  which  alone 
made  them  what  they  were,  was  denounced  and 
abused  as  a  deadly  poison,  the  introduction  of 
which  into  the  South  was  more  to  be  feared 
than  the  plague.  And  these  denunciations,  dic 
tated  by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  were 
but  too  well  founded.  With  the  building  up  of 
commerce  and  the  industrial  pursuits,  that  is, 
with  the  spreading  of  culture  and  prosperity, 
the  delusion  would  inevitably  vanish  that  the 
interests  of  the  small  slave-holders  and  the  rest 
of  the  white  population  coincided  with  those  of 
the  great  planters.  These  last  would  have 
planted  abolitionism  at  the  very  doors  of  their 
mansions,  and  would  have  invited  it  to  the  seat 
of  honor  at  their  hearth-stones.  Slavery  doomed 
the  South  to  be  and  to  remain  an  almost  ex 
clusively  agricultural  country,  and,  at  the  same 


72  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

time,  to  use  up  at  a  steadily  advancing  rate  the 
capital  which  Providence  had  bestowed  upon 
her  in  the  shape  of  a  fertile  soil  and  a  genial  cli 
mate.  So  long  as  slavery  remained  the  dominant 
interest  in  the  Southern  States,  they,  for  that 
very  reason,  had  to  be  hostile  to  a  home  indus 
try,  if  it  needed  to  be  artificially  nursed  into  ex 
istence  by  high  protective  tariffs.  Everything 
they  needed  of  industrial  products  they  were 
obliged  to  buy  from  elsewhere,  and  they  of 
course  wanted  to  buy  where  they  could  get 
the  articles  best  an'd  cheapest.  But  the  pro 
tective  tariffs  forced  them  to  buy  inferior  Amer 
ican  goods  at  a  higher  price,  or  to  pay  for  the 
European  wares  much  more  than  their  real 
value.  We  need  not  here  inquire  into  the  wis 
dom  of  this  "  American  system  "  from  a  na 
tional  point  of  view.  Thus  much  was  incon 
testable,  that  it  ran  counter  to  the  immediate 
interest  of  the  South,  or,  to  speak  more  cor 
rectly,  of  the  great  slave-holders.  Therefore, 
as  the  nature  of  things  cannot  be  changed,  this 
had  to  remain  a  "fixed  fact"  so  long  as  the 
interests  of  the  slave-holders  held  undisputed 
sway  over  the  slave  States.  If,  however,  a  gov 
ernment  pursues  an  economical  policy,  which 
is  permanently  opposed  to  the  immediate  inter 
ests  of  a  geographical  section  of  the  country, 
this  section  will  never  acknowledge  that  the 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  73 

policy  is  or  can  be  compatible  with  the  true 
national  interests. 

Thus  far  no  statesman,  either  south  or  north 
of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line,  had  fully  grasped 
the  question.  The  plantation  States  felt  the  ef 
fect  of  the  American  system,  but  they  did  not  un 
derstand  the  original  cause  of  the  irreconcilable 
conflict  of  interests  between  the  two  sections  of 
the  Union,  nor  was  any  one  aware  that  the  con 
flict  was  irreconcilable  to  the  fullest  extent  of 
the  word.  This  fact  was  the  more  obscured 
because  some  special  interests,  as  those  of  the 
sugar  and  indigo  planters,  caused  an  alliance  be 
tween  a  part  of  the  extreme  South  and  the  pro 
tectionists  ;  and  furthermore,  because  the  bor 
der  States,  in  consequence  of  their  geographical 
situation  and  the  contest  between  the  slave-hold 
ing  interest  and  the  free-labor  system,  limped  on 
both  sides.  Yet  it  was  as  certain  as  a  proposi 
tion  of  Euclid  that  the  conflict  was  irreconcila 
ble,  and  therefore  "  irrepressible,"  because  free 
dom  and  slavery  are  antagonistic  ideas,  acting 
with  equal  energy  upon  the  intellectual,  politi 
cal,  economical,  social,  and  moral  life  of  a  peo 
ple.  It  has  been  truly  said  that  "  compromise  is 
the  essence  of  politics  ;  "  genuine  compromises, 
however,  can  only  be  concluded  with  regard  to 
measures,  never  between  principles,  that  is,  be 
tween  intellectual  and  moral  conceptions  which, 


74  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

in  their  very  essence,  are  the  opposite  poles  of 
an  idea. 

In  relation  to  the  concrete  question,  these 
plain  truths  were,  at  the  time,  as  little  under 
stood  by  Calhoun  as  by  any  other  statesman  of 
the  country.  As  he  was  not  a  member  of  Con 
gress  during  the  contest  which  terminated  in 
the  Missouri  compromise,  we  know  but  little  of 
his  position  towards  the  slavery  question  at  this 
memorable  period.  Enough,  however,  is  known 
of  it  to  prove  that  he  had  not  as  yet  deeply  re 
flected  upon  it.  Like  all  the  other  members  of 
Mr.  Monroe's  cabinet,  he  admitted  the  constitu 
tional  right  of  Congress  to  prohibit  slavery  in 
the  Territories.  If  he  had  perceived  that  this 
was  the  pivotal  point  on  which  the  whole  slav 
ery  question  was  ultimately  to  turn,  and  that 
upon  its  decision  the  existence  of  slavery  de 
pended,  he  certainly  would  not  have  done  so. 
Not  that  he  would  have  wittingly  misinter 
preted  the  Constitution,  but  he  would  have  seen 
the  whole  instrument  in  a  totally  different  light. 
Already  the  maintenance  of  slavery  was,  in  his 
view,  an  incontestable  right  under  the  funda 
mental  law  of  the  land,  and  also  it  was  an  ab 
solute  necessity.  Already  it  was  a  matter  of 
course  with  him  that  everything  else  must  yield 
to  this  consideration.  Adams  writes  on  Febru 
ary  24,  1820,  in  his  Diary  :  — 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  75 

"I  had  some  conversation  with  Calhoun  on  the 
slave  question,  pending  in  Congress.  He  said  he  did 
not  think  it  would  produce  a  dissolution  of  the  Union, 
but  if  it  should  the  South  would  be  from  necessity 
compelled  to  form  an  alliance,  offensive  and  defen 
sive,  with  Great  Britain. 

"  I  said  that  would  be  returning  to  the  colonial 
state. 

"  He  said,  Yes,  pretty  much,  but  it  would  be  forced 
upon  them." 

Ten  years  after  Calhoun's  death,  the  South 
tried  the  realization  of  this  programme.  Long 
before  he  had  begun  to  concentrate  the  whole 
power  of  his  intellect  upon  the  examination  of 
this  problem,  his  unerring  instinct  unveiled  the 
remote  future.  While  the  thinker  and  the 
practical  statesman  but  just  enter  upon  the 
task  which  was  to  constitute  the  dark  glory  of 
his  life,  the  seer  points  to  the  end,  which  is  to 
come  after  his  own  bones  have  been  turned  into 
dust. 

It  was  not  the  territorial  but  the  economical 
question  which  opened  the  eyes  of  Calhoun  and 
pushed  him  with  irresistible  force  into  a  new 
path,  so  that  Adams  said  rather  too  little  than 
too  much  when  he  declared  that  "  his  career  as 
a  statesman  has  been  marked  with  a  series  of 
the  most  flagrant  inconsistencies."  But  he 
wronged  him  grievously  in  asserting  that  "his 


76  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

opinions  are  the  sport  of  every  popular  blast," 
and  that  he  "  veers  round  in  his  politics,  to  be 
always  before  the  wind,  and  makes  his  intellect 
the  pander  of  his  will."  If  these  reproaches 
ever  had  any  foundation,  he  mastered  this  weak 
ness  just  while  and  because  he  abjured  his  for 
mer  political  faith.  Mr.  Curtis  most  justly 
says,  in  his  "  Life  of  Daniel  Webster,"  "  Mr. 
Calhoun  was  a  man  of  deep  convictions."  His 
veering  round  was  gradual,  because  it  was  not 
done  to  serve  some  impure  personal  end,  but 
was  the  result  of  an  honest  change  in  his  opin 
ions.  After  it  had  once  begun,  it  went  steadily 
on  without  pausing  for  a  single  moment,  be 
cause  he  had  taken  his  stand  on  a  principle,  and 
followed  up  the  consequences  of  it  with  masterly 
logic  and  fatalistic  sternness  of  purpose. 

The  tariff  of  1828  gave  birth  to  his  first  great 
political  manifesto,  the  so-called  South  Carolina 
Exposition.  The  document  issued  by  the  legis 
lature  of  that  State  does  not  concern  us  here  ; 
we  have  only  to  deal  with  Calhoun 's  original 
draft  of  it.  Nor  is  it  now  of  any  interest 
whether  his  economical  reasoning  was  correct 
or  fallacious;  only  the  political  conclusions 
which  he  drew  from  his  economical  premises 
are  of  historical  importance.  The  essential 
point  of  these  economical  premises  is  that,  ac 
cording  to  him,  there  is  a  permanent  conflict  of 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  77 

interest  with  regard  to  the  tariff  policy  between 
the  "  staple  States  "  and  the  rest  of  the  Union. 
The  reason  of  this  is  simply  that  the  staple 
States  are  exclusively  devoted  to  agriculture, 
and  will  forever  remain  purely  agricultural  com 
munities,  because  "  our  soil,  climate,  habits, 
and  peculiar  labor  are  adapted"  -to  this  "our 
ancient  and  favorite  pursuit."  This  was  the 
wizard's  wand  which  worked  such  an  astonish 
ing  metamorphosis  in  the  mind  of  Calhoun  that 
one  is  tempted  to  believe  that  a  new  man,  whom 
we  have  never  met  before,  has  stepped  upon  the 
stage.  In  the  beginning  of  his  career  we  have 
heard  him  praised  as  absolutely  free  from  sec 
tional  prejudices  ;  and  we  have  seen  that  he,  in 
deed,  judged  everything  from  a  national  point 
of  view,  hardly  deigning  to  answer  the  objec 
tions  which  legal  quibbles,  party  passion,  and 
local  interests  raised  against  what  the  welfare 
and  the  honor  of  the  "  nation  "  demanded.  But 
now  he  speaks  of  "  our  political  system  resting 
on  the  great  principle  involved  in  the  recognized 
diversity  of  geographical  interests  in  the  com 
munity,"  and  adopts  this  for  the  rest  of  his  life 
as  the  basis  of  all  his  political  reasoning  and  his 
whole  political  activity.  The  "  Exposition  " 
fills  fifty-six  printed  pages,  but  it  does  not  con 
tain  a  single  sentence  bearing  directly  on  the 
national  interest.  This  point  is  only  incidentally 


78  JOHN  C.    CALIIOUN. 

mentioned,  with  the  assertion  that  the  pretended 
unconstitutional  usurpation  of  the  federal  gov 
ernment,  which  has  called  forth  the  "  Exposi 
tion,"  seriously  endangers  the  political  morality 
and  the  liberty  of  the  republic.  The  national 
statesman  is  transformed  into  the  champion  of 
the  interests  and  the  rights  of  the  minority,  and 
the  reason  of  the  change  is  that  the  minority  is 
a  geographical  section  with  a  "  peculiar  labor  " 
system,  which  creates  a  "  recognized  diversity  " 
of  interests.  His  first  question  is  no  more,  What 
ought  the  federal  government  to  do,  and  what 
has  it  the  right  to  do  ?  but,  What  effect  has  the 
policy  of  the  federal  government  on  the  staple 
States  in  their  peculiar  situation,  and  what  con 
stitutional  means  have  they  for  counteracting 
the  pernicious  effects  of  the  federal  policy  ?  The 
corner-stone  of  the  political  edifice  of  the  United 
States  is  henceforth  to  him  no  more  the  princi 
ple  that  the  majority  is  to  rule,  but  that  the 
minority  has  the  right  and  the  power  to  check 
mate  the  majority,  whenever  it  considers  the 
federal  laws  unconstitutional ;  in  other  words, 
whenever  different  views  are  entertained  about 
the  powers  conferred  by  the  Constitution  upon 
the  federal  government,  those  of  the  minority 
were  to  prevail,  provided  it  was  deemed  worth 
while  to  have  recourse  to  the  last  "  constitu 
fcional "  resort. 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  79 

The  Articles  of  Confederation  had  been  sup 
planted  by  the  Constitution  in  order  to  render 
the  Union  "more  perfect."  If  this  purpose 
was  to  be  fulfilled,  the  Union  must  continue  to 
grow  more  perfect,  for  where  life  is  there  is 
also  development.  Either  it  was  an  illusion 
that  the  historical  destiny  of  the  North  Amer 
ican  continent  could  be  fulfilled  by  welding  it 
into  one  Union  composed  of  many  republican 
commonwealths,  and  then  the  Union  would, 
sooner  or  later,  fall  to  pieces,  no  matter  what 
the  Constitution  said;  or  the  authors  of  the  Con 
stitution  had  correctly  understood  the  genius  of 
the  American  people,  and  had  skilfully  adapted 
their  work  to  the  peculiar  natural  conditions 
of  the  country,  and  in  that  event  the  States 
would  steadily  go  on  growing  together  as  the 
parts  of  an  organic  whole,  no  matter  what  this 
or  that  man,  or  even  this  or  that  section,  might 
be  pleased  to  proclaim  as  the  correct  interpre 
tation  of  the  Constitution.  Calhoun  had  been 
so  well  aware  of  this  fact  that  a  favorite  argu 
ment  of  his  in  support  of  the  policy  advocated 
by  him  had  been  the  favorable  effect  it  would 
have  upon  the  "  consolidation  of  the  Union." 
Now  there  was  in  the  whole  political  dictionary 
no  term  more  abhorred  by  him  than  this.  The 
sovereignty  of  the  States,  in  the  fullest  sense 
of  the  term,  is  declared  to  be  the  essential  prin- 


80  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ciple  of  the  Union  ;  and  it  is  not  only  asserted 
as  an  incontestable  right,  but  also  claimed  as  an 
absolute  political  necessity  in  order  to  protect 
the  minority  against  the  majority.  The  author 
ity  quoted  for  this  opinion  is  not  any  section  of 
the  Constitution,  but  the  Virginia  and  Ken 
tucky  resolutions,  with  their  doctrine,  that  the 
States  have  the  right  "  to  interpose  "  when  the 
federal  government  is  guilty  of  a  usurpation, 
because,  as  there  is  no  common  judge  over 
them,  they,  as  the  parties  to  the  compact,  have 
to  determine  for  themselves  whether  it  has  been 
violated.  This  theory  is  brought  by  Calhoun 
into  the  more  precise  formula  that  each  State 
has  the  right  to  "  veto  "  a  federal  law  which  it 
deems  unconstitutional.  Whether  such  a  veto 
is  to  be  an  injunction  against  the  execution  of 
the  law  throughout  the  Union,  or  only  in  the 
individual  State,  and,  in  the  latter  case,  what  is 
to  become  of  the  principle  that  different  federal 
laws  cannot  prevail  in  different  parts  of  the 
Union,  we  do  not  learn  from  the  "  Exposition." 
We  are  only  told  that  the  veto  ought  to  be  pro 
nounced  by  a  convention  as  representing  the 
sovereignty  of  the  State,  but  it  is  left  undecided 
whether  it  might  not  also  be  done  by  the  legis 
lature. 

Calhoun  was  very  far  from  having  completely 
killed  the  old  national  Adam  in  his  bosom.    He 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  81 

therefore  could  not  entirely  suppress  the  feel 
ing  that,  if  this  theory  were  to  be  put  into  prac 
tice,  it  might  lead  after  all  to  very  strange  con 
sequences  with  regard  to  the  legislative  activity 
of  the  federal  government ;  nay,  with  regard 
to  the  life  of  the  Union  itself.  So  he  hastened 
to  show  that  the  veto  was  by  no. means  so  ter 
rible  a  thing  as  it  might  appear  at  the  first 
glance.  In  adopting  the  Constitution  the  States 
had  so  far  abandoned  their  sovereignty  that 
three  fourths  of  them  could  change  the  com 
pact  as  they  pleased.  If,  therefore,  it  was  de 
sired  that  the  federal  government  should  have 
the  contested  power,  it  was  only  necessary  that 
three  fourths  of  the  States  should  say  so,  and 
all  the  damage  done  would  be  that  the  exercis 
ing  of  the  power  had  been  postponed  for  a 
while.  How  was  it  that  these  penetrating  eyes 
failed  to  see  that  the  federal  legislation  might 
thereby  be  turned  into  a  bulky  machine,  more 
fatal  to  healthy  political  life  than  Juggernaut's 
car  to  the  fanatical  worshippers?  But  leaving 
this  practical  objection  aside,  how  was  it  that 
he  failed  to  see  that  thereby  one  fourth  of  the 
States  would  get  the  power  to  change  the  Con 
stitution  at  will  ?  Suppose  —  and  the  case  might 
certainly  very  easily  happen  —  that  the  federal 
government  exercises  a  power  which  has  been 
actually  granted  to  it  by  the  Constitution,  and 


82  JOHN  C.    CALEOUN. 

that  a  State  sees  fit  to  veto  the  law,  that  the 
question,  as  must  be  the  case,  is  submitted  to 
all  the  States,  and  the  objecting  State  is  sup 
ported  by  one  fourth  of  the  whole  number.  Is 
any  dialectician  sbarp  enough  to  disprove  the 
fact  that,  in  such  a  case,  the  Constitution, 
though  not  a  single  letter  is  either  added  or 
erased,  has  been  actually  changed  by  one  fourth 
of  the  States,  though  that  instrument  expressly 
requires  the  consent  of  at  least  three  fourths  to 
effect  the  slightest  change?  Working  in  de 
fence  of  the  peculiar  interests  of  the  slave-hold 
ers  with  the  lever  of  the  state  sovereignty,  Cal- 
houn  thus  begins  to  subvert  the  foundation  of 
the  whole  fabric  of  the  Constitution. 

The  practical  conclusion  to  which  Calhoun 
came  was,  "  that  there  exists  a  case  which 
would  justify  the  interposition  of  this  State,  in 
order  to  compel  the  general  government  to 
abandon  an  unconstitutional  power,  or  to  ap 
peal  to  this  high  authority  [the  States]  to  con 
fer  it  by  express  grant."  He,  however,  deemed 
it  "  advisable  "  "  to  allow  time  for  further  con 
sideration  and  reflection,  in  the  hope  that  a  re 
turning  sense  of  justice  on  the  part  of  the  ma 
jority,  when  they  come  to  reflect  on  the  wrongs 
which  this  and  the  other  staple  States  have  suf 
fered,  and  are  suffering,  may  repeal  the  obnox 
ious  and  unconstitutional  acts,  and  thereby  pre- 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  83 

vent  the  necessity  of  interposing  the  veto  of 
the  State." 

Daniel  Webster  wrote  on  April  10,  1833,  to 
Mr.  Perry,  "  In  December,  1828,  I  became 
thoroughly  convinced  tliat  the  plan  of  a  South 
ern  confederacy  had  been  received  with  favor 
by  a  great  many  of  the  political  men  of  the 
South."  If  this  suspicion  was  well  founded 
the  above-quoted  sentence  of  the  Exposition 
proves  that  Calhoun,  at  all  events,  was  not 
privy  to  such  a  plot.  He  not  only  had  no  de 
sire  to  force  a  crisis  upon  the  country,  but  he 
had  strong  hopes  that  it  would  be  avoided,  and 
he  plainly  stated  his  reasons  for  these  hopes. 
He  was  "  further  induced,  at  this  time,  to  rec 
ommend  this  course,  under  the  hope  that  the 
great  political  revolution,  which  will  displace 
from  power  on  the  4th  of  March  next  those 
who  have  acquired  authority  by  setting  the  will 
of  the  people  at  defiance,  and  which  will  bring 
in  an  eminent  citizen,  distinguished  for  his  ser 
vices  to  the  country  and  his  justice  and  pa 
triotism,  may  be  followed  up,  under  his  influ 
ence,  with  a  complete  restoration  of  the  pure 
principles  of  our  government."  But  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  he  meant  exactly  what  he  said,  nei 
ther  more  nor  less.  He  hoped  that  by  the  in 
fluence  of  Andrew  Jackson  the  protectionists 
would  be  defeated,  but  he  did  not  feel  quite 


84  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

sure  of  it ;  and  if  his  hopes  should  not  be  real 
ized,  he  had  explicitly  stated  what,  in  his  opin 
ion,  ought  to  be  done.  In  order  to  leave  no 
doubt  whatever  on  this  point,  he  followed  up 
the  last-mentioned  sentence  with  the  declara 
tion  that,  in  thus  recommending  delay,  he 
wished  it  "to  be  distinctly  understood  that 
neither  doubts  of  the  rightful  power  of  the 
State  nor  apprehension  of  consequences  "  con 
stituted  the  smallest  part  of  his  motives. 

Calhoun's  reason  for  not  trusting  too  implic 
itly  in  Jackson's  influence  to  bring  about  a  rev 
olution  in  the  economical  policy  of  the  fed 
eral  government  was  the  double  programme 
on  which  the  general  had  been  elected.  In  the 
South  he  had  been  sustained  as  a  friend  of 
"  Southern  interests,"  i.  e.,  as  an  anti-protec 
tionist  ;  while  in  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and 
the  West  he  had  been  supported  as  the  firm 
friend  of  the  tariff  and  of  internal  improve 
ments.  The  inaugural  address  touched  this 
leading  question  of  the  day  but  very  slightly, 
and  with  such  cautious  vagueness  that  neither 
party  was  satisfied,  because  neither  knew  what 
it  had  to  expect  from  the  new  President.  The 
first  annual  message,  which  had  been  looked  for 
with  keen  expectation,  gave  no  more  satisfac 
tion  to  either.  All  that  could  be  safely  inferred 
from  It  was  that  the  President  would  gladly  see 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  85 

some  duties  reduced,  but  it  contained  nothing 
to  justify  the  hope  of  the  South  that  he  would, 
on  principle,  throw  his  whole  weight  into  the 
scales  against  the  entire  protective  system. 
Calhoun  even  saw  a  direct  bid  for  the  favor  of 
the  protectionists  in  the  proposal  to  divide  the 
expected  yearly  surplus  among  the  States  for 
the  execution  of  internal  improvements.  He 
began  to  look  upon  the  President  with  a  certain 
distrust,  and  this  feeling  was  fully  reciprocated 
by  Jackson.  Those  who  had  no  opportunity  to 
observe  the  actors  closely,  while  the  curtain  was 
down,  did  not,  however,  become  aware  of  the 
fact  that  an  ominous  disturbance  in  the  friendly 
relations  between  the  two  first  officers  of  the 
government  had  occurred,  until  the  society  of 
the  capital  had  begun  to  become  convulsed  by 
the  tragi-comical  intermezzo  of  the  Mrs.  Eaton 
affair. 

No  serious  historian  will  be  expected  to  enter 
upon  the  details  of  this  once  celebrated  case  of 
the  American  chronique  scandaleuse.  It  is  the 
less  necessary  to  do  so  because  it  in  fact  only 
helped  on  and  accelerated  the  important  polit 
ical  events,  of  which  it  has  frequently  been  said 
to  have  been  the  main  cause.  It  suffices  to  re 
call  to  the  memory  of  the  reader  that  Mrs. 
Eaton  was  reported  to  have  had  before  her  sec 
ond  marriage  illicit  intercourse  with  her  present 


86  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

husband,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  that  there 
fore  many  ladies  refused  to  admit  her  into  their 
company.  Jackson,  prompted  partly  by  his 
generous  temper,  and  partly  by  the  bitter  recol 
lections  of  what  had  been  said  against  his  own 
wife,  exerted  all  his  influence  to  break  the  social 
ban  under  which  the  wife  of  his  Secretary  and 
personal  friend  had  been  put.  The  ladies,  how 
ever,  were  not  to  be  dictated  to,  and  they  car 
ried  the  day  against  the  victor  of  New  Orleans. 
Against  the  wives  of  the  members  of  his  cab 
inet  even  the  President's  iron  will  was  power 
less,  and  Calhoun,  the  Vice-President,  according 
to  his  own  statement,  considered  it  his  duty 
to  take  the  lead  in  this  determined  opposition 
against  the  attempt  to  force  the  suspected  lady 
upon  society.  Van  Buren,  on  the  contrary,  who 
was  a  widower  and  led  a  bachelor's  life,  even 
surpassed  his  wonted  politeness  in  his  treatment 
of  Mrs.  Eaton.  Jackson,  however,  was  utterly 
unable  to  draw  the  correct  line  between  private 
and  public  affaii's  whenever  his  feelings  were  en 
listed  in  a  cause.  Van  Buren  therefore  greatly 
ingratiated  himself  with  the  President  by  assid 
uously  paying  his  court  to  Mrs.  Eaton,  while 
Calhoun,  by  strictly  adhering  to  the  rigid 
course  of  morality,  which  has  always  distin 
guished  the  family  life  of  South  Carolina,  had 
to  pay  for  it  by  a  corresponding  decline  in  Jack- 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  87 

son's  good  will.  Both  Van  Buren  and  Calhoun 
ardently  wished  to  succeed  the  general  in  the 
presidency,  and  neither  of  them  failed  to  see 
that  Jackson's  favor  might  go  far  towards  de 
ciding  who  should  be  the  next  occupant  of  the 
White  House.  Moreover,  Calhoun  was  serving 
his  second  term  as  Vice-President.  All  the 
precedents  were  against  his  presenting  himself 
once  more  as  a  candidate  for  reelection,  and  he 
justly  apprehended  that  to  return  for  four  years 
into  private  life  might  postpone  the  realization 
of  his  long-deferred  hopes  ad  calendas  G-rcecas. 
He  was  therefore  most  anxious  that  Jackson 
should  serve  but  one  term,  while,  for  the  same 
reason,  Van  Buren  and  his  partisans  were  not 
less  zealous  advocates  of  Jackson's  reelection. 

So,  while  everything  was  yet  quiet  and 
smooth  on  the  surface,  the  mine  was  dug  and 
charged ;  one  spark  sufficed  to  lead  to  a  great 
catastrophe.  Calhoun  himself  remained  to  the 
end  of  his  life  firmly  convinced  that  Van  Buren 
was  the  engineer  who  had  constructed  the  in 
genious  battery  for  the  explosion.  Though 
there  is  no  documentary  proof  for  it,  yet  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  Van  Buren  did  in  fact 
take  part  in  devising  the  scheme  ;  but  he  was 
too  wary  and  too  cunning  in  such  transactions 
ever  to  do  himself  what  could  be  done  as  well, 
or  even  better,  by  some  devoted  friend.  Ad- 


88  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

ams,  however,  writes  on  January  30,  1831, 
"  Wirt  concurred  entirely  with  me  in  opinion 
that  this  was  a  snare  deliberately  spread  by 
Crawford  to  accomplish  the  utter  ruin  of  Cal- 
houn."  The  opportunities  for  these  two  men 
to  be  well  informed  were  too  good  not  to  re 
quire  that  the  greatest  weight  be  accorded  to 
their  opinion.  Besides,  the  powder  for  the 
petard  was  confessedly  furnished  by  Craw 
ford's  guilty  indiscretion.  He  divulged  the 
secrets  of  certain  of  the  cabinet  meetings  of 
Monroe's  administration,  which  filled  Jackson's 
mind  with  deep  hatred  and  contempt  against 
Calhoun.  If  we  were  writing  the  biography  of 
Andrew  Jackson,  it  would  be  necessary,  in  this 
connection,  to  review  the  whole  controversy 
concerning  the  general's  conduct  in  the  Semi- 
nole  war.  But  in  a  life  of  Calhoun  we  can 
with  propriety  dispense  with  that  thankless 
task,  confining  our  remarks  to  a  single  point  in 
it,  and  even  that  may  be  treated  with  great 
brevity. 

In  the  course  of  his  operations  against  the 
Seminoles,  General  Jackson  had  not  only  crossed 
the  Florida  boundary,  as  he  was  authorized  to 
do  in  case  the  object  of  the  campaign  could  not 
otherwise  be  attained,  but  he  had  forcibly  taken 
possession  of  the  Spanish  forts  at  St.  Mark's 
and  Pensacola.  In  July,  1818,  the  question  as 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  89 

to  whether  and  how  far  these  high-handed  pro 
ceedings  should  be  sustained  by  the  administra 
tion  formed  the  subject  of  long  and  earnest 
discussions  by  Mr.  Monroe  and  his  cabinet. 
The  general  had  acted  in  good  faith.  A  letter 
to  the  President,  in  which  he  communicated  his 
intentions,  having  accidentally  remained  unan 
swered,  he  mistook  the  silence  for  tacit  consent, 
and  afterwards,  without  regard  to  dates,  even 
adduced  a  subsequent  letter  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  a  third  person  as  proof  that  the  govei'n- 
ment  had  given  him  full  discretion.  This  was 
by  no  moans  the  view  which  Mr.  Monroe  and 
his  cabinet  took  of  the  matter.  Even  Adams, 
who  went  farthest  in  supporting  the  general's 
course,  did  not  undertake  to  justify  it  wholly  by 
rules  of  international  law,  but  deemed  it  neces 
sary  to  adduce  considerations  of  high  policy  for 
his  opinion.  Calhoun,  as  Adams  states  in  his 
Diary,  "  principally  bore  the  argument  against 
me,  insisting  that  the  capture  of  Pensacola  was 
not  necessary  upon  principles  of  self-defence, 
and  therefore  was  both  an  act  of  war  against 
Spain  and  a  violation  of  the  Constitution  ;  that 
the  administration,  by  approving  it,  would  take 
all  the  blame  of  it  upon  themselves  ;  that  by 
leaving  it  upon  his  responsibility  they  would 
take  away  from  Spain  all  pretext  for  war  and 
lor  resorting  to  the  aid  of  other  European  pow- 


90  JOHN   C.   CALHOUN. 

ers, — they  would  also  be  free  from  al]  reproach 
of  having  violated  the  Constitution  that  it  was 
not  the  menace  of  the  Governor  of  Pensacola, 
that  had  determined  Jackson  to  take  that 
place ;  that  he  had  really  resolved  to  take  it 
before  ;  that  he  had  violated  his  orders,  and 
upon  his  own  arbitrary  will  set  all  authority  at 
defiance."  He  therefore  demanded  an  inves 
tigation  of  the  general's  conduct ;  but  although 
"  all  the  members  of  the  cabinet,  except  myself 
[Adams]  are  of  opinion  that  Jackson  acted  not 
only  without,  but  against,  his  instructions,"  and 
"  that  he  has  committed  war  upon  Spain,"  a 
middle  course  was  finally  adopted,  which,  with 
out  directly  and  formally  disavowing  the  gen 
eral,  satisfied  Spain. 

Jackson  knew  that  his  conduct  had  not  met 
with  the  approval  of  the  administration,  but  he 
had  heretofore  believed  that  the  contemplated 
proceedings  against  him  had  been  principally 
urged  by  Crawford,  and  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  Calhoun  had  exerted  himself  in  his  de 
fence.  Now,  however,  a  letter  from  Crawford 
to  Senator  Forsyth  (April  30, 1830),  which  had 
been  written  for  this  purpose,  was  put  into  his 
hands,  and  undeceived  him  on  the  latter  point, 
at  the  same  time  giving  a  false  and  malicious 
coloring  to  the  whole  transaction.  If  any  mem 
ber  of  the  administration  had  been  animated 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  91 

by  a  really  hostile  spirit  against  the  general,  it 
had  been  Crawford;  yet  Crawford  now  pre 
tended  that,  upon  learning  all  the  attending  cir 
cumstances,  he  had  become  satisfied  that  Jack 
son  was  fully  excused,  if  not  justified.  And 
the  weight  which  he  thus  shook  from  his  own 
shoulders  he  shifted  upon  the  back  of  Calhoun, 
by  the  bold  exaggeration  that  the  latter  had 
persistently  demanded  the  punishment  of  the 
general. 

These  revelations  threw  Jackson  into  a  tow 
ering  passion.  On  May  13  he  sent  Crawford's 
letter  with  a  curt  note  to  Calhoun,  demanding 
"  to  learn  of  you  whether  it  be  possible  that 
the  information  given  is  correct."  Calhoun 
might  have  declined  to  answer  the  interroga 
tory,  because  nobody  had  a  right  to  demand 
from  him  a  confession  concerning  what  had 
passed  in  the  cabinet  meetings  of  the  adminis 
tration,  of  which  he  had  been  a  member.  He, 
however,  replied  with  a  long  statement  and 
elaborate  argument,  which  had  too  much  the 
character  of  a  justification  of  his  conduct  and  of 
an  impeachment  of  Crawford's  behavior  and 
motives.  Though  he  proved  that  Jackson  could 
and  ought  to  have  known  that  the  proceedings 
in  Florida  were,  at  the  time,  considered  by  him 
(Calhoun)  transgressions  of  the  orders  issued 
from  his  department,  and  that  he  had,  without 


92  JOHN  C.   CALEOUN. 

any  personal  hostility,  acted  according  to  his 
convictions  of  duty,  for  which  he  owed  no  ac 
count  to  the  general  either  then  or  now,  all  such 
arguments  did  not  avail  him  anything,  and  his 
dignity  would  have  been  better  served  by  tak 
ing  higher  ground.  Most  truly  did  he  say,  "  It 
was  an  affair  of  mere  official  duty,  involving 
no  question  of  private  enmity  or  friendship ;  " 
but  that  was  a  view  which  Andi'ew  Jackson  was 
absolutely  unable  to  understand.  In  theory  he 
may  have  admitted  the  possibility  of  an  honest 
difference  of  opinion,  but  whatever  related  to 
himself  he  could  only  see  in  an  eminently  per 
sonal  light ;  and  if  any  one  whom  he  deemed 
his  friend  had  the  misfortune  and  audacity  to 
differ  with  him,  the  brand  of  Cain  was  indelibly 
stamped  on  that  man's  forehead.  All  Calhoun 
got  for  his  pains  was  violent,  impudent,  and 
absurd  abuse,  mingled  with  ludicrous  pathos. 
He  was  charged  with  "  secretly  endeavoring  to 
destroy  my  reputation,"  while  the  poor  victim 
"had  too  exalted  an  opinion  of  your  honor  and 
frankness  to  believe  for  one  moment  that  you 
could  be  capable  of  such  deception.  ...  I  re 
peat,  I  had  a  right  to  believe  that  you  were  my 
sincere  friend,  and,  until  now,  never  expected 
to  have  occasion  to  say  of  you,  in  the  language 
of  Cgesar,  Et  tu,  Brute  !  " 

The  reproach  of  a  lack  of   frankness  was, 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  93 

however,  not  quite  unfounded,  but  it  was 
now,  rather  than  heretofore,  that  Calhoun  was 
guilty  of  it.  He  declared  in  his  reply  of  May 
29,  "I  neither  questioned  your  patriotism  nor 
your  motives."  Adams's  Diary,  that  invaluable 
source  of  historical  information,  furnishes  the 
proof  tli at  this  was  not  strictly  true.  On  July 
14,  1818,  Adams  gives  it  as  his  impression 
that  "  Calhoun,  the  Secretary  of  War,  generally 
of  sound,  judicious,  and  comprehensive  mind, 
seems  in  this  case  to  be  personally  offended 
with  the  idea  that  Jackson  has  set  at  naught 
the  instructions  of  the  department."  Again, 
in  a  short  synopsis  of  a  conversation  between 
himself  and  Calhoun,  on  March  2,  1831,  two 
weeks  after  the  publication  of  the  correspond 
ence  with  Jackson,  Adams  writes,  — 

"  He  said,  too,  that  bis  remark  in  the  cabinet  meet 
ing,  in  reply  to  my  argument  that  Jackson's  taking 
the  Spanish  forts  had  been  defensive,  to  meet  the 
threats  of  Masot,  namely,  that  Jackson  had  deter 
mined  to  take  the  province  before,  was  not  with  al 
lusion  to  the  letter  of  January  6, 1818,1  but  to  a  rumor 
that  Jackson  had  been  personally  interested  in  a  pre 
vious  land  speculation  at  Pensacola." 

This  breach  with  Jackson  was  the  death 
blow  to  the  presidential  aspirations  of  Calhoun. 

1  Jackson's  letter  to  the  President,  before  alluded  to,  which 
bad  accidentally  remained  unanswered. 


94  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

Mr.  Wirt  thought  "  that  he  had  blasted  his 
prospects  of  future  advancement  forever,"  and 
Adams  called  him  "  a  drowning  man,"  at  the 
same  time,  however,  asserting  that  he  "  never 
theless  entertains  very  sanguine  hopes."  Per 
haps  this  expression  was  a  little  too  strong,  but 
at  all  events  Calhoun  maintained  his  candidacy 
a  while  longer,  although  he  not  only  had  to 
encounter  the  enmity  of  Jackson's  partisans, 
but  could  also  no  longer  count  upon  the  support 
of  New  England,  which  had  become  ill-disposed 
towards  him  by  reason  of  the  political  course  of 
his  friends  in  Congress.  It  was  rumored  that 
Clay's  Western  friends  were  inclined  to  take 
him  up,  in  case  they  should  find  the  chances 
of  their  own  champion  desperate,  and  Calhoun 
himself  seems  to  have  thought  it  possible  that, 
if  he  should  conclude  to  run  against  Jackson, 
the  election  might  revert  once  more  to  the 
House  of  Representatives.  But  the  drift  of 
public  opinion  was  too  strong  not  to  destroy 
these  illusions  very  speedily.  Calhoun's  disap 
pointment  was,  undoubtedly,  very  bitter ;  but 
those  strangely  misjudged  the  man  who  attrib 
uted  to  it  the  terrible  energy  with  which  he 
henceforth  pursued  the  course  upon  which  he 
had  entered  with  the  South  Carolina  Exposi 
tion.  He  was  not  driven  by  disappointed  am 
bition  into  a  sectional  policy  with  a  view  to- 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  95 

wards  tearing  the  Union  asunder,  in  order  to 
become  the  chief  of  one  half,  because  he  could 
not  be  the  chief  of  the  whole.  Slavery  had 
split  the  Union  into  two  geographical  sections, 
and,  in  spite  of  everything  man  could  do,  the 
rent  widened  into  a  chasm,  and  the  chasm  into 
an  abyss.  That  was  not  the  work- of  Calhoun, 
but  the  unavoidable  consequence  of  the  fact 
that  the  Union  was  composed  of  free  and  slave- 
holding  States.  He  could  not  have  done  it  if 
he  had  wanted  to,  and  he  was  as  far  as  any  man 
from  wanting  to  do  it.  The  only  effect  of  the 
disappointment  of  his  ambition  was  the  quick 
dispersion  of  the  mist  which  had  hitherto  been 
lying  over  his  eyes  as  over  those  of  the  whole 
people.  The  shackles  of  minor  considerations 
and  personal  interests  began  to  fall  from  his 
limbs.  Embittered  but  free,  he  henceforth  pur 
sued  his  course,  forming  alliances  without  heed 
ing  the  claims  of  old  or  new  party  connections, 
and  not  afraid  to  encounter  the  enmity  of  any 
one  ;  never  ceasing  to  love  and  cherish  the 
Union,  but  learning  to  love  slavery  better  and 
better.  He  was  not  a  demi-god,  but  a  man, 
having  his  full  share  of  human  weakness  and 
littleness.  But  nature  had  not  only  endowed 
him  with  a  powerful  brain ;  the  marrow  of  his 
bones  and  the  core  of  his  heart  were  sound. 
Not  for  the  world  would  he  have  betrayed  his 


96  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

country,  and  even  slavery  could  not  turn  him 
into  a  dark  conspirator.  Yet  it  has  been  pre 
tended  that  he  was  guilty  of  such  betrayal  and 
conspiracy  merely  in  order  to  see  the  title  Pres 
ident  prefixed  to  his  name.  Those  who,  like 
Senator  Benton,  honestly  believed  this,  stum 
bled  into  an  egregious  blunder,  because,  in  spite 
of  all  their  keen-sightedness,  they  remained 
blind  to  the  fact  that  the  wedlock  between  slav 
ery  and  freedom  could  not  be  a  lasting  one. 
What  they  attributed  to  the  traitorous  machin 
ations  of  his  disappointed  ambition  would  have 
happened,  even  though  out  of  every  fibre  of 
John  C.  Calhoun  a  Henry  Clay,  a  Daniel  Web 
ster,  and  a  Thomas  Benton  had  been  made.  It 
was  not  a  crime,  but  it  was  his  misfortune,  that 
he  saw  everything  relating  to  slavery  with  such 
appalling  clearness,  discerning,  with  unerring 
eye,  the  last  consequences  at  the  first  glance. 

As  soon  as  all  hope  had  to  be  given  up  that 
the  protective  system  could  be  destroyed  with 
Jackson's  help  in  the  regular  parliamentary  way, 
Calhoun  resumed  the  contest  at  the  point  where 
he  had  left  it  with  the  South  Carolina  Exposi 
tion.  His  second  manifesto  —  "  Address  to  the 
People  of  South  Carolina,"  dated  Fort  Hill,  July 
26,  1831  —  was  published  in  the  "  Pendleton 
Messenger."  The  whole  question  of  the  rela 
tion  which  the  States  and  the  general  govern- 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  97 

merit  bear  to  each  other,  i.  e.,  of  state  sover 
eignty,  was  reargued.  The  key-note  of  his 
whole  argument  and  of  his  whole  subsequent 
political  life  is  the  assertion,  "The  great  dis 
similarity  and,  as  I  must  add,  as  truth  compels 
me  to  do,  contrariety  of  interests  in  our  country 
.  .  .  are  so  great  that  they  cannot  be  subjected 
to  the  unchecked  will  of  a  majority  of  the  whole 
without  defeating  the  great  end  of  government, 
without  which  it  is  a  curse,  —  justice."  This 
is  the  real  broad  foundation  of  his  doctrine  that 
the  Union  could  never  have  a  safe  foundation 
upon  any  other  legal  basis  save  state  sover 
eignty,  which  enables  the  minority  to  defend 
themselves  against  usurpations.  No  new  argu 
ment  is  adduced  either  on  the  constitutional  or 
on  the  economical  question,  but  the  whole  rea 
soning  is  closer  and  the  language  is  more  direct 
and  bolder.  The  federal  government  has  dwin 
dled  down  to  a  mere  "  agent  "  of  the  "  sover 
eign  States,"  and  the  veto  power  of  these  is 
termed  "  nullification." 

Calhoun  had,  of  course,  not  expected  to  con 
vince  his  adversaries.  What  he  wanted  was  to 
mark  off  the  old,  widely  trodden  road  with  the 
utmost  precision,  so  that  in  future  no  gap  could 
be  reasoned  into  it,  and  to  consolidate  his  own 
party,  and  to  inspire  it  with  resolution  to  live 
up  to  its  profession  of  faith.  The  apprehen- 


98  JOHN  C.   CALIIOUN. 

sion  that  this  would  be  done  was  great  enough 
to  dampen  the  ardor  of  the  protectionists  when 
the  tariff  question  came  again  before  Congress. 
The  duties  were  considerably  reduced,  but  the 
plantation  States  were  not  satisfied  either  with 
the  amount  or  with  the  manner  in  which  the 
reduction  was  effected.  South  Carolina  re 
ceived  the  new  tariff  as  a  declaration  that  the 
protective  system  was  "  the  settled  policy  of 
the  country,"  and  on  August  28, 1832,  Calhoun 
issued  his  third  manifesto,  determined  to  have 
the  die  cast  without  further  delay.  This  letter 
to  Governor  Hamilton  of  South  Carolina  is  the 
final  and  classical  exposition  of  the  theory  of 
state  sovereignty.  Nothing  new  has  ever  been 
added  to  it.  All  the  later  discussions  of  it 
have  but  varied  the  expressions  and  amplified 
the  argument  on  particular  points.  Thirty 
years  later  the  programme  laid  down  in  it  was 
carried  out  by  the  South  piece  by  piece,  and 
the  justification  of  the  Southern  course  was 
based,  point  by  point,  upon  this  argument. 

The  late  champion  of  a  national  policy  and 
of  consolidating  measures  now  takes  for  his 
starting-point  the  assertion  that,  "  so  far  from 
the  Constitution  being  the  work  of  the  American 
people  collectively,  no  such  political  body,  either 
now  or  ever,  did  exist."  The  historical  review 
by  which  he  tried  to  prove  this  assertion  con- 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  99 

tains  two  seemingly  slight,  but  in  fact  very- 
important,  errors.  The  colonies  did  not  "  by 
name  and  enumeration  "  declare  themselves  free 
and  independent  States,  nor  is  the  Constitu 
tion  declared  "  to  be  binding  between  the  States 
so  ratifying,"  but  Article  VII.  of  the  Constitu 
tion  reads,  "  The  ratification  of  the  conventions 
of  nine  States  shall  be  sufficient  for  the  es 
tablishment  of  this  Constitution  between  the 
States  so  ratifying."  From  these  historic 
"  facts  "  he  draws  the  conclusion  "  that  there  is 
no  direct  and  immediate  connection  between 
the  individual  citizens  of  a  State  and  the  general 
government."  Strange  indeed!  for  the  authors 
and  the  advocates  of  the  Constitution  thought 
that  the  most  important  change  effected  in  the 
political  structure  of  the  Union,  by  substituting 
the  Constitution  for  the  Articles  of  Confedera 
tion,  was  exactly  the  establishment  of  direct 
and  immediate  connections  between  the  indi 
vidual  citizens  and  the  federal  government ; 
and  not  a  single  day  passed  in  which  a  great 
number  of  citizens  were  not  actually  brought 
into  contact  with  the  federal  government,  in 
the  courts,  in  the  custom-houses,  in  the  depart 
ments,  etc.,  without  being  reminded  in  any  way 
whatever  that  they  were  citizens  of  this  or  that 
particular  State.  If  the  relation  between  the 
individual  citizen  and  the  federal  government 


100  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

were,  in  fact,  exclusively  through  the  State, 
then,  indeed,  it  might  have  been  true  that 
"  it  belongs  to  the  State  as  a  member  of  the 
Union,  in  her  sovereign  capacity  in  convention, 
to  determine  definitely,  as  far  as  her  citizens 
are  concerned,  the  extent  of  the  obligation 
which  she  has  contracted  ;  and  if,  in  her  opinion, 
the  act  exercising  the  power  [in  dispute]  be  un 
constitutional,  to  declare  it  null  and  void,  which 
declaration  would  be  obligatory  on  her  citizens." 
The  federal  government  is  floating  in  the  air 
without  a  straw  of  its  own  to  rest  upon,  the 
sport  of  the  sovereign  fancies  of  the  States. 
"  Not  a  provision  can  be  found  in  the  Consti 
tution  authorizing  the  general  government  to 
exercise  any  control  whatever  over  a  State  by 
force,  by  veto,  by  judicial  process,  or  in  any 
other  form,  —  a  most  important  omission,  de 
signed,  and  not  accidental."  And  the  actual 
state  of  the  case  corresponds  with  the  right, 
for  "  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  general 
government,  within  the  limits  of  the  States,  to 
execute,  legally,  the  act  nullified,  while,  on  the 
Other  hand,  the  State  would  be  able  to  enforce, 
legally  aud  peaceably,  its  declaration  of  nullifi 
cation."  Yet  nullification  is  declared  to  be 
"  the  great  conservative  principle  "  of  the  Union. 
Undoubtedly,  there  is  method  in  this  madness, 
but  madness  it  is  nevertheless  ;  for  the  whole 


VICE-PRRSIDENT.  101 

theory  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  system- 
atizatiou  of  anarchy.  The  Union  is  constructed 
upon  the  principle  that  the  essence  of  the  idea 
State,  the  supremacy  of  the  will  which  has  to 
act  for  the  whole,  —  that  is,  in  a  free  State,  the 
government  of  the  laws,  —  is  by  principle  ex 
cluded  from  its  structure.  If  there  ever  was  an 
illustration  of  the  "tragedy  of  Hamlet  with  the 
part  of  Hamlet  left  out,"  here  it  is.  This  vast 
republic,  to  which  the  future  belonged  more 
than  to  any  other  state  of  the  globe,  was  to  be 
a  shooting  star,  a  political  monster  without  a 
supreme  will,  because  this  could  be  lodged  no 
where  with  safety.  The  resort  to  force — 
"  should  folly  or  madness  ever  make  the  at 
tempt  "  —  would  be  utterly  vain,  if  at  all  pos 
sible,  for  "  it  would  be  ...  a  conflict  of  moral, 
not  physical,  force."  This  moral  force,  how 
ever,  was  also  but  a  rope  of  sand,  if  a  sovereign 
State  should  so  will  it.  Even  a  decision  by 
three  fourths  of  the  States  would  by  no  means  be 
unconditionally  binding  upon  all  the  members 
of  the  Union.  u  Should  the  other  members  un 
dertake  to  grant  the  power  nullified,  and  should 
the  nature  of  the  power  be  such  as  to  defeat 
the  object  of  the  association  or  union,  at  least 
as  far  as  the  member  nullifying  is  concerned, 
t  would  then  become  an  abuse  of  power  on 
the  part  of  the  principals,  and  thus  present  a 


102  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

case  where  secession  would  apply."  The  Union 
was  to  have  laws  only  so  long  and  just  so  far 
as  every  constituent  member  of  it  was  pleased 
to  submit  to  them.  In  his  great  political  tes 
tament,  the  "  Disquisition  on  Government," 
Calhoun  directly  says,  "  Nothing  short  of  a 
negative,  absolute  or  in  effect,  on  the  part  of 
the  government  [!]  of  a  State  can  possibly  pro 
tect  it  against  the  encroachments  of  the  united 
government  of  the  States,  whenever  [!]  their 
powers  come  in  conflict."  And  as  even  this 
might  prove  not  to  be  a  sufficient  protection, 
each  State  was  to  have,  in  the  form  of  the  right 
of  secession,  a  most  absolute  veto  against  all 
its  co-States.  What  a  nice  checker-board  the 
United  States  might  become,  if  the  exercise  of 
this  right  should  get  to  be  the  political  fashion  ! 
Suppose  the  States  at  the  mouths  of  the  great 
streams,  and  four  or  five  others  commanding  a 
part  of  their  navigable  waters,  should  secede, 
what  a  pretty  picture  the  map  of  the  United ' 
States  would  present !  Why,  the  German  Bund 
of  by-gone  days  would  have  had  a  most  for 
midable  rival.  Calhoun  himself  would  have 
turned  with  disgust  and  contempt  from  the 
idea  of  thus  bridging  over  the  craggy  actualities 
of  life  with  the  cobwebs  of  an  over-subtle  logic, 
if  he  had  conceived  the  possibility  of  his  theory 
being  ever  put  into  practice  in  this  manner.  It 


VICE-PRESIDENT.  103 

seemed  to  him  so  plausible  only  because  he 
was  fully  conscious  of  the  fact  that,  if  it  were 
ever  put  to  the  test,  the  Union  would  split  into 
two  solid  geographical  sections.  Never  would 
he  have  stultified  his  intellect  by  this  ingenious 
systematization  of  anarchy,  if  he  could  not 
have  written,  — 

"  Who,  of  any  party,  with  the  least  pretension  to 
caudor,  can  deny  that  on  all  these  points  [the  great 
questions  of  trade,  of  taxation,  of  disbursement  and 
appropriation,  and  the  nature,  character,  and  power  of 
the  general  government]  se  deeply  important,  no  two 
distinct  nations  can  be  more  opposed  than  this  [the 
staple  States]  and  the  other  sections  ?  " 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   SENATE. 

ON  November  24  the  South  Carolina  con 
vention  passed  the  nullification  ordinance,  which 
was  to  take  effect  on  February  1,  1833.  Cal- 
houn  at  once  resigned  the  vice-presidency,  in 
order  to  take  the  seat  in  the  United  States  Sen 
ate,  vacated  by  General  Hayne,  who  had  been 
elected  Governor  of  South  Carolina.  Hun 
dreds  of  eyes  closely  scrutinized  the  face  of  the 
"  great  nullifier  "  as  he  took  the  oath  to  sup 
port  the  Constitution,  but  the  firm  repose  of  his 
countenance  dispelled  all  doubts  of  his  sincer 
ity.  His  personal  courage,  however,  was  seri 
ously  questioned  by  many.  Benton  and  others 
assure  us  that  he  finally  yielded,  because  he  had 
been  informed  that  Jackson  had  threatened  to 
hang  him  as  high  as  Haman.  This  dramatic 
anecdote  has  been  repeated  so  often  that  the 
mass  of  the  American  people  have  come  to  be 
lieve  it  as  an  undoubted  historic  fact.  That 
Jackson  may  have  uttered  some  such  threat  is 
probable  enough,  but  Calhoun  never  betrayed 
such  a  weakness  of  nerves  as  to  justify  a  sus- 


TflE  SENATE.  105 

picion  that  an  empty  threat  could  wipe  from  his 
brains  all  remembrance  of  the  Constitution. 
And  an  empty  threat  this  most  certainly  was, 
if  it  was  ever  made.  Jackson  was  not  now 
the  general  commanding  in  the  wilds  of  Flor 
ida,  but  President  of  the  United  States ;  and 
Calhoun  was  not  an  Arbuthnot  or  Ambrister, 
but  a  senator  of  the  United  States.  The  sec 
tion  of  the  Constitution,  however,  has  yet  to  be 
written  which  empowers  the  President  to  hung 
any  man,  and  especially  a  United  States  sena 
tor.  The  hanging  story  may  have  been  good 
enough  at  the  time  for' political  purposes,  but  it 
deserves  no  place  in  history.  Yet  Calhoun  knew 
well  enough  that  not  only  he  personally,  but 
also  his  State,  was  playing  a  high  game,  in  which 
eventually  powder  and  lead,  and  perhaps  even 
the  hangman,  upon  the  requisition  of  the  courts 
or  of  a  court-martial,  might  speak  the  last  word. 
He  therefore  did  yield,  but  only  because  Con 
gress  and  Jackson  —  notwithstanding  the  justly 
celebrated  "proclamation"  —  yielded  still  more. 
The  explanations  with  which  Calhoun  accom 
panied  his  affirmative  vote  on  a  certain  provision 
of  the  tariff  bill,  after  he  had  declared  it  un 
constitutional,  were  vain  talk ;  he  bent  his  proud 
neck,  because  Mr.  Clayton  had  left  him  no  al 
ternative  except  to  submit,  or  to  let  the  whole 
compromise  fail.  On  the  other  hand,  however, 


106  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

the  new  tariff  conceded  in  the  main  the  de 
mands  of  South  Carolina,  and  the  so-called 
Force  Bill,  which  gave  the  President  the  means 
to  subdue  by  force  of  arms  any  resistance  to 
the  laws  of  the  Union,  was  only  passed  after 
the  passage  of  the  tariff  bill  had  been  fully  se 
cured.  Congress,  with  the  reluctant  approval 
of  the  President,  bought  the  acquiescence  of 
South  Carolina,  and  then  the  daring  little  State 
was  told  that  she  would  have  been  crushed  had 
she  persisted  in  her  mad  course.  A  dread  —  hon 
orable  and  patriotic  indeed,  but  on  the  part  of 
the  federal  government  much  to  be  regretted 
—  of  the  consequences  had  forced  both  parties 
from  their  original  stand-point.  The  princi 
ple  was  purposely  left  undecided,  and,  as  to  the 
immediate  practical  questions,  a  compromise 
was  effected  ;  but  if  either  party  had  a  right  to 
claim  the  victory,  it  was  certainly  not  Jackson 
and  the  majority  of  Congress,  but  Calhoun  and 
South  Carolina. 

Another,  and  perhaps  the  best,  proof  that  ap 
prehensions  for  his  personal  safety,  on  account 
of  Jackson's  reported  threats,  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  course  pursued  by  Calhoun,  is  the  calm 
ness  with  which  he  reviewed  the  field  after  the 
contest  was  over.  There  was  not  a  single  man 
in  either  camp  who  judged  the  results  of  it 
more  correctly  than  he.  Whenever  a  suitable 


THE  SENATE.  107 

opportunity  wits  offered,  he  claimed,  in  a  calm 
and  dignified  but  very  decided  manner,  that 
the  overthrow  of  the  protective  system  was  due 
to  the  resistance  offered  by  South  Carolina,  and 
that  the  conservative  and  beneficial  character 
of  nullification  had  been  proved  by  experience. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  he  never  failed  to 
acknowledge  that  the  doctrine  of  states-rights 
had  suffered  a  defeat  by  the  passage  of  the 
Force  Bill.  He  even  laid  greater  stress  upon 
this  fact,  and  exaggerated  its  significance.  On 
April  9, 1834,  he  delivered  a  speech  in  support 
of  a  bill,  which  he  had  introduced,  to  repeal  the 
obnoxious  act,  although  by  its  own  limitation 
the  power  conferred  by  it  on  the  President  was 
to  expire  at  the  termination  of  this  session. 
Those  who  charged  him  with  doing  so  only 
in  order  to  appear  consistent,  greatly  deceived 
themselves.  From  the  moment  that  he  had  as 
sumed  the  leadership  of  the  states-rights  party 
the  principles  obsta  was  always  present  to  his 
mind,  and  the  unswerving  rigor  with  which  he 
applied  it  goes  far  to  explain  why  he  held  such 
a  unique  position  among  the  Southern  statesmen 
in  the  slavery  conflict.  "  The  precedent,  unless 
the  act  be  expunged  from  the  statute  book,  will 
live  forever,  ready,  on  «,ny  pretext  of  future 
danger,  to  be  quoted  as  an  authority  to  confer 
on  the  chief  magistrate  similar  or  even  more 


108  JOHN  C.   CALUOUN. 

dangerous  powers,  if  more  dangerous  can  be  de 
vised."  Therefore  he  declared  it  "  subversive 
of  our  political  institutions,  and  fatal  to  the  lib 
erty  and  happiness  of  the  country,"  although, 
as  to  the  immediate  object  for  which  it  pur 
ported  to  be  passed,  the  compromise  tariff  had 
rendered  it  a  piece  of  waste  paper  ere  it  had 
been  inscribed  on  the  statute  book.  He  was 
not  lulled  into  the  sleep  of  false  security  by  the 
calm  after  the  first  blast  of  the  storm.  Al 
ready  in  the  so-called  Edgefield  letter  of  March 
27,  1833,  declining  an  invitation  to  a  public 
dinner,  he  had  written,  "  The  struggle  to  pre 
serve  the  liberty  and  Constitution  of  the  coun 
try,  and  to  arrest  the  corrupt  and  dangerous 
tendency  of  the  government,  so  far  from  being 
over,  is  not  more  than  fairly  commenced.  .  .  . 
Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves  by  supposing  that 
the  danger  is  past.  We  have  but  checked  the 
disease.  If  one  evil  has  been  remedied,  another 
has  succeeded." 

As  he  declined  all  public  demonstrations  pro 
posed  to  be  given  in  acknowledgment  of  the 
stand  he  had  taken  against  the  federal  govern 
ment,  because  he  did  not  want  to  carry  fuel  to 
the  fire  of  his  calumniators,  who  attributed  his 
course  solely  to  impure  personal  motives,  so  also 
he  abstained  from  currying  the  favor  of  his  own 
party  by  shouting  triumph  and  flattering  them 


THE  SENATE.  109 

with  paeans.  To  sound  the  tocsin  was  the  un 
grateful  task  of  the  rest  of  his  life,  and  the 
greater  the  success  of  the  slave  power  the  harder 
he  pulled  the  rope.  In  August,  1833,  he  wrote 
to  the  citizens  of  Newton  County,  who  had  ten 
dered  him  a  public  dinner,  — 

"  I  utter  it  under  a  painful  but  a  solemn  conviction 
of  its  truth  that  we  are  no  longer  a  free  people,  —  a 
people  living  under  a  Constitution,  as  the  guardian  of 
their  rights  ;  but  under  the  absolute  rule  of  an  un 
checked  majority,  which  has  usurped  the  power  to  do 
as  it  pleases,  and  to  enforce  its  pleasure  at  the  point 
of  the  bayonet.  .  .  .  This  condition  we  had  been  long 
approaching ;  and  to  it  we  are  now  absolutely  re 
duced  by  the  proclamation  and  force  act.  .  .  .  So, 
long,  then,  as  the  act  of  blood  stains  our  statute  book, 
and  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  is  practically  denied" 
by  the  government,  so  long  will  be  the  duration  of  our 
political  bondage." 

This  is  the  ceterum  censeo,  which  recurs  in  all 
his  speeches  during  the  next  years.  In  his  first 
great  speech  after  the  nullification  session,  he 
declared,  — 

"  I  stand  wholly  disconnected  with  the  two  great 
parties  now  contending  for  ascendency.  My  political 
connections  are  with  that  small  and  denounced  party 
which  has  voluntarily  retired  from  the  party  strifes 
of  the  day,  with  a  view  of  saving,  if  possible,  the  lib 
erty  and  the  Constitution  of  the  country  in  this  great 
crisis  of  our  affairs." 


110  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

He  had  not  become  a  Whig,  nor  had  he  ceased 
to  be  a  Democrat,  but  he  was  one  of  the  most 
uncompromising  adversaries  of  Jacksonism.  In 
all  the  leading  questions  of  these  years,  so  full 
of  bitter  strife,  he  stands  in  the  front  rank  of 
the  opposition,  but  he  has  no  more  in  common 
with  Clay  and  Webster  than  before.  He  and 
they  fought  side  by  side  against  a  common 
enemy,  but  he  did  not  fight  with  them  for  a 
common  cause.  In  their  defensive  warfare 
against  the  removal  of  the  government  depos 
its  from  the  United  States  Bank,  these  three 
occupied  the  same  ground ;  but  when  it  came 
to  the  question  of  renewing  the  charter  of  the 
bank,  or  to  the  general  problem  of  the  cur 
rency,  their  ways  separated,  though  they  did 
not  diverge  so  much  as  one  would  suppose  from 
Calhoun's  subsequent  course. 

With  regard  to  the  bank,  he  sat  as  yet,  so 
to  say,  on  the  fence.  He  did  not  conceal  the 
lively  distrust  and  grave  apprehensions  with 
which  he  viewed  the  close  connection  of  the  gov 
ernment  with  a  privileged  moneyed  corporation 
of  such  enormous  means,  but  the  reasons  of 
expediency  still  prevailed  over  the  objections 
which  would  have  been  decisive  with  him,  if 
he  had  felt  free  to  follow  his  inclination  and 
general  principles.  He  himself  even  reminded 
the  Senate  of  the  fact  that  the  bank  would 


THE  SENATE.  Ill 

probably  not  have  been  established,  if  it  had 
not  been  for  his  exertions.  His  argumentation 
was  as  clear  and  logical  as  usual  and  it  led  him 
to  definite  practical  propositions;  and  yet  his 
speeches  leave  the  impression  upon  the  reader's 
mind  that  he  himself  did  not  know  exactly 
what  to  think  and  what  to  will.  Like  the  coun 
try,  he  was  in  a  state  of  transition  with  regard 
to  this  perplexing  problem,  and  it  is  a  curious 
fact  that  so  early  as  1834  he  pointed  out  the 
ultimate  solution  of  it ;  but  he  did  it  in  such  a 
way  that  it  would  be  absurd  to  claim  for  him 
the  honor  of  the  discovery.  In  his  speech  of 
January  13,  on  the  removal  of  the  deposits,  he 
said,  — 

"  So  long  as  the  question  is  one  between  a  Bank  of 
the  United  States,  incorporated  by  Congress,  and  that 
system  of  banks  which  has  been  created  by  the  will 
of  the  Executive,  it  is  an  insult  to  the  understanding 
to  discourse  on  the  pernicious  tendency  and  unconsti 
tutionally  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  To 
bring  up  that  question  fairly  and  legitimately,  you 
must  go  one  step  farther  :  you  must  divorce  the  gov 
ernment  and  the  banking  system.  You  must  refuse 
all  connection  with  banks.  You  must  neither  receive 
nor  pay  away  bank-notes ;  you  must  go  back  to  the 
old  system  of  the  strong-box?  and  of  gold  and  silver. 
...  I  repeat,  you  must  divorce  the  government  en 
tirely  from  the  banking  system ;  or,  if  not,  you  are 
bound  to  incorporate  a  bank  as  the  only  safe  and 


112  JOHN  C.   CALEOUN. 

efficient  means  of  giving  stability  and  uniformity  to 
the  currency." 

Calhoun  was  not  a  "  statesman  "  of  the  type 
which,  at  this  time,  began  to  become  only  too 
common  in  the  United  States.  He  did  not  owe 
his  position  to  the  grace  of  King  Caucus  and  the 
favor  of  his  grandees,  the  washed  and  unwashed 
patriots  of  the  primary  meetings.  He  there 
fore  did  not  know  and  understand  everything 
by  intuition,  as  this  privileged  class  of  mortals 
do,  but  he  was  obliged  to  study  and  reflect  upon 
the  subjects  with  which  he  had  to  deal  as  a  leg 
islator.  As  a  seat  in  the  legislative  hall  was  in 
his  opinion  as  well  the  most  responsible  as  the 
most  honorable  post  in  which  a  man  can  be  put 
by  the  confidence  of  his  fellow-citizens,  he  ap 
plied  himself  to  this  task  with  all  the  thorough 
going  earnestness  of  his  nature.  It  is  therefore 
a  matter  of  course  that  his  speeches  never 
lacked .  a  positive  element  of  more  or  less,  and 
not  unfrequently  of  considerable,  merit.  Yet 
ever  since  the  Southern  Samson  has  put  his 
head  into  the  lap  of  the  Delilah  of  state  sover 
eignty,  his  strength  is  on  the  wane  whenever 
he  returns  to  his  old  place  among  the  builders 
of  his  country's  greatness  and  happiness.  Crit 
ically  to  dissect  the  arguments  of  others  and  to 
expose  the  weak  points  of  their  devices,  to  de 
nounce  their  inconsistencies  and  mercilessly  to 


THE  SENATE.  113 

lash  the  moral  shortcomings  of  their  policy, 
and,  above  all,  to  point  out  the  breakers  ahead 
of  the  ship  of  state,  —  these  are  the  things  in 
which  he  excels. 

Jackson's  administration  offered  a  wide  field 
for  the  vigorous  application  of  all  these  pecul 
iar  qualities,  and  it  was  but  human  that  Cal- 
houn  should  avail  himself  the  more  willingly 
of  the  opportunity  on  account  of  his  personal 
relations  with  the  President.  His  speeches  on 
the  removal  of  the  deposits  and  on  Jackson's 
protest  against  the  resolution  of  the  Senate,  de 
nouncing  it  as  an  unwarrantable  assumption  of 
power,  exposed  the  President's  high-handed 
way  of  dealing  with  the  Constitution  and  the 
laws,  also  the  gross  fallacies  and  inconsistencies 
of  his  reasoning,  in  a  truly  masterly  way,  and 
were  not  less  admirable  defences  of  the  consti 
tutional  rights  and  privileges  of  the  legislative 
branch  of  the  government.  He  did  not  spare 
the  President,  but  neither  his  personal  griev 
ances  nor  the  intensity  of  his  political  anger 
and  disgust  carried  him  beyond  the  line  which 
respect  for  the  office  ought  to  draw  whenever 
the  chief  magistrate  of  the  republic  is  spoken 
of ;  and  his  most  vigorous  thrusts  were  not 
aimed  against  the  person,  but  against  the  sys 
tem  which  had  been  inaugurated  by  Jackson. 

If  the  high-toned  moral  severity  of  the  above- 


114  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

mentioned  speeches  was  seasoned  now  and  then 
with  cutting  irony  and  haughty  defiance,  Cal- 
houn's  remarks  on  the  wholesale  dismissal  of 
federal  office-holders  without  cause  betray  pa 
triotic  sadness  and  deep  anxiety  for  the  future 
of  his  country.  The  subject  was  of  too  serious 
a  nature  to  permit  him  to  indulge  in  personal 
animosities  or  party  bickerings.  The  removal 
of  the  deposits,  the  protest,  the  whole  bank 
question,  though  all  of  great  import,  were  after 
all  but  questions  of  the  day,  which  would  soon 
be  dead  issues,  of  no  interest  to  anybody  ex 
cept  the  student  of  history.  But  would  not  the 
very  life-blood  of  the  body  politic  be  poisoned 
if  the  government  should  fall  into  the  hands 
of  mercenaries,  with  whom  politics  constituted 
only  a  trade,  to  which  they  devoted  themselves 
for  the  sake  of  the  "  spoils  "  of  office  ?  Was 
not  the  love  of  country  in  danger  of  being 
drowned  in  the  whirlpools  of  party  strife,  if  the 
official  spokesmen  of  the  national  parties  should 
be  men  who  owed  their  position  to  the  dexter 
ity  with  which  they  gathered  followei'S  around 
their  standards  by  means  of  the  spoils?  Would 
not  the  politics  of  the  republic  degenerate  more 
and  more  from  a  contest  about  great  public 
measures,  principles,  and  ideas,  into  a  mean 
scuffle  about  the  husks,  if  it  should  become  an 
acknowledged  principle  that  "  to  the  victor  be- 


THE  SENATE.  115 

long  the  spoils  "  ?  Would  not  every  party  be 
forced  to  follow  suit  if  the  example  should  be 
once  successfully  set,  —  for  what  party  could 
hope  to  vanquish  with  untrained  volunteers  the 
skilled  bands  of  lansquenets  fighting  for  booty  ? 
Would  not  the  management  of  the  public  af 
fairs  rapidly  sink  until  it  became-  a  by-word,  if, 
instead  of  fitness  for  the  office,  the  services  ren 
dered  to  the  party,  or  rather  to  the  chiefs  of  the 
party,  should  become  the  criterion  for  all  the 
appointments,  and  if  the  federal  offices  should 
come  to  be  filled  with  those  who  had  not  suc 
ceeded  in  private  life ;  for  would  not  the  others 
at  best  consider  the  federal  offices  but  momen 
tary  make-shifts,  if  ability  and  faithfulness 
could  no  longer  secure  their  tenure  ?  Last,  but 
not  least,  would  not  the  people  begin  to  turn 
with  disgust  from  politics  when  they  saw  the 
statesmen  more  and  more  ousted  by  mere  bread- 
and-butter  politicians  ?  And  what  is  the  life  of 
a  democratic  republic  worth  if  the  people  accus 
tom  themselves  to  consider  politics  the  monop 
oly  of  a  set  of  men  whom  they  do  not  respect  ? 
In  his  speech  on  the  removal  of  the  deposits, 

Calhoun  had  said,  with  burning  indignation :  — 

• 
"  Can  he  [Secretary  Taney]  be  ignorant  that  the 

whole  power  of  the  government  has  been  perverted 
into  a  great  political  machine,  with  a  view  of  cor- 
mptitig  and  controlling  the  country  ?  Can  he  be 


116  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ignorant  that  the  avowed  and  open  policy  of  the 
government  is  to  reward  political  friends  and  punish 
political  enemies  ?  .  .  .  With  money  we  will  get  par 
tisans,  with  partisans  votes,  and  with  votes  money,  is 
the  maxim  of  our  public  pilferers.  .  .  .  With  money 
and  corrupt  partisans  a  great  effort  is  now  'making  to 
choke  and  stifle  the  voice  of  American  liberty  through 
all  its  constitutional  and  legal  organs  by  pensioning 
the  press  ;  by  overawing  the  other  departments  ;  and 
finally  by  setting  up  a  new  organ,  composed  of  office 
holders  and  partisans,  under  the  name  of  a  National 
Convention,  which,  counterfeiting  the  voice  of  the 
people,  will,  if  not  resisted,  in  their  name  dictate  the 
succession" 

In  a  speech  of  February  13, 1835,  lie  summed 
up  the  ultimate  results  of  the  spoils  system  in 
the  following  words :  — 

"  When  it  comes  to  be  once  understood  that  poli 
tics  are  a  game ;  that  those  who  are  engaged  in  it  but 
act  a  part ;  that  they  make  this  or  that  profession  not 
from  honest  conviction  or  an  intent  to  fulfil  them,  but 
as  the  means  of  deluding  the  people,  and  through 
that  delusion  to  acquire  power,  —  when  such  profes 
sions  are  to  be  entirely  forgotten,  the  people  will  lose 
all  confidence  in  public  men ;  all  will  be  regarded  as 
mere  jugglers,  —  the  honest  and  the  patriotic  as  well 
as  the  cunning  and  the  profligate ;  and  the  people  will 
become  indifferent  and  passive  to  the  grossest  abuses 
of  power  on  the  ground  that  those  whom  they  may 
elevate,  under  whatever  pledges,  instead  of  reforming, 


THE  SENATE.  117 

will  but  imitate  the  example  of   those  whom  they 
have  expelled." 

Does  not  this  passage  read  like  a  cutting  from 
an  editorial  of  the  last  number  of  an  "  indepen 
dent  "  newspaper  of  the  present  day,  advocating 
civil  service  reform  ?  But  though  he  foresaw 
with  astonishing  perspicacity  what  this  mis 
chievous  innovation  must  inevitably  lead  to,  the 
root  of  the  evil  and  the  remedy  for  it  he  discov 
ered  no  more  than  did  any  of  his  contempora 
ries.  The  uniform  practice  of  the  preceding 
administrations  concerning  dismissal  from  office 
—  even  Jefferson's  hardly  forming  an  exception; 
although  the  loud  complaints  of  the  opposition 
had  not  been  wholly  unfounded —  made  him 
believe  that  nothing  more  was  needed  than  to 
deprive  the  President  of  the  power  which,  as 
he  contended,  had  been  conferred  upon  him 
under  a  mistaken  construction  of  the  Constitu 
tion.  He  himself,  as  he  openly  avowed,  had 
formerly  held  the  opposite  opinion,  and  the  ar 
gument  with  which  he  supported  the  assertion 
that  the  power  of  appointing  did  not  imply  that 
of  dismissing  was  more  ingenious  than  pro 
found  and  sound.  But  whatever  the  true  an 
swer  to  the  constitutional  question  be,  the  great 
mistake  lay  in  the  supposition  that  the  evil 
could  be  cured  by  putting  the  power  of  dis 
missal  from  office  under  the  direct  control  of 


118  JOHN   C.   CALHOUN. 

Congress  or  the  Senate.  Experience  has  proved 
that  Congress  was  more  to  be  feared  than  the 
President ;  for,  in  spite  of  the  clear  provision  of 
the  Constitution,  even  the  power  of  appoint 
ment  has  in  the  main  virtually  passed  from  the 
hands  of  the  President  into  those  of  the  mem 
bers  of  Congress  ;  and  the  civil  service  reform 
ers  of  our  days  usually  consider  this  the  worst 
feature  of  the  actual  system.  Calhoun,  like  the 
whole  Whig  opposition,  mistook  a  mere  symp 
tom  for  the  cause  of  the  disease.  Because 
Jackson's  administration  assumed  more  and 
more  the  character  of  the  reign  of  an  autocrat, 
they  apprehended  that  the  encroachments  of 
the  Executive  upon  the  donjain  of  the  other 
departments  of  the  government,"and  more  es 
pecially  the  legislative,  would  continue  to  un 
dermine  the  Constitution  until  the  whole  fabric 
of  republican  liberty  should  be  in  danger  of  top 
pling  to  the  ground.  The  above-quoted  de 
nunciation  of  the  National  Convention,  "com 
posed  of  office-holders  and  partisans,"  which 
was  to  "  dictate  the  succession,"  closed  with  the 
following  words  :  "  When  the  deed  shall  have 
been  done,  the  revolution  completed,  and  all 
the  powers  of  our  republic,  in  like  manner,  con 
solidated  in  the  Executive  and  perpetuated  by 
his  dictation."  Calhoun  and  the  Whigs  failed 
to  see  that,  whosoever  might  become  President 


THE  SENATE.  119 

it  could  not  possibly  be  an  Andrew  Jackson  II. 
Jackson  might  be  powerful  enough  virtually  to 
nominate  his  successor,  but  to  appoint  an  heir 
was  beyond  his  power.  The  presidential  office 
was  only  the  means  of  exercising  this  extraor 
dinary  power ;  but  the  source  of  it  was  the 
peculiar  disposition  of  the  majority  of  the  peo 
ple  towards  him,  and  this  peculiar  disposition 
was  a  thing  which  he  could  not  bequeath  to 
anybody.  Van  Buren  knew  this  so  well  that 
in  his  letter  accepting  the  nomination  by  the 
Baltimore  Convention  he  humbly  declared,  "  As 
well  from  inclination  as  from  duty,  I  shall,  if 
honored  with  the  choice  of  the  American  peo 
ple,  endeavor  to  tread  generally  in  the  foot 
steps  of  President  Jackson."  He  was  Jackson's 
choice,  but  the  heirs  of  the  general  were  the 
politicians,  and  Van  Buren  would  never  have 
occupied  the  White  House  if  he  had  not  been 
one  of  the  master  minds  of  the  politicians.  If 
he  had  ever  presumed  to  speak  in  Jackson's 
tone  and  to  act  in  his  autocratic  spirit,  the 
"  Sage  of  Kinderhook  "  would  have  been  con 
sidered  by  his  own  party  to  be  out  of  his  senses. 
March  4,  1837,  did  not  inaugurate  a  second 
"era  of  good  feeling."  The  opposition  re 
mained  loud  and  passionate,  but  the  melodies 
of  their  war-songs  were  changed,  or  they  were 
at  least  sung  in  another  key.  To  pretend  that 


120  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

Martin  Van  Buren  would  "  name  "  his  successor, 
and  that  there  was  still  immediate  danger  of 
the  liberties  of  the  country  being  crushed  by 
the  consolidation  of  all  powers  in  the  Executive, 
would  have  been  simply  ridiculous.  The  fears 
entertained  on  this  head  during  the  administra 
tion  of  Jackson  had  certainly  not  been  fictitious, 
though  they  had  been  generally  very  highly 
colored  for  the  sake  of  effect.  The  best  proof 
of  their  serious  character  was  furnished  by  a 
movement  for  an  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion,  abolishing  the  veto  power  of  the  President. 
Calhoun,  however,  had  not  so  far  lost  the  sobri 
ety  of  his  judgment  as  to  approve  of  this  idea. 
He  declared  the  veto  "  indispensable,"  because 
without  it  "the  independence  of  the  Presi 
dent,"  so  far  as  concerned  Congress,  would  be 
destroyed.  He  shared  for  the  moment  the  er 
roneous  views  of  the  Whigs  as  to  the  future,  but 
as  to  the  past,  i.  e.,  the  origin  of  the  evil,  he 
went  farther  back  than  they.  The  encroach 
ments  of  the  Executive  upon  the  legislative  and 
judicial  department  of  the  government  were 
with  him  "the  second  stage  of  the  revolution  ;  " 
but  it  had  begun  "  many  years  ago,  with  the 
commencement  of  the  restrictive  system,  and 
terminated  its  first  stage  with  the  passage  of  the 
Force  Bill  of  the  last  session,  which  absorbed 
Ell  the  rights  and  sovereignty  of  the  States,  and 


THE  SENATE.  121 

consolidated  them  in  this  government."  Thus 
his  argument  returned  to  its  starting-point. 
The  only  way  to  secure  "the  preservation  of 
our  institutions  "  was  to  adopt  the  doctrine  of 
state  sovereignty  with  all  its  consequences;  and 
the  last  cause  of  all  the  evils  complained  of,  by 
which  the  liberty  of  the  country,  and  perhaps 
even  the  existence  of  the  republic,  were  put  in 
jeopardy,  was  the  violation  of  this  fundamental 
principle  by  the  federal  government. 

From  this  time  forward,  every  speech  of  Cal- 
houn  which  is  not  strictly  confined  to  some  spe 
cial  subject,  contains  a  repetition  of  these  two 
assertions  in  some  form  or  other,  and  his  incli 
nation  is  constantly  growing  to  make  the  range 
for  his  observations,  on  all  subjects  whatsoever, 
wide  enough  to  permit  some  remarks  on  these 
topics,  or  at  least  a  passing  allusion  to  them. 
The  wiseacres,  who  laughed  all  the  warnings  of 
the  alarmists  to  scorn,  began  to  consider  him  a 
kind  of  monomaniac  on  this  head.  Yet  it  was 
they  whose  minds  wandered  through  the  dales 
and  o'er  the  hills  of  cloud-land,  while  his  feet 
remained  firmly  planted  on  the  rock  of  actual 
ities.  Every  day  the  slavery  question  became 
more  exclusively  the  needle  which  determined 
the  course  of  the  politics  of  the  country,  and  if 
safety  for  the  interests  of  the  slave-holders 
could  be  obtained  at  all  in  the  Union,  it  was 


122  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

only  through  the  doctrine  of  state  sovereignty. 
No  one  understood  so  well  as  Calhoun  that,  the 
appearance  of  the  abolitionists  had  laid  the  axe 
to  the  root  of  slavery,  though  they  were  but  a 
handful  of  men  and  women,  with  neither  fame, 
social  position,  office,  money,  nor  the  general 
approbation  of  the  public  mind  to  make  them 
formidable  adversaries;  and  therefore  as  yet  no 
one  fully  understood  how  terribly  in  earnest 
he  was  and  how  correctly  he  read  the  future, 
when  he  declared  at  every  opportunity  that  the 
minority,  that  is  the  South,  was  doomed,  if 
state  sovereignty  was  not  recognized  as  the 
central  pillar  on  which  the  dome  of  the  Consti 
tution  rested. 

In  January,  1831,  William  Lloyd  Garrison  had 
established  in  Boston  "  The  Liberator,"  with  the 
programme  of  "  immediate  and  unconditional 
emancipation,"  and  in  December,  1833,  the 
American  Anti-Slavery  Society  had  put  forth 
its  "  declaration  of  principles,"  declaring  against 
slavery  a  war  which  excluded  the  possibility 
of  peace.  The  slave  States  were  thrown  into 
a  wild  excitement  by  the  proceedings  of  the 
enthusiastic  little  band,  and  in  the  North  the 
mob,  very  generally  countenanced  by  public 
opinion  and  even  by  the  authorities,  had  begun 
to  hunt  the  agitators  down  as  criminals  who, 
like  Western  horse-thieves,  were  of  too  danger 


THE  SENATE.  123 

ous  a  character  to  be  admitted  within  the  pale 
of  the  law.  Some  time,  however,  was  yet  to 
elapse,  ere  the  question  came  directly  before 
Congress.  An  occasional  remark  on  "the  fanat 
ics  and  madmen  of  the  North,  who  are  wag 
ing  war  against  the  domestic  institutions  of  the 
South,  under  the  plea  of  promoting  the  general 
welfare,"  is  therefore  about  all  we  hear  from 
Calhoun  on  this  subject,  during  the  first  years. 
But  when  at  last  the  discussion  made  its  way 
into  the  halls  of  legislation  he  at  once  took  part 
in  it  in  a  manner  which  proved  that  for  a  long 
time  all  his  faculties  had  been  concentrated 
upon  the  topic ;  for  he,  and  he  alone,  fully  mas 
tered  it. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

SLAVERY. 

IN  the  Senate  the  flood-gates  of  debate  were 
opened  by  Calhoun's  motion  (January  7,  1836) 
not  to  receive  two  petitions  for  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  The  war 
of  words,  in  which  nearly  one  half  of  all  the 
senators  took  part,  lasted  until  March  11.  Even 
by  his  Southern  colleagues  Calhoun  was  severely 
reproved  for  opening  this  box  of  Pandora.  They 
accused  him  of  going  on  a  quixotic  expedition 
in  search  of  abstract  political  principles,  because 
he  himself  declared  that  the  abolitionists  could 
not  possibly  "  entertain  the  slightest  hope  that 
Congress  would  pass  a  law,  at  this  time,  to 
abolish  slavery  in  this  District,  .  .  .  and  that 
seriously  to  attempt  it  would  be  fatal  to  their 
cause."  Was  it  not  a  frivolous  playing  with 
fire  and  powder  to  force  the  discussion  of  this 
question  upon  Congress,  since  the  material 
rights  and  interests  of  the  South  were  abso 
lutely  secured  by  the  perfect  unanimity  of 
Congress,  most  energetically  backed  by  public 
opinion  in  all  the  Northern  States  ?  Would 


SLAVERY.  125 

not  this  uncalled-for  debate  do  more  to  pro 
mote  the  cause  of  abolitionism  than  all  the 
pamphlets  and  emissaries  of  the  abolitionists 
had  been  able  to  do  ?  For  whether  his  consti 
tutional  argument  was  sound  or  not,  it  was  an 
incontestable  fact  that  his  motion  was  con 
sidered  by  the  North  a  wanton  attack  upon  the 
right  of  petition. 

There  was  undoubtedly  a  good  deal  of  truth 
in  all  these  objections  to  the  course  pursued  by 
Calhoun.  Yet  the  charge  was  wholly  unfounded 
that  he  was  endeavoring  intentionally  to  in 
cense  the  North  and  the  South  against  each 
other,  in  order  to  promote  the  purposes  of  his 
party.  He  spoke  the  simple  truth  when  he 
asserted,  in  his  speech  of  March  9,  1836,  that, 
"  however  calumniated  and  slandered,"  he  had 
"  ever  been  devotedly  attached  "  to  the  Union 
and  the  institutions  of  the  country,  and  that  he 
was  "  anxious  to  perpetuate  them  to  the  latest 
generation.5'  He  acted  under  the  firm  convic 
tion  of  an  imperious  duty  towards  the  South 
and  towards  the  Union,  and  his  assertion  was 
but  too  well  founded  that  these  petitions  for  the 
abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia 
were  blows  on  the  wedge,  which  would  ulti 
mately  break  the  Union  asunder. 

That  the  attack  of  the  abolition  petitions  was 
not  directed  against  slavery  in  the  States,  but 


126  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

merely  against  slavery  in  the  District,  was, 
though  not  from  the  legal  point  of  view,  yet  as 
to  the  ultimate  practical  result,  matter  of  ab 
solute  indifference.  If,  as  all  the  petitions  as 
serted,  the  nature  of  slavery  made  its  existence 
in  the  District  a  national  disgrace  and  a  national 
sin,  the  same  disgrace  and  the  same  sin  weighed 
down  every  Southern  State.  Calhoun's  asser 
tion,  therefore,  could  not  be  refuted,  that  "  the 
petitions  were  in  themselves  a  foul  slander  on 
nearly  one  half  of  the  States  of  the  Union."  If 
the  national  legislature  now,  in  any  way,  offered 
its  assistance  to  brand  the  peculiar  institution  of 
of  one  half  of  the  constituent  members  of  the 
Union,  it  certainly  violated  the  spirit  of  the  Con 
stitution  ;  for  the  Constitution,  as  everybody  ad 
mitted,  not  only  tacitly  recognized  slavery  as  a 
fact  which  the  States  exclusively  had  power  to 
deal  with,  but  moreover  served  in  many  essen 
tial  respects  as  its  direct  support  and  protection. 
Calhoun  was  therefore  unquestionably  right 
when  he  said  that,  unless  an  undoubted  provi 
sion  of  the  Constitution  compelled  them  to  re 
ceive  such  petitions,  it  was  their  duty  to  reject 
them  at  the  very  threshold  ;  and  he  proved  that 
there  was  no  such  absolute  compulsion  by  an  un 
doubted  constitutional  provision.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  inasmuch  as  some  obligations 
were  imposed  upon  the  whole  Union  with  re- 


SLAVERY.  127 

gard  to  slavery,  the  existence  of  slavery  in  some 
of  the  States  was  actually  and  legally  also  a  con 
cern  of  those  States  in  which  it  did  not  exist, 
And  in  respect  to  whatever  actually  and  legally 
concerned  the  people,  they  had  a  constitutional 
right  to  demand  that  their  representatives  should 
listen  to  their  wishes  and  grievances  presented 
in  the  form  of  petitions.  Besides,  no  ingenuity 
could  reason  out  of  the  Constitution  the  power  of 
Congress  over  slavery  in  the  District ;  for  some 
where  the  power  had  to  be  lodged,  and  the 
legislative  power  of  Congress  over  the  District 
was  expressly  declared  to  be  "  exclusive  in  all 
cases  whatsoever."  To  lay  down  the  principle 
that  Congress  was  in  duty  bound  to  shut  its 
door  against  all  anti-slavery  petitions  was  there 
fore  most  certainly  an  abridgment  of  the  right 
of  petition.  The  opponents  of  Calhoun  were, 
in  fact,  no  less  right  than  he.  Not  their  argu 
ments,  but  the  facts,  and  the  Constitution, 
which  had  been  framed  according  to  the  facts, 
were  at  fault.  The  founders  of  the  republic 
had  been  under  the  necessity  of  admitting 
slavery  into  the  Constitution,  and  the  inevita 
ble  consequence  was  that  conclusions  which 
were  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other  could 
be  logically  deduced  from  it  by  starting  the 
argument  first  from  the  fact  that  slavery  was 
an  acknowledged  and  protected  institution, 


128  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

which,  so  far  as  the  States  were  concerned,  was 
out  of  the  pale  of  the  federal  jurisdiction  ;  and 
then  from  the  no  less  incontestable  fact  that  the 
determining  principle  of  the  Constitution  was 
liberty,  and  that  the  spirit  and  the  whole  life 
of  the  American  people  fully  accorded  with  the 
Constitution  in  this  respect. 

The  flaw  in  all  the  reasoning  of  Calhoun  on 
the  slavery  question  was,  that  he  took  no  ac 
count  whatever  of  the  latter  fact.     The  logical 
consequence  of  this  was  that  his  constitutional 
theories  were  of  a  nature  which  rendered  the 
acquiescence  of  the  North  in  them  an  utter  im 
possibility.     He  never  became  fully  conscious 
of  this  fact,  which  rendered  all  his  exertions  to 
obtain  absolute  safety  for  slavery  in  the  Union 
as  vain  as  the  pouring  of  water  into  a  cask  with 
out  a  bottom.     His  reasoning  on  the  dangers 
which  threatened  slavery  in  the  actual  Union, 
under  the  actual  Constitution,  was,   however, 
not  in  the  least  affected  by  it.     From  the  first 
he  saw  them  with  such  an  appalling  clearness 
that  his  predictions  could  not  but  seem  halluci 
nations  of  a  diseased  mind  so  long  as  the  peo 
ple,  both  at  the  North  and  at  the  South,  had 
not  been  taught  by  bitter  experience  that  the 
conflict  was  irrepressible,  because  a  compromise 
between  antagonistic  principles  is  db  initio  an 
impossibility.    From  the  first  he  saw,  predicted 


SLAVERY.  129 

and  proved  that,  unless  his  constitutional  doc 
trines  were  accepted,  slavery  could  not  be  safe 
in  the  Union,  and  that  therefore  the  slave  States 
would  have  to  cut  the  ties  which  bound  them 
to  the  North. 

"  Our  true  position,"  he  declared'  in  the  above- 
mentioned  speech,  "that  which  is  indispensable  to 
our  defence  here,  is,  that  Congress  has  no  legitimate 
jurisdiction  over  the  subject  of  slavery  either  here  or 
elsewhere.  The  reception  of  this  petition  surrenders 
this  commanding  position ;  yields  the  question  of  ju 
risdiction,  so  important  to  the  cause  of  abolition  and 
so  injurious  to  us ;  compels  us  to  sit  in  silence  to  wit 
ness  the  assault  on  our  character  and  institutions,  or 
to  engage  in  an  endless  contest  in  their  defence.  Such 
a  contest  is  beyond  mortal  endurance.  We  must  in 
the  end  be  humbled,  degraded,  broken  down,  and 
worn  out. 

"  The  senators  from  the  slave-holding  States,  who, 
most  unfortunately,  have  committed  themselves  to 
vote  for  receiving  these  incendiary  petitions,  tell  us 
that  whenever  the  attempt  shall  be  made  to  abolish 
slavery  they  will  join  with  us  to  repel  it.  ...  But  I 
announce  to  them  that  they  are  now  called  on  to  re 
deem  their  pledge.  The  attempt  is  NOW  being  made. 
The  work  is  going  on  daily  and  hourly.  The  war  is 
waged  not  only  in  the  most  dangerous  manner,  but 
in  the  only  manner  that  it  can  be  waged.  Do  they 
expect  that  the  abolitionists  will  resort  to  arms,  and 
commence  a  crusade  to  liberate  our  slaves  by  force? 
9 


130  JOHN   C.    CALHOUN. 

Is  this  what  they  mean  when  they  speak  of  the  at 
tempt  to  abolish  slavery?  If  so,  let  me  tell  our 
friends  of  the  South  who  differ  from  us  that  the  war 
which  the  abolitionists  wage  against  us  is  of  a  very 
different  character,  and  far  more  effective.  It  is  a 
war  of  religious  and  political  fanaticism,  mingled,  on 
the  part  of  the  leaders,  with  ambition  and  the  love 
of  notoriety,  and  waged  not  against  our  lives,  but  our 
character.  The  object  is  to  humble  and  debase  us 
iu  our  own  estimation,  and  that  of  the  world  in  gen 
eral  ;  to  blast  our  reputation,  while  they  overthrow 
our  domestic  institutions.  This  is  the  mode  in  which 
they  are  attempting  abolition,  with  such  ample  means 
and  untiring  industry  ;  and  now  is  the  time  for  all 
who  are  opposed  to  them  to  meet  the  attack.  How 
can  it  be  successfully  met?  This  is  the  important 
question.  There  is  but  one  way :  we  must  meet  the 
enemy  on  the  frontier,  —  on  the  question  of  receiv- 
.ng ;  we  must  secure  that  important  pass,  —  it  is  our 
Thermopylae.  The  power  of  resistance,  by  an  uni 
versal  law  of  nature,  is  on  the  exterior.  Break 
through  the  shell,  penetrate  the  crust,  and  there  is 
no  resistance  within.  In  the  present  contest,  the 
question  on  receiving  constitutes  our  frontier.  It  is 
the  first,  the  exterior  question,  that  covers  and  pro 
tects  all  others.  Let  it  be  penetrated  by  receiving 
this  petition,  and  not  a  point  of  resistance  can  be 
found  within,  as  far  as  this  government  is  concerned. 
If  we  cannot  maintain  ourselves  there,  we  cannot  on 
any  interior  position.  .  .  .  There  is  no  middle  ground 
that  is  tenable." 


SLAVERY.  131 

Has  not  the  history  of  the  slavery  conflict 
fully  borne  out  every  one  of  these  assertions  ? 
Calhoun  reads  the  future  as  if  the  book  of  fate 
were  lying  wide  open  before  him.  Only  as  to 
the  means  by  which  he  proposed  to  avert  the 
impending  dangers  he  was  as  blind  as  all  the 
rest  of  the  people.  If  the  enlistment  of  the 
moral  and  religious  sentiment  of  the  world 
against  slavery  was  a  war,  in  which  the  South 
must  ultimately  break  down,  what  was  the  use 
of  hermetically  closing  the  Capitol  at  Washing 
ton  against  all  the  manifestations  of  the  spirit 
of  abolitionism?  Since  when  did  the  civilized 
world  or  even  the  American  people  wait  for 
the  gracious  permission  of  Congress,  ere  they 
dared  to  form  their  religious  opinions  or  moral 
convictions?  And  if  the  religious,  moral,  and 
political  convictions  of  Congress  and  of  the 
people  did  not  agree,  which  of  the  two  would 
finally  have  to  yield,  Congress  or  the  people  ? 
Even  if  it  had  been  but  a  political  question, 
the  attempt  would  have  been  simply  absurd 
to  decree  it  out  of  existence  by  a  resolution 
of  the  legislature  not  to  listen  to  what  the  peo 
ple  had  to  say  about  it.  But  if  it  was  also  a 
moral  and  religious  question  —  which  most 
certainly  it  was  —  the  attempt  was  doubly  ab 
surd.  There  is  no  "  frontier  "  which  can  be 
successfully  defended  against  ideas,  and  no 


132  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

"  shell "  is  so  hard  that  such  ideas  cannot  pene 
trate  it.  The  confession  that,  if  the  shell  were 
broken  through,  there  was  no  resistance  within, 
amounted  therefore  to  a  confession  that  slavery 
would  at  last  succumb,  if  the  slave-holding 
States  remained  in  the  Union. 

From  all  sides  Calhoun  was  accused  of  stir 
ring  up  sectional  animosity  and  strife  in  a  most 
unwarrantable  manner,  by  exciting  the  South 
with  his  wild  talk  about  awful  dangers,  which 
had  nowhere  any  existence  except  in  his  own 
feverish  brain.  The  truth,  however,  was  that 
he  did  not  see  spectres  in  broad  daylight,  but 
that  he  took  too  hopeful  a  view  of  the  future. 
What  in  his  opinion  was  but  a  dire  eventuality, 
which  could  be  easily  averted,  was,  by  his  own 
showing,  the  inevitable  end  of  the  slavery  con 
flict.  Abolitionism  tolled  the  death-bell  of  slav 
ery  in  the  Union,  and  dearly  have  the  Amer 
ican  people  had  to  pay  for  it,  that  they  ever 
doubted  Calhoun's  declaration  that,  whenever 
the  slave-holding  States  had  to  choose  between 
the  Union  and  slavery,  they  would  not  hesitate 
for  a  moment  to  decide  in  favor  of  slavery. 

"  We  love  and  cherish  the  Union  ;  we  remember 
with  the  kindest  feelings  our  common  origin,  with 
pride  our  common  achievements,  and  fondly  antic 
ipate  the  common  greatness  and  glory  that  seem  to 
await  us:  but  origin,  achievements,  and  anticipation 


SLAVERY.  133 

of  common  greatness  are  to  us  as  nothing,  com 
pared  with  this  question.  It  is  to  us  a  vital  ques 
tion.  It  involves  not  only  our  liberty,  but,  what  is 
greater  (if  to  freemen  anything  can  be),  existence 
itself.  The  relation  which  now  exists  between  the 
two  races  in  the  slave-holding  States  has  existed  for 
two  centuries.  It  has  grown  with  our  growth,  and 
strengthened  with  our  strength.  It  has  entered  into 
and  modified  all  our  institutions,  civil  and  political. 
None  other  can  be  substituted.  We  will  not,  cannot, 
permit  it  to  be  destroyed.  . .  .  Come  what  will,  should 
it  cost  every  drop  of  blood  and  every  cent  of  prop 
erty,  we  must  defend  ourselves;  and  if  compelled, 
we  would  stand  justified  by  all  laws,  human  and  di 
vine  ;  .  .  .  we  would  act  under  an  imperious  neces 
sity.  There  would  be  to  us  but  one  alternative,  —  to 
triumph  or  perish  as  a  people.  ...  I  ask  neither  sym 
pathy  nor  compassion  for  the  slave-holding  States. 
We  can  take  care  of  ourselves.  It  is  not  we,  but  the 
Union,  which  is  in  danger.  .  .  .  We  cannot  remain 
here  in  an  endless  struggle  in  defence  of  our  char 
acter,  our  property  and  institutions." 

Calhoun  spoke  to  deaf  ears.  The  petition 
was  received,  but  the  prayer  of  the  petitioners 
was  rejected  by  an  overwhelming  majority  after 
a  short  and  unimportant  debate,  in  which  the 
South  was  repeatedly  and  emphatically  assured 
that  thus  a  precedent  was  to  be  established  for 
the  rejection  of  all  similar  petitions,  without 
any  discussion,  directly  after  their  reception. 


134  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

James  Buchanan  was  the  father  of  the  great 
device  of  thus,  with  an  obliging  compliment  to 
both  sides,  slipping  through  between  the  ham 
mer  and  the  anvil.    It  was  a  new  trial  of  the  old 
art  of  cloaking  by  empty  formulas  the  contradic 
tion  of  principles  and  the  collision  of  facts.    The 
petitioners  did  not  see  any  material  difference 
between  a  refusal  to  receive  and  a  rejection  on 
principle  without  any  discussion  ;  and  the  prin 
ciple,  on  the  unconditional  maintenance  of  which 
alone,  in  Calhoun's  opinion,  the  safety  of  slav 
ery  depended,  was  surrendered.    Ill-will  against 
the  South  had  nothing  whatever  to   do  with 
that.     Though   slavery  was   not  liked   in  the 
Northern  States,  they  were  as  yet  but  too  will 
ing  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  South.    They 
shunned  the  agitation  of  the  slavery  question 
more  than  did  the  South,  and  they  were  most 
willing  to  suppress  abolitionism.     The  trouble 
only  was  that  there  was  no  way  of  doing  it. 
It  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  the  more  in 
telligent  and  educated   Southerners   can   have 
deemed  it  possible  for  the  North  to  adopt  the 
means  which  the  Southern  radicals  proposed, 
with  insulting  imperiousness ;  and  yet  there  was 
a  goodly  number  of  Northern  politicians  who 
readily  consented  to  decree  even  the  impossible. 
President  Jackson's  message  of  December  2, 
1835,  had  invited  Congress  to  pass  a  law  pro- 


8 L  AVERT.  135 

bibiting,  "  under  severe  penalties,  the  circula 
tion  in  the  Southern  States,  through  the  mail, 
of  incendiary  publications  intended  to  instigate 
slaves  to  insurrection."  In  point  of  fact,  no 
such  publication  had  ever  been  issued  by  any 
American  press ;  but  what  the  President  really 
wanted  was,  of  course,  clear  enough:  the  mails 
should  be  closed  to  all  publications  tainted  with 
the  spirit  of  abolitionism.  On  Calhoun's  mo 
tion,  this  part  of  the  message  was  referred  to  a 
special  committee,  which,  on  February  4,  1836, 
introduced  a  bill,  accompanied  by  a  report. 
Calhoun,  who  was  the  author  of  the  bill  and  of 
the  report,  defended  them  on  April  12,  1836, 
in  one  of  the  most  remarkable  speeches  ever 
delivered  either  by  him  or  by  anybody  else  in 
Congress.  The  recommendation  of  the  Presi 
dent  was  rejected,  because  a  law  "  discrimi 
nating,  in  reference  to  character,  what  publica 
tions  shall  not  be  transmitted  by  the  mail," 
would  be  an  abridgment  of  the  liberty  of  the 
press.  Moreover,  and  above  all,  the  principle 
upon  which  such  a  law  would  have  rested  de 
livered  the  South,  bound  hand  and  foot,  to  the 
discretion  of  the  federal  government.  If  Con 
gress  had  the  right  to  determine  what  publica 
tions  were  incendiary  and  to  forbid  their  trans 
mission  through  the  mail,  it  evidently  had  also 
the  right  to  decide  what  publications  were  not 


136  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

incendiary  and  to  enforce  their  transmission 
through  the  mail.  Both  objections  were  un 
questionably  well  founded,  and  an  unsophisti 
cated  mind  would  have  naturally  expected  to 
see  the  conclusion  drawn  from  them  that  the 
publications  of  the  abolitionists  could  not  be 
legally  excluded  from  the  mail.  The  bill,  how 
ever,  prohibited  "deputy-postmasters  from  re 
ceiving  and  transmitting  through  the  mail,  to 
any  State,  Territory,  or  District,  certain  papers 
therein  mentioned,  the  circulation  of  which  is 
prohibited  by  the  laws  of  said  State,  Terri 
tory,  or  District."  Calhoun,  in  fact,  demanded 
at  least  as  emphatically  as  Jackson  the  exclu 
sion  of  abolition  publications  from  the  mail,  and 
even  the  means  by  which  he  proposed  to  attain 
his  end  were  virtually  the  same,  though  they 
appeared  under  a  different  nomenclature.  The 
only  real  difference  between  the  President  and 
the  senator  was  the  constitutional  doctrine  on 
which  they  based  their  respective  demands;  but 
that  was  indeed  a  difference  of  the  last  impor 
tance.  Jackson's  idea  was  simply  that,  as  slav 
ery  was  an  institution  recognized  by  the  Con 
stitution,  the  federal  government  could  not 
allow  itself  to  be  used  for  undermining  it,  but 
was  obliged  to  protect  it  against  attacks  which 
were  not  only  "unconstitutional,"  but  "repug 
nant  to  the  principles  of  our  national  compact 


SLAVERY.  137 

and  to  the  dictates  of  humanity  and  religion." 
Calhoun,  on  the  other  hand,  took  exactly  the 
opposite  view.  According  to  him,  the  federal 
government  had  no  right  to  meddle  in  any  way 
whatever  witli  this  question ;  all  it  could  do, 
and  what  at  the  same  time  was  bound  to  do,  was 
to  enjoin  upon  its  officers  to  conform  themselves 
strictly  to  the  laws  of  the  State  in  which  they 
happened  to  be  employed. 

"  The  internal  peace  and  security  of  the  States 
are  under  the  protection  of  the  States  themselves,  to 
the  entire  exclusion  of  all  authority  and  control  on 
the  part  of  Congress.  It  belongs  to  them,  and  not 
to  Congress,  to  determine  what  is  or  is  not  calculated 
to  disturb  their  peace  and  security.  ...  In  the  ex 
ecution  of  the  measures  which  may  be  adopted  by  the 
States  for  this  purpose  [to  prohibit  the  circulation  of 
any  publication  or  any  intercourse  calculated  to  dis 
turb  or  destroy  the  relation  between  master  and 
slave],  the  powers  of  Congress  over  the  mail,  and  of 
regulating  commerce  with  foreign  nations  and  be 
tween  the  States,  may  require  cooperation  on  the  part 
of  the  general  government ;  and  it  is  bound,  in  con 
formity  with  the  principle  established,  to  respect  the 
laws  of  the  State  in  their  exercise,  and  so  to  modify 
its  acts  as  not  only  not  to  violate  those  of  the  States, 
but,  as  far  as  practicable,  to  cooperate  in  their  execu 
tion." 

Calhoun's  bill  therefore  provided  that  post- 


138  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

masters  who  "  knowingly  "  transmitted  or  de 
livered  any  "  paper "  treating  of  slavery  in  a 
way  contrary  to  the  laws  of  the  State  should 
be  punished  by  fine  and  imprisonment.  Which 
clause  of  the  Constitution  conferred  upon  Con 
gress  the  power  to  enact  national  laws  for  fur 
thering  the  execution  of  the  state  laws,  this 
strictest  of  the  strict  construct! onists  forgot  to 
tell.  Like  a  noble  steed  on  the  race-course  he 
did  not  look  to  the  right  nor  to  the  left,  his 
course  leading  in  a  straight  line  to  the  goal.  If 
he  had  but  once  cast  a  passing  glance  on  either 
side,  he  could  hardly  have  helped  being  himself 
amused  at  the  strange  consequences  of  his  the 
ory,  if  nature  had  not  denied  him  all  sense  of 
humor  so  far  as  politics  were  concerned.  The 
laws  of  the  States  on  the  incriminated  publica 
tions  might  be  as  different  as  the  glass  splinters 
and  the  little  pebbles  in  a  kaleidoscope  vary  in 
shape  and  color.  The  federal  law,  therefore, 
would  enjoin  upon  the  postmasters  to  obey  and 
execute  some  dozen  different  and  perhaps  even 
contradictory  laws  relating  to  the  same  subject, 
—  a  law  which  would  at  all  events  have  the 
merit  of  novelty  in  the  history  of  legislation. 
A  postmaster  in  Massachusetts  imprisoned  for 
omitting  to  do  a  certain  thing,  and  a  postmas 
ter  in  South  Carolina  imprisoned  for  doing  this 
very  thing,  both  punished  in  pursuance  of  the 


SLAVERY.  139 

same  federal  law,  —  these  two  gentlemen,  if  no 
one  else,  would  certainly  not  be  convinced  of 
the  soundness  of  Calhoun's  theory. 

The  United  States  statutes  were  not  disfig 
ured  by  such  a  monstrous  law.  The  blot  is 
sufficiently  ugly  that  it  received  in  the  Senate 
nineteen  votes,  four  of  which  were  cast  by  North 
ern  senators.  Calhoun  himself  had  probably  not 
expected  a  more  favorable  result,  for  even  of 
the  four  Southern  members  of  the  committee 
only  Mason,  of  North  Carolina,  besides  himself, 
had  given  the  report  and  the  bill  an  unqualified 
approval.  The  whole  speech  of  April  12,  1836, 
gives  the  impression  that  its  real  purpose  was 
not  so  much  to  convince  the  Senate  of  the  neces 
sity  or  propriety  of  passing  this  particular  bill 
as  to  get  the  argument  before  the  country  as  a 
new  manifesto,  or  rather  pronunciamento,  of  the 
slave  power.  At  all  events,  it  is  only  from  this 
point  of  view  that  it  is  of  great  importance. 

Calhoun  had  taken  a  great  step  beyond  the 
stand-point  which  he  had  occupied  during  the 
nullification  controversy.  Then  he  had  said 
that  the  federal  government  and  the  States 
were  parties  to  a  compact  having  no  common 
judge,  and  therefore  each  was  entitled  to  decide 
for  itself  as  to  the  extent  of  its  obligations  un 
der  the  compact,  as  to  the  violations  of  the 
same  by  the  other  party,  and  as  to  the  means 


140  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

and  the  measure  of  the  remedy.  Only  at  this 
subsequent  stage,  and  in  evident  contradiction 
of  the  alleged  "  party  "  relation,  was  the  na 
tional  government  made  to  assume  the  position 
of  an  "agent"  of  the  States.  Now  we  hear 
nothing  more  of  a  compact;  the  federal  govern 
ment  stands  no  more  on  an  equal  footing  with 
the  States ;  it  appears  only  in  the  character  of 
their  agent,  and  a  most  humble,  nay,  a  pitiful 
and  despicable  agent  it  is,  for  it  is  bound  to  do 
the  bidding  of  every  one  of  its  constituent  mem 
bers,  no  matter  how  contradictory,  how  absurd, 
how  outrageous  their  behests  may  be.  Yet  Cal- 
houn  has  not  changed  his  general  constitutional 
theory  concerning  the  relation  between  the  fed 
eral  government  and  the  States.  It  appears  in  a 
modified  light  only  because  he  does  not  confine 
his  reasoning  to  the  constitutional  question. 
The  history  of  the  slavery  question  has  forced 
him  boldly  to  step  beyond  it,  and  plant  his  foot 
on  the  higher  and  firmer  ground  of  the  unalter 
able  facts.  He  holds  fast  to  the  Constitution, 
for  he  shares  the  almost  idolatrous  veneration  of 
the  whole  people  for  it ;  he  knows  how  to  find 
in  it  what  he  needs,  and  he  is  fully  conscious  that 
he  would  be  a  general  without  a  single  soldier 
in  his  army  from  the  moment  when  his  theories 
and  his  practical  demands  should  avowedly 
come  into  conflict  with  its  provisions.  But  the 


SLAVERY.  141 

leading  idea  of  his  whole  argument  is  the  too 
well  founded  conviction  that,  whether  in  con 
formity  with  the  Constitution  or  not,  the  issue 
would  be  decided  according  to  the  facts.  Slav 
ery  is,  in  his  opinion,  not  only  a  fact,  but  an 
immutable  fact,  because  it  is  the  direct  out 
growth  of  the  natural  relation  between  the  white 
and  the  black  races. 

"  To  destroy  the  existing  relations  would  be  to  de 
stroy  this  prosperity  [of  the  Southern  States],  and  to 
place  the  two  races  in  a  state  of  conflict,  which  must 
end  in  the  expulsion  or  extirpation  of  one  or  the 
other.  No  other  can  be  substituted  compatible  with 
their  peace  or  security.  The  difficulty  is  in  the  di 
versity  of  the  races.  So  strongly  drawn  is  the  line 
between  the  two  in  consequence,  and  so  strengthened 
by  the  force  of  habit  and  education,  that  it  is  impossi 
ble  for  them  to  exist  together  in  the  community,  where 
their  numbers  are  so  nearly  equal  as  in  the  slave-hold 
ing  States,  under  any  other  relation  than  that  which 
now  exists.  Social  and  political  equality  between 
them  is  impossible.  No  power  on  earth  can  over 
come  the  difficulty.  The  causes  lie  too  deep  in  the 
principles  of  our  nature  to  be  surmounted.  But,  with 
out  such  equality,  to  change  the  present  condition  of 
the  African  race,  were  it  possible,  would  be  but  to 
change  the  form  of  slavery." 

When  the  Republicans,  many  years  later, 
made  the  political  and  social  equality  of  the 


142  JOHN  C.   CALTIOUN. 

freedmen  one  of  the  principal  planks  of  their 
party  platform,  they  never,  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  author,  quoted  this  declaration  of  Cal- 
houn,  though  a  higher  authority  than  the  fore 
most  representative  of  the  slave-holders  could,  of 
course,  not  be  adduced  for  the  necessity  of  such 
a  radical  change  in  the  relation  of  the  two  races. 
This  is  the  best  proof  that,  although,  or  perhaps 
precisely  because,  Calhoun  was  the  fanatical 
champion  of  the  ideas  of  the  Middle  Ages  with 
regard  to  slavery,  he  was  so  far  in  advance  of  his 
times  with  regard  to  the  slavery  question,  that 
his  prophetic  warnings  could  not  possibly  be  of 
any  use  to  the  country.  They  were  always  at 
tentively  listened  to,  here  with  patriotic  anger, 
there  with  scorn  and  disdain,  and  by  some  with 
an  involuntary  shudder;  but  nobody  really 
brought  them  home  to  his  understanding,  and 
therefore  they  were  too  soon  forgotten,  to  be 
transmitted  as  a  portentous  bequest  to  the  gen 
eration  Xvhich  was  to  work  out  their  fulfilment 
in  wading  through  an  ocean  of  blood.  Many 
suspected  him  of  treason,  while  he  performed 
only  with  a  sorrowing  heart  the  office  of  a  Cas 
sandra  ;  they  accused  him  of  planning  the  de 
struction  of  the  Union,  while  he  heaped  one  ir 
refutable  argument  upon  another,  proving  the 
impossibility  of  the  maintenance  of  slavery  in 
the  Union  ;  and  when  the  very  "  dough-faces  ' 


SLAVERY.  143 

began  to  see  that  their  clamoring  for  peace  was 
as  the  whistling  of  a  boy  against  the  storm,  they 
charged  him  with  being  the  principal  author  of 
the  catastrophe,  because  he  had  foretold  it. 
His  claim  to  a  place  among  the  first  men  who 
have  acted  a  part  on  the  political  stage  of  the 
United  States  has  never  been  contested,  and  yet 
he  has  been  handed  down  to  posterity  a  mere 
distorted  shadow  of  the  real  man,  because  his 
incessant  cries  of  "  Beware  !  "  and  "  Woe  to 
you  !  "  remained  fresh  in  the  memory  of  the  peo 
ple,  while  the  reasoning  of  which  these  warn 
ings  had  been  but  the  last  conclusion,  was  for 
gotten  or  misconstrued.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  this, 
he  and  those  to  whom  his  memory  has  been 
dear  have  had  no  right  to  complain,  because, 
though  he  was  no  traitor,  but  honestly  and  ear 
nestly  wished  to  see  the  Union  preserved,  still 
the  Union  and  all  that  made  it  valuable  and 
dear  to  him  were  "  as  nothing  "  to  him  com 
pared  with  slavery. 

This  being  the  case  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the 
term,  and  slavery  being  an  immutable  fact,  the 
word  compromise  is  not  to  be  found  in  his  polit 
ical  vocabulary  with  regard  to  the  slavery  ques 
tion.  In  a  second  speech  on  abolition  petitions 
(February  6,  1837),  he  declares,  "I  hold  con 
cession  or  compromise  to  be  fatal.  If  we  con 
cede  an  inch,  concession  would  follow  conces- 


144  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN 

sion,  com  promise  would  follow  compromise,  until 
our  ranks  would  be  so  broken  that  effectual  re 
sistance  would  be  impossible."  So  as  every 
agitation  of  the  slavery  question  in  a  hostile 
spirit  eo  ipso  touches  the  vitals  of  the  "  peculiar 
institution,"  it  must  be  suppressed,  if  the  Union 
is  to  be  preserved.  In  the  discussion  of  the 
abolition  petitions,  his  love  of  the  Union  had  be 
trayed  this  slave  of  his  own  implacable  logic 
into  the  gross  mistake  of  regarding  the  exclu 
sion  of  the  slavery  question  from  the  halls  of 
Congress  as  substantially  identical  with  a  to 
tal  and  permanent  extinction  of  its  agitation 
everywhere  and  in  every  form.  He  clung  to 
this  fallacy,  because  to  renounce  it  was  to  ac 
knowledge  that,  if  the  rest  of  his  argumentation 
was  correct,  his  attempts  to  save  slavery  and 
the  Union  were  ab  initio  absolutely  idle.  Now, 
however,  he  did  not  recur  to  this  point,  but 
drew  directly  from  his  premises  the  conclusion 
that  the  federal  government  was  bound  to  ef 
fect  the  suppression  of  the  agitation  without 
meddling  in  any  way  whatever  with  the  "pe 
culiar  institution ;  "  that  is,  that  within  the 
sphere  of  its  legitimate  action,  and  to  the  full 
est  extent  of  its  constitutional  powers,  it  was 
bound  to  do  what  the  States  demanded.  No 
justification  for  refusing  to  do  so  did  or  ever 
sould  exist.  Even  the  exercise  of  an  unques* 


SLAVERY.  145 

tioned  constitutional  power  was  no  valid  excuse. 
The  discretion  of  Congress  had  its  limit  in  the 
notion  of  every  single  State  as  to  what  its  indi 
vidual  security  demanded.  A  constitutional 
federal  law  would  instantly  lose  its  validity  and 
constitutionality,  if  a  State  should  see  fit,  under 
the  plea  of  securing  its  peace,  to  pass  a  conflict 
ing  law  :  — 

"  The  low  must  yield  to  the  high  ;  the  convenient 
to  the  necessary  ;  mere  accommodation  to  safety  and 
security.  This  is  the  universal  principle  which  gov 
erns  in  all  analogous  cases,  both  in  our  social  and  po 
litical  relations.  Whenever  the  means  of  enjoying  or 
securing  rights  come  into  conflict, — rights  themselves 
never  can,  —  this  universal  and  fundamental  principle 
is  the  one  which,  by  consent  of  mankind,  governs  in 
all  such  cases.  Apply  it  to  the  case  under  considera 
tion,  and  need  I  ask  which  ought  to  yield?  Will 
any  rational  being  say  that  the  laws  of  eleven  States 
of  the  Union  which  are  necessary  to  their  peace,  se 
curity,  and  very  existence  ought  to  yield  to  the  laws 
of  the  general  government  regulating  the  post-office, 
which  at  the  best  is  a  mere  accommodation  and  conven 
ience,  —  and  this  when  the  government  was  formed 
by  the  States,  mainly  with  a  view  to  secure  more  per 
fectly  their  peace  and  safety  ?  But  one  answer  can 
be  given.  All  must  feel  that  it  would  be  improper 
for  the  laws  of  the  States,  in  such  case,  to  yield  to 
those  of  the  general  government,  and  of  course  that 
the  latter  ought  to  yield  to  the  former.  When  I  say 
JO 


146  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ought,  I  do  not  mean  on  the  principle  of  concession. 
I  take  higher  ground  :  I  mean  under  the  obligation  of 
the  Constitution  itself." 

This  obligation  he  found  in  the  clause  which 
empowers  Congress  "  to  make  all  laws  which 
shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into 
execution  "  the  powers  vested  by  the  Constitu 
tion  in  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
whence  he  drew  the  seemingly  so  simple  and 
unanswerable  conclusion  that  no  law,  relating  to 
a  mere  accommodation  and  convenience,  could  be 
proper,  if  it  endangered  the  peace,  security,  and 
very  existence  of  any  one  of  the  States.  Each 
State  being  the  exclusive  judge  of  what  its  peace 
and  security  demanded,  the  direct  consequence 
was  that  each  State  had  to  decide  upon  the  neces 
sity  and  propriety  of  the  federal  laws.  Thus  the 
final  result  of  Calhoun's  reasoning  is  again  a 
systematization  of  anarchy,  but  it  is  an  anarchy 
of  a  higher  order  than  that  which  he  had  ar 
rived  at  in  the  tariff  controversy.  Then  he  had 
claimed  for  each  State  the  right  to  nullify,  so 
far  as  itself  was  concerned,  a  federal  law  which 
it  deemed  unconstitutional,  and  now  he  attrib 
uted  to  each  State  the  right  to  invalidate  a  con 
stitutional  federal  law,  and  to  render  it  unconsti 
tutional  by  passing  a  conflicting  law.  Whether 
the  law  was  to  be  invalidated  only  as  to  the  par 
ticular  State,  or  for  the  whole  Union,  we  are  not 


SLAVERY.  147 

told.  According  to  the  theory,  it  ought  to  have 
been  the  former;  but  then  the  old  difficulty 
arose,  that  there  was  a  federal  law  which  was 
a  law  but  for  a  part  of  the  Union,  while,  if  it 
was  invalidated  for  the  whole  Union,  twenty- 
three  sovereign  States,  which  took  no  exception 
to  what  their  senators  and  representatives  in 
Congress  had  seen  fit  to  do,  had  to  submit  to 
the  will  of  one  sovereign  State. 

We  are  not  informed  which  horn  of  the  di 
lemma  Calhoun  preferred  ;  but  in  either  case 
the  absurdity  was  so  glaring  that  he  again  could 
not  have  failed  to  see  it,  if,  in  the  particular 
matter  on  which  he  reasoned,  there  had  not 
been  a  solidarity  of  interests  of  all  the  slave- 
holding  States.  This  is  the  more  evident  as, 
throughout  the  report  and  the  speech,  each  State 
and  the  slave-holding  States  are  interchangeably 
used  as  equivalent  terms  with  regard  to  the 
question  in  hand.  The  constitutional  question 
is  argued  in  such  a  manner  that  the  right  and 
the  power  claimed  belong  to  each  State  individ 
ually  ;  and  whenever  he  came  to  speak  of  the 
facts,  that  is  to  say,  whenever  he  applied  the 
theory  to  the  legislative  problem  before  the 
Senate,  he  said  the  South,  the  eleven  slave-hold 
ing  States,  etc.  In  the  report,  too,  as  well  as  in 
the  speech,  the  consideration  of  the  fact  pre 
dominates  in  a  very  remarkable  degree  over  the 
constitutional  argument :  — 


148  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

"  He  must  be  blind,  indeed,  who  does  not  perceive 
that  the  subversion  of  a  relation  which  must  be  fol 
lowed  with  such  disastrous  consequences  can  only  be 
effected  by  convulsions  that  would  devastate  the  coun 
try,  burst  asunder  the  bonds  of  the  Union,  and  engulf, 
in  a  sea  of  blood,  the  institutions  of  the  country.  It 
is  madness  to  suppose  that  the  slave-holding  States 
would  quietly  submit  to  be  sacrificed.  Every  consid 
eration  —  interest,  duty,  and  humanity,  the  love  of 
country,  the  sense  of  wrong,  hatred  of  oppressors,  and 
treacherous  and  faithless  confederates,  and,  finally, 
despair  —  would  impel  them  to  the  most  daring  and 
desperate  resistance  in  defence  of  property,  family, 
country,  liberty,  and  existence." 

Yes,  it  is  madness  to  suppose  that  the  slave- 
holding  States  would  quietly  submit  to  be  sac 
rificed,  —  that  is  the  pivot  on  which  the  report, 
the  speech,  and  the  bill  turn,  and  not  on  any 
clause  of  the  Constitution.  If  "existence"  was 
at  stake  and  "  despair  "  sat  at  the  council  table, 
then,  indeed,  it  was  a  matter  of  course  that  not 
only  the  Union,  but  also  the  whole  Constitution, 
was  "as  nothing."  Therefore,  also,  the  speech 
did  not  conclude  with  a  maxim  or  rule  of  con 
stitutional  law,  but  with  the  announcement  of 
a  fact : — 

"  I  must  tell  the  Senate,  be  your  decision  what  it 
may,  the  South  will  never  abandon  the  principles  of 
this  bill.  If  you  refuse  cooperation  with  our  laws, 


SLAVERY.  149 

and  conflict  should  ensue  between  yours  and  ours,  the 
Southern  States  will  never  yield  to  the  superiority  of 
yours.  .  .  .  Let  it  be  fixed,  let  it  be  riveted  in  every 
Southern  mind  that  the  laws  of  the  slave-holding  States 
for  the  protection  of  their  domestic  institutions  are 
paramount  to  the  laws  of  the  general  government  in 
regulations  of  commerce  and  the  mail ;  that  the  latter 
must  yield  to  the  former  in  the  event  of  conflict." 

In  the  opinion  of  those  who  neither  saw  nor 
thought  beyond  the  immediate  future,  this  an 
nouncement  proved  to  be  less  than  an  empty 
threat.  Not  only  was  Calhoun's  bill  rejected, 
but  in  the  same  year  another  bill  was  passed  by 
both  Houses  of  Congress,  and  approved  by  the 
President,  prohibiting  postmasters,  under  se 
vere  penalty,  from  "  unlawfully  "  detaining  in 
their  offices  "  any  letter,  package,  pamphlet,  or 
newspaper  with  intent  to  prevent  the  arrival 
and  delivery  of  the  same."  Nowhere  was  the 
nullification  of  this  law  spoken  of,  and  never 
again  was  an  attempt  made  by  federal  legisla 
tion  thus  indirectly  to  abridge  the  liberty  of  the 
press.  Yet  Calhoun  was  right  in  the  most  es 
sential  point.  The  South  never  did  abandon 
the  principle  of  this  bill ;  that  is  to  say,  the 
principle  that  slavery  had  to  be  protected  and 
defended  at  all  hazards,  —  with  and  under  the 
Constitution,  if  possible,  but  protected  and  de 
fended  it  must  and  should  be,  under  all  circum- 


150  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

stances  and  by  any  necessary  means.  Calhoun 
knew  that  well  enough,  and  he  therefore  did 
not  wear  the  dismayed  mien  of  a  defeated  man. 
With  the  same  tone  of  deep,  immutable  con 
viction  he  repeated  at  every  opportunity  the 
declaration  that  the  South  would  never  yield 
in  the  slavery  question,  because  it  could  not  do 
it.  He  did  not  live  to  see  the  day  when  this 
declaration  was  put  to  its  final  test ;  but  the  de 
lay  was  so  long  only  because,  through  all  these 
gloomy  years,  the  resistance  of  the  North  in 
variably  broke  down  before  the  attacks  of  the 
solid  phalanx  of  the  slave  power.  Calhoun  had 
been  defeated  in  the  question  of  the  abolition 
petitions  and  in  that  of  the  incendiary  publica 
tions,  because  the  South  had  not  come  up  to  the 
mark ;  but  the  inglorious  victories  of  the  North 
augured  nothing  but  ignominious  defeats  for 
the  future,  while  Calhoun  could  anticipate  brill 
iant —  but  alas  !  how  terribly  disastrous —  vic 
tories,  for  he  was  sure  that  the  South  would 
steadily  advance  towards  the  mark  which  he 
had  drawn  for  it.  Therefore  it  would  have 
been  a  most  egregious  mistake  to  judge  the  sit 
uation  by  the  immediate  result  of  his  move 
ment  in  those  two  questions.  The  defeated 
"  doctrinaire  "  was  not  "  shelved  ;  "  on  the  con 
trary,  his  influence  was  on  the  increase,  though 
he  dared  once  more  to  throw  the  gauntlet  into 
the  face  of  public  opinion. 


SLAVERY.  151 

Nearly  a  year  passed  ere  Calhoun  addressed 
the  Senate  again  on  the  slavery  question.  The 
old  economical  questions  pushed  themselves 
once  more  into  the  foreground.  In  spite  of  the 
compromise  tariff,  the  revenues  of  the  govern 
ment  increased  at  such  a  rate  that  the  appre 
hension  arose  anew  of  seeing  a  vast  surplus 
accumulate.  The  various  propositions  for  avert 
ing  that  "  calamity  "  or  employing  the  super 
fluous  money  do  not  concern  us  here.  It  need 
only  be  mentioned  that  Calhoun  considered  it 
a  serious  danger,  and  as,  in  his  opinion,  the  ac 
cumulation  of  the  surplus  could  not  be  pre 
vented,  he  earnestly  advocated  that  it  should 
be  "  deposited  "  in  the  treasuries  of  the  States, 
according  to  their  federal  representation. 

It  is  a  very  curious  and  even  important  fact, 
which,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  goes,  has  thus 
far  been  entirely  overlooked,  that  Calhoun,  be 
sides  his  general  reasons,  had  a  special  purpose 
in  proposing  such  a  disposal  of  the  surplus  rev 
enue.  In  a  letter  to  some  citizens  of  Athens, 
Georgia  (August  5,  1836),  he  writes :  — 

"  Instead  of  being  cut  off  from  the  vast  commerce 
of  the  West,  as  had  been  supposed,  we  find,  to  our 
surprise,  that  it  is  in  our  power,  with  proper  exertions, 
to  turn  its  copious  stream  to  our  own  ports.  Just  at 
this  important  moment,  when  this  new  and  brilliant 
prospect  is  unfolding  to  our  view,  the  Deposit  Bill  is 


152  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

about  to  place  under  the  control  of  the  States  inter, 
ested  ample  means  of  accomplishing,  on  the  most  ex 
tended  and  durable  scale,  a  system  of  railroad  com 
munication  that,  if  effected,  must  change  the  social, 
political,  and  commercial  relations  of  the  whole  coun 
try  vastly  to  our  benefit,  but  without  injuring  other 
sections." 

The  federal  government  dares  not  do  indi 
rectly  what  it  has  no  right  to  do  directly  —  how 
often  had  he  declared  this  to  be  a  fundamental 
principle  of  constitutional  law !  And  yet  what 
was  this  proposed  distribution  if  not  "  internal 
improvements  "  by  indirection  ?  True  enough, 
not  internal  improvements  which  Congress 
deemed  of  national  importance,  but  under  the 
exclusive  control  of  the  separate  States,  and  in 
tended,  in  the  first  place,  to  serve  state  inter 
ests.  But  it  is  not  because  the  consistency  of 
Calhoun  might  be  called  into  question  that  this 
idea  deserves  more  attention  than  it  has  hith 
erto  received  from  historians.  The  arch-doc 
trinaire  was  in  the  South  one  of  the  first  to  see 
that  with  the  railroads  a  force  had  been  intro 
duced  which  was  to  exert  a  most  powerful  influ 
ence  in  shaping  the  destinies  of  the  country,  not 
only  in  general,  but  also  with  regard  to  the  re 
lation  of  the  two  geographical  sections  lying  re 
spectively  north  and  south  of  Mason  and  Dix- 
on's  line.  He  himself  proposed  a  certain  route 


SLAVERY.  153 

through  the  Alleghanies,  spending  eight  days  on 
his  exploring  expedition,  and  walking  over  a 
considerable  part  of  the  ground.  The  interest 
which  he  manifested  in  this  problem  was  so 
great  that  the  Southern  papers  spoke  of  him  as 
the  fittest  man  to  be  made  the  president  of  the 
great  Southern  and  Western  Railroad  Company. 
He  was  fully  awake  to  the  importance  of  the 
fact  that  the  difference  in  the  wealth  of  the  two 
sections  increased  every  year  in  favor  of  the 
North ;  and  he  saw  that,  as  the  general  econom 
ical  development  would  go  on  at  an  unparalleled 
rate  in  consequence  of  communication  by  steam, 
this  difference  would  necessarily  increase  at  the 
same  ratio  if  the  South  should  lag  behind  the 
North  in  realizing  the  possibilities  created  by 
the  new  invention.  Yet  his  last  conclusion 
could  not  have  been  more  wrong,  if  every  one 
of  his  premises  had  been  erroneous.  Not  Con 
gress  and  its  tariff  laws,  as  he  supposed,  but 
slavery  was  the  cause  of  the  remarkable  phe 
nomenon  which  justly  rendered  him  so  uneasy; 
and  therefore  the  new  invention,  which  was  a 
blessing  to  all  mankind,  was  sure  to  prove  a 
curse  to  the  slave-holders.  As  early  as  1817  a 
representative  of  Louisiana  had  declared  in 
Congress,  "  We  need  no  roads ;"  and  a  country 
which  needs  no  roads  cannot  have  railroads. 
The  will  of  the  South  was  as  nothing  in  this 


154  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

question.  The  principal  cities  might  indeed  be 
connected  by  rail,  and  it  was  done  in  the  course 
of  time  ;  but  there  were,  so  to  speak,  no  brooks 
and  rivers  to  feed  the  main  streams,  and,  what 
ever  the  South  might  do,  it  could  not  create 
them.  The  idea  of  Calhoun,  to  make  up  for 
lost  time  and  overtake  the  North  by  means  of 
railroads,  was  a  more  preposterous  delusion  than 
any  he  had  indulged  in  heretofore.  No  power 
on  earth  could  spur  the  South  into  a  livelier 
pace,  because  it  is  the  very  nature  of  the  "  pe 
culiar  institution  "  to  move  in  a  jog  trot.  The 
railroads  only  served  to  put  this  fact  into  a  more 
glaring  light ;  while  in  the  North  they  acceler 
ated  the  economical  development  more  than  the 
wildest  imagination  could  have  anticipated  at 
that  time. 

It  was  neither  all  nor  the  worst  that  Cal- 
houn's  hopes  were  to  be  wholly  disappointed, 
and  that  a  new  impetus  was  to  be  given  in  the 
direction  in  which  the  economical  development 
of  the  country  had  been  moving  ever  since  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution.  He  was  undoubt 
edly  right  in  doing  his  best  for  an  extensive 
railroad  system,  for  the  less  the  South  kept  up 
in  this  respect  with  the  North  the  more  unfa 
vorably  would  it  compare  in  every  respect  with 
the  non-slave-holding  States.  But  every  spike 
which  fastened  a  rail  in  Southern  soil  was  a 


SLAVERY.  155 

nail  driven  into  the  coffin  of  slavery;  for  every 
engine,  nay,  every  traveller  and  every  bale  of 
goods,  came  impregnated  with  the  spirit  of  the 
times,  which  would  not  and  could  not  brook 
slavery.  The  South  had  no  choice  ;  Calhoun 
was  right  in  believing  that  self-preservation 
bade  the  South  to  grasp  even  more  eagerly  than 
the  North  at  the  cup  which  was  to  mankind 
what  the  alchemists  had  vainly  tried  to  find  for 
the  individual,  —  an  elixir  of  life  ;  but  slavery 
turned  it  into  poison.  The  irrepressible  con 
flict  between  North  and  South  was  to  end  with 
the  disruption  of  the  Union  ;  but  another  and 
more  intense  irrepressible  conflict  gnawed  the 
intestines  of  the  South,  and  it  was  this  that 
rendered  the  doom  of  slavery  inevitable.  What 
ever  the  merits  or  demerits  of  the  deposit 
scheme  were  from  a  general  point  of  view,  if 
the  Southern  States  should  invest  their  share  in 
railroads,  it  would  certainly  have  been  the  best 
use  they  could  make  of  the  money,  and  yet  it 
would  have  been  better  for  them  to  throw  all 
the  surplus  into  the  sea. 

The  adoption  of  Calhoun's  device  led  to  one 
of  the  most  curious  episodes  in  the  financial 
history  of  the  United  States,  which  abounds 
with  strange  incidents.  But  whatever  may  be 
thought  of  the  remedy,  it  will  not  be  denied  that 
Calhoun  was  right  in  asserting  that  the  govern- 


156  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ment  ought  not  to  take  more  out  of  the  pockets 
of  the  citizens  than  it  really  needed  for  its  le 
gitimate  purposes,  and  that  a  chronically  ple 
thoric  treasury  might  have  grave  consequences. 
Calhoun  chiefly  apprehended  that  such  a  con 
stantly  overflowing  purse  would  be  a  powerful 
means  to  corrupt  the  whole  government  machin 
ery  still  more  than  heretofore,  by  leading  to  a 
further  increase  of  the  vast  patronage  of  the 
federal  government,  and  by  enlisting  all  the 
federal  officers  still  more  exclusively  in  the 
party  service,  and  that  the  independence  and 
sovereignty  of  the  States  would  thereby  be  still 
more  endangered. 

It  had  evidently  become  with  him  a  matter 
of  course  that  every  legislative  problem  of  a 
general  character  must,  in  some  way  or  other, 
stand  in  close  connection  with  these  two  ques 
tions.  The  alarming  increase  of  the  revenues 
was  partly  due  to  the  enormous  sales  of  the 
public  lands,  which  were,  to  a  great  extent, 
bought  on  speculation.  Here  was  certainly  a 
problem  of  the  first  magnitude  and  beset  with 
extraordinary  difficulties ;  but  it  is,  to  say  the 
least,  rather  surprising  to  see  the  greatest  stress 
laid  on  the  dangers  which  were  to  arise  in  those 
two  respects  from  this  source.  This  is  not  the 
place  to  discuss  the  great  land  question,  and  we 
will  therefore  not  inquire  into  the  merits  or  de- 


SLAVERY.  157 

merits  of  Calhoun's  general  opinions  concern 
ing  it.  The  reason  for  his  proposition  (Febru 
ary,  1837)  to  cede  the  public  lands  to  the  new 
States,  namely,  "  to  place  the  senators  and  rep 
resentatives  from  the  new  States  on  an  equality 
with  those  from  the  old,  by  withdrawing  our 
local  control,  and  breaking  the  vassalage  under 
which  they  are  now  placed,"  would,  however, 
hardly  admit  of  a  serious  criticism. 

A  less  far-fetched  opportunity  was  offered 
him  to  discuss  state  sovereignty,  from  a  new 
point  of  view  and  in  a  thorough  manner,  in  the 
debate  on  the  question  of  admitting  Michigan 
as  a  State.  Congress  had  made  the  admission 
dependent  upon  the  condition  that  Michigan 
should  agree  to  a  certain  boundary  line.  This 
agreement  had  been  made,  but  opinions  differed 
as  to  whether  it  had  been  made  in  a  legal  or 
illegal  manner.  As  to  the  concrete  question,  it 
suffices  to  say  that  Calhoun  was  of  the  latter 
opinion.  We  have  to  look  somewhat  more 
closely  only  at  the  general  theory,  which  he 
proclaimed  on  this  occasion. 

Calhoun  asserted  that  the  condition  concern 
ing  the  boundary  attached  "  simply  to  her  ad 
mission  into  the  Union,"  and  did  not  affect  in 
the  least  either  the  acceptance  of  her  constitu 
tion  by  Congress  or  "  the  declaration  that  she 
is  a  State."  There  was  no  difference  of  opinion 


158  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

as  to  the  first  part  of  the  assertion,  but  it  was 
contended  on  the  other  side  that  Michigan  was 
not  and  could  not  be  a  State  before  her  admis 
sion  into  the  Union.  Calhoun  proved  that  this 
assertion  was  incompatible  with  the  act  of  Con 
gress  imposing  the  boundary  condition.  That, 
however,  could  not  be  decisive  as  to  the  main 
question.  Contests  upon  great  constitutional 
principles  cannot  be  decided  by  appealing  to 
the  wording  of  a  statute,  because  this  might 
be  grossly  inaccurate  and  careless  ;  besides,  the 
Constitution  would  then  be  but  a  piece  of  wax 
in  the  hands  of  Congress,  for  Congress  might  at 
first  pass  a  law  to  suit  itself,  and  then  declare 
the  correct  reading  of  the  Constitution  to  be 
thus  and  thus,  since  this  law  says  so  and  so. 
But  Calhoun  did  not  rest  his  case  solely  upon 
this  act  of  Congress.  He  said  :  — 

"  I  now  go  farther,  and  assert  that  it  [the  position 
of  the  friends  of  the  bill  before  the  Senate]  is  in  di 
rect  opposition  to  plain  and  unquestionable  matter  of 
fact.  There  is  no  fact  more  certain  than  that  Mich 
igan  is  a  State.  She  is  in  full  exercise  of  sovereign 
authority,  with  a  legislature  and  a  chief  magistrate. 
She  passes  laws ;  she  executes  them ;  she  regulates 
titles,  and  even  takes  away  life,  —  all  on  her  own 
authority.  Ours  has  entirely  ceased  over  her ;  and 
yet  there  are  those  who  can  deny,  with  all  these  facts 
before  them,  that  she  is  a  State.  They  might  as  well 
deny  the  existence  of  this  hall ! " 


SLAVERY.  159 

If  Calhoun  had  been  able  under  any  circum 
stances  to  consider  a  question  of  this  nature  with 
a  judicial  mind,  instead  of  entering  upon  its  ex 
amination  with  the  foregone  conclusions  of  a 
passionate  partisan,  he  would  have  perceived  at 
the  first  glance  that  the  case  was  far  from  be 
ing  so  plain  as  he  made  it  out.  Michigan  was 
unquestionably  no  longer  a  Territory,  and  she 
did  —  and  she  did  of  right  —  all  that  he  had 
mentioned.  The  most  appropriate  —  or  it  is 
perhaps  more  correct  to  say  the  least  inappro 
priate  —  name  to  be  found  in  the  insufficient  no 
menclature  of  political  science  for  the  common 
wealth,  therefore,  was  possibly  a  "  State."  That, 
however,  was  of  very  little  consequence  with 
regard  to  the  point  made  by  Calhoun.  Every 
thing  depended  upon  the  answer  to  the  ques 
tion  what  kind  of  a  State  it  was,  or,  in  other 
words,  what  the  term  "  State  "  signified  in  this 
particular  case.  That  Michigan  was  not  at  this 
moment  a  State  in  the  most  general  acceptation 
of  the  term,  even  Calhoun  would  hardly  have 
ventured  to  deny.  Would  he  have  dared  to  as 
sert  that,  while  the  question  of  her  admission 
into  the  Union  was  pending,  she  would  have  the 
right  to  declare  war  against  some  other  sover 
eign  power,  to  conclude  treaties,  to  coin  money, 
to  grant  letters  of  mark  and  reprisal,  etc.  ?  Un 
deniably  she  lacked  many  of  the  most  essen- 


160  JOHN  C.   CALEOUN. 

tial  powers  inherent  to  sovereignty,  and,  in 
consequence,  she  evidently  was  not  a  State  as 
that  phrase  is  most  frequently  used.  Just  as 
evidently  she  was  not  a  State  of  the  Union 
in  the  sense  of  the  Constitution,  for  the  ques 
tion  under  consideration  was  her  admission  into 
the  Union.  Yet  no  one  pretended  that  she  was 
out  of  the  Union.  Whatever  her  legal  rela 
tion  towards  the  federal  government  might  be, 
she  certainly  was  a  part  of  the  great  common 
wealth  known  by  the  name  of  the  United  States 
of  America.  Calhoun  could  the  less  contest 
this  fact,  because  another  proof  which  he  ad 
duced  for  his  assertion  was  that  Michigan  had 
elected  senators,  and,  according  to  the  Consti 
tution,  only  States  elect  senators.  This  argu 
ment  clearly  went  too  far  the  other  way.  In 
correct  language,  Michigan  had  not  elected 
senators  of  the  United  States,  but  she  had 
elected  two  men,  who  were  to  be  her  senators 
in  Congress  after  she  had  been  admitted  into 
the  Union.  Also,  since  Michigan  was  a  part  of 
the  republic,  the  authority  of  Congress  over 
her  had  incontestably  not  "  entirely  ceased," 
for  there  is  and  can  be  no  part  of  the  republic 
over  which  Congress  has  not  some  authority. 
Whether  this  authority  went  so  far  as  to  give 
Congress  the  right  to  remand  Michigan  into 
her  former  territorial  status,  if  she  refused  to 


SLAVERY.  161 

comply  with  the  conditions  imposed  upon  her 
admission  into  the  Union,  need  not  here  be 
inquired  into.  Calhoun's  argument  is  like  a 
sword  without  a  blade,  if  it  be  proved  that  Mich 
igan  was  but  a  State  in  an  inchoate  condition, 
which  could  be  perfected  only  by  the  act  of 
Congress  admitting  her  into  the  Union. 

Calhoun  did,  of  course,  not  contest  that  an 
act  of  Congress  was  needed  to  make  Michigan 
a  State  of  the  Union,  but  he  did  not  assent  any 
further  to  the  proposition  just  stated. 

"  I  am  told,  if  this  be  so,  if  a  Territory  must  be 
come  a  State  before  it  can  be  admitted,  it  would  fol 
low  that  she  might  refuse  to  enter  the  Union  after 
she  had  acquired  the  right  of  acting  for  herself.  Cer 
tainly  she  may.  A  State  cannot  be  forced  into  the 
Union.  She  must  come  in  by  her  own  free  assent, 
given  in  her  highest  sovereign  capacity  through  a 
convention  of  the  people  of  the  State.  Such  is  the 
constitutional  provision  ;  and  those  who  make  the 
objection  must  overlook  both  the  Constitution  and  the 
elementary  principles  of  our  government,  of  which 
the  right  of  self-government  is  the  first,  —  the  right  of 
every  people  to  form  their  own  government,  and  to 
determine  their  political  condition." 

The  right  here  claimed  is  not  the  right  of  se 
cession.  If  secession,  not  as  an  eventually  jus 
tifiable  revolutionary  act,  but  as  a  constitutional 

right,  is  a  monstrous  political  absurdity,  this 
11 


162  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

right  thus  asserted  concerning  Michigan  is  an 
absurdity  in  comparison  with  which  the  right 
of  secession  is  the  soundest  political  conception, 
and  even,  like  nullification,  "a  conservative 
principle."  Calhoun  now  and  afterwards  main 
tained  that  a  so-called  enabling  act  of  Congress 
was  required  to  give  a  Territory  the  right  to 
erect  itself  into  a  State.  But  if  any  political 
proposition  can  be  called  self-evident,  it  is  cer 
tainly  this :  that  an  enabling  act  can  only  give 
permission  to  a  Territory  to  erect  itself  into  a 
State  of  the  Union.  Even  if  Congress  could 
ever  be  so  regardless  of  duty,  and  so  mad  as  to 
give  a  Territory  permission  simultaneously  with 
adopting  a  state  constitution  to  will  itself  out 
of  the  Union,  in  which  clause  of  the  Consti 
tution  did  this  strict  constructionist  find  the 
power  granted  to  Congress  to  commit  such  a 
suicidal  act  ?  The  Constitution,  which  Calhoun 
proclaimed  the  grandest  embodiment  of  political 
wisdom  thus  far  seen  by  the  world,  would  have 
been  the  greatest  monstrosity  ever  conceived 
by  the  human  mind,  if  the  Union  could  con 
stitutionally  lose  all  its  territorial  possessions, 
merely  because  the  inhabitants  of  the  Territories 
were  pleased  to  bow  themselves  out  of  it,  by 
way  of  acknowledging  the  privilege  accorded 
them  to  become  full  members  of  the  Union. 
That  "so  long  as  these  sound  principles  are  ob- 


SLAVERY.  163 

served  "  no  State  would  ever  "  reject  this  hig 
privilege,"  or  would  "  ever  refuse  to  enter  this 
Union,"  but  rather  would  "  rush  into  your  em 
brace,  so  long  as  your  institutions  are  worth 
preserving,"  was  an  assertion  of  no  consequence 
whatever.  The  possibility  stamps  the  theory 
as  such  an  infinite  absurdity  that  it  would  be 
an  insult  to  the  reader  to  discuss  it  at  all,  if 
John  C.  Calhoun  had  not  been  its  advocate. 
But  one  month  later  he  very  correctly  spoke 
of  "the  public  domain  "  as  being  "  the  property 
of  the  whole  people  of  the  United  States."  So 
an  insignificant  minority — the  inhabitants  of 
the  Territories  —  had  the  right  to  deprive  the 
whole  people  of  this  inestimable  property,  and 
appropriate  it  exclusively  to  themselves,  and, 
with  the  indirect  sanction  of  Congress,  given 
by  the  permission  to  adopt  state  constitutions, 
set  up  in  business  for  themselves,  without  per 
haps  even  deigning  to  say  good-by  to  this 
Union,  which  improved  so  wonderfully  upon 
the  example  of  King  Lear.  But  enough,  and 
more  than  enough,  of  this  doctrine,  which  every 
school-boy  will  pronounce  to  be  utter  nonsense. 
Yet  one  of  the  most  acute  political  reasoners 
produced  by  America  honestly  believed  it,  be 
cause  it  was  a  logical  outgrowth  of  the  doctrine 
of  state  sovereignty  and  because  the  doctrine 
of  state  aovereignty  was  the  sheet-anchor  which 


164  JOHN  C.   CALPOUN. 

held  the  worm-eaten   bark  of  slavery  to  her 
moorings. 

Poor  man  !  Adams  wrote  some  months  later, 
"  Calhoun  looks  like  a  man  racked  with  furious 
passions  and  stung  with  disappointed  ambition, 
as  he  is."  Certainly,  Calhoun  had  not  forgot 
ten  his  bitter  disappointments,  nor  had  he 
ceased  to  hope  that  he  would,  after  all,  some 
time  reach  the  goal  of  his  wishes ;  but  his  per 
sonal  ambition  had  long  ago  become  wholly 
subordinate  to  the  passions  which  the  slavery 
conflict  had  awakened  in  his  bosom.  The  en 
croachments  of  the  slave  power  upon  the  do 
main  of  liberty  went  on  at  an  alarming  rate ; 
but  Calhoun  derived  no  satisfaction  from  any 
success,  because  every  advance  disclosed  to  his 
mind  more  clearly  the  immensity  of  the  space 
still  to  be  traversed,  ere  the  slave-holders  could 
say  to  themselves :  Put  out  the  watch-fires,  let 
us  rest  and  enjoy  the  fruits  of  our  toils,  for 
there  is  nothing  more  to  be  apprehended.  In 
his  second  speech  on  the  admission  of  Michigan, 
he  had  thus  very  correctly  characterized  him 
self:— 

"  It  has  perhaps  been  too  much  my  habit  to  look 
more  to  the  future  and  less  to  the  present  than  is 
wise ;  but  such  is  the  constitution  of  my  mind  that 
when  I  see  before  me  the  indications  of  causes  cal 
culated  to  effect  important  changes  in  our  political 


SLAVERY.  165 

condition,  I  am  led  irresistibly  to  trace  them  to 
their  sources,  and  follow  them  out  in  their  conse 
quences." 

His  name  would  appear  in  smaller  letters  in 
the  history  of  the  United  States,  but  his  happi 
ness  as  a  man  would  have  been  greater,  if  it 
had  been  otherwise.  What  wonder  that  passion 
raked  its  deep  furrows  into  the  face  of  a  man 
who  fought  with  all  the  fervor  of  his  hot  blood 
and  all  the  energy  of  his  iron  will  for  a  cause, 
and  yet  perceived  that  every  victory  gained  in 
creased  the  number  and  determination  of  its 
enemies,  and  rendered  their  ultimate  triumph 
more  probable,  if  not  certain !  If  he  had  still 
been  open  to  arguments  on  this  head,  this  con 
dition  of  the  struggle  would  have  necessarily 
awakened  doubts  in  his  mind  concerning  the 
justice  of  his  cause ;  but  as  his  stand  had  been 
ii-revocably  taken,  the  remarkable  phenomenon 
had  just  the  opposite  effect.  The  denunciations 
of  slavery  by  the  abolitionists  incited  him  to  ex 
tol  it  in  unmeasured  terms. 

In  a  brief  but  most  important  speech  (Feb 
ruary  6,  1837)  the  question  of  receiving  the 
abolition  petitions  was  taken  up  by  him  once 
more.  It  was  not  done  with  a  view  to  a  recon 
sideration  of  the  memorable  decision  of  the 
Senate,  though  he  tried  to  prove  that  his  opin 
ion  had  been  fully  borne  out  by  the  course  of 


166  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

events.  He  saw  his  prophecies  about  to  be  ful 
filled,  and  his  object  was  to  warn  the  Senate 
once  more  to  arrest  its  fatal  course  down  the  in 
clined  plane,  which  terminated  in  an  abyss. 

"  I  then  said  that  the  next  step  would  be  to  refer 
the  petition  to  a  committee,  and  I  already  see  indica 
tions  that  such  is  now  the  intention.  .  .  .  We  are 
now  told  that  the  most  effectual  mode  of  arresting  the 
progress  of  abolition  is  to  reason  it  down  ;  and  with 
this  view  it  is  urged  that  the  petitions  ought  to  be  re 
ferred  to  a  committee.  That  is  the  very  ground 
which  was  taken  at  the  last  session  in  the  other 
House ;  but  instead  of  arresting  its  progress,  it  has 
since  advanced  more  rapidly  than  ever.  The  most 
unquestionable  right  may  be  rendered  doubtful  if 
once  admitted  to  be  a  subject  of  controversy,  and  that 
would  be  the  case  in  the  present  instance." 

This  was  all  very  true,  but  Calhoun  was 
mistaken  in  supposing  that  it  could  be  helped. 
In  this  very  speech,  he  himself  furnished  the 
best  proof  that  nothing,  which  either  the  Sen 
ate  or  any  other  earthly  power  could  do,  would 
alter  any  of  these  facts  in  the  least.  True 
enough,  the  attempt  of  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  to  reason  abolitionism  down  had 
been  worse  than  futile.  The  antislavery  spirit 
could  not  be  reasoned  down;  and  yet  Calhoun's 
whole  speech  was  nothing  but  an  attempt  to  do 
this  very  thing,  and  to  do  it  with  arguments 


SLAVERY.  167 

which  unanswerably  proved  the  truth  of   his 
first  assertion,  that  it  could  not  be  done. 

"  They  who  imagine  that  the  spirit  now  abroad  in 
the  North  will  die  away  of  itself,  without  a  shock  or 
convulsion,  have  formed  a  very  inadequate  concep 
tion  of  its  real  character  ;  it  will  continue  to  rise  and 
spread,  unless  prompt  and  efficient  measures  to  stay 
its  progress  be  adopted.  Already  it  has  taken  pos 
session  of  the  pulpit,  of  the  schools,  and,  to  a  con 
siderable  extent,  of  the  press,  —  those  great  instru 
ments  by  which  the  mind  of  the  rising  generation  will 
be  formed. 

"  However  sound  the  great  body  of  the  non-slave- 
holding  States  are  at  present,  in  the  course  of  a  few 
years  they  will  be  succeeded  by  those  who  will  have 
been  taught  to  hate  the  people  and  institutions  of 
nearly  one  half  of  this  Union  with  a  hatred  more 
deadly  than  one  hostile  nation  ever  entertained  to 
wards  another.  It  is  easy  to  see  the  end.  By  the 
necessary  course  of  events,  if  left  to  themselves,  we 
must  become,  finally,  two  peoples.  It  is  impossible, 
under  the  deadly  hatred  which  must  spring  up  be 
tween  the  two  great  sections,  if  the  present  causes 
are  permitted  to  operate  unchecked,  that  we  should 
continue  under  the  same  political  system.  The  con 
flicting  elements  would  burst  the  Union  asunder, 
powerful  as  are  the  links  which  hold  it  together. 
Abolition  and  the  Union  cannot  coexist.  As  the 
friend  of  the  Union,  I  openly  proclaim  it,  and  the 
sooner  it  is  known  the  better.  The  former  may  now 


168  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

be  controlled,  but  in  a  short  time  it  will  be  beyond 
the  power  of  man  to  arrest  the  course  of  events." 

What  a  bewildering  tangle  of  contradictions ! 
If  the  antislavery  spirit,  left  unchecked,  was 
sure  to  spread,  and  if  it  had  already  taken  pos 
session  of  the  pulpit,  of  the  schools,  and  of  a 
considerable  part  of  the  press,  —  that  is  to  say, 
of  the  three  great  formative  agencies  of  public 
opinion,  —  who  and  what  should  then  check  it? 
Besides  public  opinion,  there  was  no  other  power 
except  the  public  authorities.  In  a  democratic 
republic,  however,  the  public  authorities  are  the 
creatures  of  public  opinion,  and  not  its  masters. 
And  what  did  Calhoun  want  the  public  author 
ities  to  do  ?  They  were  not  to  reason  with  the 
antislavery  spirit,  for  to  argue  the  case  at  all 
was  to  render  the  unquestionable  right  doubt 
ful,  and,  as  experience  had  taught,  only  served 
the  cause  which  was  to  be  put  down.  Was 
Congress  to  pass  penal  laws  against  the  man 
ifestation  of  the  antislavery  spirit  in  the  pul 
pits,  in  the  schools,  and  in  the  press  ?  Would 
not  the  mere  suggestion  of  such  a  law  raise  a 
storm  of  passionate  debate,  such  as  had  never 
before  swept  through  the  halls  of  Congress? 
And  if  such  laws  could  be  passed  in  the  face  of 
the  express  provisions  of  the  Constitution  and 
tigainst  public  opinion,  how  long  could  they  re 
main  in  the  statute  book?  But  if  Congress 


SLAVERY  169 

should  not  reason  with  the  antislavery  spirit, 
and  could  not  pass  penal  laws  against  it,  what 
could  it  do  but  maintain  an  indignant  silence  ? 
Yet  that  would  have  been  the  policy  of  the 
ostrich.  The  danger  does  not  disappear  be 
cause  we  shut  our  eyes  against  it.  Nobody 
knew  this  better  than  Calhoun,  and  so  he  spoke 
in  tones  which  would  have  chilled  the  blood  in 
the  veins  of  his  audience  if  they  had  had  the 
faintest  idea  in  what  an  awful  manner  every 
word  of  his  predictions  would  be  fulfilled  in 
due  time.  Therefore  it  was,  by  his  own  show 
ing,  a  delusion,  without  the  smallest  particle 
of  firm  ground  to  rest  upon,  that  the  antislav 
ery  spirit  could  yet  be  controlled.  It  was  the 
natural  offspring  of  the  moral  convictions  and 
the  political  sentiments  of  the  times ;  and,  in 
consequence,  every  attempt  to  fetter  it  neces 
sarily  acted  upon  it  as  a  spur.  Calhoun  could 
not  have  failed  to  understand  that  he  had 
knocked  the  last  vestige  of  his  argument  from 
under  his  feet,  if  it  had  not  been  so  true  that 
he  spoke  as  a  friend  of  the  Union.  Slavery 
had  to  be  maintained  though  the  skies  should 
fall,  yet  that  the  days  of  the  Union  were  num 
bered  he  would  not  believe  until  it  was  actually 
rent  in  twain.  But  abolition  and  this  Union 
could  not  coexist ;  therefore  there  had  to  be 
some  means  of  crushing  abolitionism,  though  he 


170  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

himself  had  been  forced  to  demonstrate  that 
there  was  and  could  be  none. 

A  man  of  so  lucid  a  mind  as  Calhoun,  and  so 
incapable  of  consciously  shutting  his  eyes  to 
any  truth  because  he  did  not  like  it,  could  not 
rest  satisfied  with  being  snugly  spun  into  such 
a  Gordian  knot  of  contradictions.  If  it  could 
not  be  unravelled,  perhaps  it  might  be  cut  by 
a  bold  stroke.  The  sword  must,  of  course,  be 
taken  from  the  armory  of  reason.  Did  not  the 
assertion  that  the  antislavery  spirit  could  not 
be  reasoned  down  admit  of  a  restrictive  quali 
fication  ?  Denunciations,  constitutional  argu 
ments,  warnings,  and  threats  were  alike  power 
less.  But  could  not  the  flood  be  stemmed,  if 
the  antislavery  spirit  were  proved  to  be  an 
egregious  mistake  and  a  gross  blunder  ?  This 
it  was  that  he  now  undertook  to  do. 

The  Philadelphia  Convention  had  nearly  de 
spaired  of  overcoming  the  difficulties  thrown  by 
slavery  in  the  way  of  a  "  better  Constitution," 
although  the  moral  view  taken  of  slavery  by  the 
North  and  the  South  differed  at  that  time  com 
paratively  little.  The  more  exacting  the  South 
ern  States  were  with  regard  to  slavery,  the  more 
readily  did  they  admit  that  it  was  a  moral, 
political,  and  economical  evil.  There  was  no 
hypocrisy  in  these  declarations,  though  unques 
tionably  the  intensity  of  conviction  did  not 


SLAVERY.  171 

generally  correspond  with  the  emphasis  of  lan 
guage.  The  confessions  would  have  been  much 
more  guarded  if  it  had  been  apprehended  that 
they  might  lead  to  disadvantageous  consequences. 
Why  should  slavery  not  be  called  a  mildew  and 
a  curse,  since  the  North  had  no  objection  to  hav 
ing  the  whole  responsibility  for  the  existence 
of  the  evil  thrown  upon  England,  and  since  it 
was  honestly  believed  that  the  prohibition  of 
the  foreign  slave-trade  would  cause  its  gradual 
extinction  ?  Was  it  not  rather  to  be  supposed 
that  the  resistance  of  the  North  against  the 
demands  of  the  South  would  be  weakened  by 
an  appeal  to  the  sympathy  of  Northerners  with 
the  unfortunate  condition  of  their  Southern 
brethren,  and  by  strengthening  the  hope  that 
the  Southern  States,  prompted  by  their  moral 
convictions  and  by  what  they  considered  their 
true  interest,  would  make  all  possible  exertions 
to  render  the  constitutional  compromises  in  fa 
vor  of  slavery  only  temporary  make-shifts  ?  The 
more  these  hopes  proved  to  be  vain  delusions, 
the  more  it  became  the  settled  policy  of  the 
South  to  season  its  exactions  with  a  strong 
dose  of  sound  moral  sentiments.  The  South 
had  begun  with  honest  self-deception,  and  it 
gradually  sunk  into  conscious  deception  of  oth 
ers  ;  hollow  declamations  took  the  place  of  true 
and  more  or  less  deep  sentiments.  Now  and 


172  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

then  a  voice  was  heard  energetically  disclaim 
ing  the  least  hostility  against  negro  slavery 
from  any  point  of  view.  These  bold  confes 
sions  were,  however,  hardly  noticed  amid  the 
din  of  general  protestations  against  "  slavery  in 
the  abstract,"  and  though  they  were  ominous 
signs  of  the  times,  they  were,  in  fact,  of  them 
selves  of  no  great  importance,  because  they 
were  after  all  but  personal  opinions.  Only 
when  placed  on  the  basis  of  a  general  principle 
did  they  become  a  vital  force,  which  pushed  the 
slavery  conflict  into  a  new  phase  of  develop 
ment.  Calhoun  now  took  this  decisive  step, 
with  full  consciousness  of  its  significance.  He 
not  only  denied  that  slavery  "  in  the  abstract " 
was  an  evil,  but  he  emphatically  proclaimed 
negro  slavery  to  be  a  good. 

"  But  let  me  not  be  understood  as  admitting,  even 
by  implication,  that  the  existing  relations  between 
the  two  races  in  the  slave-holding  States  is  an  evil : 
far  otherwise,  I  hold  it  to  be  a  good,  as  it  has  thus 
far  proved  itself  to  be  to  both,  and  will  continue  to 
prove  so  if  not  disturbed  by  the  fell  spirit  of  abolition. 
.  .  .  The  relation  now  existing  in  the  slave-holding 
States  between  the  two  [races]  is,  instead  of  an  evil, 
a  good,  —  a  positive  good." 

The  argument  that  the  negroes  were  greatly 
benefited  by  slavery,  because  physically,  intel 
lectually,  and  morally  their  actual  condition  was 


SLAVERY.  173 

infinitely  better  than  it  would  have  been  in 
the  wilds  of  Africa,  was  very  old,  and  one  still 
meets  with  it  occasionally.  Was  it  not,  then, 
cruel  and  unchristian  to  declare  the  African 
slave-trade  piracy,  and  thereby  deprive  the  poor 
benighted  Africans  of  every  chance  of  under 
going  this  blissful  change?  But,  however  that 
might  be,  why  was  it  a  blessing  for  native-born 
Americans  of  the  negro  race  to  be  kept  in  slav 
ery,  because  it  had  been  a  blessing  to  their  an 
cestors,  two  or  more  generations  back,  to  be 
transported  from  Africa  to  America,  though 
they  were  sold  into  slavery  ?  But  we  need  not 
dwell  upon  the  threadbare  sophistry  of  the  ar 
gument,  because  Calhoun  only  repeated  what 
had  been  said  a  thousand  times  before. 

Of  much  more  importance  was  his  "  appeal 
to  facts  "  to  support  the  other  assertion :  That 
slavery  was  also  "  a  positive  good  "  for  the  other 
race.  "In  the  mean  time,"  he  said,  "the  white 
or  European  race  has  not  degenerated.  It  has 
kept  pace  with  its  brethren  in  other  sections  of 
the  Union,  where  slavery  does  not  exist.  It  is 
odious  to  make  comparisons ;  but  I  appeal  to  all 
sides  whether  the  South  is  not  equal  in  virtue, 
intelligence,  patriotism,  courage,  disinterested 
ness,  and  all  the  high  qualities  which  adorn  our 
nature."  Inefficient  and  unreliable  as  were  the 
statistics  of  the  United  States  at  that  time,  they 


174  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

were  full  and  accurate  enough  to  tell  a  strange 
story  about  bow  tbe  Soutb  bad  kept  pace  with 
the  North  with  regard  to  intelligence,  so  far  as 
intelligence  depends  upon  school  instruction  and 
upon  the  whole  character  of  the  life  of  the  com 
munity  in  which  an  individual  happens  to  live. 
The  history  of  the  slavery  conflict  and  of  the 
questions  which  stood  in  close  connection  with 
it  furnished  an  odd  commentary  on  tbe  pecul 
iar  disinterestedness  of  the  South.  Some  parts 
of  the  local  news  and  the  advertising  columns 
of  the  Southern  papers  concerning  slaves  were 
strange  reading  for  one  wanting  to  inform  him 
self  about  certain  virtues  and  high  qualities 
which  adorn  our  nature.  Yet  Calhoun  spoke 
in  good  faith,  —  only  he  had  "  the  upper  ten 
thousand  "  in  mind,  while  he  spoke  of  the  white 
race.  Every  year  it  became  more  evident  that 
the  curse  of  slavery  weighed  upon  the  white 
race  as  heavily  as  upon  the  negroes,  if  not  even 
more  so.  Only  in  one  thing  did  Calhoun  admit 
the  inferiority  of  the  South,  —  in  "  the  arts  of 
gain:"  a  most  important  thing,  indeed,  since 
the  arts  of  gain  are  the  most  powerful  agen 
cies  of  civilization.  But  the  South  was  not  re 
sponsible  for  this  one  weak  point  in  its  case,  for 
he  traced  it  "  mainly  to  the  fiscal  action  of  this 
government."  Adam  was  more  successful  in 
covering  bis  nudity  with  a  fig-leaf  than  the 


SLAVERY.  175 

South  in  the  attempt  to  account  for  its  unsat 
isfactory  economical  condition  by  this  charge 
against  the  economical  policy  of  the  federal 
government.  Whether  good  or  bad,  that  policy 
had  been  the  same  for  the  whole  country,  and 
the  North  had  advanced  with  giant  strides,  while 
the  South,  in  spite  of  its  natural  advantages,  its 
cotton  monopoly  and  the  unparalleled  increase 
of  the  cotton  culture,  complained  that  "the  fox 
dwelt  amid  the  hearth-stones  of  once  blooming 
plantations."  There  was  no  other  essential  dif 
ference  in  the  condition  of  the  two  sections  than 
slavery  and  what  had  resulted  from  it,  and  to 
slavery,  therefore,  the  inferiority  in  the  arts  of 
gain  had  ultimately  to  be  traced. 

This  "appeal  to  facts"  more  than  sufficed 
to  prove  that  heavy  clouds,  laden  with  storm 
and  lightning,  overhung  the  sky  of  the  sunny 
South,  if  it  adopted  this  doctrine  of  the  positive 
good  of  slavery  to  both  races.  For  then  it  had 
sealed  with  its  own  hands  the  decree  of  fate, 
that  it  had  steadily  to  go  on  from  bad  to  worse. 
But  all  this  was  as  nothing  compared  with  the 
general  principle,  upon  which  Calhoun  rested 
his  assertion :  "  I  take  higher  ground.  ...  I 
hold,  then,  that  there  never  has  yet  existed  a 
wealthy  and  civilized  society  in  which  one  por 
tion  of  the  community  did  not,  in  point  of  fact, 
live  on  the  labor  of  the  other."  Almost  in- 


176  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

numerable  have  been  the  devices  —  "  from  the 
brute  force  and  gross  superstition  of  ancient 
times,  to  the  subtle  and  artful  fiscal  contriv 
ances  of  modern  "  —  by  which  so  small  a  share 
of  the  wealth  of  all  civilized  communities  has 
been  allotted  to  those  by  whose  labor  it  was 
produced,  and  so  large  a  share  given  to  the  non- 
producing  classes. 

"  I  might  well  challenge  a  comparison  between 
them  and  the  more  direct,  simple,  and  patriarchal 
mode  by  which  the  labor  of  the  African  race  is, 
among  us,  commanded  by  the  European.  I  may  say 
with  truth  that  in  few  countries  so  much  is  left  to 
the  share  of  the  laborer,  and  so  little  exacted  from 
him.  .  .  .  But  I  will  not  dwell  on  this  aspect  of  the 
question  ;  I  turn  to  the  political,  and  here  I  fear 
lessly  assert  that  the  existing  relation  between  the 
two  races  in  the  South,  against  which  these  blind 
fanatics  are  waging  war,  forms  the  most  solid  and 
durable  foundation  on  which  to  rear  free  and  stable 
political  institutions.  It  is  useless  to  disguise  the 
fact.  There  is  and  always  has  been,  in  an  advanced 
stage  of  wealth  and  civilization,  a  conflict  between 
labor  and  capital.  The  condition  of  society  in  the 
South  exempts  us  from  the  disorders  and  dangers 
resulting  from  this  conflict ;  and  explains  why  it 
is  that  the  condition  of  the  slave-holding  States  has 
been  so  much  more  stable  and  qniet  than  that  of  the 
North.  The  advantages  of  the  former,  in  this  re 
spect,  will  become  more  and  more  manifest  if  left 


SLAVERY.  177 

undisturbed  by  interference  from  without,  as  the 
country  advances  in  wealth  and  numbers.  We  have, 
in  fact,  but  just  entered  that  condition  of  society 
where  the  strength  and  durability  of  our  political  in 
stitutions  are  to  be  tested ;  and  I  venture  nothing  in 
predicting  that  the  experience  of  the  next  generation 
will  fully  test  how  vastly  more  favorable  our  condi 
tion  of  society  is  than  that  of  other  sections  for  free 
and  stable  institutions,  provided  we  are  not  disturbed 
by  the  interference  of  others,  or  shall  have  sufficient 
intelligence  and  spirit  to  resist  promptly  and  success 
fully  such  interference." 

This  was  a  manifesto  of  infinitely  more  im 
port  than  all  his  writings  and  speeches  on  nul 
lification.  His  warfare  against  the  antislavery 
spirit  had  been  in  the  beginning  strictly  de 
fensive.  Because  the  broad  shield  of  the  Con 
stitution  completely  covered  the  "peculiar  in 
stitution  "  of  the  South  against  all  legislative 
interference  by  the  federal  government,  there 
fore  he  had  thought  that  it  must  also  prove  im 
penetrable  to  the  arrows  of  abolitionism  ;  and 
with  the  doctrine  of  state  sovereignty  he  had 
built  the  citadel  of  nullification,  which  would  in 
all  emergencies  furnish  a  last  unconquerable  ref 
uge.  Strong  as  this  position  was,  he  soon  be 
came  convinced  that  it  was  not  strong  enough. 
Without  abandoning  it,  he  now  warned  the 
North  that  the  permanent  and  absolute  security 
12 


178  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

of  slavery  was  a  question  of  life  and  death  with 
the  South,  and  that  this  plain  fact  would  deter 
mine  its  action,  if  the  antislavery  spirit  was  not 
promptly  and  forever  crushed  out.  A  constant 
warfare,  calculated  morally  to  ruin  the  slave- 
holding  States  in  their  own  eyes  and  in  the 
eyes  of  the  civilized  world,  would  not  and  could 
not  be  endured  by  them.  Now  he  himself  chal 
lenged  not  only  the  abolitionists,  but  the  whole 
North  and  the  whole  civilized  world,  to  a  deci 
sive  combat  with  those  moral  and  intellectual 
arms  from  which,  according  to  his  own  state 
ment,  the  slave-holding  States  alone  had  any 
thing  to  apprehend,  —  a  most  audacious  but  un 
avoidable  step.  If  a  successful  defence  was  at 
all  possible,  the  attack  had  to  be  met  with  the 
same  weapons  with  which  it  was  made.  As  long 
as  the  South  apologized  for  slavery  as  a  dire  ne 
cessity,  a  vast  majority  of  the  Northern  people 
would  insist  upon  having  the  constitutional  ob 
ligations  scrupulously  fulfilled  by  the  federal 
government.  But  they  would  do  it  less  and  less 
willingly,  because  the  antislavery  spirit,  which 
was  the  spirit  of  the  times,  could  not  be  checked 
by  the  Constitution ;  for  the  Constitution  was  a 
rule  of  action,  but  not  a  law  for  the  thoughts 
and  sentiments  of  the  people.  If  the  hostile 
feeling  against  slavery  was  to  be  conquered,  the 
people  had  to  be  convinced  that  it  was  mistaken 


SLAVERY.  179 

and  wrong.  And  as  slavery  could  not  be  an  in 
different  thing,  if  its  maintenance  was  a  ques 
tion  of  life  and  death  with  the  South,  it  must 
necessarily  be  a  blessing.  Thus  the  necessities 
of  defence  imperatively  demanded  the  trans 
formation  of  slavery  from  a  curse  into  a  most 
enviable  institution,  for  moral  and  political  rea 
sons. 

That  there  was  some  truth  in  Calhoun's  as 
sertions  could  not  be  gainsaid.  The  conflict 
between  labor  and  capital  constituted  the  sig 
nificance  of  the  times  in  the  western  world, 
and  the  slave-holding  States  knew  nothing  of  it, 
because  labor  was  owned  by  capital,  and  there 
fore  capital  arranged  the  relation  in  every  re 
spect  wholly  to  suit  itself.  So  long  as  labor  did 
not  appeal  to  brute  force,  the  South  was,  in  con 
sequence,  exempt  from  the  dangers  and  disor 
ders  which  result  from  this  conflict  in  communi 
ties  where  labor,  too,  has  its  rights  and  is  in  a 
condition  to  defend  its  interests  ;  there  it  was 
navigation  on  a  pond,  here  on  a  never  motion 
less  and  sometimes  tempestuous  sea ;  but  there 
the  sun  bred  poisonous  miasmas  in  the  stagnant 
waters,  and  the  navigator  was  in  danger  of  suffo 
cating  in  the  mire  if  the  boat  capsized  by  some 
accident,  while  here  were  the  dangers,  but  also 
the  vigor  and  all  the  resources,  of  real,  ever-pro 
gressing  life.  Had  Calhoun  so  entirely  forgotten 


180  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

all  that  he  had  seen  during  his  college  years  in 
New  England  that  this  difference  really  escaped 
his  keen  eye  ?  Had  he  grown  to  be  so  impreg 
nated  with  the  spirit  of  slavery  that  the  spirit  of 
the  people  of  the  free  States  had  become  to  him 
a  book  closed  with  seven  seals?  Could  they  ever 
be  made  to  believe  that  slavery  was  "  a  positive 
good  "  ?  And  if  this  declaration  would  always 
have  the  sound  of  a  blasphemy  in  their  ears, 
what  would  he  have  gained  for  the  security  of 
slavery  in  the  Union,  even  if  his  assertion  were 
true  ?  The  hatred  of  slavery  in  the  North  was 
as  yet  very  far  from  being  so  deadly  as  he  ex 
pected  it  to  become  in  a  little  while  ;  but  still 
slavery  was  hated  upon  political,  moral,  and 
religious  principles.  Principles,  however,  are 
vital  forces  in  the  history  of  mankind,  and  what 
a  man  believes  to  be  a  principle  works  with  him 
as  such.  Therefore,  even  if  Calhoun  were  right, 
his  declaration  could  only  fan  the  flames  of  the 
conflict  between  South  and  North.  It  was  the 
formal  announcement  that  this  conflict  never 
could  terminate  in  a  peace,  nor  even  be  inter 
rupted  by  an  honest  truce. 

All  the  free  States  were  genuine  democracies, 
and  therefore  the  assertion  that  slavery  is  the 
most  solid  and  durable  foundation  upon  which 
to  rear  free  institutions  was  in  their  eyes  simply 
a  contradictio  in  adjecto.  Whether  the  institu- 


SLAVERY.  181 

tions  which  the  South  reared  on  this  base  were 
good  or  bad,  they  were  confessedly  the  products 
of  a  different  civilization,  —  of  a  civilization  dif 
fering  from  that  of  the  North  not  only  in  details, 
but  in  the  formative  principle.  It  is,  however, 
self-evident  that  two  civilizations,  with  antago 
nistic  formative  principles,  cannot  permanently 
coexist  in  one  political  organism,  because  they 
move  in  opposite  directions.  Instead  of  recon 
ciling  the  North  and  the  civilized  world  to  the 
existence  of  slavery,  Calhoun's  new  gospel  of 
slavery  was  a  declaration  of  aggressive  war. 
But  one  step  more  could  be  taken  in  this  direc 
tion  :  the  deeds  could  be  made  to  conform  to  the 
theory,  the  conversion  of  the  heathen  to  the  new 
gospel  could  be  undertaken  ;  the  logical  conse 
quence  of  the  doctrine  of  the  "  positive  good " 
was  the  propagandism  of  slavery. 

The  time  was  not  far  off  when  the  South, 
with  Calhoun  as  its  foremost  leader,  was  to  take 
this  last  step,  which  proved  to  be  the  beginning 
of  the  end.  For  a  while,  however,  the  atten 
tion  of  the  country  was  diverted  from  the  slav 
ery  conflict  by  financial  and  other  economical 
questions,  which  pressed  themselves  into  the 
foreground  in  a  most  unpleasant  manner. 

We  have  seen  how  many  wise  heads  in  the 
Capitol  at  Washington,  and  among  them  that 
of  Calhoun,  were  troubled  by  the  fear  that  the 


182  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

United  States  government  stood  in  danger  of 
something  like  the  fate  of  King  Midas.  But 
instead  of  having  to  deal  with  an  overflowing 
treasury,  they  had  to  struggle  with  the  disas 
trous  consequences  of  the  crash  of  1837,  the 
worst  economical  crisis  the  country  had  as  yet 
experienced  since  the  war  of  independence.  Cal- 
houn  took  a  prominent  but  not  a  leading  part 
in  all  the  questions  mediately  and  immediately 
connected  with  this  catastrophe.  To  present 
the  reader  with  an  intelligent  synopsis  of  his 
views  would  require  a  discourse  on  the  general 
history  of  the  times,  which  cannot  be  com 
pressed  within  the  small  frame  of  this  biogra 
phy.  It  appears,  however,  the  less  necessary  to 
enlarge  upon  them,  because  no  new  principles 
were  involved  in  the  discussion,  and  the  stand 
taken  by  Calhoun  did  not  mark  a  new  epoch  in 
his  general  career.  From  the  personal  point  of 
view  it  is  almost  of  more  interest  that,  in  Feb 
ruary,  1837,  he  had  a  last  direct  encounter  with 
General  Jackson,  who  had  taken  him  to  task 
for  some  remarks  supposed  to  have  been  made 
by  Calhoun  in  a  speech  on  the  land  question. 
As  the  hot-tempered  President  had  based  his 
grossly  abusive  letter  on  an  inaccurate  report, 
Calhoun  had  no  difficulty  in  chastising  him  se 
verely  for  this  attempt  "  upon  the  privileges  of 
a  United  States  senator ; "  this  time,  however, 


SLAVERY. 

himself  overstepping  the  limits  which  the  offi 
cial  station  of  his  adversary  should  have  im 
posed  upon  him. 

Perhaps  this  incident  influenced  to  some  ex 
tent  his  language  in  the  speech  which  he  deliv 
ered  a  few  days  later  on  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  to  France ;  but  it  would  be  ridic 
ulous  to  suppose  that  personal  hostility  to  Jack 
son  was  the  reason  of  his  opposition  to  the 
policy  of  the  President  in  the  indemnity  ques 
tion.  He  proved  beyond  contradiction  that  the 
untoward  turn  which  this  affair  had  taken  was 
mainly  due  to  the  false  steps  of  the  administra 
tion,  and  he  conclusively  showed  that  in  a  war 
between  the  United  States  and  France  the 
former  would  have  infinitely  more  to  suffer, 
•while  neither  could  derive  any  advantage  from 
it.  The  national  pride  was  flattered  to  hear  the 
victor  of  New  Orleans  blow  the  war  trumpet 
so  lustily  and  defiantly ;  but  the  sober  second 
thought  of  the  people  entirely  agreed  with  Cal- 
honn,  that  it  would  be  madness,  on  a  mere  ques 
tion  of  "  etiquette,"  to  provoke  a  war  with  the 
oldest  ally  of  the  United  States,  who  had  ren 
dered  them  such  signal  services  in  their  hour  of 
nerd. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

UNDER  VAN  BUEEN. 

Much  time  was  to  elapse  ere  justice  was  ren 
dered  Calhoun  with  regard  to  the  course  he 
saw  fit  to  pursue  upon  the  leading  question  of 
the  day,  —  President  Van  Buren's  sub-treasury 
scheme,  which  was  to  sever  entirely  and  for 
ever  the  connection  between  the  government 
and  banks  of  every  description.  It  was  but 
natural  that  the  Whigs  were  deeply  chagrined 
to  see  Calhoun  part  company  with  them  in  the 
moment  wheu,  as  he  himself  freely  admitted, 
the  continuation  of  the  alliance  would  have  led 
to  the  overthrow  of  the  administration  party  ; 
but  they  had  no  right  to  expect  anything  else 
from  him.  He  was  not  guilty  of  any  treachery, 
nor  could  he  be  justly  charged  with  inconsist 
ency,  though  in  1835,  when  the  sub-treasury 
scheme  was  first  introduced  by  General  Gordon, 
he  had  declared  it  "  premature,"  and  in  1836, 
when  the  proposition  was  renewed  by  Benton, 
"  impracticable  at  the  time  ; "  nay,  even  though 
he  had  himself  proposed  the  establishment  of  a 
United  States  Bank  for  twelve  years  "  as  a 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  185 

better  and  more  practical  plan  to  unbank  the 
banks."  It  accorded  strictly  with  the  facts 
when  he  declared,  "We  joined  our  old  oppo 
nents  on  the  tariff  question,  but  under  our  own 
flag  and  without  merging  in  their  ranks."  No 
body  had  ever  pretended  that  he  had  become  a 
Whig ;  he  had  concluded  an  alliance  with  the 
Whigs  for  the  specific  purpose  of  opposing  the 
encroachments  of  the  executive  upon  the  do 
main  of  the  other  departments  of  government, 
and  of  counteracting  all  the  dangerous  tenden 
cies  of  Jackson's  unscrupulous  autocratic  rule. 
From  Martin  Van  Buren,  however,  nothing 
was  to  be  apprehended.  "  Executive  usurpa 
tion  had  been  arrested.  The  Treasury  was 
empty,  and  the  administration  had  scarcely  a 
majority  in  either  House  or  in  the  Union."  The 
object  of  the  alliance  had  been  accomplished. 
The  questions  which  were  now  the  order  of  the 
day  left  the  two  great  national  parties  intact, 
but  Calhoim  was  free  to  join  either  side,  be 
cause  he  belonged  to  neither.  "  He  was  master 
of  his  own  move,  and  acknowledged  connection 
with  no  party  but  the  state-rights  party,  — 
the  small  band  of  nullifiers,  —  and  acted  either 
with  or  against  the  administration  or  the  na 
tional  party,  just  as  it  was  calculated  to  further 
the  principles  and  policy  which  we,  of  that 
party,  regarded  as  essential  to  the  liberty  and 


186  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

institutions  of  the  country."  Viewing  the 
general  situation  of  the  country  in  the  manner 
he  did,  it  was  therefore  a  matter  of  course  that 
he  pitched  his  solitary  tent  for  the  present  next 
the  camp-fires  of  the  administration  party. 

"  We  have,  Mr.  President,  arrived  at  a  remarkable 
era  in  our  political  history.  The  days  of  legislative 
and  executive  encroachments,  of  tariffs  and  surpluses, 
of  bank  and  public  debt  and  extravagant  expen 
diture,  are  past  for  the  present.  The  government 
stands  in  a  position  disentangled  from  the  past,  and 
freer  to  choose  its  future  course  than  it  has  ever  been 
since  its  commencement.  We  are  about  to  take  a 
fresh  start.  I  move  off  under  the  states-rights  ban 
ner,  and  go  in  the  direction  in  which  I  have  been  so 
long  moving.  I  seize  the  opportunity  thoroughly  to 
reform  the  government ;  to  bring  it  back  to  its  orig 
inal  principles  ;  to  retrench  and  economize ;  and  rig 
idly  to  enforce  accountability.  I  shall  oppose  strenu 
ously  all  attempts  to  originate  a  new  debt ;  to  create 
a  national  bank ;  to  reunite  the  political  and  money 
powers  (more  dangerous  than  church  and  state)  in 
iny  form  or  shape ;  to  prevent  the  disturbances  of  the 
compromise,  which  is  gradually  removing  the  last 
vestige  of  the  tariff  system.  And,  mainly,  I  shall  use 
my  best  efforts  to  give  an  ascendency  to  the  great 
conservative  principle  of  state  sovereignty  over  the 
dangerous  and  despotic  doctrine  of  consolidation." 

Had  the  Whigs,  then,  quite  overlooked  that, 
although    he    had   fought   with   them    against 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  187 

Jackson,  it  was  an  utter  impossibility  that  he 
should  ever  exert  himself  for  their  ascendency  ? 
That  the  man  who  declared  that  he  "  wished  to 
be  considered  nothing  more  than  a  plain  and  an 
honest  nullifier"  should  "  join  the  friends  of 
the  tariff,  of  a  national  bank,  and  the  whole 
system  of  congressional  usurpations,  and  utterly 
break  down  his  old  friends  of  1827,  who  had 
taken  shelter  under  his  position,  and  thus 
give  a  complete  and  final  victory  to  his  old  op 
ponents  of  that  period,  and  with  it  a  permanent 
ascendency  to  them  and  their  principles  and 
policy,  which,  he  honestly  believed,  could  not 
but  end  in  consolidation,  with  the  loss  of  our 
liberty  and  institutions,"  —  this,  indeed,  was  a 
most  preposterous  idea.  Calhoun,  however,  was 
was  mistaken  in  one  point,  and  that  the  most 
material.  The  victory  of  the  administration 
could  never  turn  to  the  advantage  of  the  states- 
rights  party.  The  independent  Treasury  gave 
the  administration  of  the  finances  a  really  p'olit- 
ical  character  for  the  first  time,  and  it  therefore 
necessarily  contributed  to  the  growing  together 
of  the  "  sovereign "  States  into  a  national 
Union. 

Our  sources  do  not  inform  us  whether  Cal 
houn  ever  became  aware  of  this  fact.  His  first 
great  movement  to  bring  the  government  "back 
to  its  original  principles  "  looks  less  like  the  hope- 


188  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

i ill  beginning  of  a  thorough  reform  than  like  the 
desperate  effort  of  a  man  who  is  in  danger  of 
being  swallowed  up  by  the  surging  waves,  to  pile 
up  dike  upon  dike  till  he  has  a  wall  so  broad 
and  high  that  he  can  laugh  the  most  furious 
storms  to  scorn.  Vain  exertions,  for  his  dikes 
are  not  constructed  of  earth,  stone,  and  mortar, 
but  of  mere  assertions.  The  most  strenuous 
efforts  of  the  North  to  put  down  abolitionism  by 
public  opinion  had  been  met  by  the  South  with 
the  contemptuous  remark  that  all  the  satisfac 
tion  the  South  got  for  its  just  complaints  was 
"  words,  mere  words ;  "  and  now  the  great 
leader  of  the  slave  power  had  nothing  more 
substantial  to  throw  into  the  way  of  the  anti- 
slavery  spirit  than  "  words,  mere  words."  The 
last  aim  and  end  of  the  bringing  back  of  the 
government  to  its  original  principles  was  the 
security  of  slavery ;  and  this  was  to  be  obtained 
not  by  legislation,  but  by  resolving  this  and  that 
witft  regard  to  the  constitutional  and  political 
aspect  of  the  slavery  question.  Did  these  long 
strings  of  resolutions,  by  being  spread  over  the 
journal  of  the  Senate,  acquire  any  secret  virtue 
which  made  them  a  wall  of  adamant,  against 
which  all  the  arms  of  the  antislavery  spirit 
would  splinter  like  glass  ?  Whom  did  they 
bind  ?  Not  even  the  Senate  itself,  and  yet 
infinitely  less  the  other  departments  of  the 


UNDER    VAN  BUREN.  189 

government  or  even  the  people.  They  had  no 
legal  authority  whatever,  and  though  they 
might  be  of  great  moral  weight  with  many 
persons,  what  effect  was  to  be  expected  from 
the  mere  opinion  of  the  temporary  majority 
of  the  Senate,  which  might  be  changed  at  any 
moment,  if  all  the  bulwarks  of  the  Constitu 
tion  were  no  longer  deemed  in  themselves  suf 
ficient  protection  for  the  peculiar  institution? 
Surely,  the  resolution  mania,  which  from  this 
time  possessed  Calhoun,  is  alone  ample  proof 
how  justly  he  was  charged  with  being  a  doc 
trinaire. 

But  it  was  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  all 
the  weeks  which  the  haughty  planter  forced  the 
Senate,  at  the  expense  of  its  legitimate  legisla 
tive  business,  to  pass  in  debate  on  his  constitu 
tional  opinions  were  spent  to  no  purpose.  It 
has  been  said  before  that,  with  regard  to  the 
slavery  question,  this  doctrinaire  was  the  only 
one  who  moved  on  at  even  pace  with  the  events, 
and  he  knew  now  as  well  as  ever  what  he  was 
about.  So  far  as  he  expected  anything  from  his 
resolutions  for  the  greater  security  of  slavery 
.be  was  not  only  disappointed,  but  he  did  in  fact, 
as  he  was  charged  on  all  sides  with  doing,  pour 
oil  upon  the  flames.  But  the  resolutions  were 
not  only  designed  to  serve  as  additional  guards 
lor  the  "  positive  good  "  of  the  South ;  they 


190  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

were  besides  a  programme  for  the  future,  and 
as  such  they  were  a  political  event  of  the  first 
magnitude. 

The  central  idea  of  the  resolutions  of  Decem 
ber  27,  1837,  was,  of  course,  that  the  safety  of 
the  South  depended  entirely  upon  the  doctrine 
of  state  sovereignty,  and  their  immediate  pur 
pose  was  to  get  the  Senate  formally  pledged 
to  this  principle  in  its  direct  bearings  on  the 
slavery  question.  Hence  the  series  was  very 
logically  opened  by  stating  how  the  Union  came 
into  existence  under  the  Constitution.  It  is 
declared  that  every  State  "  entered  into  the 
Union  "  by  its  own  voluntary  act.  The  old 
Union  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
therefore,  evidently  had  ceased  to  exist  some 
time  before ;  when  and  how,  Calhoun  unfort 
unately  forgot  to  say.  The  Senate,  however, 
with  thirty-one  against  thirteen  votes,  assented 
to  this  bold  falsification  of  a  plain  historical 
fact. 

This  premise  once  secured,  Calhoun  had  won 
the  game.  From  the  purely  Confederate  nature 
of  the  Union  the  second  resolution  was  deduced  : 
that  the  intermeddling  of  States  or  of  a  "  com 
bination  of  their  citizens  with  the  domestic  in 
stitutions  or  police  of  the  others,  on  any  ground, 
or  under  any  pretext  whatever,  political,  moral, 
or  religious,  with  a  view  to  their  alteration  or 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  191 

subversion,"  is  "  not  warranted  by  the  Con 
stitution."  Pompous  and  positive  as  this  reso 
lution  sounded,  it  was  of  so  gelatinous  a  char 
acter  that,  while  the  political  agitator  could  do 
anything  he  pleased  with  it,  the  constitutional 
jurist  could  not  keep  the  smallest  particle  of 
it  firmly  between  his  fingers.  Who  was  able 
to  enumerate  "  the  domestic  institutions "  to 
which  the  doctrine  of  the  resolution  could  be 
rightfully  applied  ?  Webster  showed  conclu 
sively  that  slavery,  for  one,  did  not  belong  to 
them.  Where,  too,  was  the  master  mind  which 
could  give  a  serviceable  definition  of  "  inter 
meddling,"  or  of  "  with  a  view  to  their  altera 
tion,"  or  of  "  not  warranted  by  the  Constitu 
tion  "  ?  If  all  this  was  to  have  so  precise  a 
meaning  that  the  doctrines  of  rights  should  and 
could  be  fixed  in  laws,  and  their  observance 
secured  by  compulsory  legal  measures,  —  and  it 
was,  obviously,  only  on  this  supposition  that  they 
could  serve  the  purpose  intended,  —  then  every 
thing  which  had  relation  to  the  domestic  institu 
tions  of  other  States  would  become  a  punishable 
violation  of  the  Constitution.  The  existence  of 
slavery  had  to  vanish  from  the  consciousness 
of  the  free  States;  for  until  this  happened 
their  thoughts  must  be  in  some  degree  occu 
pied  with  it;  the  thoughts  must  manifest  them 
selves,  and  every  manifestation  of  the  thoughts 


192  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

had,  in  and  of  itself,  a  tendency  to  operate  an 
"  alteration  "  of  the  existing  state  of  things.  Yet 
the  resolution  served  well  enough  Calhoun's 
main  purpose.  What  this  was,  he  plainly  told 
in  his  rejoinder  to  the  suggestion  to  strike  out 
the  word  "  religious,"  —  that  "  the  whole  spirit 
of  the  resolution  hinged  on  that  word."  The 
Senate  was  to  declare  that  the  anathema  of  the 
Constitution  rested  on  the  heads  of  the  fanatics 
who  presumed  to  question  the  rightfulness  of 
negro  slavery  on  moral  and  religious  grounds ; 
and  the  Senate  complied  with  the  demand ;  only 
fourteen  out  of  forty-five  votes  being  recorded 
in  favor  of  striking  out  the  words  "  moral "  and 
"  religious."  But  what  had  Calhoun  gained 
by  that,  even  supposing  that  his  interpretation 
of  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution  was  correct  ? 
Would  the  religious  convictions  of  the  people 
be  subverted  by  the  Constitution,  or  would  the 
latter  become  a  dead  letter  from  the  moment 
when  it  stood  in  acknowledged  antagonism  to 
the  former  ?  Always  there  was  the  same  fun 
damental  error  in  all  his  reckoning.  He  clearly 
perceives  that  the  whole  slavery  question  hinges 
upon  the  political,  economical,  and  moral  an 
tagonism  between  slavery  and  liberty,  tries  to 
suppress  some  manifestations  of  it,  and  draws 
from  that  suppression  conclusions,  as  if  it  were 
identical  with  the  suppression  of  the  antago- 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  193 

nism  itself.  But  the  futility  of  his  efforts  has 
pressed  him  another  step  forward  :  instead  of 
merely  forbidding  the  agitation  to  enter  the 
Capitol,  he  now  bids  Congress  declare  that  the 
Constitution  wants  to  see  every  door  in  the  free 
States  hermetically  closed  against  it. 

To  understand  the  whole  import  of  the  sec 
ond  resolution  it  is,  however,  necessary  to  read 
it  in  connection  with  the  third,  which  indirectly 
overthrew  the  demand  of  the  former,  but  of 
course  in  favor  of  slavery.  This  third  resolu 
tion  declared  it  to  be  the  duty  of  the  federal 
government  to  use  its  powers  in  such  a  manner 
as  "to  give  .  .  .  increased  stability  and  secur 
ity  to  the  domestic  institutions  of  the  States 
that  compose  the  Union."  The  people  of  the 
free  States  were  to  have  no  political,  moral,  or 
religious  thoughts  on  slavery,  or  at  least  not  to 
manifest  them  in  any  way  whatever  disagreea 
ble  to  the  slave-holding  States;  but  they  were 
bound,  through  the  federal  government,  act 
ively  to  exert  themselves  in  its  favor.  It  is 
not  said  in  what  manner  and  to  what  extent 
this  was  to  be  done ;  but  did  not  the  very  gen 
erality  of  the  terms  used  imply  that  it  had  to 
be  done  in  any  manner  and  to  any  extent  de 
clared  necessary  by  the  slave-holding  States? 
For  they  alone  had  the  right  to  judge  what  the 
stability  and  security  of  their  peculiar  institu- 

13 


194  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

tion  demanded.  There  was  not  a  trace  of  doc 
trinarian  spirit  in  this  resolution.  It  was  a  pos 
itive  programme,  big  with  consequences  which 
would  have  curdled  the  blood  in  the  veins  of 
Calhoun  himself,  if  he  had  foreseen  them  all. 
It  was  the  first  step  towards  deriving  the  prac 
tical  results  of  the  doctrine  of  the  "  positive 
good  ;  "  the  first  step  towards  securing  the  ser 
vices  of  the  federal  govenrment  for  the  glorious 
work  of  slavery  propagandism. 

The  fourth  resolution  applied  the  foregoing 
doctrines  by  name  to  slavery,  declaring  all  at 
tacks  on  it  "  a  manifest  breach  of  faith,  and  a 
violation  of  the  most  solemn  obligations,  moral 
and  religious."  The  Senate  called  upon  to  in 
struct  the  people  in  this  spirit  about  their  re 
ligious  obligations  ;  abolition,  according  to  Cal 
houn,  in  possession  of  the  pulpits,  the  schools, 
and  the  press ;  the  abolitionists  declaring  slav 
ery  "  the  sum  of  all  villainies,"  — was  anything 
more  needed  to  prove  that  two  antagonistic 
principles  were  here  in  deadly  conflict  ?  With 
this  one  line  Calhoun  had  irrefutably  demon 
strated  the  vanity  of  all  his  efforts  to  save  slav 
ery  and  the  Union. 

The  next  resolution  read,  — 

"  Resolved,  That  the  intermeddling  of  any  State 
or  States,  or  their  citizens,  to  abolish  slavery  in  this 
District,  or  in  any  of  the  Territories,  on  the  ground, 


UNDER    VAN  BUREN.  195 

or  under  the  pretext,  that  it  is  immoral  or  sinful,  or 
the  passage  of  any  act  or  measure  of  Congress  with 
that  view,  would  be  a  direct  and  dangerous  attack  on 
the  institutions  of  all  the  slave-holding  States." 

If  all  that  had  been  asserted  in  the  preceding 
resolutions  was  correct,  this  one  was  certainly 
incontrovertible  ;  therefore  it  was  all  the  more 
significant  that  Calhoun  refrained  from  declar 
ing  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of 
Columbia  unconstitutional,  although  he  express 
ly  stated  this  to  be  his  opinion.  But  while  he 
chus  politely  and  obligingly  bowed  to  the  con 
stitutional  doctrines  of  the  North,  its  moral  and 
religious  convictions  were  once  more  imperi 
ously  bidden  to  leave  this  question  alone.  "  The 
deluded  agitators  must  be  plainly  told  that  it  is 
no  concern  of  theirs  what  is  the  character  of 
our  institutions."  Not  a  finger  was  to  be  raised 
against  slavery  "  under  the  pretext "  of  its  im 
morality  or  sinful  ness,  not  only  where  it  actu 
ally  existed,  but  also,  added  the  sixth  and  last 
resolution,  where  it  might  exist  in  future. 

"  To  refuse  to  extend  to  the  Southern  and  Western 
States,  any  advantage  which  would  tend  to  strengthen 
or  render  t'nem  more  secure,  —  or  to  increase  their 
limits  or  population  by  the  annexation  of  new  ter 
ritory  or  states,  on  the  assumption  or  under  the  pre 
text  that  the  institution  of  slavery,  as  it  exists  among 
them,  is  immoral  or  sinful,  or  otherwise  obnoxious, 


-    — 


: 


198  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

of  the  extraordinary  session  of  Congress  in  1841 
applies,  so  far  as  he  is  concerned,  to  this  whole 
time.  "  What  are  we  doing,  and  what  engrosses 
all  our  attention  from  morn  to  noon,  and  from 
week  to  week,  ever  since  our  arrival  here  at  the 
commencement  of  this  extraordinary  session, 
and  will  continue  till  its  end  ?  What  but  banks, 
loans,  stocks,  tariffs,  distribution,  and  supplies?" 
The  old  economical  controversies,  more  or  less 
altered  by  circumstances,  are  the  battle-ground  of 
the  parties,  fighting  with  undiminished  ardor  and 
varying  success.  The  old  arguments  are  repeated 
ad  nauseam.  Though  all  the  questions  were  of 
the  highest  importance,  and  much  erudition,  in 
genuity,  eloquence,  and  passion  were  displayed 
on  both  sides,  the  continuous  reading  of  the 
debates  is  simply  treadmill  work.  Calhoun's 
speeches,  too,  abound  with  repetitions.  The  sta 
tistical  data,  the  illustrations,  the  arrangement 
of  the  thoughts,  change ;  but  he  fights  for  his 
old  doctrines  with  the  old  reasons  :  independent 
treasury,  no  bank,  no  internal  improvements,  no 
protective  tariff,  no  distribution  of  the  proceeds 
of  the  sale  of  the  public  lands,  cession  of  the 
public  lands  to  the  States  in  which  they  are  sit 
uated,  no  loans,  etc.  A  good  deal  of  sound  rea 
soning,  a  good  deal  of  bold  and  sometimes  reck 
less  generalizing,  now  and  then  exaggerated  into 
a  downright  absurdity,  may  be  found  in  all  his 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  199 

speeches  on  these  interesting  subjects.  The 
thorough  student  of  the  general  history  of  the 
United  States  cannot  dispense  with  perusing 
them  all  carefully,  but  they  do  not  show  either 
the  man  or  the  statesman  in  a  new  light.  From 
the  personal  point  of  view,  they  are  the  most 
interesting  on  account  of  some  sharp  encounters 
which  he  had  with  Clay  and  Webster.  Each 
of  the  three  great  senators  tried  to  demonstrate 
his  own  consistency  throughout  his  political  ca 
reer,  and  the  inconsistency  which  had  marked 
that  of  his  adversary ;  and  each  of  them  was  per 
fectly  successful  as  to  the  latter  task,  and,  in 
spite  of  infinite  ingenuity  and  eloquence,  sadly 
failed  as  to  the  former.  With  the  change  of 
conditions,  their  political  convictions  had 
changed,  and,  by  changing  these,  they  had 
learned  to  read  the  Constitution  in  a  different 
way.  Neither  of  them  lost  anything  in  the  es 
timation  of  the  people  by  this  fact,  because  it 
was  an  honest  change  of  opinion,  and  since  their 
constituents  had  gone  through  the  same  process 
they  might  have  had  the  manliness  and  candor 
to  avow  it  unreservedly.  But  perhaps  the  re 
proach  that  not  one  of  them  ventured  upon  a 
stand-point  of  such  moral  elevation  rests  more 
upon  the  general  tendency  of  American  politics 
than  upon  them  personally.  Once,  indeed,  Cal- 
houn  openly  confessed  that  he  had  been  orig- 


200  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

inally  inclined  to  take  a  latitudinarian  and 
national  view  of  tbe  powers  of  the  federal  gov 
ernment;  but  when  he  spoke  in  the  deep  and 
incisive  tones  of  an  authority,  —  and  that  be 
came  more  and  more  his  habitual  way  of  speak 
ing, —  or  when  an  opponent  had  nettled  his  self- 
love,  he  was  but  too  easily  betrayed  into  wast 
ing  his  time  and  his  ability  in  vain  attempts  to 
knead  his  earlier  sayings  and  political  acts  into 
the  mould  of  his  present  convictions. 

Some  of  the  speeches  of  this  period  require 
particular  notice,  but  they  are  precisely  those 
which  were  only  remotely  or  not  at  all  con 
nected  with  the  party  issues. 

The  illegitimate  connection  of  the  civil  ser 
vice  with  party  politics  had  become  such  a  cry 
ing  evil  that  another  effort  was  made  to  strike 
it  at  the  root ;  but  again  the  would-be  reform 
ers  sought  the  root  where  it  did  not  lie.  A  bill 
was  introduced  and  debated  upon,  which,  as 
Calhoun  expressed  it,  proposed  "  to  inflict  the 
penalty  of  dismission  on  a  large  class  of  the  offi 
cers  of  this  government,  who  shall  electioneer, 
or  attempt  to  control  or  influence  the  election 
of  public  functionaries  either  of  the  general  or 
state  governments,  without  distinguishing  be 
tween  their  official  and  individual  character  as 
citizens."  Calhoun,  who  spoke  on  the  bill  on 
February  22,  1839,  declared  it  for  this  reason 


UNDER    VAN  BUREN.  201 

unconstitutional.  We  need  not  inquire  whether 
this  charge  was  well  founded,  or  whether  he 
made  good  his  case  as  to  the  constitutional 
question.  Supposing  that  he  was  right,  this  de 
fect  of  the  bill  could  have  been  easily  mended ; 
but  he  very  justly  asserted  that  such  a  law 
would  "  prove  either  useless,  or  worse  than  use 
less." 

"  But  suppose  the  immediate  object  of  the  bill  ac 
complished,  and  the  office-holders  rendered  perfectly 
silent  and  passive,  it  might  even  then  be  doubted 
whether  it  would  caus.e  any  diminution  in  the  influ 
ence  of  patronage  over  elections.  It  would  indeed 
greatly  reduce  the  influence  of  the  office-holders. 
They  would  become  the  most  insignificant  portion  of 
the  community,  as  far  as  elections  were  concerned. 
But  just  in  the  same  proportion  as  they  might  sink, 
the  no  less  formidable  corps  of  the  office-seekers 
would  rise  in  importance.  The  struggle  for  power 
between  the  ins  and  the  outs  would  not  abate  in  the 
least,  in  violence  or  intensity,  by  the  silence  or  in 
activity  of  the  office-holders,  as  the  amount  of  pat 
ronage,  the  stake  contended  for,  would  remain  un- 
diminished.  Both  sides,  those  in  and  those  out  of 
power,  would  turn  from  the  passive  and  silent  body 
of  the  incumbents,  and  court  the  favor  of  the  active 
corps,  that  panted  to  supplant  them ;  and  the  result 
would  be  an  annual  sweep  of  the  former,  after  every 
election,  to  make  room  to  reward  the  latter,  —  and 
this  on  whichever  side  the  scale  of  victory  might 


202  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

turn.  The  consequence  would  be  rotation  with  a 
vengeance.  The  wheel  would  turn  round  with  such 
velocity  that  anything  like  a  stable  system  of  policy 
would  be  impossible.  Each  temporary  occupant,  who 
might  be  thrown  into  office  by  the  whirl,  would  seize 
the  moment  to  make  the  most  of  his  good  fortune, 
before  he  might  be  displaced  by  his  successor,  and  a 
system  (if  such  it  might  be  called)  would  follow,  not 
less  corrupting  than  unstable." 

That  was  all  true  enough,  but  what  had  he 
to  propose  instead?  "Place  the  office-holders, 
with  their  yearly  salaries,  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  executive  power,  and  they  would  in  a  short 
time  be  as  mute  and  inactive  as  this  bill  pro 
poses  to  make  them.  Their  voice,  I  promise, 
would  then  be  scarcely  raised  at  elections,  or 
their  persons  be  found  at  the  polls."  If  he  had 
changed  but  one  word,  —  if  he  had  said  party  in 
power  instead  of  executive  power,  —  this  advice 
would,  indeed,  have  been  the  egg  of  Columbus. 
The  context  hardly  allows  a  doubt  that  he  now, 
as  before,  only  wished  to  assign  a  controlling 
influence  over  the  removals  to  Congress  or  the 
Senate  ;  and  if  that  was  to  be  the  whole  reform, 
his  law,  like  the  bill  under  discussion,  would 
have  been  "  useless,  or  worse  than  useless."  As 
concerning  the  slavery  conflict,  so  also  in  this 
question,  he  foresaw  and  foretold  the  impending 
dangers  and  inevitable  evil  consequences,  and 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  203 

lie  sLowed  great  ability  in  criticising  the  opin 
ions  of  the  other  political  physicians ;  but  his 
own  prescriptions  were  poisonous  drugs. 

In  respect  to  the  civil  service,  this  is  not 
very  surprising,  because,  though  Calhoun  saw 
clearer  than  most  of  his  contemporaries,  he  had 
after  all  not  made  a  serious  effort  to  push  his 
examination  beyond  the  surface  of  the  ques 
tion  ;  another  generation  was  to  grapple  with 
this  problem,  for  it  had  to  grow  infinitely  worse 
ere  the  necessity  of  getting  at  the  bottom  of 
it  could  be  fully  realized.  But  of  the  slavery 
conflict  he  had  a  better  right  than  anybody  to 
say,  as  he  frequently  did,  that  he  had  thor 
oughly  examined  it  in  all  its  bearings,  and  that 
he  understood  it.  Therefore  the  apodeictic  man 
ner  in  which  he  promised  a  radical  cure,  if  but 
the  application  of  his  remedies  would  be  con 
sented  to,  exposes  him  to  the  charge  of  having 
been  a  dishonest  quack,  if  he  is  not  admitted  to 
have  been  an  honest  fanatic,  who,  like  all  fanat 
ics,  viewed  his  subject  but  from  one  fixed  point 
and  under  one  unchangeable  visual  angle. 

This  deep  conviction  of  his  own  infallibility 
in  relation  to  everything  concerning  slavery 
rendered  it  a  very  significant  fact  that  he  once 
was  compelled  to  admit  that  he  was  at  his  wits' 
end,  and  had  no  advice  to  offer.  Of  course 
neither  pride  nor  policy  allowed  the  very  words 


204  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

to  fall  from  his  lips,  but  the  folded  arms  and 
knitted  brow  with  which,  after  reiterated  loud 
complaints,  he  suffered  the  government  to  re 
main  in  the  embarrassing  situation,  into  which, 
it  had  been  thrown  by  trying  to  serve  the  inter 
ests  of  the  slave-holders,  spoke  with  a  most  im 
pressive  eloquence. 

Two  American  vessels  with  negroes  on  board, 
the  Comet  and  the  Encomium,  had  been 
stranded,  in  1830  and  1834,  on  the  false  keys 
of  the  Bahama  Islands,  and  the  local  authorities 
of  Nassau,  New  Providence,  had  refused  to  rec 
ognize  the  negroes  as  slaves  and  deliver  them 
up  to  their  owners.  In  1835  a  very  similar  case 
occurred.  The  brig  Enterprise  was  forced  by 
stress  of  weather  into  Port  Hamilton,  Ber 
muda,  and  the  local  authorities  detained  the 
slaves,  pretending  that  they  had  become  free 
men  by  coming  within  English  jurisdiction. 
The  United  States  government  took  up  all 
three  cases  in  behalf  of  the  owners,  and  claimed 
a  fair  compensation.  England  at  last  yielded 
as  to  the  first  two,  but  persisted  in  her  refusal 
as  to  the  last,  and,  at  the  same  time,  declared 
that  no  such  claim  would  ever  again  be  allowed. 
This  distinction  was  based  upon  the  fact  "  that 
before  the  Enterprise  arrived  at  Bermuda  slav 
ery  had  been  abolished  in  the  British  Empire.' 

On  March  4,   1840,  Calhoun  introduced  in 


UNDER   VAN  BUBEN.  205 

the  Senate  a  set  of  resolutions  declaratory  of 
what  lie  conceived  to  be  the  principles  of  the 
law  of  nations  applying  to  the  case,  and  severely 
condemning  the  course  of  the  English  author 
ities.  Some  days  later  he  delivered  a  long 
speech  in  support  of  the  resolutions,  and  had 
the  satisfaction  of  seeing  them  unanimously 
adopted.  The  South  liked  to  dwell  upon  this 
fact  as  a  striking  proof  of  the  justice  of  its 
claims.  The  unanimity  of  the  Senate  was,  how 
ever,  only  apparent.  Of  fifty-two  senators,  only 
thirty-three  voted  ;  nineteen  were  evidently  not 
satisfied  that  Calhoun  had  made  good  his  case, 
but  for  reasons  best  known  to  themselves  they 
preferred  not  to  say  so.  The  "unanimous" 
vote  of  the  Senate  was,  in  fact,  a  proof  of  the 
awe  in  which  almost  all  the  Northern  politi 
cians  stood  of  the  slave  power,  but  there  was 
very  little  reason  to  draw  from  it  the  conclu 
sion  that  the  doctrine  propounded  in  the  resolu 
tions  could  not  be  called  into  question.  Adams, 
who  certainly  knew  as  much  of  the  law  of  na 
tions  as  any  member  of  Congress,  wrote  con 
cerning  the  Enterprise  resolutions,  "Calhoun 
crows  about  his  success  in  imposing  his  own 
bastard  law  of  nations  upon  the  Senate  by  his 
preposterous  resolutions,  and  chuckles  at  Web 
ster's  appealing  to  those  resolutions  now,  after 
dodging  from  the  duty  of  refuting  and  con 
founding:  them  then." 


206  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

The  essential  point  of  Calhoun's  doctrine  was 
that  he  denied  the  right  of  England,  with  re 
gard  to  citizens  of  foreign  countries,  to  make 
any  difference  between  slaves  and  other  prop 
erty,  if  by  some  unavoidable  cause  the  slaves 
should  momentarily  come  within  the  limits  of 
her  jurisdiction.  This  opinion  was  based  upon 
the  assertion  that  slavery  was  fully  recognized 
by  the  law  of  nations.  England  did  not  directly 
and  in  so  many  words  assert  the  contrary,  but 
she  proved  by  her  acts  that,  at  least  so  far  as 
any  positive  obligations  could  be  deduced  from 
this  principle,  she  refused  to  acknowledge  its 
existence  or  its  binding  force  upon  her.  This 
fact  was  in  itself  proof  absolute  that  Calhoun's 
assertion  could  at  best  be  true  only  with  a  most 
important  qualification.  He  overlooked  the  fact 
that  the  law  of  nations  is  not  immutable,  but 
constantly  changing  and  developing  with  the 
general  development  of  civilization.  The  very 
fact  that  England  assumed  the  position  she  did 
sufficiently  proved  that  this  law  was  in  a  state 
of  transition  as  to  the  principle  in  question. 
The  law  of  nations  rests  upon  the  free  consent 
of  the  civilized  peoples.  If,  therefore,  the  great 
est  maritime  power  of  the  world,  with  most  ex 
tensive  possessions  adjacent  to  the  sea  or  sur 
rounded  by  it  in  all  parts  of  the  globe,  withdrew 
its  assent  to  a  principle  of  which  the  practical 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  207 

application  was  confined  to  the  sea-coast,  it 
could  no  longer  be  maintained.  That  this  was 
so  with  regard  to  the  case  in  hand  was  the  more 
evident,  because  none  of  the  other  European 
powers  of  any  consequence  had  a  practical  in 
terest  in  the  question,  and  the  hostility  of  pub 
lic  opinion  all  over  the  civilized  world  against 
slavery  was  constantly  and  rapidly  increasing. 
Calhoun's  resolutions,  therefore,  were  neither 
more  nor  less  than  a  vain  protest  against  the 
onward  course  of  civilization,  and  the  Senate, 
by  "unanimously"  adopting  them,  announced 
to  the  world  that  the  most  democratic  and  most 
progressive  state  of  the  universe  was  bound  to 
cry  Halt  !  and  pull  back  the  wheel  of  time 
whenever  and  wherever  the  interests  of  the 
slave-holders  were  in  danger  of  being  crushed 
by  it. 

To  oblige  the  slave  power,  the  Senate  had 
made  an  ugly  blot  on  the  record  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  slave  power  did  not  derive  the 
least  advantage  from  it,  nay,  it  even  sustained 
positive  darnnge.  England  did  not  change  her 
course  by  a  single  point  on  account  of  the  reso 
lutions,  and  the  attention  of  the  world  had  again 
been  called  in  the  most  pointed  manner  to  the 
allegation  that  slavery  was  indeed  a  "  positive 
good  "  and  the  best  foundation  of  liberty.  That 
was  a  positive  damage,  and  no  small  one,  for 


208  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

every  syllable  of  what  Callioun  had  said  years 
ago,  with  such  impressive  emphasis  about  the 
part  played  by  the  moral  convictions  in  the 
tragedy  of  this  conflict,  was  true.  Every  such 
manifestation  of  the  slave  power  caused  its  op 
ponents  to  write  with  larger  letters  on  their 
own  banner  the  device  under  which  the  slav- 
ocracy  had  been  sailing  ever  since  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution :  Let  us  alone  !  Slavery  is  a 
state  institution  with  which  the  federal  govern 
ment  has  no  concern.  Let  us  alone !  To  be 
left  alone  in  this  sense  was,  however,  to  be 
delivered  over  to  destruction  by  the  moral  and 
economical  agencies  which  rule  the  world.  The 
"  Let  us  alone "  of  the  slave-holders  meant, 
You  have  not  only  to  shut  your  eyes  and  ears, 
but  also  to  lock  up  your  thoughts  and  your  con 
sciences,  whenever  our  interests  require  you  to 
do  so;  for  slavery  is  a  domestic  institution  of 
the  sovereign  States ;  but  it  is  your  duty  to 
throw  the  whole  weight  of  the  Union  for  us 
into  the  scales,  whenever  we  tell  you  that  our 
safety  demands  it,  for  the  Constitution  recog- 
lizes  and  "  guarantees  "  slavery.  How  long 
would  the  North  submit  to  such  a  bargain  ? 
That  question  nobody  could  answer  as  yet ;  but 
two  things  were  certain :  every  time  that  the 
federal  government  submitted  to  its  enforce 
ment,  the  number  of  those  in  the  North  who 


UNDER    VAN  BUREN.  209 

grew  restive  under  it  increased;  and  every  time 
that  the  slave-holders  had  succeeded  in  enforc 
ing  it,  they  were  compelled  to  push  both  sides 
of  their  claim  a  long  step  farther.  Calhoun, 
understanding  the  nature  of  the  slavery  ques 
tion  better  than  any  other  Southern  man,  had 
to  march  far  ahead  on  both  diverging  lines,  and 
therefore,  while  no  other  single  man  has  done 
so  much  to  erect  the  temple  of  the  slave  power, 
also  no  other  single  man  has  done  so  much  to 
render  its  sudden  downfall  inevitable  and  to. 
hasten  the  catastrophe.  So  it  was  in  this  case.. 
What  a  triumph  that  not  a  single  senator  dared, 
to  raise  his  voice  against  the  "  bastard  law  of 
nations,"  and  what  a  portentous  humiliation  to 
have  nothing  but  "  words,  words,  and  again 
words "  to  oppose  to  England's  "  outrageous 
course  "  !  The  South  pocketed  at  the  same  time 
the  glorious  impotent  resolutions  and  a  signal 
defeat. 

There  is  no  question  that  Calhoun  very 
keenly  felt  the  defeat,  for  he  had  declared  that 
a  "  vital  principle  "  was  involved  for  the  South, 
and  that  England  "interdicted  nearly  as  effect 
ually  the  intercourse  by  sea  between  one  half 
of  this  Union  and  the  other,  as  to  the  greatest 
and  most  valuable  portion  of  the  property  of 
the  South,  as  if  she  was  to  send  out  cruisers 
against  it."  Yet  he  soon  scrupulously  avoided 

14 


210  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

touching  upon  the  question  even  in  private  con 
versation.  But  he  deemed  the  success  which 
he  had  obtained  over  the  North  of  more  import, 
for  the  obvious  reason  that  the  fate  of  the  slave 
power  depended  not  upon  the  international,  but 
upon  the  national,  standing  of  slavery.  In  No 
vember,  1841,  the  English  authorities  of  Nas 
sau  dared  to  repeat  their  former  offence  under 
most  aggravating  circumstances,  for  the  brig 
Creole  was  brought  into  the  harbor  by  the  very 
slaves,  who  had  successfully  revolted  and  killed 
one  of  the  slave-holders  in  the  struggle.  Yet 
Calhoun  did  not  deem  it  necessary  to  burl  a  new 
set  of  resolutions  against  England ;  nay,  he  even 
refrained  from  venting  his  wrath  in  a  speech ; 
but  he  did  not  omit  to  commend  very  heart 
ily  the  remonstrance  of  Webster,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  which  was,  indeed,  based  entirely  on 
the  resolutions  of  March  4,  1840.  "The  letter 
which  had  been  read,"  he  said,  "  was  drawn  up 
with  great  ability,  and  covered  the  ground  which 
had  been  assumed  on  this  subject  by  all  parties 
in  the  Senate."  He  hoped  that  it  would  "have 
a  beneficial  effect,  not  only  upon  the  United 
States,  but  Great  Britain.  Coming  from  the 
quarter  it  did,  this  document  would  do  more 
good  than  in  coming  from  any  other  quarter." 

Was  it  not  an  ominous  sign  of  the  times  that 
such  praise,  in  such   an   affair,  was  bestowed 


UNDER    VAN  BUREN.  211 

upon  Daniel  Webster  from  these  lips?  Fur 
ther,  the  great  statesman  of  Massachusetts  could 
boast  of  having  won  the  approval  of  the  great 
Carolinian  in  another  question  relating  to  slav 
ery.  To  the  surprise  of  most  people,  as  well 
in  the  North  as  in  the  South,  Calhoun  was  in 
favor  of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  concluded 
at  Washington,  on  August  9,  1842,  in  which 
the  high  contracting  powers,  England  and  the 
United  States,  obligated  themselves  to  main 
tain  a  squadron  of  a  certain  strength  on  the 
African  coast  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing 
the  slave-trade.  It  seems  hardly  necessary  to 
state  that  Calhoun  was  not  pleased  with  the 
agreement ;  very  far  from  it,  indeed-  He  pre 
mised  his  affirmative  vote  by  the  declaration 
"  that  there  were  several  circumstances  which 
caused  no  small  repugnance  on  his  part  to  any 
stipulations  whatever  with  Great  Britain  on 
the  subject  of  those  articles  ;  and  he  would  add 
that  he  would  have  been  gratified  if  they  and 
all  other  stipulations  on  the  subject  could  have 
been  entirely  omitted ;  but  he  must,  at  the  same 
time,  say  he  did  not  see  how  it  was  possible  to 
avoid  entering  into  some  arrangement  on  the 
subject,"  and,  considering  all  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  he  did  not  think  this  agreement 
bad  enough  to  justify  the  rejection  of  the  whole 
treaty,  while  it  was  better  than  to  maintain  the 


212  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

dangerous  status  quo.  If  Calhoun  thought  thus, 
it  is  not  astonishing  that  Adams  declared  "  the 
negotiation  itself  a  Seapinade;  a  struggle  be 
tween  the  plenipotentiaries  to  outwit  each 
other,  and  to  circumvent  both  countries  by  a 
slippery  compromise  between  freedom  and  slav 
ery."  But  Calhoun  was  certainly  no  friend  of 
slippery  compromises.  Was  it  then  really  only 
the  embarrassing  situation  of  the  United  States 
which  caused  him.  to  consent  to  this?  Adams 
thought  not.  He  writes,  "  There  is  a  temper 
ance  in  his  [Calhoun's]  manner,  obviously  aim 
ing  to  conciliate  the  Northern  political  sopranos, 
who  abhor  slavery,  and  help  to  forge  fetters  for 
the  slave."  But  what  reason  did  he  have  to 
wish  just  now  to  conciliate  this  numerous  fam 
ily  of  the  species  "  dough-face  "  ? 

The  ambitious  wish  which  had  so  long  and 
so  violently  agitated  Calhoun's  life  while  he 
stood  in  his  prime  had  once  more  taken  hold 
of  his  mirld,  now  that  he  had  entered  upon  the 
years  in  which  all  that  this  earth  has  to  be 
stow  begins  to  lose  its  charm  and  gloss,  because 
the  twilight  has  set  in  and  the  evening  shades 
are  darkening.  The  deep  animosity  which  the 
nullification  conflict  had  excited  against  him 
throughout  the  North  had  so  far  subsided  that 
South  Carolina  ventured  to  urge  upon  her  sister 
States  his  claims  on  the  presidency.  She  in- 


UNDER    VAN  BUREN.  213 

tended  no  empty  compliment.  Her  own  ad 
miration  for  her  favorite  son  did  not  so  entirely 
becloud  her  judgment  that  she  flattered  her 
self  and  him  with  the  anticipation  of  certain 
success;  but  she  deemed  it  so  far  possible  that 
she  entered  his  name  upon  the  list  of  candi 
dates  with  all  the  hot  and  overbearing  impetu 
osity  with  which  she  was  wont  to  take  up  every 
important  question.  Calhoun,  too,  indulged  in 
the  hope  that  the  dream  of  his  earlier  manhood 
might  at  last  be  realized.  At  the  end  of  1842 
he  resigned  his  seat  in  the  Senate,  the  resigna 
tion  to  take  effect  from  the  close  of  the  27th 
Congress.  The  Legislature  of  South  Carolina, 
immediately  upon  the  acceptance  of  the  resig 
nation,  unanimously  nominated  him  a  candi 
date  for  election  as  President  of  the  United 
States. 

To-day  nobody  will  question  that  Calhoun 
was  by  far  the  superior  of  all  his  Democratic 
competitors  in  intellect  and  in  justly  acquired 
fame  and  character ;  and  even  at  that  time  but 
few  failed  to  see  this,  though  many  did  not  see 
fit  publicly  to  acknowledge  the  fact.  But  in 
fcpite  of  his  great  superiority  in  all  the  essential 
qualities,  no  calm  observer  could  doubt  for  a 
moment  that  his  hopes  were  sure  to  be  disap 
pointed.  The  second  and  third  rate  politicians 
exerted,  directly  or  indirectly,  so  great  an  in- 


214  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

fluence  upon  the  party  nominations  that  the 
chances  of  the  first  men  of  the  nation  to  reach, 
in  ordinary  times,  the  goal  of  the  presidency 
had  become  exceedingly  small.  The  special  in 
terests  of  this  class  of  people  were  better  served 
by  sending  one  of  their  own  chiefs  into  the 
White  House  than  by  elevating  to  the  chair  a 
leading  statesman,  whose  renown  and  influence 
were  not  based  upon  their  cheap  cunning  and 
petty  arts.  But  even  if  this  had  been  other 
wise,  Calhoun  would  have  had  no  chance  what 
ever.  It  was,  to  say  the  least,  exceedingly 
doubtful  whether  he  could  ever  be  elected,  if 
nominated  by  the  party,  and  therefore  it  was 
certain  that  he  would  never  receive  the  nomi 
nation.  It  is  true  that  he  was  not  entirely  with 
out  support  in  some  of  the  Northern  States. 
The  Irish  especially  manifested  everywhere 
some  predilection  for  him,  on  account  of  his 
pedigree,  and  in  New  York,  where  the  Whigs 
indulged  very  freely  in  their  nativist  and  anti- 
Catholic  tendencies,  this  predilection  could  al 
most  be  mistaken  for  genuine  enthusiasm.  But 
as  the  first  commandment  of  the  political  dec 
alogue  of  the  Irish  masses  was  to  vote  the  regu 
lar  ticket,  and  as  his  Irish  extraction  was  nearly 
all  they  knew  of  him,  their  support  was  of  very 
little  avail,  unless  his  other  partisans  were  nu 
merous  and  enthusiastic  enough  to  scare  his  op* 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  215 

ponents  within  the  party  into  submission.  If 
the  Southern  wing  unanimously  and  emphati 
cally  declared  themselves  for  him,  the  Northern 
would,  perhaps,  not  dare  to  resist. 

But  only  ignorance  or  blind  admiration  could 
suppose  for  a  moment  that  the  Southern  Demo 
crats  could  be  marched  up  in  serried  ranks  to 
sustain  his  candidature.  Ever  since  he  had  ab 
jured  his  early  national  and  latitudinarian  bias, 
and  become  an  "honest  nullifier"  in  the  ser 
vice  of  the  slavocracy,  he  had  unfitted  himself 
to  be  the  leader  of  a  great  national  party,  be 
cause  he  had  assumed  the  leadership  of  an  ex 
treme  sectional  faction.  Perhaps  this  extreme 
faction  was  destined,  in  the  course  of  time,  to 
develop  into  a  party,  which  would  exercise  des 
potic  sway  over  the  whole  South.  Nay,  it  was 
sure  to  come  to  that,  because  the  correct  un 
derstanding  of  the  slavery  conflict  must  spread 
with  its  own  development.  As  yet,  however, 
ninety-nine  out  of  a  hundred  saw  the  slavery 
question  through  a  mist,  and  therefore  even 
those  who  would  have  followed  Calhoun  through 
thick  and  thin,  to  even  out-Heroding  Herod, 
were  now  shocked  and  dismayed  by  his  radi 
calism.  There  was  probably  not  a  single  slave 
holder  in  the  whole  Union  who  was  not  glad  to 
have  in  the  United  States  Senate  such  a  cham 
pion  of  the  peculiar  institution,  whose  courage 


216  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

and  will  were  equal  to  any  emergency ;  but 
outside  of  South  Carolina,  the  number  of  those 
who  were  very  anxious  to  see  him  at  the  head 
of  the  government  was  comparatively  small. 

The  Calhounites  fought  stubbornly  and  car 
ried  their  point  in  the  first  preliminary  ques 
tion,  —  the  postponing  of  the  national  conven 
tion  to  the  spring  of  1844,  —  against  the  ad 
herents  of  Van  Buren,  who  had  wished  to  set  it 
for  as  early  a  date  as  November,  1843.  In  the 
other  controverted  previous  question,  however, 
the  partisans  of  Van  Buren  were  all  the  more 
unyielding.  The  Calhounites  wanted  the  dele 
gates  to  the  national  convention  elected  by  dis 
tricts,  while  their  opponents  would  have  the 
decision  as  to  the  mode  of  election  left  to  the 
States.  If  the  national  convention  was  to  rep 
resent,  so  far  as  possible,  not  the  political  log- 
rollers,  but  the  party,  the  preference  had  un 
doubtedly  to  be  accorded  to  the  proposition  of 
the  Calhounites ;  but  it  was  certainly  somewhat 
strange  that  they,  who  believed  themselves  to 
have  a  monopoly  of  the  pure  states-rights  doc 
trine,  ventured  to  wish  to  give  prescriptions  to 
the  "States." 

So  far  as  their  course  was  determined  by 
what  they  supposed  to  be  the  interest  of  theii 
respective  candidates,  both  factions  might  have 
saved  their  time  and  temper,  and  allowed  this 


UNDER    VAN  BUREN.  217 

question  to  take  care  of  itself.  Van  Buren  was 
successful  in  the  trial  heat,  but  his  final  morti 
fication  was  only  the  greater;  for  after  all  he 
lost  the  race,  although  his  foremost  competitor 
had  taken  the  wise  resolution  to  withdraw  from 
it  altogether  on  January  20,  1844. 

South  Carolina  was  dismayed,  but  she  did 
not,  as  she  had  done  heretofore,  throw  away  her 
electoral  votes  by  voting  for  some  candidate  of 
her  own.  This  time  she  submitted  to  the  party 
behest,  although  she  did  it  with  anything  but 
good  grace.  The  defeat  of  Calhoun's  candidat 
ure  had,  however,  but  little  to  do  with  her  an 
ger.  She  indulged  once  more  in  a  spasm  of 
loud-mouthed  passion  on  account  of  the  double 
face  which  James  K.  Polk,  the  Democratic  can 
didate,  had  seen  fit  to  put  on  with  regard  to 
the  tariff  question,  in  order  to  secure  for  him 
self  the  electoral  vote  of  Pennsylvania,  without 
which  his  election  was  deemed  impossible.  Polk 
was  accused  of  having  gone  over,  bag  and  bag 
gage,  to  the  camp  of  the  protectionists  ;  indig 
nation  meetings  and  dinners,  with  an  abundance 
of  furious  toasts,  denunciations,  and  threats, 
were  the  order  of  the  day  ;  the  "  Charleston 
Mercury  "  was  not  satisfied  with  urging  "  leg 
islative  nullification,"  but  invited  the  people  of 
the  State  to  adopt  "ulterior  measures,"  in  case 
that  "  should  prove  inadequate." 


218  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

There  is  always  a  fire  where  such  volumes  of 
smoke  becloud  the  sky ;  but  this  time  the  quan 
tity  of  smoke  stood  in  no  proportion  to  the  size 
or  heat  of  the  fire.  Calhoun  disapproved  of 
this  wild  ado  about  so  little,  and  that  now  hap 
pened  quite  frequently  which  but  a  few  weeks 
before  had  seemed  impossible,  —  that  his  name 
was  not  mentioned  at  all  at  the  political  festivi 
ties  of  the  radicals.  He  did  not  take  this  slight 
much  to  heart,  nor  had  he  any  reason  to  do  so. 
Not  only  was  it  a  matter  of  course  that  Polk 
had  not  become  a  protectionist,  but  it  was  also 
perfectly  evident  that  for  the  present  the  tariff 
was  but  a  question  of  the  second  or  third  order. 
In  both  parties  the  opinions  were  far  from  be 
ing  in  full  accord  on  this  head,  and  in  neither 
did  the  masses  of  those  who  were  not  most 
immediately  interested  in  it  feel  very  deeply 
about  it.  And  now  should  a  storm  be  artifi 
cially  raised  about  a  little  more  or  less  of  duties, 
and  thereby  the  gauntlet  thrown  into  the  face 
not  only  of  the  whole  Whig  party,  North  and 
South,  but  of  all  those  who  were  too  dull  of 
comprehension  to  see  the  conservative  force  of 
nullification,  and  who  clung  to  the  old-fashioned 
idea  that  a  law  is  a  law,  and  has  to  be  obeyed, 
—  now,  when  the  opportunity  was  offered  of 
securing  a  prize  of  incalculable  value  to  the 
democracy?  Holmes  and  Rhett  might  amuse 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  219 

their  followers  by  a  revival  of  the  nullification 
idea,  "  meditate  ulterior  measures,"  talk  of  dis 
union,  and  declare  that  "  to  this  complexion  it 
must  come  at  last ; "  Calhoun  had  packed  away 
his  thunderbolts,  and  thus  far  he  alone  knew 
how  to  use  them  effectually. 

So  early  as  1839  he  had,  in  the  face  of  al 
most  countless  declarations  to  the  contrary, 
and  yet  apparently  in  good  faith,  astonished 
the  Senate  by  the  emphatic  assertion  that  a  dis 
solution  of  the  Union  ever  had  been,  and  would 
remain  in  all  future  time,  an  imaginary  danger. 
Replying  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  he  had  said :  — 

"  The  senator  has  done  no  more  than  justice  to 
that  measure  [the  compromise  tariff].  It  terminated 
honestly  and  fairly,  without  the  sacrifice  of  any  in 
terest,  one  of  the  most  dangerous  controversies  that 
ever  disturbed  the  Union  or  endangered  its  exist 
ence.  Not  the  danger  of  dismemberment,  as  we  learn 
from  the  senator,  was  anticipated  abroad.  No,  the 
danger  lay  in  a  different  direction.  Dismemberment 
is  not  the  only  mode  in  which  our  Union  may  be 
destroyed.  It  is  a  federal  Union,  an  Union  of  sov 
ereign  States,  and  can  be  as  effectually  and  much 
more  easily  destroyed  by  consolidation  than  by  dis 
memberment.  He  who  knows  anything  of  the  history 
of  our  race  and  the  workings  of  the  human  breast 
best  understands  the  great  and  almost  insuperable 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  dissolution.  There  is  scarcely 
An  instance  on  record  of  any  people,  speaking  the 


220  JOHN   <7.   CALHOUN. 

same  language  and  having  the  same  government  and 
laws,  who  have  ever  dissolved  their  political  connec 
tions  through  internal  causes  or  struggles.  .  .  .  The 
constant  struggle  is  to  enlarge,  and  not  to  divide ; 
and  there  neither  is  nor  ever  has  been  the  least  dan 
ger  that  our  Union  would  terminate  in  dissolution." 

That  was  no  bait  thrown  to  "  the  political 
sopranos  "  of  the  North.  He  believed  what  he 
said,  yet  he  did  not  mean  to  retract  a  single  syl 
lable  of  what  he  had  declared  so  often  before. 
The  Union  and  abolition,  as  he  had  once  ex 
pressed  it,  cannot  coexist.  If  the  spirit  of  the 
fanatical  visionaries  of  the  North  is  not  chained 
down,  then  the  Union  is  irretrievably  gone,  for 
between  the  Union  and  slavery  the  South  has 
no  choice.  But  he  is  satisfied  that  the  South 
will  never  be  pressed  before  this  alternative. 
In  the  letter,  before  mentioned,  to  the  citizens 
of  Athens,  he  had  written  :  — 

"  Of  all  the  questions  which  have  been  agitated 
under  our  government,  abolition  is  that  in  which  we 
of  the  South  have  the  deepest  concern.  It  strikes 
directly  and  fatally,  not  only  at  our  prosperity,  but 
our  existence  as  a  people.  Should  it  succeed,  our  fate 
would  be  worse  than  that  of  the  aborigines  whom  we 
have  driven  out,  or  the  slaves  whom  we  command. 
It  is  a  question  that  admits  of  neither  concession  nor 
compromise.  .  .  .  There  is  one  point  in  connection 
with  this  important  subject  on  which  the  South 


UNDER   VAN  BUREN.  221 

ought  to  be  fully  informed.  From  all  that  I  saw  and 
heard  during  the  session,  I  am  perfectly  satisfied  that 
we  must  look  to  ourselves,  and  ourselves  only,  for 
safety.  It  is  perfectly  idle  to  look  to  the  non-slave- 
holding  States  to  arrest  the  attacks  of  the  fanatics. 
.  .  .  Nor  would  it  be  less  vain  to  look  to  Congress. 
The  same  cause  that  prevents  the  non-slave-holding 
States  from  interference  in  our  favor  at  home  will 
equally  prevent  Congress.  .  .  .  But,  if  true  to  our 
selves,  we  need  neither  their  sympathy  nor  aid.  The 
Constitution  has  placed  in  our  power  ample  means, 
short  of  secession  or  disunion,  to  protect  ourselves." 

We  have  seen  more  than  once  that  he  had 
his  hours  of  despondency,  when  this  conviction 
was  severely  shaken,  but  it  was  never  wholly 
relinquished.  And  now  he  thought  that  the 
day  had  come  when  a  pillar  of  such  gigantic 
dimensions  could  be  put  as  an  additional  sup 
port  under  the  dome  of  slavery  that  it  would 
be  able  to  withstand  all  the  assaults  of  aboli 
tionism.  The  annexation  of  Texas  was  to  ren 
der  the  Union  indissoluble  by  strengthening  the 
slave  power  so  much  that  it  would  have  noth 
ing  more  to  apprehend. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

TEXAS. 

As  early  as  May  23,  1836,  Calhoun  had  de 
clared  in  the  Senate  that  he  — 

"  had  made  up  his  mind  not  only  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  Texas,  but  for  her  admission  into 
this  Union  ;  and  if  the  Texans  managed  their  affairs 
prudently,  they  would  soon  be  called  upon  to  decide 
that  question.  No  man  could  suppose  for  a  moment 
that-  that  country  could  ever  come  again  under  the 
dominion  of  Mexico ;  and  he  was  of  opinion  that  it 
was  not  for  our  interests  that  there  should  be  an  in 
dependent  community  between  us  and  Mexico.  There 
were  powerful  reasons  why  Texas  should  be  a  part 
of  this  Union.  The  Southern  States,  owning  a  slave 
population,  were  deeply  interested  in  preventing  that 
country  from  having  the  power  to  annoy  them." 

Thus,  but  one  month  after  the  battle  of  Ja- 
cinto,  he  publicly  and  formally  announced  his 
programme  with  regard  to  the  question  which 
was  to  be  the  pivotal  point  on  which  the  fate 
of  slavery  was  to  turn.  No  other  single  indi 
vidual  did  so  much  as  he  to  bring  about 
the  annexation.  He  himself  has  emphatically 


TEXAS.  223 

claimed  that  merit,  and  he  considered  it  the 
greatest  and  most  beneficent  achievement  of  his 
public  career.  Perhaps  it  was,  as  things  finally 
turned  out,  but  he  would  have  cursed  the  day 
on  which  he  put  his  hand  to  the  plough,  if  he 
had  known  what  a  dragon  seed  was  to  be 
planted.  On  February  24, 1847,  when  the  har 
vesting  of  the  fatal  crop  had  already  begun,  he 
said  in  the  Senate :  — 

"  I  trust,  Mr.  President,  there  will  be  no  dispute 
hereafter  as  to  who  is  the  real  author  of  annexation. 
Less  than  twelve  months  since,  I  had  many  compet 
itors  for  that  honor  :  the  official  organ  here  claimed, 
if  my  memory  serves  me,  a  large  share  for  Mr. 
Polk  and  his  administration,  and  not  less  than  half  a 
dozen  competitors  from  other  quarters  asserted  them 
selves  to  be  the  real  authors.  But  now,  since  the 
war  [with  Mexico]  has  become  unpopular,  they  all 
seem  to  agree  that  I,  in  reality,  am  the  author  of 
annexation.  I  will  not  put  the  honor  aside.  I  may 
now  rightfully  and  indisputably  claim  to  be  the  au 
thor  of  that  great  measure,  —  a  measure  which  has 
so  much  extended  the  domains  of  the  Union  ;  which 
has  added  so  largely  to  its  productive  powers  ;  which 
promises  so  greatly  to  extend  its  commerce ;  which 
has  stimulated  its  industry,  and  given  security  to  our 
most  exposed  frontier.  I  take  pride  to  myself  as 
being  the  author  of  this  great  measure." 

Though  there  is  no  positive  proof  for  it,  Ben- 
ton's  allegation  is  therefore  probably  true,  that 


224  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

Calhoun  was  also  the  real  author  of  the  intrigue 
which  was  to  give  the  annexation  wheel  the 
necessary  impetus,  after  several  years  had  been 
spent  in  unsuccessful  attempts  to  put  it  prop 
erly  into  motion.  Other  circumstances  point 
in  the  same  direction,  and  that  he  at  first  care 
fully  kept  himself  concealed  in  the  background 
is  satisfactorily  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
immediate  purpose  of  the  intrigue  was  to  bring 
the  still  enormous  influence  of  Jackson  into 
play. 

In  the  beginning  of  1843  a  Baltimore  news 
paper  published  a  letter  of  Gilmer,  dated  Jan 
uary  10,  to  "  a  friend  "  (Duff  Green)  in  Mary 
land,  on  the  necessity  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  Benton  says  that  the  letter  was  like  a 
flash  of  lightning  from  a  clear  sky.  The  public, 
however,  were  allowed  to  settle  down  once  more 
into  indolent  unconcern,  for  what  followed  was 
played  under  cover.  The  letter  touched  most 
strongly  the  two  chords  which  were  sure  to  find 
the  loudest  echo  in  Jackson's  breast :  preserva 
tion  against  England's  ambitious  desires  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  Union.  But  as  the  name 
of  Gilmer,  as  well  as  Green,  awakened  the  sus 
picion  that  Calhoun  was  seated  in  the  prompt 
er's  box,  the  letter  was  sent  to  the  "  Sage  of 
the  Hermitage  "  by  Aaron  V.  Brown,  of  Ten 
nessee,  who  was  but  an  unconscious  tool  in 


TEXAS.  225 

other  hands.  Jackson  answered  at  once  in  the 
tone  desired,  and  although  the  letter  had  been 
confessedly  asked  for  only  for  the  purpose  of 
working  on  the  masses,  it  was  now  carefully  put 
away  until  the  opportune  moment  for  its  pub 
lication  should  come.  Those  who  held  the 
wires  behind  the  curtain  had  attained  their  im 
mediate  end.  Jackson  had  irrevocably  engaged 
himself  for  immediate  annexation.  Without 
himself  being  aware  of  it,  he  had  thereby  de 
prived  himself  of  the  possibility  of  throwing  his 
whole  weight  into  the  scales  in  favor  of  Van 
Buren ;  for  immediate  annexation  was  to  be 
made  the  leading  issue  of  the  presidential  cam 
paign  of  1844.  This  was  another  reason  for 
the  Calhounites  to  insist  upon  the  postponement 
of  the  nominating  convention,  for  they  needed 
time  to  tie  the  South  so  closely  down  to  this 
programme  that  it  could  not  afterward  draw 
back  for  the  sake  of  a  question  of  persons. 

A  few  months  later,  one  of  the  greatest  ob 
stacles  in  the  way  of  the  annexationists  was 
removed  by  Webster's  exit  from  the  cabinet. 
Upshur,  who,  after  a  short  interregnum  under 
Legare,  became  Tyler's  Secretary  of  State, 
worked  with  his  whole  energy  and  with  consid 
erable  skill  at  the  solution  of  this  problem.  On 
October  16,  1843,  he  proposed  a  treaty  of  an 
nexation  to  the  Texan  agent.  Texas,  however, 

15 


226  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

was  not  now  quite  so  eager  to  grasp  the  out 
stretched  hand  as  she  had  been  heretofore. 
Thanks  to  the  efforts  of  England  and  France, 
there  was  an  armistice  between  her  and  Mexico, 
and  negotiations  tending  to  a  formal  peace  had 
been  begun.  Van  Zandt,  the  Texan  chargS  d'af 
faires  in  Washington,  in  a  letter  of  January 
17,  1844,  called  the  attention  of  Upshur  to  the 
fact  that,  under  these  circumstances,  a  treaty  of 
annexation  would  drive  Mexico  to  the  immedi 
ate  resumption  of  hostilities,  and  that  it  would 
also  cost  Texas  the  friendship  of  the  mediating 
powers.  He  therefore  confidentially  inquired 
whether,  in  case  the  proposal  of  annexation 
were  accepted  by  the  Texan  executive,  the 
President  would,  even  before  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty,  protect  Texas  by  a  sufficiently  strong 
land  and  maritime  force  against  all  attacks. 
Upshur  dared  not  answer  either  yes  or  no.  To 
refuse  the  request  was  to  drive  Texas  wholly 
into  the  arms  of  England,  while  to  grant  it 
was  to  pledge  the  President  to  assume,  on  his 
own  responsibility,  as  the  price  of  Texas,  the 
war  of  Texas  against  Mexico. 

The  bursting  of  the  cannon  Peacemaker  on 
board  the  Princeton,  on  February  28,  1844, 
ended  the  embarrassment  of  the  Secretary.  To 
whose  hands  should  the  consummation  of  the 
annexation  now  be  confided?  The  answer  to 


TEXAS.  227 

this  question  was  not  given,  as  one  would  have 
expected,  by  the  President,  but  by  Henry  A. 
Wise.  Already,  more  than  two  years  before, 
in  a  speech  delivered  in  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  the  hot-blooded  Virginian  had  gone 
into  ecstasy  over  the  idea  "  of  planting  the  lone 
star  of  the  Texan  banner  on  the  Mexican  capi- 
tol,"  of  extending  slavery  to  the  Pacific,  and  of 
robbing  the  Mexican  churches.  Now  he  thought 
that  the  time  had  come  to  enter  upon  the  real 
ization  of  this  sublime  programme,  and  he  was 
too  great  a  man  to  let  the  trifling  considerations 
of  propriety,  honesty,  and  right  stand  in  his 
way.  He  had  the  effrontery  to  go  to  McDuffie 
and  induce  him  to  urge  upon  Calhoun  the  ac 
ceptance  of  the  Secretaryship  of  State,  caus 
ing  him  (McDuffie)  to  believe  that  he  (Wise) 
had  been  sent  by  the  President.  Then  he  urged 
Tyler  to  offer  the  place  to  Calhoun.  The  Pres 
ident  at  first  declined  to  comply  with  the  wish, 
but  he  finally  submitted,  when  he  had  been 
told  what  his  devoted  friend  had  .presumed  to 
do. 

Calhoun  accepted,  declaring  at  the  same  time 
that  he  would  resign  the  office  so  soon  as  an 
nexation  should  become  an  accomplished  fact. 
It  was  the  universal  understanding  that  it  was 
only  for  this  special  purpose  that  he  had  been 
called  to  the  helm,  and  that  only  for  this  reason 


228  JOHN  C.  CALEOUN. 

he  consented  to  become  a  member  of  the  cabinet 
of  the  President,  who  had  no  party  in  Congress, 
and  but  a  corporal's  guard  of  office-holders 
among  the  people,  to  sustain  him.  He  after 
wards  fully  confirmed  this  view.  On  February 
12,  1847,  he  said  in  the  Senate :  — 

"  According  to  ray  view,  the  time  was  not  propi 
tious  in  one  respect.  The  then  President  had  no 
party  in  either  House.  I  am  not  certain  that  he  had 
a  single  supporter  in  this,  and  not  more  than  four  or 
five  in  the  other.  It  appeared  to  me  to  be  a  very 
unpropitious  moment,  under  such  circumstances,  to 
carry  through  so  important  a  measure.  When  it 
was  intimated  to  me  that  I  was  to  be  nominated  for 
the  office  of  Secretary  of  State,  I  strongly  remon 
strated  to  my  friends  here ;  but  before  my  remon 
strance  reached  them,  I  was  unanimously  appointed, 
and  was  compelled  to  accept.  I  saw  the  administra 
tion  was  weak,  and  that  the  very  important  measure 
would  be  liable  to  be  defeated.  But  circumstances 
made  action  on  it  inevitable." 

Niles's  "  Register  "  of  March  23,  1844,  said : 

"  The  nomination  of  John  C.  Calhoun  to  the  office 
of  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  entire  unanimity  with 
which  that  nomination  has  been  approved,  not  only 
by  the  Senate,  but  the  public  press  of  the  country, 
presents  the  incident,  in  our  judgment,  as  one  of  the 
most  eventful,  certainly  in  the  life  of  that  distin 
guished  and  talented  statesman,  and  very  possibly 


TEXAS.  229 

also,  in  the  future  and  fate  of  the  country,  the  inter 
ests  of  which,  to  a  vast  extent,  indeed,  are  thereby 
confided  to  him,  at  a  moment  of  exceeding  delicacy." 

That  the  Senate  unanimously  confirmed  the 
nomination  of  a  man  of  Calhoun's  standing  was 
a  matter  of  course ;  but  it  would  have  been 
strange  indeed  if  it  had  with  entire  unanimity 
"approved"  it,  and  stranger  still  if  the  whole 
press,  and  consequently  also  the  whole  people, 
had  rejoiced  at  it,  —  too  strange  to  be  believed, 
although  some  years  later  he  himself  asserted 
that  he  had  been  called  "by  the  unanimous 
voice  of  the  country  to  take  charge  of  the 
State  Department."  Just  because  it  was  in 
fact  "a  moment  of  exceeding  delicacy"  and 
"  the  future  and  the  fate  of  the  country  "  were, 
"  to  a  vast  extent,"  confided  to  his  hands,  the 
nomination  of  this  most  thorough-going  and 
most  daring  partisan  inevitably  caused  the  deep 
est  concern  to  all  the  opponents  of  annexation, 
while  it  gave  the  greatest  satisfaction  to  all  its 
advocates.  And  he  fully  justified  as  well  the 
expectations  of  the  latter  as  the  apprehensions 
of  the  former ;  but  in  doing  so  he  blurred  his 
fair  fame.  The  man  who  had  had  the  courage 
to  become  "  an  honest  nullifier  "  ought  to  have 
had  the  courage  to  manage  this  annexation 
business  with  perfect  honesty,  though  with  a 
high  hand,  and  not  stoop  to  sail  under  false  col- 


230  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

ors.  He  would  never  have  forgotten  so  far  as 
he  did  what  he  owed  to  the  dignity  of  his  coun 
try  and  his  personal  honor,  if  he  had  not  thought 
the  annexation  of  such  vital  importance  that 
almost  anything  seemed  justifiable  to  render 
success  more  certain. 

From  the  moment  when  Calhoun  arrived  in 
Washington,  the  negotiations,  which  had  been 
rather  stagnant  during  the  interregnum,  were 
resumed  with  zeal,  while  public  opinion  was 
aroused  by  the  publication  of  Jackson's  letter 
of  February  12,  1843,  postdated  1844.  John 
Nelson,  who  provisionally  had  charge  of  the 
State  Department,  had  declined  to  accede  to 
the  before-mentioned  condition  of  Texas,  for 
the  obvious  reason  that  the  President  had  not 
the  constitutional  power  to  employ  armed  force 
against  a  state  with  which  the  Union  was  at 
peace.  He  had,  however,  assured  the  Texans 
that  Tyler  was  "not  indisposed"  to  make  the 
desired  disposition  of  the  troops,  in  order  that 
they  might  be  able  to  protect  Texas  at  the 
"  proper  time."  Calhoun  now  tried  his  luck  with 
similar  vague  phrases,  but  the  Texan  agents 
would  not  be  paid  off  in  such  a  way.  On  April 
11  he  yielded  with  a  heavy  heart,  informing 
the  two  plenipotentiaries  that  an  order  had 
been  issued  to  concentrate  a  powerful  squadron 
in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  "  to  move  the  dis- 


TEXAS.  231 

posable  forces"  on  the  southwestern  frontier 
"to  meet  any  emergency."  The  only  object 
he  attained  was  that  he  was  allowed  to  evade 
the  greatest  difficulty  by  one  word,  which  left  a 
possibility  open  to  him,  not,  indeed,  to  justify 
the  action  of  the  administration,  but  to  defend 
it  by  dialectic  subtleties.  He  declared  that, 
"  during  the  pendency  of  the  treaty  of  annexa 
tion,  the  President  would  deem  it  his  duty  to 
use  all  the  means  placed  within  his  power  by  the 
Constitution  to  protect  Texas  from  all  foreign 
invasion."  On  the  following  day  the  treaty  was 
signed. 

Ten  days  elapsed  ere  the  treaty  was  sub 
mitted  to  the  Senate.  The  reason  of  this,  under 
the  circumstances,  very  surprising  delay  was 
the  wish  of  the  Secretary  to  lay  simultaneously 
before  the  Senate  a  copy  of  a  letter,  which  was 
formally  a  reply  to  a  dispatch  of  Lord  Aberdeen, 
and  addressed  to  Mr.  Pakenham,  the  English 
plenipotentiary,  but  which  in  fact  was  a  piece  of 
special  pleading  in  justification  of  annexation, 
directed  to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  A 
more  remarkable  and  more  revolting  document 
has  never  been  issued  from  the  State  Depart 
raent  of  the  country. 

In  the  dispatch  of  December  26,  1843,  which 
had  been  communicated  by  Mr.  Pakenham  to 
Secretary  Upshur  on  February  26,  1844,  Lord 
Aberdeen  had  said,  — 


282  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

"  We  desire  to  see  [slavery]  abolished  in  Texas. 
With  regard  to  the  latter  point,  it  must  be  and  is 
well  known,  both  to  the  United  States  and  to  the 
whole  world,  that  Great  Britain  desires,  and  is  con 
stantly  exerting  herself  to  procure,  the  general  aboli 
tion  of  slavery  throughout  the  world.  .  .  .  With  re 
gard  to  Texas,  we  avow  that  we  wish  to  see  slavery 
abolished  there,  as  elsewhere,  and  we  would  rejoice 
if  the  recognition  of  that  country  by  the  Mexican 
government  should  be  accompanied  by  an  engage 
ment  on  the  part  of  Texas  to  abolish  slavery  eventu 
ally,  and  under  proper  conditions,  throughout  the 
republic." 

Callioim  declared  in  his  letter  of  April  18, 
1844,  to  Mr.  Pakenham,  that  these  avowals 
of  Great  Britain  had  made  it,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  President,  "  the  imperious  duty  of  the 
federal  government "  to  conclude,  "  in  self-de 
fence,"  a  treaty  of  annexation  with  Texas  as 
the  most  effectual  measure  to  defeat  England's 
intention. 

"  The  United  States  have  heretofore  declined  to 
meet  her  [Texas']  wishes;  but  the  time  has  now  ar 
rived  when  they  can  no  longer  refuse,  consistently 
with  their  own  security  and  peace,  and  the  sacred  ob 
ligation  imposed  by  their  constitutional  compact  for 
mutual  defence  and  protection.  .  .  .  They  are  with 
out  responsibility  for  that  state  of  tilings  already 
adverted  to  as  the  immediate  cause  of  imposing  on 
them,  in  self-defence,  the  obligation  of  adopting  the 


TEXAS.  233 

measures  they  have.  They  remained  passive  so  long 
as  the  policy  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  which 
has  led  to  its  adoption,  had  no  immediate  bearing  on 
their  peace  and  safety." 

It  may  not  be  correct  to  apply,  without  modi 
fication,  the  code  of  private  ethics  to  politics  ; 
but,  however  flexible  political  morality  be,  a  lie 
is  a  lie,  and  Calhoun  knew  that  there  was  not 
one  particle  of  truth  in  these  assertions.  Al 
most  eight  years  before,  on  May  23,  1836,  as 
we  have  seen,  he  himself  had  declared  annexa 
tion  to  be  necessary,  and  the  first  and  fore 
most  reason  which  he  alleged  for  it  was  the 
interest  which  the  Southern  States  had  in  ifc, 
on  account  of  their  peculiar  institution.  Two 
years  later  his  colleague,  Mr.  Preston,  had 
moved  in  the  Senate,  and  Mr.  Thompson,  of 
South  Carolina,  had  also  moved  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  to  declare  annexation  ex 
pedient.  Several  state  Legislatures,  as  those  of 
Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  Tennessee,  had  agi 
tated  the ,  question  with  hot  zeal,  unreservedly 
avowing  that  they  did  so  "  upon  grounds  some 
what  local  in  their  complexion,  but  of  an  im 
port  infinitely  grave  and  interesting  to  the  peo 
ple  who  inhabit  the  southern  portion  of  this 
confederacy."  In  December,  1841,  it  was  a  pub 
lic  secret  in  the  political  circles  of  Washington 
that  Tyler  had  again  taken  up  the  annexation 


234  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

project.  It  had,  in  fact,  never  been  abandoned, 
but  only  temporarily  put  off  the  order  of  the 
day,  because,  for  various  reasons,  the  time  had 
not  been  deemed  opportune.  But  on  October 
16,  1843,  more  than  two  months  before  Lord 
Aberdeen's  dispatch  was  written,  and  more  than 
four  months  before  it  was  delivered,  Upshur 
had  made  the  formal  proposition  of  annexation. 
Whether  Calhoun  had  any  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  this  dispatch  before  he  had  con 
sented  to  become  the  successor  of  Upshur  we 
do  not  know ;  but  that  he  would  have  accepted 
Tyler's  invitation,  and  entered  upon  the  office 
with  exactly  the  same  programme,  if  Lord 
Aberdeen's  dispatch  had  never  been  written, 
nobody  has  ever  ventured  to  question.  It  is, 
therefore,  an  incontestable  fact  that  there  was 
not  a  particle  of  truth  in  those  allegations  of 
the  Secretary,  and  that  he  was  fully  conscious 
of  it. 

To  pervert  the  truth  in  such  a  manner  re 
quired  indeed  a  bold  front.  Even  if  the  whole 
world  had  not  been  familiar  with  the  fact  that 
ever  since  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  the  annex 
ation  of  Texas  had  been  but  a  question  of  time 
with  the  whole  South  and  the  Democratic  party, 
Calhoun's  assertion  would  have  been  simply  ri 
diculous.  Lord  Aberdeen's  dispatch  contained 
absolutely  nothing  to  startle  or  even  to  surprise 


TEXAS,  235 

the  United  States.  The  avowals  which,  accord 
ing  to  Calhoun,  the  President  regarded  with 
such  "  deep  concern,"  only  stated  a  fact  as  no 
torious  as  the  existence  of  slavery  itself.  That 
England's  hostility  to  slavery  and  her  desire  to 
see  it  everywhere  abolished  was  "  for  the  first 
time  "  avowed  "  to  this  government  "  was  evi 
dently  of  no  consequence  whatever,  for  it  did 
not  add  a  grain's  weight  to  the  importance  of 
the  fact.  Lord  Aberdeen  expressly  declared 
that  England's  policy  remained  unaltered,  and 
Calhoun  did  not  pretend  to  doubt  in  the  least 
the  truth  of  this  assurance.  The  mere  fact 
that  England  had  seen  fit  to  state,  in  an  official 
dispatch,  what  every  school-boy  already  knew 
to  be  the  case,  could  not  be  a  cause  of  alarm, 
and  the  reason  which  had  induced  her  to  do  it 
was  calculated  to  have  exactly  the  opposite  ef 
fect.  Lord  Aberdeen  had  not  indulged  in  any 
threats,  but  the  only  purpose  of  his  dispatch  was 
to  dispel  any  apprehensions  which  the  United 
States  could  possibly  entertain.  He  said  :  — 

"  We  should  rejoice  if  the  recognition  of  that  coun 
try  by  the  Mexican  government  should  be  accompa 
nied  by  an  engagement  on  the  part  of  Texas  to  abol 
ish  slavery  eventually,  and  under  proper  conditions 
throughout  the  republic.  But  although  we  earnestly 
desire  and  feel  it  to  be  our  duty  to  promote  such  a 
consummation,  we  shall  not  interfere  unduly,  or  with 


236  JOHN  a  CALHOUN. 

an  improper  assumption  of  authority,  with  either 
party,  in  order  to  assure  the  adoption  of  such  a  course. 
We  shall  counsel,  but  we  shall  not  seek  to  compel  or 
unduly  control,  either  party.  .  .  .  She  [Great  Brit 
ain]  has  no  thought  or  intention  of  seeking  to  act  di 
rectly  or  indirectly,  in  a  political  sense,  on  the  United 
States,  through  Texas.  .  .  .  The  governments  of  the 
slave-holding  States  may  be  assured  that,  although  we 
shall  not  desist  from  those  open  and  honest  efforts 
which  we  have  constantly  made  for  procuring  the 
abolition  of  slavery  throughout  the  world,  we  shall 
neither  openly  nor  secretly  resort  to  any  measures 
which  can  tend  to  disturb  their  internal  tranquillity, 
or  thereby  to  affect  the  prosperity  of  the  American 
Union." 

It  did  not  require  the  keen  intellect  of  a  Cal- 
houn  to  see  that  these  emphatic  disclaimers 
were  meant  to  be  the  essential  part  of  Lord 
Aberdeen's  dispatch,  and  not  the  sentences  on 
which  he  based  his  reply  to  Mr.  Pakenham. 
Yet  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that 
they  only  served  him  as  a  pretext,  because  he 
could  find  no  better  one,  and  that  his  uneasiness 
on  account  of  England's  policy  was  feigned. 
His  alarm  was  not  only  most  real,  but  it  was 
also  fully  justified.  In  the  course  of  the  nego 
tiations  with  Texas,  Upshur  had  repeatedly 
avowed  that  the  alleged  ambitious  designs  of 
Great  Britain,  and  especially  her  exertions  for 
the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  republic,  impera- 


TEXAS.  237 

lively  demanded  that  the  annexation  should  no 
longer  be  delayed.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
it  was  acknowledged  on  all  sides  that  slavery 
was  doomed  in  Texas,  independently  of  any 
thing  England  might  do.  Leading  Texans,  e.  g. 
Ex-President  Mirabeau  B.  Lamar,  had  fre 
quently  declared  that  the  anti-slavery  party 
would  soon  acquire  the  ascendency,  and  that  the 
abolition  of  slavery  could  be  effected  "  without 
the  slightest  inconvenience."  The  most  zealous 
advocates  of  annexation  in  Congress  had  em 
phatically  indorsed  this  opinion,  and  Upshur 
himself  had  written  to  Mr.  Murphy,  "  If  Texas 
should  not  be  attached  to  the  United  States,  she 
cannot  maintain  that  institution  [slavery]  ten 
years,  and  probably  not  half  that  time."  Cal- 
houn  held  the  same  opinion.  He  informed  Mr, 
Pakenham  that  the  President  had  "  the  settled 
conviction  that  it  would  be  difficult  for  Texas, 
in  her  actual  condition,  to  resist  what  she  [Great 
Britain]  desires,  without  supposing  the  influence 
and  exertions  of  Great  Britain  would  be  extended 
beyond  the  limits  assigned  by  Lord  Aberdeen  ;  " 
and  he  added,  "  and  this,  if  Texas  could  not  re 
sist  the  consummation  of  the  object  of  her  de 
sire,  would  endanger  both  the  safety  and  pros 
perity  of  the  Union." 

An  independent  Texas  without  slavery  and 
the  permanent   continuance  of   slavery  in  the 


238  JOHN   C.   CALHOUN. 

Union  were,  however,  irreconcilable.     Even  if 
this  had  been  a  mistake,  as  it  undoubtedly  was 
not,  the  opponents  of  the  slavocracy  had  no  rea 
son  to  contest  the  truth  of  this  confession,  for 
it  was  the  most  destructive   judgment  which 
could  be  passed  on  slavery.     The  slavocracy  de 
clared  through  its  most  gifted  representative,  in 
an  official  document,  that  between  it  and  lib 
erty  there  existed  a  conflict  of  principle  so  ir 
reconcilable,  that   by   the    simple    fact    of  the 
neighborhood  of  independent  States  in  which 
slavery  did  not  exist,  it  was  brought  face   to 
face  with  the  question  of  life  or  death.     Did  it 
not  follow  directly  from  this  that  its  political 
connection  with  free  States  was  possible  only 
on  the  supposition  of  the  complete  subservience 
of  the  latter  ?    Was  there  a  more  forcible  proof 
needed,  or  even  possible,  than  the  very  demand 
which  the  slavocracy  now  made,  in  consequence 
of  that  fact?     Because  the  slave-holding  States, 
thought   their  peculiar  institution    endangered 
by  the  existence  of  an  independent  free  State, 
it  was  declared  to  be  the  "  imperative  duty  " 
and  a  "  sacred  obligation  "  of  the  United  States, 
imposed  by  their  constitutional  compact,  to  ab 
sorb  that  State  into  the  Union,  in  order  to  pre 
vent  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  it.     It  was  not 
only  a  fact  that  Texas  was  to  be  annexed  to 
make  the  continued  existence  of  slavery  possi- 


TEXAS.  239 

ble  there,  but  the  fact  was  officially  declared 
before  the  whole  world  by  the  executive  of  the 
Union.  The  democratic  republic,  which  had 
based  its  existence  upon  the  rights  of  man,  was 
morally  and  constitutionally  bound  to  prevent 
the  breaking  of  the  chains  of  the  slave  in  a 
neighboring  republic,  though  it  could  be  done 
only  by  adding  these  very  chains  to  those  which 
already  bound  its  arms.  Calhoun's  letter  to 
Pakenham  was  the  official  proclamation  of  the 
"  nationalization  "  of  slavery,  only,  however,  so 
far  as  it  imposed  duties  upon  the  Union,  but  by 
no  means  with  regard  to  any  corresponding 
rights.  "  With  us,"  the  Secretary  declared,  the 
policy  to  be  adopted  in  reference  to  the  African 
race  "  is  a  question  to  be  decided  not  by  the 
federal  government,  but  by  each  member  of  this 
Union,  for  itself,  according  to  its  own  views  of 
its  domestic  policy,  and  without  any  right  on 
the  part  of  the  federal  government  to  interfere 
in  any  manner  whatever.  Its  rights  and  duties 
are  limited  to  protecting,  under  the  guarantees 
of  the  Constitution,  each  member  of  this  Union 
in  whatever  policy  it  may  adopt  in  reference  to 
the  portion  within  its  respective  limits."  The 
slave-holding  States  had  to  say  what  was  nec 
essary  to  protect  them  in  the  policy  they  had 
been  pleased  to  adopt,  and  the  federal  govern 
ment  had  to  act  accordingly.  The  President 


240  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

had  had  no  choice.  The  annexation  of  Texas 
was  "  the  most  effectual,  if  not  the  only  means 
of  guarding  against  the  threatened  danger," 
and  therefore  he  had  acted  simply  "in  obedi 
ence  "  to  the  constitutional  obligation  of  the 
Union.  In  other  words,  it  was  the  constitu 
tional  obligation  of  the  Union  to  engage  in  slav 
ery  propagandism  in  the  defence  of  the  interests 
of  the  slavocracy,  and,  confessedly,  even  at  the 
risk  of  a  war ;  for  the  Secretary  declared,  in  an 
official  dispatch  to  the  American  representative 
in  Mexico,  that  the  step  had  been  taken  "  in 
full  view  of  all  possible  consequences." 

If  the  United  States  had  indeed  assumed  such 
sacred  obligations  towards  the  slave-holders,  in 
establishing  the  Constitution,  there  could  be  no 
impropriety  in  it  that  Calhoun  concluded  his 
letter  with  a  short  but  enthusiastic  exposition 
of  his  theory  of  the  "  positive  good."  But  what 
were  those  to  think  of  it  who  did  not  acknowl 
edge  those  obligations  ?  Surely,  the  history 
of  the  United  States  had  entered  upon  a  new 
phase,  if  the  Secretary  of  State  could  dare,  in 
an  official  communication  and  in  the  name  of 
the  federal  Executive,  to  lecture  a  foreign  state 
upon  the  blessings  of  slavery.  And  by  his  own 
testimony  he  stands  convicted  of  having  en 
gaged  in  this  whole  correspondence  partly  for 
the  very  purpose  of  doing  that,  and  of  having 


TEXAS.  241 

been  grievously  disappointed  that  the  rejection 
of  the  treaty  prevented  him  from  enlarging 
upon  this  exalted  theme.  The  "  Charleston 
Mercury  "  of  November  28,  1860,  published  a 
previously  unknown  letter,  dated  July  2,  1844, 
in  which  Calhoun  says  :  — 

"  If  an  opportunity  should  offer,  I  had  hoped  to 
draw  out  a  full  correspondence  by  my  letters  to  Mr. 
Pakenham.  They  were,  in  part,  written  with  that 
view,  and  were  intended  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a 
long  and  full  correspondence  ;  and  I  doubt  not  what 
was  intended  would  have  been  accomplished,  had  the 
Senate  done  its  duty  [!]  and  ratified  the  treaty.  Their 
neglect  to  do  so,  I  fear,  will  not  only  lose  Texas  to 
the  Union,  but  also  defeat  my  aim  in  reference  to 
the  correspondence.  Had  the  treaty  been  ratified^ 
my  last  letter  to  Mr.  Pakenham,  which  he  trans 
mitted  to  his  government,  would  not  have  been  left 
without  a  reply,  which  would  have  brought  on  what 
I  intended.  As  it  is,  it  will  not  be  answered,  as  I 
infer  from  Mr.  Pakenham's  conversation  recently. 
His  government  is  content  to  leave  to  our  Senate 
the  defence  of  its  course,  and  is  too  wise,  when  it  can 
be  avoided,  to  carry  on  a  correspondence  in  which 
they  see  they  have  little  to  gain.  I  regret  it.  It 
will,  I  fear,  be  difficult  to  get  another  opportunity 
to  bring  out  our  cause  fully  and  favorably  before  the 
world.  I  shall  omit  none  which  may  afford  a  decent 
pretext  for  renewing  the  correspondence." 

Even  ultra-Democratic  papers  and  journals  in 

16 


242  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

the  North  criticised  the  Pakenham  letter  in  the 
severest  terms.  The  "  Democratic  Review," 
though  it  advocated  immediate  annexation,  and 
professed  "  exalted  admiration,  respect,  and 
even  attachment "  for  Calhoun,  complained 
with  bitterness  that  the  President  and  his 
Secretary  had  not  left  a  shred  of  the  Southern 
doctrine,  which  was  also  that  of  the  Northern 
Democrats,  that  slavery  was  a  local  institution, 
"  with  which  the  free  States  had  nothing  to  do, 
for  which  they  were  in  no  wise  responsible." 
It  reproved  with  indignation  the  "  volunteer 
discussion  of  the  essential  merits  of  this  pecul 
iar  local  institution  through  the  peculiar  organ 
of  our  collective  nationality,  for  which,  if  for 
anything,  the  Union,  and  the  whole  Union,  is 
emphatically  responsible."  Without  reserve,  it 
avowed  that  Calhoun  had  "nationalized"  and 
"  federalized  "  slavery,  "  actually  pledging  the 
military  intervention  of  the  country,  by  a  simple 
unconstitutional  executive  promise,  to  plunge 
directly  into  war  with  Mexico  if  she  should 
execute  her  threat  of  immediate  invasion  of 
Texas ;  "  and  all  this  "  on  the  avowed  ground,  the 
almost  exclusively  avowed  ground,  of  strength 
ening  and  preserving  the  institution  of  slav- 
ery." 

Such  language  from  a  leading  organ  of  their 
own  party  might  well  have  induced  the  Presi- 


TEXAS.  243 

dent  and  his  Secretary  to  pause  and  ponder. 
Even  if  they  succeeded,  they  were  evidently 
playing  a  dangei'ous  game.  The  deep-seated  dis 
satisfaction  in  their  own  camp  indicated  that  it 
would  probably  not  be  ended  by  their  winning 
the  stakes,  and  the  sequel  might  be  very  far 
from  corresponding  with  the  beginning.  But 
Calhoun,  who  so  justly  boasted  of  being  wont  to 
look  to  the  farthest  consequences  of  every  ques 
tion,  had  now  neither  ears  nor  eyes  for  anything 
except  his  immediate  object.  It  is  asserted  that 
he  obtained  from  Archer,  of  Virginia,  the  chair 
man  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
the  solemn  promise  that  he  would  delay  the 
Senate  forty  days  with  regard  to  the  annexation 
treaty.  The  alleged  reason  for  this  wish  was 
that  Mexico's  answer  to  the  notification  of  the 
treaty  was  expected  by  the  last  day  of  that 
term.  That  was  unquestionably  an  empty  pre 
tence,  for  in  various  ways  this  time  might  have 
easily  been  shortened  a  little  ;  and,  besides,  it 
had  been  declared  from  the  first  that  Mexico 
would  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  in  any  way 
whatever  in  this  question.  The  term  was  evi 
dently  fixed  with  relation  to  the  national  con 
vention  of  the  Democratic  party,  which  was  to 
meet  two  days  earlier  at  Baltimore.  Calhoun 
wanted  to  make  sure  of  the  party  with  regard 
to  the  main  question,  ere  he  allowed  the  Senate 


244  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

to  come  to  a  decision  on  the  treaty.  The  "  Spec 
tator,"  the  reputed  organ  of  Calhoun  in  Wash 
ington,  had  formally  declared  that  Van  Buren 
was  to  be  considered  "as  beside  the  presiden 
tial  canvass,"  because  he  had  refused  to  pledge 
himself  for  immediate  annexation.  Therewith 
the  programme  was  announced  which  the  an- 
nexationists  were  resolved  to  impose  upon  the 
convention  at  all  hazards.  After  a  long  and 
arduous  struggle  over  the  preliminary  questions, 
they  triumphed  completely.  The  majority  vote 
which  Van  Buren  received  at  the  first  ballot 
was  a  bootless  compliment.  His  partisans  knew 
that  they  had  lost  the  game  before  the  voting 
commenced.  On  the  eighth  ballot  the  name 
of  Governor  Polk,  of  Tennessee,  appeared  for 
the  first  time,  and  on  the  next  ballot  be  was 
nominated.  Polk  was  what,  in  the  political 
slang  of  to-day,  is  called  "  a  dark  horse  ;  "  but 
as  to  the  test  question,  he  could  have  been  im 
plicitly  trusted,  even  if  the  platform  had  not 
pledged  the  party  to  "  the  re-annexation  of 
Texas  at  the  earliest  practicable  period." 

The  impatience,  which  Calhoun  had  betrayed 
in  the  first  stages  of  his  annexation  campaign 
proved  that  he  would  have  manoeuvred  with 
more  quickness  and  boldness  if  he  had  not  had 
good  reason  to  apprehend  that  the  Senate  would 
take  serious  objection  to  his  policy.  It  was  well 


TEXAS.  245 

kwown  that  the  treaty  would  not  be  supported 
by  all  those  who  were  in  favor  of  speedy  annex 
ation.  The  Pakenham  correspondence  was  a 
two-edged  sword.  Calhoun  had  cut  himself  as 
badly  as  he  had  cut  his  opponents.  He  had 
succeeded  in  consolidating  the  South  to  the  ex 
tent  that  he  had  expected ;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  he  had  aroused  the  feeling  of  the  North 
to  such  a  degree  that  even  the  best  disposed 
senators  were  afraid  that  they  would  commit 
political  suicide  by  voting  for  this  treaty,  after 
it  had  been  officially  based  on  such  grounds. 
Besides,  they  did  not  see  why  such  immoderate 
haste  should  be  necessary.  Tyler's  and  Cal- 
houn's  interests  might  be  well  enough  served 
by  it,  but  that  was  only  another  reason  for  them 
to  curb  the  over-zealous  administration.  While 
there  were  but  few,  if  any,  senators  who,  under 
any  circumstances,  would  have  been  anxious  to 
smooth  the  way  of  either  the  President  or  the 
Secretary  in  the  pursuit  of  any  personal  ends, 
the  majority  deemed  it  a  duty  to  administer  to 
them  a  severe  rebuke  for  their  gross  infringe 
ments  upon  the  rights  of  Congress  and  the  lack 
of  consideration  for  the  Senate,  which  had  char 
acterized  the  whole  transaction.  Even  zealous 
annexationists  indulged  in  searching  and  caus 
tic  criticisms  of  the  treaty  and  all  the  attendant 
circumstances,  and  on  June  8  it  was  rejected 
by  a  vote  of  thirty-five  against  sixteen. 


246  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

The  dismay  of  Tyler  and  Calhoun  was  great, 
but  they  were  not  in  the  least  daunted.  They 
were  bent  upon  attaining  their  end.  If  it  was 
not  to  be  secured  in  tliis  way,  nothing  was  to 
deter  them  from  trying  any  other  which  prom 
ised  success,  though  they  might  have  to  ride 
rough-shod  over  the  Constitution  and  all  the 
constitutional  doctrines  which  they  had  hereto 
fore  professed.  On  the  second  day  after  the 
rejection  of  the  treaty,  the  President  sent  a  mes 
sage  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  accompa 
nied  by  all  the  documents  relating  to  the  ques 
tion.  The  essence  of  the  message  was  contained 
in  the  declaration  that  Congress  was  "  fully 
competent,  in  some  other  form  of  proceeding, 
to  accomplish  everything  that  a  formal  ratifica 
tion  of  the  treaty  could  have  accomplished." 
That  was  in  fact  an  appeal  from  the  Senate, 
which  had  the  unquestionable  right  to  reject 
a  treaty,  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  to 
which  no  power  has  been  given  by  the  Consti 
tution  in  relation  to  treaties.  What  was  the 
sense  of  rendering  the  consent  of  two  thirds  of 
the  Senate  indispensable  for  the  conclusion  of 
every  treaty,  if,  after  a  treaty  had  been  rejected 
by  the  Senate,  a  simple  majority  of  both  Houses 
of  Congress  had  the  right  virtually  to  ratify  it, 
by  accomplishing  in  some  other  form  what  the 
treaty  was  to  have  accomplished  ?  Like  a 


TEXAS.  247 

French  cavalier  of  the  old  regime,  Tyler  waived 
away  this  question  with  the  bold  reply,  "  The 
great  question  is,  not  as  to  the  manner  in  which 
it  shall  be  done,  but  whether  it  shall  be  accom 
plished  or  not."  That  such  an  answer  would 
not  have  been  given,  unless  it  was  fully  ap 
proved  by  Calhoun,  will  not  be  doubted.  But 
when  had  the  most  reckless  Federalists  ever 
dared  to  profess  such  an  unblushing  latitudina- 
rianism,  or  to  nationalize  the  Union  to  such  an 
extent  by  pushing  the  Constitution  aside,  and 
giving  the  federal  government  carte-Blanche  in 
a  question  more  important  than  any  other  ever 
submitted  to  it  ?  Verily,  the  country  had  fallen 
upon  strange  times,  if  such  a  doctrine  could  be 
officially  proclaimed  by  the  President,  under  the 
sanction  of  the  man  who  had  come  very  near 
plunging  the  Union  into  a  civil  war,  by  pushing 
his  states-rights  theory  to  such  extremities  that 
he  found,  in  the  right  of  nullification,  the  main 
stay  of  the  Union  and  its  great  conservative 
principle. 

The  President  had  made  no  definite  proposi 
tion  to  Congress,  but  the  language  of  the  mes 
sage  of  June  10  was  too  plain  to  admit  any 
doubt  that  the  administration  would  not  let 
matters  quietly  take  their  own  course  after  the 
close  of  the  session.  The  check  which  it  had 
received  had  made  it  only  more  determined  and 


248  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

bolder.  Upon  a  notification  from  the  Texan 
Secretary  of  State  that  Mexico  intended  a  new 
invasion,  Calhoun  stated  that  his  letter  of  April 
11  had  promised  armed  intervention  only  in 
case  this  emergency  should  occur  while  the 
treaty  of  annexation  was  pending.  We  have 
seen  how  loath  he  had  been  to  give  this  promise, 
which  his  immediate  predecessor,  Nelson,  had 
declared  unconstitutional,  and  yet  he  now,  Sep 
tember  10,  after  the  treaty  had  been  rejected, 
volunteered  to  extend  the  obligation  to  the  whole 
time  during  which  "  the  question  of  annexa 
tion  "  should  remain  "pending."  In  a  formal 
and  constitutional  sense,  however,  annexation 
was  not  now  at  all  a  pending  question.  That 
the  President  had  expressed  the  wish  to  see  it 
ultimately  accomplished,  no  matter  in  what 
way,  and  that  some  members  of  Congress  had 
suggested  this  and  that,  did  not  and  could  not 
make  it  a  question  in  this  sense.  The  treaty 
had  been  rejected,  the  executive  had  not  en 
tered  upon  new  negotiations  with  Texas  for  an 
other  treaty,  and  Congress  was  not  even  in  ses 
sion.  The  annexation  of  Texas  was,  therefore, 
no  more  a  "  pending  question  "  than  the  tariff, 
the  bank,  or  any  other  political  problem  in 
which  the  people  took  a  lively  interest.  There 
was  absolutely  nothing  to  be  found  in  the  act 
ual  condition  of  things  from  which  even  the 


TEXAS.  249 

most  subtle  dialectics  could  deduce  any  interna 
tional  rights  or  obligations.  Besides,  the  Sen 
ate  had  given  it  to  be  understood,  in  no  very- 
ambiguous  manner,  that,  at  least  in  what  con 
cerned  the  President's  independent  initiative, 
it  did  not  approve  of  the  promises  made  in  the 
letter  of  April  11.  Calhoun,  therefore,  forbore 
to  announce,  in  express  words,  an  armed  inter 
vention  ;  but  the  declaration  that  the  United 
States  would  feel  themselves  "  highly  offended  " 
by  a  renewal  of  the  war,  and  that  they  would 
not  "  permit  it,"  virtually  amounted  to  the  same 
thing.  When  the  news  came  that  Mexican 
agents  were  agitating  the  Indians  at  the  fron 
tier,  —  news  which  never  failed  to  reach  Wash 
ington,  whenever  it  was  opportune  that  it 
should  come,  — Calhoun  followed  up  his  protest 
of  September  10  by  authorizing  (September  17) 
the  Union  troops  to  enter  Texas  as  soon  as  the 
Texans  should  desire  it. 

In  their  hot  pursuit  of  the  long-coveted  prize, 
which  had  so  unexpectedly  slipped  through  their 
fingers,  Tyler  and  Calhoun  were,  in  fact,  as 
ready  "  to  assume  the  full  responsibility  "  for 
any  step  which  promised  to  bring  them  nearer 
the  goal  as  Andrew  Jackson  had  ever  been 
when  the  constitutionality  or  legality  of  his  acts 
was  called  into  question.  Perhaps  they  would 
have  proceeded  with  a  little  more  caution,  if  the 


250  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

Southern  annexationists  had  not  set  them  the 
example  of  an  unblushing  recklessness,  which 
was  without  a  parallel  in  the  whole  history  of 
the  Union.  The  threats  of  disunion,  if  the 
North  dared  to  resist  this  extension  of  the  do 
main  of  slavery,  were  too  common  to  make  the 
desired  impression.  Much  more  effect  had  the 
announcement  that  the  North  would  have  to 
choose  between  Texas  and  the  abolition  of  the 
tariff  of  1842.  There  were  many  respectable 
men  in  the  North  who  honestly  believed  slav 
ery  to  be  a  sin  and  a  curse,  but  who  loved  their 
pockets  more  than  they  hated  slavery.  With 
others,  again,  their  party  attachment  was 
stronger  than  their  hatred  and  fear  of  slavery. 
They  benumbed  their  consciences  with  the  illu 
sion  that  they  could  cleanse  their  skirts  of  all 
responsibility  by  protesting  against  the  annex 
ation  and  recommending  the  election  of  anti-an- 
nexationists  to  Congress,  while  they  voted  for 
Polk.  As  to  the  office-seekers,  a  slight  raising 
of  the  party  whip  was,  of  course,  sufficient  to 
make  them  all  zealous  annexationists,  no  matter 
what  their  convictions  had  been  before  the  Bal 
timore  Convention ;  their  convictions  had  to  be 
stored  away  for  the  time  being,  for  it  would 
\iave  been  foolhardiness  to  carry  such  heavy  bag 
gage  in  so  hot  a  race,  with  so  many  competitors. 
So  the  annexationists  could  count  upon  the 


TEXAS.  251 

whole  Democratic  party  of  the  North,  though  a 
considerable  part  of  it  either  entirely  disap 
proved  of  annexation,  or,  at  least,  thought  im 
mediate  annexation  inexpedient.  Yet,  in  spite 
of  that  and  of  their  complete  control  over  the 
federal  patronage,  the  annexationists  would  have 
lost  the  election,  if  the  Liberty  Party,  instead 
of  putting  up  a  candidate  of  their  own,  had  sup 
ported  the  Whigs,  in  order  to  bar  the  way  to 
the  former.  The  votes  of  that  party  caused 
the  Whigs  to  lose  the  States  of  New  York  and 
Michigan,  and  with  them  the  election.  Polk 
was  elected,  but  the  history  of  the  election 
proved  beyond  contradiction,  that  the  majority 
of  the  people  were  opposed  to  immediate  an 
nexation.  Tyler's  annual  message  of  Decem 
ber  3,  however,  not  only  asserted  the  contrary, 
but  declared  that  both  Houses  of  Congress  had 
been  instructed,  —  by  "a  controlling  majority 
of  the  people,  and  a  large  majority  of  the 
States,"  —  "  in  terms  the  most  emphatic,"  to 
accomplish  annexation  immediately,  and  he 
therefore  recommended  it  to  be  done  in  the 
most  simple  way,  namely,  by  joint  resolution. 

How  often  had  the  holy  anger  of  Calhoun's 
constitutional  and  political  conscience  been 
aroused  by  Jackson's  daring  to  put  such  inter 
pretations  upon  elections !  Yet  everything  with 
which  Jackson  could  be  justly  reproached  in 


252  JOHN  C.   CALTiOUN. 

this  respect  was  mere  child's  play,  in  compari 
son  with  the  monstrosity  of  the  political  heresy 
of  this  assertion  and  with  its  brazen  disregard 

O 

of  truth ;  and  that  Tyler  neither  would  nor 
could  have  ventured  to  make  it  without  Cal- 
houn's  consent  nobody  will  contest.  It  was 
simply  not  true  that  the  election  had  pre 
sented  to  the  people  for  its  decision  "the  iso 
lated  question  of  annexation."  If  it  had  been 
true,  the  result  could,  perhaps,  by  means  of 
Benton's  "  demos  krateo  "  principle,  have  been 
tortured  into  an  instruction  "  to  both  branches 
of  Congress,  by  their  respective  constituents ; " 
but  neither  the  most  searching  chemical  anal 
ysis  nor  the  most  powerful  microscope  could 
discover  the  slightest  vestige  of  this  "  demos 
krateo  principle "  in  the  Constitution.  Besides, 
the  theory  of  the  message  refuted  itself  in  such 
a  way  that  not  another  word  is  needed  to  show 
it  up  as  a  political  counterfeit  of  the  most 
bungling  kind.  If  the  electoral  votes  of  the  sev 
eral  States  were  binding  instructions  to  the  re 
spective  senators,  the  eleven  States  which  had 
voted  for  Clay  had  instructed  their  senators, 
"  in  terms  the  most  emphatic,"  against  annexa 
tion.  The  Union,  however,  consisted  at  the 
time  of  but  twenty-six  States,  and  the  least  im 
portant  of  treaties  required  the  assent  of  two 
thirds  of  the  senators.  Thus  the  "  instruc 


TEXAS.  253 

tions  "  which  the  senators  had  received  from 
the  "  States  "  made  it  impossible  to  accomplish 
annexation  in  the  way  which  Tyler  himself  had 
acknowledged  to  be  at  least  "  the  most  suitable." 
Yet  the  "instructions"  from  a  simple  majority 
of  States  would,  by  the  theory  advanced,  have 
made  it  the  imperative  duty  of  the  Senate  to 
conclude,  without  any  further  previous  consid 
eration,  a  compact  with  a  foreign  power,  than 
which  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  one  more  im 
portant.  If  the  "  people,"  by  means  of  a  pres 
idential  election,  could  oblige  Congress  to  in 
corporate  a  foreign  state,  and  if  Congress  could 
effect  such  incorporation  by  a  simple  majority 
resolution,  the  "  consolidation  "  of  the  Union 
was  complete,  and  its  confederate  character  was 
completely  and  forever  lost.  The  theory  of  the 
message  was,  in  fact,  the  subversion  of  all  the 
underlying  principles  of  Calhoun's  political  doc 
trines,  upon  which  he  had  based  his  defence  of 
the  "  peculiar  institution."  In  spite  of  that, 
however,  he  consented  to  this  theory  without 
any  compunction,  because  the  slavocracy  would 
have  to  die,  and  to  die  beyond  resurrection,  if  it 
could  not  get  more  land  and  create  more  slave- 
holding  States. 

Congress  did  not  accede  to  the  proposition  of 
the  President  without  a  little  more  ado.  The 
House  of  Representatives,  indeed,  was  satisfied 


254  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

with  having  the  line  of  the  Missouri  Compro 
mise  continued  through  Texas  ;  but,  in  the  Sen 
ate,  a  back  door  had  to  be  provided  for  the  con 
sciences  of  those  annexationists  who  held  that 
the  only  constitutional  way  of  effecting  the  an 
nexation  was  by  treaty.  The  resolution  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  was  amended,  by  au 
thorizing  the  President  to  negotiate  another 
treaty  of  annexation,  if  he  should  deem  it  more 
advisable  to  do  so  than  to  submit  the  joint  reso 
lution  to  Texas.  Benton  and  the  other  sena 
tors,  who  had  sustained  the  above-mentioned 
constitutional  view,  never  deigned  to  inform  the 
people  whence  they  derived  the  right  to  give 
the  President  the  choice  to  bring  about  the  an 
nexation  either  in  the  constitutional  or  in  an  un 
constitutional  way,  as  he  should  think  best. 
The  crutch  with  which  they  limped  over  this 
obstacle  was  McDuffie's  declaration  that  Cal- 
houn  would  not  have  the  "  audacity  "  to  choose 
the  unconstitutional  way,  and  submit  the  joint 
resolution  to  Texas.  Did  they  really  so  little 
know  the  man  who  had  dared  to  become  "  an 
honest  milliner"?  On  March  1, 1845, the  joint 
resolution  was  approved  by  the  President.  On 
Calhoun's  advice  "  to  act  without  delay,"  the 
cabinet  were  summoned  the  next  day,  and  con 
curred  in  the  opinion  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
who  wrote  his  dispatch,  inviting  Texas  to  ac- 


TEXAS.  255 

cept  the  terms  of  the  joint  resolution,  the  same 
night,  and  sent  it  off  "  late  in  the  evening  of 
March  3,"  a  few  hours  before  the  expiration  of 
Tyler's  term  of  office.  His  reasons  for  acting 
thus  he  has  repeatedly  stated  with  a  candor 
which  proves  that  he  would  have  been  equal  to 
a  much  greater  "  audacity,"  if  it  had  been  nec 
essary  to  secure  his  object.  In  the  dispatch  to 
Mr.  Donelson  he  wrote,  "  But  the  decisive  ob 
jection  to  the  amendment  of  the  Senate  is  that 
it  would  endanger  the  ultimate  success  of  the 
measure.  ...  A  treaty  .  .  .  must  be  submitted 
to  the  Senate  for  its  approval,  and  run  the  haz 
ard  of  receiving  the  votes  of  two  thirds  of  the 
members  present ;  which  could  hardly  be  ex 
pected,  if  we  are  to  judge  from  recent  experi 
ence."  And  on  February  24, 1847,  he  declared 
in  the  Senate,  "  I  selected  the  resolution  of  the 
House  in  preference  to  the  amendment  of  which 
the  senator  from  Missouri  was  the  author,  .  .  . 
because  I  clearly  saw,  not  only  that  it  was 
every  way  preferable,  but  the  only  certain  mode 
by  which  annexation  could  be  effected.  .  .  . 
That  the  course  I  adopted  did  secure  the  annex 
ation,  and  that  it  was  indispensable  for  that  pur 
pose,  I  have  high  authority  in  my  possession." 

Thus  it  was  that  he  triumphed  over  all  ob 
stacles,  and  succeeded  in  virtually  accomplish 
ing  the  purpose  for  which  he  had  consented  to 


2o6  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

become  a  member  of  Tyler's  cabinet.  What 
right  had  he  to  complain  that  the  work  was 
continued  by  his  successors  in  the  spirit  in 
which  it  had  been  begun  by  him  ?  Why  should 
Folk's  diplomatic  conscience  be  more  conform 
able  to  the  code  of  private  morals  than  his 
own  ?  In  order  to  get  Texas,  he,  the  sternest 
and  most  jealous  partisan  of  strict  construction, 
hud  loosened  the  bridle  of  the  Constitution  more 
than  any  of  his  predecessors  had  ever  dared  to 
do.  What  right  had  he  to  cry  out  and  wash 
his  hands  of  all  responsibility,  when  his  disci 
ples  refused  to  listen  to  his  warning  voice,  and 
rushed  on  in  mad  zeal  along  the  truck  upon 
which  he  had  started  them?  He  had  hit  the 
mark,  but  the  ball  pierced  the  target  and  con 
tinued  its  fatal  flight. 

Calhoun's  friends  expected  that  he  would  be 
called  upon  to  finish  the  great  work  which  he 
had  directed  with  so  much  skill  and  energy, 
and  it  is  asserted  that  he  shared  their  opin 
ion.  We  cannot  prove  the  contrary,  but  are  in 
clined  to  think  that  he  judged  Polk  more  cor 
rectly.  If  he  really  expected  to  remain  at  the 
head  of  the  cabinet,  the  wish  was  father  to 
the  thought.  Polk  certainly  never  intended  to 
tender  him  the  office.  Now,  after  the  annexa 
tion  of  Texas  was  as  good  as  accomplished,  the 
whole  party  would  probably  have  been  rather 


TEXAS.  257 

dissatisfied  to  see  the  first  place  awarded  to 
the  leader  of  the  small  faction  on  its  extreme 
left  wing,  which  was  so  easily  tempted,  to  break 
through  the  bonds  of  party  discipline  and  as 
sume  an  independent  position.  Especially  Jack 
son  would  have  been  deeply  mortified,  and  Polk, 
who  would  never  have  reached  the  top  of  the 
ladder  if  he  had  not  clung  so  faithfully  to  the 
heels  of  the  general,  was  not  inclined  to  ar 
ray  Jackson's  still  enormous  influence  against 
the  administration.  Besides,  it  was  asserted 
that  the  offended  politicians  of  New  York  had 
exacted  the  promise  that,  in  consideration  of 
their  supporting  the  nominees  of  the  Baltimore 
Convention,  Calhoun  should  be  discarded.  But, 
above  all,  Polk  was  personally  not  at  all  desir 
ous  to  put  a  political  star  of  this  magnitude  and 
brilliancy  in  too  close  proximity  with  the  rush 
light  of  his  own  talents  and  achievements.  Cal- 
houn's  character  and  whole  political  course  ab 
solutely  forbade  his  honest  subordination  under 
another  man's  mind  and  will,  and  Polk  was  too 
ambitious  and  self-conscious  to  be  a  mere  figure 
head  where  it  was  his  right  and  even  his  duty 
to  be  the  real  chief.  On  the  other  hand,  he 
was  well  aware  that  openly  to  slight  the  Cal- 
hounites  in  the  person  of  their  leader  would  be 
the  extreme  of  folly.  He  therefore  offered  him 
the  first  diplomatic  office,  the  legation  at  the 

17 


258  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

Court  of  St.  James,  undoubtedly  fully  satisfied 
that  the  honor  would  be  politely  declined. 

Many  years  before,  at  the  end  of  1819,  when 
Mr.  Gallatin  had  expressed  the  wish  to  be  re 
called  from  Paris,  Adams  had  asked  Calhoun 
whether  he  would  accept  the  post.  Calhoun  had 
then  answered  "that  he  was  well  aware  that  a 
long  and  familiar  practical  acquaintance  with 
Europe  was  indispensable  to  complete  the  edu 
cation  of  an  American  statesman,  and  regretted 
that  his  fortune  would  not  bear  the  cost  of  it." 
Calhoun  devoted  much  time  to  the  manage 
ment  of  his  estate,  and  he  had  the  reputation 
of  being  an  uncommonly  experienced  and  effi 
cient  planter;  but  his  pecuniary  circumstances 
remained  modest,  though  he  lived  with  his  nu 
merous  family  in  unostentatious  but  solid  com 
fort,  and  could  indulge  in  the  true  luxury  of 
always  bidding  a  hearty  welcome  to  the  throngs 
of  friends  who  came  to  enjoy  the  hospitality  of 
his  table  and  the  pleasure  of  his  genial  com 
pany.  It  is,  therefore,  very  possible  that  he 
would  have  declined,  under  all  circumstances, 
Folk's  offer,  for  the  same  reason  which  had  dic 
tated  his  answer  to  the  overtures  of  Adams.  But 
it  is  unquestionable  that  he  would  have  taken 
the  same  course  for  political  reasons,  if  he  had 
been  the  wealthiest  man  on  the  continent.  Polk 
knew  perfectly  well  that  he  paid  Calhoun  an 


TEXAS.  259 

empty  compliment,  for  it  was  certain  that  his 
going  to  London  in  such  critical  times  would 
be  considered  by  himself  and  by  his  political 
friends  a  kind  of  desertion.  It  was  too  late  in 
the  day  to  go  to  Europe  in  order  to  finish  his 
education  as  a  statesman.  If  he  now  accepted 
a  diplomatic  post,  it  could  only  be  for  one  of 
two  reasons :  either  because  he  wanted  to  grat 
ify  his  ambition  and  vanity,  or  because  he 
thought  that  he  could  render  his  country  im 
portant  services.  This  kind  of  ambition,  how 
ever,  though  its  fire  had  not  entirely  ceased 
to  burn  in  his  bosom,  was  no  longer  strong 
enough  to  determine  his  resolution  in  a  question 
of  such  moment ;  and  though  it  might  soon  be 
come  of  great  consequence  who  was  the  repre 
sentative  of  the  United  States  in  London,  yet 
he  could  evidently  do  much  more  to  avert  any 
dangers  which  might  possibly  arise  if  he  should 
stay  in  his  old  place  in  the  Senate,  where 
he  was  not  obliged  to  follow  the  instructions 
of  other  people,  but  was  entirely  free  to  be 
guided  by  his  own  opinion.  His  character  and 
the  peculiar  part  which  he  had  played  these  last 
fifteen  years  in  the  history  of  the  Union  abso 
lutely  forbade  his  being  an  instrument  in  other 
n:en's  hands  ;  either  he  had  to  direct  the  policy 
of  the  Union,  so  far  as  that  could  be  done  by 
the  Executive,  or  he  had  to  remain  the  inde- 


260  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

pendent  senator,  the  foremost  champion  of  the 
slavocracy  and  the  leader  of  the  ultra  states- 
rights  faction.  The  former  he  could  not  do, 
and  weighty  reasons  demanded  that  he  should 
once  more  return  to  the  post  which  he  had  oc 
cupied  so  long  with  so  much  distinction.  Un 
hesitatingly  he  had  thrown  his  influence  into 
the  scales  for  Polk,  because  he  had  only  to 
choose  between  him  and  Clay  ;  but  the  late  Gov 
ernor  of  Tennessee  and  Speaker  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  would  not  have  been  his  own 
first  choice,  and  he  was  far  from  being  satisfied 
that  either  the  foreign  or  domestic  policy  of  the 
new  President  would  entirely  accord  with  his 
own  views.  The  wild  denunciations  in  which 
the  radicals  of  South  Carolina  had  indulged 
during  the  campaign  had  been  disapproved  by 
him,  but  he  thought  it  wise  not  only  to  wait, 
but  also  to  watch.  He  therefore  readily  re 
turned  to  his  seat  in  the  Senate,  which  was 
vacated  by  his  successor  as  a  matter  of  course. 
His  position  in  his  State  was  such  that  he  might 
consider  the  seat  as  belonging  to  him  of  right, 
so  long  as  he  was  willing  to  remain  in  public 
life. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

OKEGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

WHEN  Calhoun  was  invited  to  become  the 
head  of  Tyler's  cabinet,  the  "Richmond  En 
quirer"  said,  "We  cannot  entertain  a  mo 
ment's  doubt  that  he  has  been  selected  with  a 
special  regard  to  the  question  of  Oregon  and  the 
annexation  of  Texas."  The  order  of  the  two 
matters  ought  to  have  been  reversed,  but  it 
was  correct  that,  next  to  Texas,  Oregon  was  the 
most  important  subject  in  the  order  of  the  day, 
and  that  it  required  a  master's  hand  to  bring 
the  negotiations  with  England  to  a  mutually 
satisfactory  termination.  Yet  it  is  very  un 
likely  that  Calhoun  himself  harbored  the  delu 
sion  that  he  would  add  a  new  laurel  leaf  to  his 
wreath  by  accomplishing  that  task.  Everything 
that  could  be  said  in  support  of  the  claims  of 
the  United  States  he  counted  up  with  his  cus 
tomary  ability,  but  he  had  no  new  fact  and  no 
new  argument  to  add  to  what  had  been  repeated 
already  a  dozen  times.  He,  therefore,  made  no 
more  impression  upon  Pakenham  than  Paken- 
ham  made  upon  him  by  reiterating  for  the 


262  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

tenth  time  what  England  had  to  say  in  sup 
port  of  her  claims.  In  this  way  it  was  evidently 
impossible  to  advance  a  single  inch  on  either 
side.  The  two  powers  could  go  on  telling  their 
respective  stories  to  the  end  of  days,  and  the 
only  result  of  it  would  be  the  heaping  of  proof 
upon  proof  that  nothing  could  be  thus  at 
tained.  The  journals  of  the  discoverers  and 
the  legal  arguments  were  certainly  of  some 
weight,  and  an  impartial  examination  of  them 
undoubtedly  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  of  the 
two  incomplete  and  contestable  titles  that  of 
the  United  States  was  the  better.  But  no  log 
books  and  no  principles  of  public  and  interna 
tional  law,  as  laid  down  by  Hugo  Grotius,  could 
avail  anything  against  the  simple  fact  that  by 
a  solemn  and  repeatedly  renewed  agreement, 
the  Territory  was  held  in  joint  occupancy  by 
the  two  powers,  and  that  the  possession  of  it 
was  deemed  by  both  an  interest  of  such  mo 
ment  that  neither  would  ever  voluntarily  yield 
the  whole  ground  to  the  other.  As  neither 
•wished  to  continue  the  status  quo,  and  still  less 
to  cut  the  knot  with  the  sword,  a  compromise 
was  the  only  way  to  settle  the  controversy. 
Great  Britain  therefore  proposed  to  submit  it 
to  an  arbitrator ;  but  on  January  21, 1845,  Cal- 
houn,  in  the  name  of  the  President,  declined 
this  offer,  upon  the  ground  that  "  it  would  be 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.          263 

unadvisable  to  entertain  a  proposal  to  resort  to 
any  other  mode,  so  long  as  there  is  hope  of  ar 
riving  at  a  satisfactory  settlement  by  negotia 
tion." 

There  the  matter  was  allowed  to  rest  for  the 
time.  Tyler  and  Calhoun  left  it  to  their  suc 
cessors  exactly  as  they  had  found  it.  Yet  it  is 
to  be  supposed  that  Calhoun  was  tolerably  well 
satisfied,  and  thought  that  he  had  done  the  best 
thing  possible,  under  the  circumstances,  for  the 
interest  of  the  United  States.  In  the  beginning 
of  1843  a  bill  for  the  occupation  and  settle 
ment  of  the  Oregon  Territory  had  been  before 
Congress.  Calhoun  opposed  its  passage,  be 
cause  he  thought  that  the  United  States  had  no 
right,  under  the  convention  of  1818-27,  to  offer 
land  bounties  to  settlers.  With  many  others, 
he  apprehended  that  this  might  lead  to  a  breach 
with  England,  and  he  deprecated  it  as  the  great 
est  folly  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  do 
anything  tending  to  provoke  a  decision  by  ar 
bitrament  of  arms.  In  six  weeks  England  could 
bring  a  strong  naval  and  military  force  from 
China  to  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  River, 
while  the  American  fleet,  which  would  have  to 
double  Cape  Horn,  would  need  about  six  months 
to  reach  that  point;  and  the  overland  march 
from  Missouri  would  require  at  least  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty  days,  if  indeed  it  were  possible 


264  JOHN  C.   CALIIOUN. 

to  sustain  any  considerable  force  in  a  region  so 
destitute  of  supplies.  The  United  States  would, 
therefore,  surely  be  worsted  in  a  conflict  of 
arms  for  the  dominion  over  that  distant  coun 
try.  On  the  other  hand,  the  almost  miraculous 
growth  of  the  population  of  the  United  States 
and  the  impetus  with  which  it  was  "  rolling  to 
wards  the  shores  of  the  Pacific"  rendered  it 
an  absolute  certainty  that,  in  a  comparatively 
short  time,  the  United  States  would  be  as  much 
stronger  in  Oregon  than  England  as  England 
was  now  stronger  than  they.  Therefore  Cal- 
houn's  advice  was,  "  Let  us  be  wise  and  abide 
our  time;  it  will  accomplish  all  that  we  desire 
with  more  certainty  and  with  infinitely  less  sac 
rifice  than  we  can  without  it."  "All  we  want, 
to  effect  our  object  in  this  case,  is  '  a  wise  and 
masterly  inactivity.' " 

Calhoun  had  now  acted  in  strict  conformity  to 
this  programme,  and,  as  a  settlement  of  the  con 
troversy  according  to  the  wishes  of  the  United 
States  was  as  yet  impossible,  it  is  to  be  pre 
sumed  that  he  was  not  exactly  dissatisfied  that 
the  negotiation  had  had  no  result  except  to  add 
another  bundle  of  useless  papers  to  the  archives 
of  the  State  Department. 

President  Polk's  inaugural  address  made  a 
sharp  cut  through  this  policy  of  "  wise  and 
masterly  inactivity  "  by  declaring  the  title  of 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.        265 

fche  United  States  to  the  Territory  "  clear  and  un 
questionable."  The  whole  country  was  thrown 
into  wild  excitement  by  this  declaration,  for  if 
Congress  took  the  same  view  of  the  question 
the  breach  with  England  seemed  almost  in 
evitable.  That  the  President,  in  spite  of  his 
"blustering  announcement,"  as  Lord  John  Rus 
sell  called  that  declaration,  addressed  a  com 
promise  proposition  to  England  was  a  surprise  ; 
but  the  chances  of  an  amicable  settlement  were 
not  thereby  increased,  for  in  one  of  the  earlier 
negotiations  the  United  States  had  been  will 
ing  to  yield  more  than  what  was  now  offered 
by  Polk.  Since  England  had  then  rejected 
the  greater  concession  as  insufficient,  it  was  a 
matter  of  course  that  she  would  not  now  accept 
the  smaller  offer.  Besides,  Polk  had  accom 
panied  it  with  the  declaration  that  "he  would 
not  have  consented  to  yield  any  portion  of  the 
Oregon  Territory  had  he  not  found  himself 
embarrassed,  if  not  committed,  by  the  acts  of  his 
predecessors."  He  therefore  withdrew  his  offer 
after  it  had  been  rejected  by  England,  and  his 
annual  message  declared  "  that  no  compromise 
which  the  United  States  ought  to  accept  can  be 
effected."  At  the  same  time  he  advised  the 
abrogation  of  the  convention  of  1818-27.  The 
consequence  was  that,  as  Calhoun  afterwards 
stated,  "  stocks  of  every  description  fell,  marine 


266  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

insurances  rose,  commercial  pursuits  were  sus 
pended,  and  our  vessels  remained  inactive  at  the 
wharves."  General  Cass,  after  previous  consul 
tation  with  the  President  and  Secretary  of  State, 
poured  oil  into  the  flames  by  a  violent  speech 
(December  15,  1845),  which  culminated  in  the 
assertion  that  "  war  is  almost  upon  us."  Several 
senators  expressed  in  strong  terms  their  dis 
satisfaction  with  the  course  which  the  influen 
tial  senator  from  Michigan  had  seen  fit  to  pur 
sue.  It  seemed,  however,  as  if  the  majority  of 
both  Houses  of  Congress  would  only  too  will 
ingly  follow  the  lead  of  the  administration. 
On  December  18,  Senator  Allen,  the  chairman 
of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  moved 
a  joint  resolution,  advising  the  President  "  to 
give,  forthwith,  notice  to  Great  Britain  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  will 
terminate  the  convention  existing  relative  to 
the  joint  occupancy  of  the  Oregon  Territory." 
And  on  January  5,  1846,  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  House  moved  a  reso 
lution,  peremptorily  demanding  "that  the  Pres 
ident  of  the  United  States  forthwith  cause  no 
tice  to  be  given  to  the  government  of  Great 
Britain,"  etc. 

The  right  to  give  notice  at  any  time  they 
pleased,  had  been  expressly  stipulated  by  the 
high  contracting  powers  in  the  convention  of 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.          267 

1827.  The  adoption  of  those  resolutions,  there 
fore,  would  not  have  given  Great  Britain  any 
just  cause  of  complaint.  The  spirit,  however, 
which  actuated  the  hotspurs  made  the  words 
almost  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war.  The 
notice  that  the  United  States  wanted  the  joint 
occupancy  to  terminate,  was  understood  to  be  a 
notification  that  Great  Britain  must  abandon 
her  claims  at  once  and  absolutely,  or  take  the 
consequences.  "  Fifty-four  forty  or  fight  "  was 
the  plain  language  of  the  radicals.  A  set  of 
resolutions,  introduced  by  Senator  Hannegan, 
boldly  denied  even  the  power  of  the  govern 
ment  to  settle  the  controversy  by  any  compro 
mise  or  to  concede  one  foot  of  the  Territory  to 
England.  Calhoun,  on  December  30,  1845,  in 
troduced  a  set  of  counter-resolutions,  asserting 
the  power  of  the  government  which  Hannegan 
denied  ;  stating  the  fact  that,  however  clear  the 
title  of  the  United  States  to  the  whole  Territory 
might  be  in  their  opinion,  there  were  conflict 
ing  claims  to  the  possession  of  the  same  be 
tween  them  and  Great  Britain ;  and  declaring 
that  the  President,  in  proposing  the  forty-ninth 
degree  as  a  compromise  boundary,  did  not 
"  abandon  the  honor,  the  character,  or  the  best 
interests  of  the  American  people." 

These  counter-resolutions  rolled  a  heavy  load 
from  the  breasts  of  all  those  in  whose  opinion 


268  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

it  was  a  criminal  folly  to  treat  this  question  in 
a  manner  which,  if  it  was  not  intended  to  pro 
voke  a  war,  actually  pressed  the  British  lion  to 
the  alternative  of  crouching  like  a  whipped 
spaniel,  or  of  using  his  powerful  claws.  It  was 
generally  believed  that  it  depended  upon  Cal- 
houn  whether  passion  and  ambition  or  cool 
statesmanship  should  rule  the  day,  and  though 
the  resolutions  were  clad  in  a  strictly  negative 
form  they  left  no  doubt  which  side  could  count 
upon  his  determined  support. 

To-day,  probably,  nobody  will  contest  that 
this  is  one  of  his  best  claims  upon  the  gratitude 
of  his  country,  and  yet  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
there  was  a  good  deal  of  solid  matter  in  the 
avalanche  of  bitter  complaints  and  stinging  re 
proaches  which  the  Northwestern  radicals  hurled 
against  him  and  all  the  Democrats  of  the  South. 
Calhoun  had  carefully  abstained  from  laying 
down  any  positive  programme  in  his  resolu 
tions,  because  his  programme  was  now,  as  it 
had  been  in  1843,  to  have  none,  —  the  policy 
of  "  wise  and  masterly  inactivity."  And  the 
reasons  which  he  had  then  adduced  for  this 
course  were  now  as  good  as  they  had  been  at 
that  time.  He  was  probably  right  in  suppos 
ing  that  a  war  would  result  in  the  loss  of 
"  every  inch  "  of  the  Territory  ;  nor  could  any 
body  question  that  time  was  the  ally  of  the 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN    WAR.         269 

United  States,  and  was  working  in  their  favor 
with  a  force  which  Great  Britain  would  ulti 
mately  be  unable  to  resist.  But  this  being  so, 
why  did  he  not  pursue  his  reasoning  to  the  last 
consequences  ?  According  to  his  argument,  the 
United  States  were  sure  to  get  the  whole  Terri 
tory,  if  they  would  but  have  patience  and  bide 
their  time ;  yet  he  did  not  contend  for  the  con 
tinuation  of  the  joint  occupancy  so  long  as 
England  could  be  prevailed  upon  not  to  give 
notice.  He  still  asserted  that,  in  his  opinion, 
the  title  of  the  United  States  to  the  whole  Ter 
ritory  was  good,  and  that  he  wished  to  secure 
the  possession  of  the  whole  to  them ;  but  the 
whole  tenor  of  his  resolutions,  and  especially 
the  last  one,  which  declared  that  the  offer  of 
the  forty-ninth  degree  was  not  an  abandon 
ment  of  their  "  best  interests,"  clearly  indicated 
that  a  fair  compromise  would  meet  with  his 
approval. 

That  was  the  wisest  and  therefore  a  truly 
patriotic  policy,  but  would  he  have  advocated 
it  if  Oregon  had  been  situated  south  of  Ma 
son  and  Dixon's  line  ?  The  history  of  the  an 
nexation  of  Texas  answers  this  question  in 
an  unmistakable  manner.  Only  part)7  passion 
could  doubt  that  the  patriotism  of  the  South 
was  strong  enough  to  defend  with  energy  the 
rights  of  the  Union,  whenever  these  rights  were 


270  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

really  "  clear  and  unquestionable."  But  it  is 
equally  certain  that  Calhoun  and  the  other  rep 
resentatives  of  the  South  were  not  at  all  anxious 
to  assume  any  burdens  and  submit  to  any  sac 
rifices  in  the  defence  of  questionable  rights, 
if  the  North  was  to  have  the  benefit  of  them. 
As  in  the  opinion  of  Giddings,  the  indomitable 
enemy  of  slavery,  the  necessity  to  restore  the 
equilibrium  between  the  two  sections,  which 
had  been  disturbed  by  the  annexation  of  Texas 
in  favor  of  the  South,  imperatively  demanded 
that  the  United  States  should  maintain  their 
claims  to  Oregon  at  every  hazard,  so  the  South 
apprehended  that  this  equilibrium  would  be 
disturbed  in  favor  of  the  North  by  securing  the 
whole  Territory  to  the  Union,  and  therefore 
was  determined  not  to  go  a  hair's-breadth  be 
yond  what  the  honor  of  the  republic  really  re 
quired.  Calhoun  had  openly  avowed  that,  so 
far  as  it  depended  upon  him,  the  annexation  of 
Texas  should  be  effected  without  delay,  though 
it  should  lead  to  a  war,  in  which  England  might 
be  found  on  the  side  of  Mexico.  With  regard 
to  the  Oregon  question,  however,  he  was  sure 
to  oppose  with  the  utmost  energy  any  policy 
tending  to  endanger  the  peace  of  the  Union, 
and  the  more  energetically,  the  more  that  pol 
icy  was  likely  to  result  in  an  extension  of  the 
Union  territory  in  the  north.  For  a  war  with 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.          271 

Great  Britain  would  be,  under  all  circumstances, 
most  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  South, 
and  might  easily  put  the  very  existence  of  slav 
ery  into  imminent  danger.  In  and  out  of  Con 
gress,  leading  men  of  the  South  openly  avoAA  ed 
that  these  considerations  for  the  special  inter 
ests  of  their  section  determined  their  course, 
and  there  was  in  fact  no  reason  to  conceal  the 
truth.  If  the  policy  of  the  radicals  was  sure  to 
do  much  harm  to  the  South,  and  if  it  was,  to 
say  the  least,  very  doubtful  whether  the  United 
States  as  a  whole  would  derive  any  benefit  from 
it,  the  adoption  of  it  would  have  been  not  only 
an  act  of  folly,  but  a  wrong  on  the  part  of  the 
North.  But,  however  sound  the  arguments  of 
Calhoun  and  the  other  representatives  of  the 
South  were,  their  sayings  and  doings,  now  that 
an  interest  of  the  North  was  at  stake,  did  not 
agree  with  what  they  had  said  and  done  when 
they  had  contended  for  the  interests  of  their 
"  peculiar  institution.".  The  difference  was  the 
less  justifiable  because  then  the  United  States 
had  had  to  deal  with  a  political  problem,  while 
they  had  now  to  maintain,  as  they  contended, 
an  existing  right.  Besides,  the  South  stood 
"pledged,"  as  Betlinger,  of  Virginia,  admitted, 
to  support  the  policy  of  the  West  with  regard 
to  Oregon,  in  consideration  of  what  the  West 
had  done  for  the  South  with  regard  to  Texas. 


272  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

It  is  true,  Calhoun  had  been  personally  no 
party  to  this  bargain,  which  had  been  concluded 
and  solemnly  proclaimed  to  the  whole  world 
by  the  Baltimore  Convention.  The  charge  of 
"  Punic  faith,"  which  Hannegan  hurled  against 
the  South,  was  therefore  too  strong  a  term,  so 
far  as  he  was  concerned.  But  he  had  not  uttered 
a  single  syllable  against  this  bargain,  and  the 
West  hud  a  right  to  infer  from  his  silence  that 
he  approved  and  sanctioned  it  as  well  as  the 
rest  of  the  Baltimore  platform.  As  he  was  the 
foremost  leader  of  the  annexationists,  perfect 
candor  would  have  required  a  declaration  that 
he  personally  intended  to  stick  to  his  policy  of 
"  masterly  inactivity  ;  "  and  now  he  even  aban 
doned  that ;  and  declared  himself  in  favor  of  a 
compromise.  Public  opinion  and  history  have 
decided  the  controversy  in  favor  of  this  policy. 
No  blame  rests  upon  Calhoun  for  what  he  did 
now.  His  annexation  game  had  not  been 
played  entirely  above  board,  and  for  this 
wrong  he  had  now  to  pay  the  just  penalty. 
What  he  had  done  then  exposed  him  now  to 
the  charges  of  inconsistency  and  bad  faith. 
And  that  was  but  the  first  drop  of  the  bitter 
cup,  which  his  own  hand  had  pressed  to  his 
lips  by  the  deed  concerning  which  he  declared 
to  the  last,  "  To  no  act  of  my  life  do  I  revert 
with  more  satisfaction." 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN  WAR.         273 

On  January  17,  1846,  Webster  had  written 
to  Mr.  Sears,  "  Most  of  the  Whigs  in  the  Sen 
ate  incline  to  remain  rather  quiet,  and  to  follow 
the  lead  of  Mr.  Calhoun.  He  is  at  the  head 
of  a  party  of  six  or  seven,  and  as  he  professes 
still  to  be  an  administration  man  it  is  best  to 
leave  the  work  in  his  hands,  at  least  for  the 
present."  Seward  was  very  indignant  at  this 
"  ill-starred  coalition  of  nullifiers  with  Whigs, 
to  save  slavery  and  free  trade."  Webster, 
however,  was  certainly  right  in  believing  that 
the  surest  way  to  check  the  wild  policy  of  the 
Western  radicals  effectually  and  in  time  was  to 
confide  the  lead  of  the  opposition  to  a  professed 
"  administration  man  ;  "  and  Seward  labored 
under  a  great  mistake  in  supposing  that  he 
and  the  Western  radicals  were  fighting  at  the 
side  of  the  administration,  against  this  opposi 
tion,  by  contending  in  full  earnest  for  the 
extreme  views  of  President  Folk's  messages. 
Calhoun  and  his  followers  and  allies  would 
probably  have  succeeded  in  enlisting  public 
opinion  as  strongly  in  favor  of  a  sensible  and 
sober  policy,  even  if  Polk  had  really  wished  to 
see  the  uncompromising  course,  which  he  offi 
cially  advocated,  adopted  by  Congress.  But 
their  task  was  undoubtedly  rendered  much  eas 
ier  by  the  fact  that  the  President  was  secretly 
as  anxious  as  they  to  see  the  fire  quenched, 

18 


274  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

•which  he  had  stirred  up  into  so  dangerous  a 
conflagration.  As  to  this  question,  Calhoun  was 
a  much  better  administration  man  than  he  was 
himself  aware  of.  But  in  serving  the  President 
here,  where  he  apparently  crossed  the  policy 
of  the  administration,  he  also  unwittingly  pro 
moted  its  ultimate  designs,  which  filled  his  mind 
with  the  greatest  apprehensions  for  the  future 
of  the  country. 

On  March  16,  1846,  Calhoun  had  said  in  the 
Senate,  "  A  further  inducement  for  dispatch  in 
settling  the  Oregon  question  is  that  upon  it  de 
pends  the  settlement  of  the  question  with  Mex 
ico."  In  this  Polk  perfectly  agreed  with  him. 
Their  ways  parted  only  when  they  came  to  the 
question  how  and  under  what  conditions  the 
settlement  with  Mexico  was  to  be  effected.  One 
of  the  main  reasons  why  Calhoun  so  earnestly 
strove  to  bring  about  a  compromise  with  Eng 
land  was  the  delusion  that  this  was  the  surest 
way  to  avert  a  war  with  Mexico,  while,  in  fact, 
the  apprehension  of  a  war  with  England  was 
the  only  thing  which,  perhaps,  could  have  de 
terred  Polk  from  his  aggressive  policy  towards 
Mexico.  No  more  unjust  accusation  could  be 
brought  against  Polk  than  that  he  wished  a  war 
with  Mexico.  He  and  his  cabinet  infinitely  pre 
ferred  the  crooked  ways  of  diplomacy  to  a  war 
even  with  an  enemy  so  weak  that  they  could 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         275 

afford  to  despise  him.  They  only  were  irrevo 
cably  determined  to  obtain  from  Mexico  what 
they  could  not  get  without  a  war,  and  thus  it 
became  a  "  necessity  "  to  "  compel  "  Mexico, 
just  as  Calhoun  had  been  "  compelled  "  to  ac 
cept  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State,  because  the 
annexation  of  Texas  was  a  "  necessity." 

Calhoun  had  accompanied  to  the  Mexican 
government  the  notification  of  the  treaty  of  an 
nexation  with  the  assurance  "  that  it  is  his  [the . 
President's]  desire  to  settle  all  questions  be 
tween  the  two  countries  which  may  grow  out  of 
this  treaty,  or  any  other  cause,  on  the  most  lib 
eral  and  satisfactory  terms,  including  that  of 
boundary."  On  March  31, 1845,  his  declaration 
was  repeated  almost  literally  by  Mr.  Shannon 
on  behalf  of  President  Polk.  Calhoun,  how 
ever,  had  intended  to  negotiate  honestly  with 
Mexico  about  the  contested  boundary  of  Texas, 
while,  according  to  Polk,  "  the  most  liberal  and 
satisfactory  terms  "  were,  that  not  a  single  inch 
of  the  territory  claimed  by  Texas  could,  under 
any  circumstances,  be  granted  to  Mexico,  and 
that,  in  order  to  prevent  future  conflicts,  New 
Mexico  and  California  should  be  sold  by  Mex 
ico  to  the  United  States.  As  Mexico  could  not 
be  prevailed  upon  to  see  the  question  in  the 
same  light,  the  American  army,  under  General 
Taylor,  was  ordered  (January  13, 1846)  to  take 


276  JOHN   C.   CALHOUN. 

possession  of  the  contested  strip  of  land,  and  to 
assume  such  an  attitude  that  an  appeal  to  the 
arbitrament  of  the  sword  was  inevitable,  unless 
Mexico  had  entirely  lost  her  self-respect. 

Calhoun  heard  of  the  fatal  order  only  "  a 
long  time  after"  it  had  been  given.  He  depre 
cated  it,  because  he  clearly  foresaw  its  perni 
cious  consequences,  and  wished  the  Senate  to 
take  some  action  forcing  the  President  to  re 
call  it.  But  he  himself  refused  to  move  in  the 
matter,  because,  as  he  said,  "  it  was  important 
I  should  maintain  the  kindest  and  most  friendly 
relations,  in  order  that  I  should  have  some 
weight  in  bringing  the  Oregon  question  to  an 
amicable  settlement."  That  this  was  no  after 
thought  is  fully  proved  by  his  whole  subsequent 
course  with  regard  to  the  Mexican  war.  But  it 
is  equally  certain  that  Calhoun  here  committed 
the  greatest  and  most  fatal  political  plunder  of 
his  whole  career.  Polk  knew  as  well  and  bet 
ter  than  he  that  Taylor's  advance  from  Corpus 
Christi  would  lead  to  a  war  with  Mexico,  and 
it  was  folly  to  think  it  possible  that  a  President 
of  the  United  States  could  see  a  double  war 
•with  Mexico  and  Great  Britain  in  the  same 
light  as  it  would  be  seen  by  a  demagogical 
stump-speaker,  intoxicated  by  his  own  spread- 
eagle  harangues.  The  order  of  January  13^ 
1 846,  would  never  have  been  issued  if  Polk  had 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         277 

not  made  up  his  mind  to  satisfy  England  with 
regard  to  Oregon.  Calhoun  could  have  crossed 
the  way  of  the  President  in  the  most  determined 
manner,  without  risking  anything  except  his 
standing  as  an  "  administration  man,"  and  that 
he  was  sure  to  lose  at  any  rate. 

On  Saturday,  May  9, 1846,  Polk  received  the 
welcome  news  that  a  skirmish  had  taken  place 
on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande.  On 
the  following  Monday  he  sent  a  message  to  Con 
gress,  which  culminated  in  the  assertion  that 
"  war  exists,  and,  notwithstanding  all  our  efforts 
to  avoid  it,  exists  by  the  act  of  Mexico  herself." 
The  House  of  Representatives  at  once  indorsed 
the  bold  statement,  without  any  examination  of 
its  truth,  and  without  allowing  the  minority  a 
single  minute  to  develop  their  views  of  the 
question.  In  the  Senate  a  short  debate  could 
not  be  avoided,  but  here,  too,  the  administration 
party  succeeded  in  preventing  the  minority  from 
entering  at  all  upon  a  previous  examination  of 
the  main  question.  Calhoun  demanded  in  vain 
"  at  least  one  day  "  to  consult  the  documents 
accompanying  the  message,  "  as  containing  the 
ground  on  which  the  bill  ["  for  the  prosecution 
of  the  existing  war"]  was  to  pass."  In  vain 
did  he  and  those  who  acted  with  him  repeatedly 
express  their  willingness  to  vote  at  once  "  the 
amount  of  supplies  contained  in  the  bill,  or  even 


278  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

a  greater  amount,"  so  that  the  succoring  of  Tay 
lor  might  not  be  delayed  one  hour,  in  case  he 
should  really  stand  in  need  of  it.  In  vain  did 
Calhoun  demonstrate  that  hostilities  did  not  nec 
essarily  constitute  a  war,  and  that  the  President's 
assertion  was  not  and  could  not  be  true,  because 
the  right  to  declare  war  was  granted  by  the 
Constitution  exclusively  to  Congress.  In  vain 
was  attention  called  to  the  fact  that  it  was  not 
known  as  yet  whether  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  would  approve  of  General  Arista's  crossing 
the  Rio  Grande.  In  vain  was  the  majority  re 
minded  that  the  history  of  the  United  States 
afforded  more  than  one  example  of  most  out 
rageous  hostilities,  in  which  they  had  been  the 
assailed  party,  and  which  yet  had  not  led  to  a 
war,  and  much  less  had  anybody  ventured  to 
assert  that  these  in  themselves  constituted  a 
war.  Like  the  President,  the  majority  wanted 
the  war  in  order  to  conquer  New  Mexico  and 
California,  and  therefore  no  reasons,  however 
•weighty  and  unanswerable,  could  be  of  any 
avail.  On  May  13  the  war  bill  was  passed  by 
a  vote  of  forty  against  two.  Calhoun  had  ab 
stained  from  voting,  for  "  he  could  neither  vote 
affirmatively  nor  negatively,"  because  "  he  had 
no  certain  evidence  to  go  on."  "  He  could  not 
agree  to  make  war  on  Mexico  by  making  war 
on  the  Constitution."  Therewith  he  ceased  to 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         279 

be  an  "  administration  man,"  without  joining 
the  opposition.  More  solitary  than  ever  before, 
he  pursued  his  independent  course.  He  neither 
broke  nor  bent,  but  the  furrows  on  his  forehead 
deepened,  and  his  eyes  looked  more  gloomy  and 
careworn  than  ever ;  for  without  abandoning  a 
single  delusion  as  to  the  nature  or  future  of 
slavery,  he  saw  but  too  clearly  that  the  more 
successfully  the  war  was  waged,  the  more  the 
"  peculiar  institution  "  and,  in  consequence,  the 
existence  of  the  Union,  became  endangered. 

Two  presidential  messages  —  one  of  August 
4,  1846,  addressed  to  the  Senate,  and  the  other 
of  the  8th  of  the  same  month,  addressed  to  Con 
gress  —  indirectly  avowed  the  real  purposes  of 
the  war,  which  everybody  had  known  from  the 
first.  Polk  asked  two  million  dollars  to  nego 
tiate  a  peace,  in  which  he  proposed  to  pay  "  a 
fair  equivalent "  for  some  territory  which  Mex 
ico  was  to  cede,  in  order  to  adjust  the  boundary 
by  a  line  "  securing  perpetual  peace  and  good 
neighborhood  between  the  two  republics."  The 
House  promptly  acted  on  the  suggestion  of  the 
President,  but  on  motion  of  Mr.  Wilmot,  of 
Pennsylvania,  a  proviso  was  attached,  by  which 
slavery  and  involuntary  servitude  were  forever 
prohibited  in  any  territory  which  might  be  ac 
quired  from  Mexico.  An  amendment,  moved 
by  Mr.  Wick,  of  Iowa,  which  divided  the  event- 


280  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ual  acquisitions  by  the  line  of  the  Missouri  Cora- 
promise,  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of  69  against 
54.  The  fulfilment  of  the  dark  forebodings 
which  had  caused  Calhoun  to  oppose  the  war 
with  all  his  energy  had  therewith  begun.  On 
February  24,  1847,  he  said  in  the  Senate :  — 

"  Every  senator  know?  that  I  was  opposed  to  the 
war  ;  but  none  save  myself  knows  the  depth  of  that 
opposition.  With  my  conceptions  of  its  character 
and  consequences,  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  vote 
for  it.  When,  accordingly,  I  was  deserted  by  every 
friend  on  this  side  of  the  House,  including  nay  then 
honorable  colleague  among  the  rest  [Mr.  McDuffie], 
I  was  not  shaken  in  the  least  degree  in  reference  to 
my  course.  On  the  passage  of  the  act  recognizing 
the  war,  I  said  to  many  of  my  friends  that  a  deed 
had  been  done  from  which  the  country  would  not  be 
able  to  recover  for  a  long  time,  if  ever ;  and  added, 
It  has  dropped  a  curtain  between  the  present  and 
the  future,  which  to  me  is  impenetrable ;  and  for  the 
first  time  since  I  have  been  in  public  life  1  am  un 
able  to  see  the  future.  I  also  added,  It  has  closed  the 
first  volume  of  our  political  history  under  the  Consti 
tution,  and  opened  the  second,  and  that  no  mortal 
could  tell  what  would  Le  written  in  it." 

For  many  years,  he  had  been  the  trusted 
leader  of  the  South  with  regard  to  everything 
relating  to  slavery,  though  but  a  small  band 
had  kept  pace  with  him.  And  in  those  porten 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         281 

tons  May  days,  when  he,  who  had  always  rushed 
on  in  advance  of  all,  the  most  radical  of  the 
radical  slavocracy,  cried  Halt!  beware!  all 
dashed  past  him  with  indignant  impatience,  as 
if  he  had  been  the  last  and  most  insignificant 
among  all  the  political  apprentices.  Now  they 
began  to  ask  themselves  whether  he  had  not 
after  all  been  right.  The  day  after  the  war  bill 
had  been  passed  by  the  House  of  Representa 
tives,  Giddings  had  said  :  — 

"  We  sought  to  extend  and  perpetuate  slavery  in  a 
peaceful  manner  by  the  annexation  of  Texas.  Now 
we  are  about  to  effect  that  object  by  war  aud  con 
quest.  .  .  .  Now  I  say  to  those  gentlemen  who  are 
so  zealous  for  this  conquest  that  our  slave  States  will 
be  the  last  to  consent  to  the  annexation  of.  free  States 
to  this  Union.  I  know  that  Southern  men  are  now, 
and  have  been,  zealous  in  bringing  on  this  war  and 
for  extending  our  territory ;  but  they  will,  at  uo  dis 
tant  day,  view  the  subject  in  its  true  light,  and  will 
change  their  position,  and  will  oppose  the  extension 
of  our  territory  in  any  direction,  unless  slavery  be 
also  extended." 

As  soon  as  the  words  "territorial  acquisi 
tions"  were  officially  pronounced,  the  verifica 
tion  of  this  prediction  began.  The  din  of  war 
on  the  Mexican  battle-fields  was  almost  drowned 
by  the  vociferous  passion  with  which  the  vic 
tors  quarrelled  over  the  expected  spoils  of  the 


282  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

vanquished.  The  Southern  President,  acting  in 
perfect  unison  with  the  slavocracy,  had  not 
been  disappointed  in  the  expectation  that  the 
bloody  flag,  which  he  had  dug  out  of  the  graves 
of  the  Spanish  conquistadores,  could  be  carried 
to  the  shores  of  the  Pacific  with  the  hearty  ap 
proval  of  the  North.  But  had  he  quite  forgot 
ten  that  it  was  absolutely  impossible  to  make 
any  conquest  simply  for  the  Union  ?  The  United 
States  had  ceased  long  ago  to  be  a  Union  merely 
of  States ;  they  were  above  all  a  Union  of  two 
heterogeneous  sections.  There  was  not  a  foot  of 
Union  territory  which  was  not  the  legal  domain 
of  one  or  other  of  these  two  sections,  and  much 
less  could  an  inch  of  new  territory  be  acquired 
without  legally  assigning  it  to  one  or  other  of 
them.  And  now  a  stanch  Democrat  and  an  ar 
dent  supporter  of  the  annexation  of  Texas  met 
the  intimation  that  new  territory  was  to  be  ac 
quired  with  the  demand  that  the  South  should 
be  at  once  legally  excluded  from  all  participa 
tion  in  the  fruits  of  the  common  exertions.  The 
South  would  not  and  could  not  submit  to  that, 
for  it  was  not  only  not  fair,  but  it  was  the  death 
sentence  of  slavery.  The  balance  of  power  be 
tween  the  two  sections  would  be  irretrievably 
destroyed,  and  that  in  itself  would  be  the  death- 
knell  of  the  "peculiar  institution."  And  did 
the  past  history  of  the  slavery  conflict  admit 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR.         283 

any  doubt  that  the  slavocracy  would  resist  its 
doom  to  the  knife?  On  the  other  hand,  how 
ever,  was  it  likely  that  the  North  would  yield, 
if  a  man  of  the  antecedents  of  Mr.  Wilmot  de 
manded  such  a  proviso  ? 

Every  day  brought  new  proofs  how  true  Cal- 
houn's  prediction  had  been,  that  in  the  North 
the  future  belonged  to  the  spirit  of  abolitionism. 
Just  now  it  had  received  by  the  annexation  of 
Texas  a  more  powerful  impetus  than  ever  be 
fore,  and  the  South  undertook  to  force  the 
North  into  a  concession,  in  comparison  with 
which  all  the  other  demands  of  the  slavocracy 
were  as  nothing.  Mexico  had  abolished  slav 
ery  long  ago.  To  allow  the  South  to  carry  its 
"peculiar  institution"  into  a  part  of  the  con 
quered  territory  was  therefore  nothing  less  than 
slavery  propagandism  with  powder  and  lead. 
The  Northern  freemen  were  to  allow  millions  of 
dollars,  which  they  had  earned  with  the  sweat 
of  their  brows,  to  be  spent,  and  the  blood  of 
their  sons  and  of  the  Mexican  patriots  to  be 
spilled  like  water,  in  order  to  open  a  new  field 
of  activity  to  the  slave-driver's  whip  on  a  soil 
which  was  consecrated  to  universal  liberty  and 
legally  protected  against  pollution  by  the  tread 
of  a  slave.  Were  the  descendants  of  the  Rev 
olutionary  patriots  willing  to  present  the  world 
with  such  a  commentary  on  the  Declaration  of 


284  JOHN   C.   CALHOUN. 

Independence,  and  to  hide  their  faces  in  shame 
before  the  semi-barbarians  of  Mexico?  Thus 
the  story  of  the  treasure-digger,  in  whose  hand 
the  gold  turned  into  glowing  coals,  had  become 
true;  but,  unlike  that  fabled  personage,  who 
threw  down  the  present  of  the  evil  spirit  with 
a  curse,  the  United  States  had  to  keep  at  least 
a  part  of  their  conquests.  It  was  folly  to  ex 
pect  that  a  war  which,  under  false  pretexts,  had 
been  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  making  cer 
tain  territorial  acquisitions  would,  under  any 
circumstances,  be  terminated  by- the  adminis 
tration  and  the  majority  of  Congress  without 
securing  any  compensation,  after  more  territory 
than  they  had  ever  coveted  had  been  actually 
conquered. 

Here  was  a  mass  of  difficulties  boiling  and 
seething  in  the  caldron  of  the  Mexican  war, 
which  was  beyond  the  skill  of  any  political  cook. 
Perhaps  some  means  could  be  discovered  to  let 
the  steam  escape,  so  that  no  explosion  would 
ensue,  but  nothing  could  prevent  the  gradual 
corrosion  of  all  the  rivets  by  the  poisonous 
fumes.  Ardent  Northern  patriots  helped  the 
President  to  cover  the  whole  width  of  the  con 
tinent  with  the  folds  of  the  star-spangled  banner, 
and  thereby  rendered  the  temporary  destruction 
of  the  Union  inevitable ;  hot-headed  slavocrats 
sustained  Folk's  policy  and  urged  him  on,  in 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         285 

order  to  realize  the  prediction  of  Henry  A. 
Wise,  that  the  "  peculiar  institution  "  would 
irresistibly  press  on,  until  the  waves  of  the  Pa 
cific  put  a  stop  to  its  conquering  march  ;  and 
thereby  they  sealed  the  fate  of  slavery. 

Calhoun  acknowledged  that  he  was  "  unable 
to  see  the  future, "  and  that  he  did  not  know 
what  the  second  volume  of  the  history  of  the 
United  States  under  the  Constitution  would 
contain.  If  he  had  probed  his  own  mind  to  the 
bottom,  he  would  have  been  forced  to  add  that 
he  was  glad  of  it.  He  would  have  shut  his 
eyes  with  a  shudder,  if  they  could  have  pierced 
through  the  mist,  for  a  voice,  which  nothing 
could  silence,  constantly  whispered  into  his  ear 
that  it  covered  an  unfathomable  abyss.  Now  and 
then  he  tried  to  ease  his  heavy  mind  by  remind 
ing  the  South  how  earnestly  and  persistently  he 
had  raised  his  warning  voice.  But  that  could 
bring  no  comfort  either  to  himself  or  others. 
On  the  contrary,  his  reproaches  were  met  by 
the  charge  that  he  more  than  anybody  else  was 
responsible  for  the  war,  because  it  was  the  legit 
imate  or  even  unavoidable  consequence  of  the 
annexation  of  Texas.  With  hot  indignation  he 
repelled  the  charge  as  an  absurd  calumny  ;  for 
the  annexation  of  Texas  had  been  an  impera 
tive  patriotic  duty  towards  the  Union,  and  he 
had  been  willing  to  meet  Mexico  with  regard 


286  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

to  the  boundary  question  in  a  most  conciliatory 
and  liberal  spirit. 

The  latter  assertion  was  probably  true,  but 
was  it  thereby  proved  that  Benton's  accusation 
had  absolutely  nothing  to  rest  upon?  Let  it 
be  granted,  for  argument's  sake,  that  he  would 
have  come  to  an  amicable  understanding  with 
Mexico,  had  it  been  certain  or  even  likely  that 
the  unravelling  of  this  snarl  would  be  left  to 
his  discretion.  The  war  was  the  legitimate 
consequence  of  the  annexation,  though  it  might 
have  been  prevented  if  the  helm  had  remained 
in  his  hands.  He  had  taught  the  people  that  it 
was  not  only  right,  but  a  national  duty,  to 
make  territorial  acquisitions,  if  the  slavocracy 
declared  its  need  of  them  for  the  safety  of  slav 
ery,  and  that  the  stays  of  moral  scruples  might 
be  loosened  to  almost  any  extent  for  this  laud 
able  purpose.  He,  therefore,  had  no  right  to 
blame  Polk  and  the  war  party  for  anything,  ex 
cept  that  they  were  not  satiated  when  he  cried 
Halt !  enough !  They  were  over-zealous  and 
maladroit  disciples,  but  still  they  were  his  dis 
ciples.  It  was  the  old  story :  the  wizard  had 
called  the  spirits  merely  to  prepare  a  bath,  and 
his  half-taught  apprentices  had  them  go  on  car 
rying  water,  till  the  house  was  flooded  and  de 
structive  streams  burst  through  every  door  and 
window. 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.          287 

But  what  was  the  use  of  these  criminations 
and  recriminations  ?  What  had  been  done  could 
not  be  undone.  There  the  facts  were,  and  they 
had  to  be  dealt  with.  Calhoun  did  not  retire 
to  his  tent  like  the  irate  Achilles.  Just  because 
Folk's  policy  had  led  the  slavocracy  into  a  dan 
gerous  defile,  it  was  all  the  more  sure  that  the 
shield  and  the  spear  of  its  veteran  hero  would 
be  seen  at  their  wonted  place  in  the  thickest  of 
the  fight.  But  to  demand  that  he  should  now 
simply  step  into  the  ranks  of  the  administration 
columns  and  obey  the  commands  of  their  leader, 
and  to  denounce  him  because  he  refused  to  do 
so,  was  folly.  Senator  Turney,  of  Tennessee, 
charged  that  he  was  prompted  by  his  pres 
idential  aspirations  to  obstruct  the  passage  of 
bills  necessary  for  the  successful  prosecution  of 
the  war.  Calhoun  repelled  the  charge  (Febru 
ary  12, 1847)  with  passionate  indignation :  "  If 
the  senator  speaks  of  me  as  an  aspirant  for  the 
presidency,  he  is  entirely  mistaken.  I  am  no 
aspirant,  —  never  have  been.  I  would  turn  on 
my  heel  from  the  presidency,  and  he  has  uttered 
a  libel  upon  me.  ...  No,  sir.  The  whole  vol 
ume  of  my  life  shows  me  to  be  above  that." 
We  have  seen  that  as  to  the  past  the  facts 
were  pretty  far  from  bearing  out  his  self-laud 
atory  assertion,  but  as  to  the  present  the  in 
sulting  intimation  was  indeed  utterly  un founded. 


288  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

It  was  a  little  too  early  after  the  last  presidential 
canvass  for  him  to  declare,  "  At  my  time  of  life 
the  presidency  is  nothing;  "  but  the  history  of 
that  canvass  had  taught  him  that  to  indulge 
any  longer  in  such  aspirations  would  be  folly, 
with  a  tinge  of  ridiculousness.  Never  again 
would  he  have  permitted  his  name  even  to  be 
mentioned  as  a  candidate.  And  even  if  he  had 
not  understood  the  lessons  of  that  canvass  as 
well  as  he  did,  he  would  have  scorned  every 
temptation,  at  this  critical  juncture  of  affairs, 
to  allow  his  course  to  be  in  the  least  influenced 
by  any  personal  considerations. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  easily  to  be  under 
stood  how  the  war  party  came  to  suspect  him 
of  personal  motives.  He  was  so  deeply  con 
vinced  that  the  war  was  a  blunder  and  a  calam 
ity  that  he  allowed  once  more  the  doctrinarian 
bent  of  his  mind  to  get  the  better  of  his  cool 
practical  judgment.  Turney  had  been  pro 
voked  into  his  accusation  by  a  speech,  in  which 
Calhoun  had  very  elaborately  advocated  the 
policy  of  a  "  defensive  line."  The  active  mili 
tary  operations  were  to  be  entirely  stopped. 
The  United  States  should  confine  themselves 
to  holding  the  conquered  territory  on  a  certain 
line,  quietly  waiting  for  Mexico  to  make  up  her 
mind  to  come  to  terms  on  this  basis.  This  he 
declared  to  be  "the  policy  best  calculated  to 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.        289 

bring  the  war  .  .  .  with  certainty  to  a  success 
ful  termination,  and  that  with  the  least  sac 
rifice  of  men  and  money,  and  with  the  least 
hazard  of  disastrous  consequences  and  loss  of 
standing  and  reputation  to  the  country."  The 
difficulties  which  the  enormous  distances,  the 
climate,  and  above  all  the  obstinate  patriotic 
pride  of  the  Mexicans  opposed  to  a  successful 
termination  of  the  war,  in  spite  of  the  brilliant 
achievements  of  the  American  arms,  were  so 
great,  that  one  can  understand  how  a  clever 
man  could  hit  upon  this  strange  plan,  which 
to-day  must  appear  simply  absurd  to  every 
body  who  is  not  acquainted  with  all  the  details 
of  those  countless  embarrassments.  Neverthe 
less,  though  the  idea  certainly  could  not  stand 
the  test  of  a  sober  and  somewhat  close  examina 
tion  ;  yet  if  the  partisans  of  the  administration 
had  been  familiar  with  what  had  occurred  be 
hind  the  curtain,  they  would  have  felt  less 
tempted  to  ridicule  it,  and  to  give  it  a  slight 
coloring  of  that  "  moral  treason  "  with  which 
they  charged  all  the  opponents  of  the  war.  The 
President  himself  had  been  in  favor  of  this 
strange  project  of  the  "  defensive  line."  The 
original  draft  of  his  message  had  recommended 
it  to  Congress.  Calhoun  had  known  this  ;  but 
he  had  not  been  informed  of  the  alteration 
which  Polk  had  made  at  the  instigation  of  Ben- 

19 


290  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ton,  who  had  convinced  him  that  such  a  passive 
policy  of  "masterly  inactivity"  was  utterly  in 
compatible  with  the  genius  of  the  American 
people. 

This  was  so  true  that  probably  neither  Con 
gress  nor  the  people  would  have  hesitated  one 
moment  to  reject  the  proposition  as  not  only  in 
expedient,  but  also  pusillanimous  and  deroga 
tory  to  the  national  honor,  even  if  the  adminis 
tration  had  supported  it  with  all  its  influence. 
As  the  personal  opinion  of  a  single  senator, 
it  was,  therefore,  of  no  consequence  whatever. 
The  majority  could  have  afforded  very  well  to 
pass  it  over  with  a  few  indifferent  remarks,  and 
consideration  for  the  man  as  well  as  policy  ought 
to  have  advised  such  a  course.  With  regard  to 
the  main  question,  Calhoun  had  announced  in 
the  same  speech  his  complete  acquiescence  in 
the  unalterable  facts :  — 

"  It  would  be  vain  to  expect  that  we  could  prevent 
our  people  from  penetrating  into  California.  .  .  . 
Even  before  our  present  difficulties  with  Mexico,  the 
process  had  begun.  Under  such  circumstances,  to 
make  peace  with  Mexico,  without  acquiring  a  cousid- 
able  portion,  at  least,  of  this  uninhabited  region,  would 
lay  the  foundation  of  new  troubles  and  subject  us  to 
the  hazard  of  new  conflicts.  .  .  .  But  it  is  not  only  in 
reference  to  a  permanent  peace  with  Mexico  that  it 
is  desirable  that  this  vast  uninhabited  region  should 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         291 

pass  into  our  possession.  High  considerations  con 
nected  with  civilization  and  commerce  make  it  no  less 
so.  We  alone  can  people  it  with  an  industrious  and 
civilized  race,  which  can  develop  its  resources,  and 
add  a  new  and  extensive  region  to  the  domain  of  com 
merce  and  civilization." 

Once  admitted  that  extensive  territorial  ac 
quisitions  had  become  inevitable,  the  other  ques 
tion,  how  they  should  be  disposed  of  with  re 
gard  to  slavery,  had  also  to  be  met  directly.  If 
Calhoun  did  not  at  once  give  a  full  answer  to  it, 
his  delay  did  not  arise  from  any  desire  to  con 
ceal  his  views.  The  object  of  his  speech  was 
to  recommend  the  "  defensive  line,"  and  for 
that  purpose  it  sufficed  to  say  how  the  terri 
tory  to  be  acquired  should  not  be  disposed  of. 
That  he  did  with  great  emphasis :  — 

"  We  are  told  —  and  I  fear  that  appearances  justify 
it  —  that  all  parties  in  the  non-slave-holding  States 
are  united  in  the  determination  that  they  shall  have 
the  exclusive  benefit  and  monopoly  ;  that  such  provi 
sions  shall  be  made  by  treaty  or  law  as  to  exclude  all 
;vho  hold  slaves  in  the  South  from  emigrating  with 
their  property  into  the  acquired  country.  ...  Be  as 
sured,  if  there  be  stern  determination  on  their  part  to 
exclude  us,  there  will  be  determination  still  sterner  on 
ours  not  to  be  excluded." 

"  This  known  pointed  division  of  opinion  "  as 
to  the  ultimate  disposition  of  the  territory 


292  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

seemed  to  him  to  render  the  vigorous  prosecu 
tion  of  the  war  impossible  :  — 

"  Now,  if  I  may  judge  from  what  has  been  de 
clared  on  this  floor,  from  what  I  hear  on  all  sides,  the 
members  from  the  non-slave-holding  States,  if  they 
were  sure  that  slavery  would  not  be  excluded  from 
the  acquired  territory,  would  be  decidedly  opposed 
to  what  they  call  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  or 
the  acquisition  of  a  single  foot  of  territory.  Can  they 
then  believe  that  the  members  of  the  slave-holding 
States,  on  the  opposite  supposition,  would  not  be 
equally  opposed  to  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war 
and  the  acquisition  of  territory  ?  " 

Ten  days  after  the  delivery  of  this  speech, 
on  February  19,  1847,  Calhoun  presented  a  set 
of  resolutions  to  the  Senate,  covering  the  whole 
ground  of  the  slave  question  with  regard  to  the 
Territories.  The  key-note  of  the  remarks  with 
which  lie  prefaced  them  was  the  assertion,  that 
"  the  day  'that  the  balance  between  the  two  sec 
tions  of  the  country  ...  is  destroyed  is  a  day 
that  will  not  be  far  removed  from  political  rev 
olution,  anarchy,  civil  war,  and  wide-spread  dis 
aster."  This  was  not  intended  as  a  threat,  nor 
even  as  a  warning,  for  he  knew  that  it  would 
not  be  heeded.  It  was  simply  the  statement  of 
the  solemn  conviction  by  which  his  course  was 
determined.  In  his  opinion  he  had  been  forced 
upon  the  position  which  lie  was  about  to  assume. 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR.         293 

Adams's  journal  is  documentary  proof  that  he 
had  not "  always,"  as  he  now  asserted,  considered 
the  Missouri  Compromise  a  surrender  of  the 
"high  principles  of  the  Constitution."  But  it 
was  of  little  consequence  when  he  had  come  to 
that  conviction.  At  all  events,  he  now  consid 
ered  that  compromise  "  a  great  error,"  and,  in 
spite  of  that,  it  had  been  at  his  suggestion,  as 
he  informed  the  Senate,  that  the  continuation 
of  the  compromise  line  had  been  proposed  in 
the  House  of  Representatives,  as  a  settlement 
of  the  controversy  about  the  territory  to  be  ac 
quired  from  Mexico.  He  had  not  wanted  the 
Southern  members  to  be  "  disturbers  of  this 
Union."  But  the  proposition  had  been  twice 
voted  down  by  a  decided  majority  ;  therefore  his 
advice  was  now,  "  Let  us  have  done  with  com 
promises.  Let  us  go  back  and  stand  upon  the 
Constitution !  " 

The  resolutions  affirmed  :  The  Territories  are 
the  common  property  of  the  several  States  com 
posing  the  Union.  Congress  has  no  right  to 
do  any  act  whatever  that  shall  directly,  or  by 
its  effects,  deprive  any  State  of  its  full  and 
equal  right  in  any  Territory :  a  law  which 
would  prevent  the  citizens  of  certain  States 
from  emigrating,  with  their  property,  into  any 
Territories  would  be  such  an  act.  Admission 
of  a  State  into  the  Union  may  not  be  made 


294  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

dependent   upon    any  other  condition,  except 
that  its  Constitution  shall  be  republican. 

A  refutation  of  this  doctrine  cannot  here  be 
attempted,  for  that  would  require  a  recapitula 
tion  of  the  whole  slavery  question  and  of  the 
doctrine  of  state  sovereignty.  As  to  the  ques 
tion  of  constitutional  law,  it  suffices  here  to  say 
that,  whether  Calhoun  was  right  or  wrong,  the 
whole  history  of  the  United  States  proved  the 
assertion  to  be  an  absurdity  ;  that  what  he 
claimed  to  be  a  "  high  constitutional  right  "  of 
the  slave-holders  was  "not  the  less  clear  because 
deduced  from  the  entire  body  of  the  instrument, 
and  the  nature  of  the  subject  to  which  it  re 
lates,  instead  of  being  specially  provided  for." 
If  this  "  constitutional  right "  was  as  clear  as  if 
it  had  been  specially  provided  for  by  the  Con 
stitution,  then  all  the  Southern  statesmen,  ever 
since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  must 
have  been  utterly  devoid  of  brains  or  absolutely 
nerveless,  for  the  right  had  never  been  ac 
knowledged  or  exercised.  Calhoun  himself 
opened  "  the  second  volume  "  of  the  history  of 
the  United  States  "  under  the  Constitution," 
and,  by  his  resolutions,  he  marked  a  new  era, 
because  they  were  not  mere  legal  abstractions, 
but  a  political  manifesto,  announcing  a  revolu 
tionary  programme  of  fearful  import. 

"  The  Constitution  which  we  now   present 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         295 

is  the  result  of  a  spirit  of  amity,  and  of  that 
mutual  deference  and  concession  which  the  pe 
culiarity  of  our  political  situation  rendered  in 
dispensable."  Thus  the  framers  of  the  Consti 
tution  had  characterized  their  own  work.  North 
and  South  had  always  declared  with  one  voice 
that  the  constitutional  convention  at  Philadel 
phia  would  have  labored  in  vain  if  the  compro 
mises  concerning  slavery  had  not  been  agreed 
upon.  Compromise  had  ever  since  been  the 
unsteady  compass  by  which  the  course  of  the 
Union  ship  had  been  directed  in  the  slavery 
question.  To  that,  and  to  that  alone,  it  was 
due  that  the  domain  of  slavery  and  the  sway  of 
the  slavocracy  over  the  national  politics  had  con 
stantly  increased.  And  now  Calhoun  demanded 
that  a  heavy  line  should  be  drawn  through  this 
word  "  compromise,"  and  that  it  should  for  all 
time  to  come  remain  expunged.  It  is  true,  he 
only  wanted  "  to  go  back  and  stand  upon  the 
Constitution,"  but  in  the  eyes  of  the  North  his 
interpretation  of  it  absolutely  divested  it  of 
the  character  of  a  compromise,  and  exacted  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  the  Union  to  the 
slavocracy.  Suppose  he  read  the  Constitution 
correctly  :  that  did  not  change  the  fact  that  it 
was  understood  very  differently  by  the  North. 

The  Constitution  in  itself,  however,  was  noth 
ing  but  a  dead  piece  of  parchment,  not  even 


296  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

able  to  resist  the  attacks  of  moths  and  mice. 
There  was  no  magical  force  in  it,  by  which  it 
could  of  itself  make  known  and  enforce  its  true 
will  and  intent.  Like  every  other  law,  it  be 
came  an  active  force  only  by  the  agency  of  the 
people  and  their  several  constituted  organs. 
Whether  right  or  wrong,  that  construction  of 
the  Constitution  had  to  prevail  which  the  peo 
ple  and  their  constituted  organs  believed  to 
be  correct.  Was  it,  then,  possible  that  they 
would  ever  adopt  the  doctrine  of  Calhoun's  res 
olutions,  according  to  which  slaves  could  be 
brought  into  "  any  Territory  of  the  United 
States,  acquired  or  to  be  acquired,"  and  accord 
ing  to  which,  in  consequence,  the  slave-holders 
had  been  most  grievously  wronged,  ever  since 
the  establishment  of  the  Constitution,  by  ex 
cluding  their  human  chattels  from  all  the  Ter 
ritories  north  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line  ? 

The  free  States  had  by  far  the  larger  part  of 
the  population  of  the  Union,  and  they  went  on 
steadily  and  rapidly  gaining  upon  the  South. 
Many  years  ago,  however,  Calhoun  had  declared 
with  the  utmost  emphasis  that,  in  the  North, 
the  future  inevitably  belonged  to  the  spirit  of 
abolitionism ;  and  by  this  time  the  prediction 
was  so  far  fulfilled  that,  according  to  his  own 
testimony,  all  parties  in  the  free  States  were 
united  in  the  determination  to  exclude  slavery 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         297 

from  the  territory  to  be  acquired  from  Mexico. 
The  experience  of  the  past  certainly  justified 
the  hope  that  it  would  be  possible  to  break  up 
this  unanimity,  but  would  it  ever  be  possible  to 
unite  the  majority  of  the  whole  people,  irrespec 
tive  of  Congress,  upon  the  basis  of  Calhoun's 
claim  ?  The  acknowledgment  of  this  claim 
would  have  been  nothing  less  than  the  renun 
ciation  on  the  part  of  the  Union  of  any  policy 
and  will  as  to  the  future  of  its  own  political 
nature ;  for  the  Territories  were  but  inchoate 
States,  and  experience  had  taught  that,  wher 
ever  slavery  gained  a  firm  foothold,  it  became 
the  paramount  formative  principle.  Calhoun 
certainly  believed  in  his  own  doctrine,  but  that 
he  should  have  expected  ever  to  reconcile  the 
majority  of  the  people  to  it  seems  hardly  cred 
ible.  His  idea  probably  was  to  obtain  a  good 
deal  by  imperiously  demanding  all.  But  he  had 
too  carefully  studied  the  history  of  the  slavery 
conflict  not  to  know  that,  by  thus  demanding 
all,  the  hatred  of  slavery  and  the  opposition  to 
the  slavocracy  would  be  greatly  intensified  with 
a  very  considerable  portion  of  the  Northern  peo 
ple.  The  formation  of  a  majority  upon  any 
positive  programme,  therefore,  evidently  pre 
supposed  the  consolidation  of  the  whole  South 
upon  the  slavery  question,  and  the  application 
of  very  powerful  levers  to  induce  the  rest  of  the 


298  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

Northern  people  to  support  the  slavocracy,  in 
spite  of  the  prevailing  current  of  public  opinion 
in  their  own  section. 

The  framers  of  the  Constitution  had  declared 
"  the  consolidation  of  the  Union  "  to  be  "  the 
greatest  interest  of  every  true  American,  in 
which  is  involved  our  prosperity,  felicity,  safety, 
perhaps  our  national  existence."  We  have  seen 
how  ardently  Calhoun  professed  the  same  faith 
in  his  earlier  years.  Now,  he  boldy  proclaims 
the  unrestrained  expansion  of  slavery  over  all 
the  Territories  of  the  Union  to  be  the  shibbo 
leth  around  which  the  whole  South  must  rally. 

"  Henceforward,  let  all  party  distinction  among  us 
cease,  so  long  as  this  aggression  on  our  rights  and  our 
honor  shall  continue,  on  the  part  of  the  non-slave- 
holding  States.  Let  us  profit  by  the  example  of  the 
abolition  party,  who,  as  small  as  they  are,  have  ac 
quired  so  much  influence  by  the  course  they  have  pur 
sued.  As  they  make  the  destruction  of  our  domestic 
institution  the  paramount  question;  so  let  us  make,  on 
our  part,  its  safety  the  paramount  question  ;  let  us  re 
gard  every  man  as  of  our  party  who  stands  up  in  its 
defence,  and  every  one  as  against  us  who  does  not, 
until  aggression  ceases." 

That  is  the  only  means  to  save  slavery  and 
with  it  the  Union.  It  is  the  only  means,  but  it 
s  also  infallible. 

"  But  if  we  should  act  as  we  ought,  —  if  we,  by 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         299 

our  promptitude,  energy,  and  unanimity,  prove  that  we 
Btand  ready  to  defend  our  rights,  and  to  maintain  our 
perfect  equality  as  members  of  the  Union,  be  the  con 
sequences  what  they  may,  and  that  the  immediate 
and  necessary  effect  of  courting  abolition  votes,  by 
either  party,  would  be  to  lose  ours,  —  a  very  different 
result  would  certainly  follow.  That  large  portion  of 
the  non-slave-holding  States  who,  although  they  con 
sider  slavery  as  an  evil,  are  not  disposed  to  violate  the 
Constitution,  and  much  less  to  endanger  its  overthrow, 
and  with  it  the  Union  itself,  would  take  sides  with  us 
against  our  assailants  ;  while  the  sound  portion,  who 
are  already  with  us,  would  rally  to  the  rescue.  The 
necessary  effect  would  be,  that  the  party  leaders  and 
their  followers,  who  expect  to  secure  the  presidential 
election  by  the  aid  of  the  abolitionists,  seeing  their 
hopes  blasted  by  the  loss  of  our  votes,  would  drop 
their  courtship,  and  leave  the  party,  reduced  to  insig 
nificance,  with  scorn.  The  end  would  be,  should  we 
act  in  the  manner  indicated,  the  rally  of  a  new  party 
in  the  non-slave-holding  States,  more  powerful  than 
either  of  the  old,  who,  on  this  great  question,  wouM 
be  faithful  to  all  the  compromises  and  obligations  of 
the  Constitution  ;  and  who,  by  uniting  with  us,  would 
put  a  final  stop  to  the  further  agitation  of  this  danger 
ous  question." 

In  truth,  he  was  no  novice  in  all  the  arts  and 
artifices  of  party  politics.  How  well  he  was 
acquainted  with  the  most  sterling  political  qual 
ity  of  the  Northern  people,  their  unfaltering 


_ "          r  .  _  ,~-  __-      *    .  ,..     -  .  „    .  . 

Xenthm  foElaat^t  sad  ke 

Iy  how  to  profit  bj  it  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Bat  there  w*s  still  the  old 


OREGON  ASTD  THE. 

which  osed  to  be  called  " 

the  moral  responsibility  for  the  civil 

the  Repdbfieaas,  beeasae  they  farced  tie  Sootk 

into  Beeoaon  by  forming  a  ^rtimil  party. 
This  riewof  tfcecase  takes  t±»e  syavptaai  far 
the  cause.  The  Union  was  »st  brain  «p  be- 

had 


bad  actually 

ginning  of  tins  process  dated  back  to  the 


; 

Ike  Bepdhfieasts  fid, 
after  the  beginning  of  the  ehil  war;  aatd  Cai- 
in  tbis  iispfrt,  as  in  all 


302  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

should  unite  in  making  the  slavery  question  in 
all  its  forms  and  bearings  the  main  plank  of  its 
political  platform,  and,  in  this  shape,  he  wanted 
"to  force  the  issue  upon  the  North."  He  writes 
to  a  member  of  the  Legislature  of  Alabama,  "  I 
would  even  go  one  step  farther,  and  say  that  it 
is  our  duty  —  due  to  ourselves,  to  the  Union, 
and  our  political  institutions  —  to  force  the  is 
sue  on  the  North.  ...  I  would  regard  any  com 
promise  or  adjustment  of  the  [Wilmot]  proviso, 
or  even  its  defeat,  without  meeting  the  danger 
in  its  whole  length  and  breadth,  as  very  unfort 
unate  for  us.  It  would  lull  us  to  sleep  again, 
without  removing  the  danger,  or  materially  di 
minishing  it."  And  how  did  he  propose  thus 
to  meet  the  danger  ?  "  There  is  and  can  be  but 
one  remedy  short  of  disunion,  and  that  is  to  re 
taliate,  on  our  part,  by  refusing  to  fulfil  the  stip 
ulations  in  their  favor,  or  such  as  we  may  select 
as  the  most  efficient."  He  proposed  a  conven 
tion  of  the  Southern  States,  which  should  agree 
that,  until  full  justice  should  be  rendered  the 
South,  all  the  Southern  ports  should  be  closed 
to  the  sea-going  vessels  of  the  North.  The 
northwestern  States  would  be  detached  from 
the  northeastern  by  leaving  open  the  trade  by 
river  and  railroad,  and  the  northeastern  States 
would  surely  come  to  terms,  for  "  their  un 
sounded  avarice  would,  in  the  end,  control 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         303 

them."  To-day,  the  South  knows  whether  the 
avarice  of  the  northeastern  States  is  quite  so 
unbounded  as  Calhoun  thought,  and  whether 
the  northwestern  States  are  willing  to  let  it  de 
pend  upon  the  gracious  good-will  of  the  South 
whether  the  national  rivers,  and  especially  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  shall  be  open  to  their 
trade. 

One  thing,  however,  Calhoun  ought  to  have 
known  already  at  that  time,  namely,  that  the 
North  would  never  acknowledge  such  a  meas 
ure  to  be  a  "  retaliation."  He  said,  "  That  the 
refusal  on  their  part  would  justify  us  in  refus 
ing  to  fulfil  those  [stipulations  of  the  national 
compact]  in  their  favor  is  too  clear  to  admit 
of  argument."  It  was,  in  fact,  too  clear  to  ad 
mit  of  argument  that,  in  the  most  essential 
point,  the  two  cases  had  no  more  in  common 
than  yes  and  no.  The  opponents  of  slavery 
were  convinced  that  Congress  had  the  constitu 
tional  right,  or  even  that  it  was  in  duty  bound, 
to  prevent  slavery  from  entering  the  free  ter 
ritories  to  be  acquired  from  Mexico ;  and  even 
Calhoun  forbore  to  charge  them  directly  with 
doing  violence  to  their  consciences  and  acting 
against  their  better  knowledge.  He,  on  the 
contrary,  unreservedly  acknowledged  that  he 
intended  to  deprive  the  North  of  its  comtitvr 
'ional  rights. 


304  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

Benton  very  correctly  said  that  such  a  reso 
lution  on  the  part  of  the  South  was  the  break 
ing  up  of  the  Union ;  and  now,  as  before,  there 
were  not  lacking  people  who  maintained  that  it 
was  this  that  Calhoun  was  aiming  at.  They  un 
derstood  the  man  the  less  in  proportion  as  the 
crisis  and  catastrophe  more  nearly  approached. 
In  the  same  letter,  above  quoted  from,  he  said : 

"  This  brings  up  the  question,  How  can  it  [the  dan 
ger]  be  so  met,  without  resorting  to  the  dissolution  of 
the  Union  ?  I  say  without  its  dissolution,  for,  in  my 
opinion,  a  high  and  sacred  regard  for  the  Constitu 
tion,  as  well  as  the  dictates  of  wisdom,  make  it  our 
duty  in  this  case,  as  well  as  all  others,  not  to  resort 
to,  or  even  to  look  to,  that  extreme  remedy,  until  all 
others  have  failed,  and  then  only  in  defence  of  our 
liberty  and  safety." 

That  he  honestly  and  ardently  wished  the  pres 
ervation  of  the  Union  is,  indeed,  as  certain  as 
it  is  certain  that  his  remedies  had  the  effect  of 
sledge-hammer  strokes.  The  consciousness  of 
weakness  drove  him  to  the  desperate  resolution 
to  burn  the  ship  of  compromise,  which  had  car 
ried  the  slavocracy  so  far,  and  to  demand  the 
unconditional  submission  of  the  North.  "  We 
are  now  stronger  relatively  than  we  shall  be 
hereafter,  politically  and  morally."  He  thought 
the  last  moment  had  come,  when  it  was  still 
possible  to  chain  down  the  North  so  absolutely 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN    WAR.          305 

by  positive  law  that  slavery  could  scorn  all  the 
assaults  of  the  brutal  facts  and  the  spirit  of  the 
times.  In  truth  there  never  had  been  a  time 
when  that  could  be  done,  and  it  grew  every 
day  less  possible  to  do  it,  because  this  growing 
weakness  of  the  slavocracy  was  no  secret  to  the 
North.  The  forging  of  new  chains  for  the 
Northern  States  made  them  feel  more  than  ever 
the  weight  of  those  which  they  already  wore ; 
and  in  shaking  these,  while  listening  to  the  com 
plaints  of  the  Southern  States  that  their  politi 
cal  and  moral  strength  was  irremediably  on  the 
wane,  they  learned  better  to  know  their  own 
strength.  The  will  and  the  ability  of  the  North 
grew  to  do  what,  in  its  opinion,  every  political 
and  moral  consideration  bade  it  do.  The  more 
the  South  succeeded  in  chaining  down  the  North 
by  positive  law,  the  louder  and  the  more  ener 
getic  the  protest  of  the  spirit  of  the  times  and 
of  the  facts  became.  And  had  Calhoun  quite 
forgotten  that  many  years  ago  he  himself  had 
declared  that  the  ultimate  decision  would  be 
given  not  by  the  law,  but  by  the  facts  ?  So  far 
from  swinging  the  fire-brand  of  sectional  agita 
tion  without  cause,  and  only  to  further  secret 
treacherous  designs,  as  so  many  accused  him  of 
doing,  he  now,  as  heretofore,  shrunk  back  from 
drawing  the  last  conclusion  from  his  own  prem 
ises,  because  he  would  not  believe  that  slavery 
20 


306  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

and  the  Union  could  not  both  be  saved.  With 
every  new  contest,  it  became  more  apparent 
that  the  curse  resting  upon  slavery  was,  that 
every  new  success  of  the  slavocracy  was  an 
other  step  towards  the  judgment  and  doom  of 
the  "peculiar  institution."  This  curse,  there 
fore,  necessarily  weighed  most  heavily  upon  the 
thoughts  and  the  deeds  of  him  who,  in  all  the 
tremendous  exertions  of  the  slavocracy  against 
the  onslaughts  of  the  spirit  of  the  times  and  of 
the  facts,  proved  himself  to  be  alone  "  a  host." 
With  the  consolidated  South,  he  now  drove  the 
North  from  the  battle-field  of  the  Wilmot  pro 
viso,  but  the  quiver  on  his  back  was  almost 
empty,  the  bow  in  his  hand  was  cracked,  and 
the  field  proved  to  be  a  barren  conquest,  so  that 
the  ultimate  effects  of  the  victory  were  those  of 
a  crushing  defeat. 

Benton,  in  his  "Thirty  Years  View,"  lays 
great  stress  upon  the  fact  that  Calhoun  never 
called  up  his  resolutions  to  be  acted  upon  by  the 
Senate,  because  they  had  been  received  with  gen 
eral  disfavor.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  how  Benton, 
after  witnessing  the  further  development  of  the 
controversy,  could  still  think  that  this  afforded 
any  reason  for  exultation.  Calhoun  continued 
to  oppose,  with  the  utmost  energy,  the  giddy 
agitators  of  unbounded  territorial  aggrandize 
ment,  though  the  contemplated  acquisitions  lay 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR.         307 

BO  far  to  the  South  that  the  slavocracy  would 
probably  have  been  able  to  secure  the  prey  for 
the  "  peculiar  institution."  When  there  seemed 
to  be  some  danger  that  it  would  be  impossible 
"  to  conquer  peace  "  unless  the  whole  Mexican 
republic  was  taken  possession  of,  he  still  ad 
vocated  his  "defensive  line,"  and  he  sternly 
put  himself  against  Folk's  recommendation  of  a 
temporary  military  occupation  of  Yucatan.  But 
while  he  did  his  best  to  prevent  the  sea  of  dif 
ficulties,  into  which  the  Union  had  been  thrown 
by  the  craving  for  more  land,  from  being  agi 
tated  even  more  profoundly,  he  did  not  recede 
one  inch  from  the  position  which  he  had  taken 
with  regard  to  the  equal  right  of  the  Southern 
States  to  all  the  Territories.  He  had  refrained 
from  calling  up  his  resolutions,  but  the  number 
of  converts  to  his  doctrines  increased  at  such 
a  rate  that  the  "  abstractions  "  rapidly  changed 
into  a  positive  programme. 

A  bill  for  the  organization  of  the  Oregon 
Territory  had  been  passed  by  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  at  the  second  session  of  the  29th 
Congress.  The  Senate  committee,  to  which  the 
bill  was  referred,  moved  to  strike  out  the  clause 
which,  in  conformity  with  the  provisional  laws 
enacted  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  Territory, 
prohibited  slavery.  As  this  motion  would  have 
led  to  endless  debates,  the  bill  was  laid  on 


308  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

the  table,  and  Oregon  remained  unorganized. 
Benton  asserts  that  the  motion  to  strike  out  was 
made  at  the  instigation  of  Calhoun.  However, 
that  be,  at  all  events  the  fate  of  the  bill  in  the 
Senate  lay  in  the  announcement  on  the  part  of 
the  South  that  Oregon,  although  lying  entirely 
north  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line,  should  not 
without  more  ado  be  given  up  to  the  North,  and 
the  resistance  was  based  upon  the  doctrine  of 
Calhoun's  resolutions. 

When  the  subject  was  taken  up  again  by 
the  30th  Congress,  it  was  openly  avowed  that 
slavery  was  not  expected  to  gain  a  firm  footing 
in  these  high  latitudes.  The  South  declared 
itself  to  be  contending  merely  for  the  principle. 
To  force  upon  the  North  the  acknowledgment 
of  the  principle  was,  however,  evidently  an  ut 
terly  hopeless  undertaking.  The  slavocrats,  Cal 
houn  not  excepted,  knew  that  well  enough,  and 
they  were  not  such  doctrinaires  as  to  risk  their 
bones  in  charging  windmills.  Calhoun  was  un 
doubtedly  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  sound 
ness  of  his  theories,  but  the  practical  aim  and 
end  of  his  struggle  for  the  principle  was  to 
wring  from  the  North  acceptable  concessions 
with  regard  to  all  present  and  future  Territories 
which  were  sufficiently  well  adapted  for  slave 
labor.  So  far  from  receding  from  the  position 
which  he  had  taken  in  his  resolutions,  he  now 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         309 

carried  their  doctrine  to  its  last  legitimate  con 
sequence  by  denying  the  binding  force  of  the 
former  compromises.  In  his  speech  of  June  27, 
1848,  on  the  Oregon  bill,  he  said  of  the  Mis 
souri  Compromise,  — 

"A  compromise  line  was  adopted  between  the 
North  and  the  South  ;  but  it  was  done  under  circum 
stances  which  made  it  nowise  obligatory  on  the  lat 
ter.  .  .  .  The  South  has  never  given  her  sanction  to 
it,  or  assented  to  the  power  it  asserted.  She  was 
roted  down,  and  has  simply  acquiesced  in  an  arrange 
ment  which  she  has  not  had  the  power  to  reverse, 
and  which  she  could  not  attempt  to  do  without  dis 
turbing  the  peace  and  harmony  of  the  Union,  to 
which  she  has  ever  been  averse." 

Calhoun  was  too  candid  and  daring  a  man,  he 
had  too  much  of  the  fanatic,  and,  above  all,  he 
understood  this  question  too  thoroughly  to  ap 
prove  of  the  covering  up  and  concealing  of  the 
depth  of  the  antagonism  which  necessarily  ag-' 
gravated  the  evils.  He  shares  with  the  aboli 
tionists  the  merit  of  having  always  probed  the 
wound  to  the  bottom,  without  heeding  in  the 
least  the  protesting  shrieks  of  the  patient.  The 
return  of  the  left  wing  of  the  Northern  Demo 
crats  into  the  service  of  the  slavocracy  was  ac 
knowledged  by  him  with  a  gracious  smile,  but 
he  spurned  the  cunning  device  which  made 
the  bitter  morsel  palatable  to  the  peace-era v- 


310  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ing  masses.  As  his  immediate  purposes  were 
served  by  it,  he  of  course  received  with  satis 
faction  the  announcement  that  the  reintegra- 
tion  of  the  Democratic  party  could  and  should 
be  effected  upon  the  basis  of  his  doctrine  of 
"non-interference."  But  no  blame  rested  upon 
him  for  the  fact  that  it  was  a  reunion  over  the 
bottomless  chasm  of  a  conscious  falsehood,  be 
cause  the  "  non-interference  "  as  understood  by 
the  Northern  Democrats  had  nothing  in  com 
mon  with  the  "  non-interference  "  demanded  by 
him  and  the  Southern  radicals,  except  the  aban 
donment  of  the  right  to  have  a  national  policy 
with  regard  to  slavery  in  the  Territories.  When 
Cass  and  Dickinson  now  proclaimed  the  doc 
trine  of  squatter  sovereignty,  the  cudgel  of  his 
logic  with  a  few  strokes  smashed  into  atoms  the 
coarse  and  bold  sophisms.  Whatever  of  legis 
lative  powers  the  Legislatures  or  the  inhabitants 
of  the  Territories  had,  was  derived  from  an  act 
of  Congress.  If,  therefore,  Congress  had  no 
right  to  take  any  action  whatever  in  respect  to 
the  introduction  of  slavery  into  the  Territories, 
the  former  evidently  could  do  so  much  less. 
Calhoun  called  the  doctrine  of  Dickinson  and 
Cass  "  the  most  absurd  of  all  the  positions  ever 
taken."  "  The  first  half  dozen  of  squatters 
would  become  the  sovereigns,  with  full  domin 
ion  and  sovereignty  over  them  [the  Territo- 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.          311 

ries]  ;  and  the  conquered  people  of  New  Mex 
ico  and  California  would  become  the  sovereigns 
of  the  country,  as  soon  as  they  became  the  Ter 
ritories  of  the  United  States,  vested  with  the 
full  right  of  excluding  even  their  conquerors." 

Calhoun's  own  doctrine  was  certainly  more 
logical,  and  he  was  perfectly  consistent  in  deny 
ing  to  Congress,  to  the  territorial  Legislatures, 
and  to  the  squatters,  as  well  the  right  to  estab 
lish  slavery  as  the  right  to  prohibit  it.  But 
nevertheless  his  theory  also  had  a  logical  hitch. 
He  claimed  for  the  slave-holders  the  right  to 
bring  their  human  chattels  into  all  the  Terri 
tories  as  a  right  under  the  Constitution,  but  he 
did  not  dare  to  assert  that  the  Constitution  es 
tablished  slavery  either  in  the  Territories  or  any 
where  else.  It  had,  however,  thus  far  been  uni 
versally  acknowledged  that,  wherever  slavery 
existed,  it  was  the  creature  of  municipal  law. 
Whence,  then,  should  slavery  derive  its  legal 
existence  in  Territories  where  it  did  not  actually 
exist,  or  where  thus  far  it  was  even  expressly 
forbidden  by  law,  as  in  New  Mexico  and  Cali 
fornia?  Was  it  now  to  be  denied  that  slavery 
could  only  be  the  creature  of  positive,  though 
perhaps  unwritten,  law,  —  i.  e.  was  the  right 
to  hold  slaves  in  any  Territory  to  be  derived 
from  the  law  of  nature  ?  If  so,  by  what  process 
of  logic  could  this  natural  right  be  limited  to 


312  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

negroes,  and  even  to  negroes  who  were  already 
slaves  in  certain  other  places  ?  This  course  led 
no  less  to  sheer  absurdity  than  the  doctrine  of 
squatter  sovereignty ;  and  yet  there  was  no 
other  course,  unless  the  Constitution  was  to  be 
construed  to  establish  slavery  in  all  the  Terri 
tories. 

Conclusive  as  this  logical  hitch  in  the  "  non 
interference  "  doctrine  was,  it  dwindled  down 
into  absolute  insignificance,  when  compared  with 
the  political  absurdity  of  the  theory.  Calhoun's 
doctrine  made  it  a  solemn  constitutional  duty 
of  the  United  States  government  and  of  the 
American  people  to  act  as  if  the  existence  or 
non-existence  of  slavery  in  the  Territories  did 
not  concern  them  in  the  least.  If  they  could  not 
help  taking  an  interest  in  it,  at  least  that  inter 
est  had  to  be  purely  academical,  as  if  the  Terri 
tories  had  been  situated  on  some  distant  planet. 
The  question  was  not  allowed  to  be  a  question 
at  all.  Yet  the  fact  was  that  North  and  South 
were  perfectly  agreed  in  considering  it  the  ques 
tion,  in  comparison  with  which  everything  else 
was  as  nothing.  Thus  the  theory  and  the  facts 
clashed  in  a  most  ridiculous  mariner ;  and  in 
such  a  conflict  between  theory  and  facts  the 
former  has  always  to  yield,  though  it  be  written 
in  giant  letters  and  with  living  fire  in  the  Con 
stitution.  No  people  with  the  least  vestige  of 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         313 

political  vitality  ever  will  or  can  turn  their  backs 
upon  a  question  which  they  consider  of  para 
mount  importance  to  their  whole  future,  look 
at  the  sky  and  whistle,  because  the  Constitu 
tion  says  that  the  matter  must  not  be  touched 
ever  so  lightly  with  a  single  finger.  And  if 
the  Constitution  does  not  say  that  in  so  many 
words,  but  only  an  endless  string  of  hotly  con 
tested  assertions,  deductions,  and  conclusions 
leads  to  this  result,  then  the  sole  effect  will  be 
that  another  huge  monument  of  human  folly 
has  been  erected. 

Nothing  shows  in  so  drastic  a  light  the  fearful 
embarrassment  into  which  the  policy  of  terri 
torial  aggrandizement  had  thrown  the  country, 
as  the  recommendation  of  a  committee  of  the 
Senate  to  solve  the  problem  by  adopting  this 
ostrich  policy.  On  July  18,  1848,  Mr.  Clay 
ton,  with  the  consent  of  Calhoun,  who  was  a 
member  of  the  select  committee,  introduced 
a  compromise  bill,  which  acknowledged  the 
provisional  laws  of  Oregon  "  till  the  territorial 
Legislature  could  enact  some  law  on  the  sub 
ject  of  slavery."  New  Mexico  and  California 
were  to  be  organized  as  Territories  by  the  ap 
pointment  of  a  governor,  secretary,  and  judges, 
to  compose  a  temporary  Legislature,  "but  with 
out  the  power  to  legislate  on  the  subject  of 
slavery  ;  thus  placing  that  question  beyond  the 


314  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

power  of  the  territorial  Legislature,  and  resting 
the  right  to  introduce  or  prohibit  slavery  in 
these  two  Territories  on  the  Constitution,  as 
the  same  should  be  expounded  by  the  judges, 
with  a  right  of  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States.  It  was  thought  that  by 
this  means  Congress  would  avoid  the  decision 
of  this  distracting  question,  leaving  it  to  be 
settled  by  the  silent  operation  of  the  Consti 
tution  itself." 

By  acquiescing  in  this  arrangement,  Calhoun 
abandoned  his  position  on  the  "  rock  "  of  the 
Constitution,  and  took  once  more  the  old  track 
of  compromises.  No  better  proof  can  be  ex 
acted  that  he  had  claimed  all  in  order  to  get 
enough.  But  this  comparative  moderation  was 
not  yet  to  be  rewarded.  Even  Democratic  organs 
emphatically  protested  against  "  the  cowardly 
conduct  of  Congress  in  seeking  to  shove  [the 
responsibility  of  the  decision]  upon  the  Supreme 
Court."  By  the  Senate  the  bill  was  passed,  but 
in  the  House  it  was  laid  on  the  table,  on  motion 
of  Alexander  H.  Stephens.  Calhoun  was  of 
course  free  to  climb  again  to  the  top  round  of 
the  ladder  of  principle,  but  his  doing  so  could 
no  longer  produce  the  same  effect  as  heretofore. 
He  knew  this  well  enough,  and  his  discomfiture 
was  the  greater  because  a  leading  Southerner 
had  felt  himself  called  upon  to  move  the  rejec- 


OREGON  AND  TEE  MEXICAN   WAR.         315 

tion  of  the  compromise.  The  consolidation  of 
the  South  on  the  basis  of  the  slavery  question 
had  indeed  so  far  been  effected  that  every  South 
erner  peremptorily  demanded  for  his  section 
some  share  of  the  Mexican  spoils ;  but  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  South  were  very  far  from  be 
ing  agreed  as  to  the  arguments  on  which  to  rest 
the  claims,  or  as  to  the  means  with  which  their 
realization  should  be  attempted.  Calhoun  had 
yet  one  arrow  left  in  his  quiver,  and  he  did  not 
hesitate  to  take  it  out ;  but  its  point  was  broken 
off  by  Southern  hands  ere  he  could  shoot  it. 

After  a  most  tenacious  resistance  on  the  part 
of  the  Senate,  the  first  session  of  the  30th 
Congress  was  brought  to  a  close  by  the  passage 
of  the  Oregon  bill  as  it  had  come  from  the 
House  ;  that  is,  with  the  exclusion  of  slavery. 
California  and  New  Mexico,  however,  had  re 
mained  unorganized.  The  rapid  and  most  ab 
normal  development  of  the  former,  in  conse 
quence  of  the  discovery  of  gold,  imperiously 
demanded  that  Congress  should  at  last  do  its 
duty  towards  the  newly  acquired  possession. 
From  all  sides  the  cry  was  raised  that  it  was 
a  shame  and  an  inexcusable  wrong  to  give  up 
the  Territory  to  anarchy,  because  Congress 
would  not  come  to  a  decison  on  the  slavery 
question.  But  there  seemed  to  be  little  chance 
that  the  knot  would  be  unravelled  by  this  Con- 


316  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

gress  at  its  second  session.  The  South  showed 
no  more  disposition  to  yield  than  before,  and 
the  North  had  good  reason  to  hope  that  a  de 
cisive  victory  could  be  gained,  if  it  but  braced 
up  its  strength  and  persisted.  California  had 
as  yet  only  two  newspapers,  and  both  declared 
that  the  population  was  unanimously  of  opin 
ion  that  "  the  simple  recognition  of  slavery  " 
in  the  Territory  would  be  the  greatest  misfort 
une.  "  The  people  of  New  Mexico,  in  conven 
tion  assembled  "  at  Santa  Fe*,  sent  a  petition  to 
Congress,  emphatically  asking  protection  against 
the  introduction  of  slaves.  Calhoun  called  the 
petition  most  impudent,  and  Westcott  thought 
it  an  abuse  of  the  right  of  petition.  But  that 
did  not  change  the  fact  that,  if  the  introduction 
of  slaves  into  these  Territories  should  be  per 
mitted,  it  would  be  done  against  the  solemn 
protests  of  the  inhabitants.  Squatter  sover 
eignty,  however,  was  the  utmost  limit  to  which 
the  Democratic  politicians  of  the  North  could 
hope  to  lead  their  constituents  in  the  service  of 
the  slavocracy.  The  determined  opponents  of 
the  slave  power,  therefore,  felt  sufficiently  elated 
to  take  the  offensive.  In  the  House  of  Represen 
tatives,  several  motions  with  a  view  to  the  ab 
olition  of  the  slave-trade,  and  even  of  slavery  it 
self  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  were  made,  and 
it  was  with  some  difficulty  that  the  more  mod- 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         317 

erate   of   these   attacks  were   repelled   by   the 
South. 

These  signs  of  the  times  appeared  to  Calhoun 
so  ominous  that  he  deemed  it  necessary  to 
prove  to  the  North  by  an  extraordinary  demon 
stration  that  in  this  question  the  South  thought, 
and  eventually  would  act,  as  one  man.  At  his 
instigation,  sixty-nine  senators  and  representa 
tives  from  the  South  met  for  deliberation  on 
December  23,  1848,  in  the  Senate  chamber.  A 
committee  of  fifteen  was  appointed,  which  ap 
pointed  a  sub-committee  to  draw  up  an  address. 
When  this  sub-committee  met,  Calhoun  sub 
mitted  to  it  the  draft  of  an  "  Address  of  the 
Southern  Delegates  in  Congress  to  their  Con 
stituents."  Of  its  object  the  address  itself  said 
that  it  "  is  to  give  you  a  clear,  correct,  but 
brief  account  of  the  whole  series  of  aggressions 
and  encroachments  on  your  rights,  with  a  state 
ment  of  the  dangers  to  which  they  expose  you. 
Our  object  in  making  it  is  not  to  cause  excite 
ment,  but  to  put  you  in  full  possession  of  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  necessary  to  a  full 
and  just  conception  of  a  deep-seated  disease, 
which  threatens  great  danger  to  you  and  the 
whole  body  politic."  It  did  not  pretend  to 
have  any  new  facts  or  arguments  to  lay  before 
the  people.  It  was  throughout  the  old  story, 
which,  in  and  out  of  Congress,  had  been  re- 


318  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN. 

peated  many  thousand  times.  Nevertheless,  a 
short  recapitulation  of  it  in  calm  but  incisive 
and  even  bitter  language  could  of  course  pro 
duce  a  great  effect.  Calhoun,  however,  did  not 
rely  principally  on  that.  The  fact  in  itself, 
that  all  the  Southern  members  of  Congress 
united  in  addressing  their  constituents  in  such 
a  solemn  form,  was  to  make  an  overpowering 
impression  not  only  on  the  South,  but  also  on 
the  North.  Men  of  all  parties  believed  that  his 
designs  went  much  farther  and  were  of  much 
darker  complexion.  The  old  charge  was  re 
newed  that  he  was  driving  directly  at  a  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Union,  and  some  of  the  accusers  had 
evidently  some  apprehension  that  this  time  he 
might  possibly  succeed.  So  far  as  his  wishes 
were  concerned,  however,  the  suspicion  was 
now  as  unfounded  as  it  had  been  on  all  former 
occasions.  The  possibility  —  and,  in  his  opin 
ion,  perhaps  no  more  an  improbable  one  —  of 
the  withdrawal  of  the  slave-holding  States  from 
the  Union,  he  kept  steadily  in  view.  There  is 
no  question  about  that,  for  he  had  often  de 
clared  it  in  express  words,  and  he  had  not  now 
made  the  concession  to  his  more  moderate  col 
leagues  to  conceal  it  in  the  least  in  the  address. 
As  the  address  was  to  impress  the  people  with 
the  gravity  of  the  crisis,  it  was  a  matter  of 
course  that  this  eventuality  had  to  be  pointed 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN  WAR.          319 

to  in  a  forcible  manner.  Nay,  more.  One  of  his 
purposes  undoubtedly  was  to  prepare  the  South 
for  it,  and  to  make  the  South  equal  to  the  emer 
gency,  if  it  should  come  to  the  worst.  But  a 
calm  and  attentive  perusal  of  the  curious  docu 
ment  cannot  fail  to  satisfy  every  reader  that 
its  main  object  was  exactly  to  prevent  this  dire 
eventuality  from  becoming  an  actuality. 

The  assertion  that  if  the  North  was  allowed 
"  to  monopolize  all  the  Territories  "  "  she  would 
emancipate  our  slaves,  under  the  color  of  an 
amendment  of  the  Constitution,"  and  then  the 
white  population  would  "  change  conditions " 
with  the  slaves,  absolutely  excluded  the  possi 
bility  of  submission,  if  all  the  Territories  should 
be  closed  to  slavery  by  the  verdict  of  the  ma 
jority.  "  As  the  assailed  you  would  stand  jus 
tified  by  all  laws,  human  and  divine,  in  repell 
ing  a  blow  so  dangerous,  without  looking  to 
consequences,  and  to  resort  to  all  means  neces 
sary  for  that  purpose."  But,  at  the  same  time, 
the  address  declared  it  probable  that  the  calam 
ity  could  still  be  averted  by  the  South.  "  If 
you  become  united,  and  prove  yourselves  to  be 
in  earnest,  the  North  will  be  brought  to  a 
pause,  and  to  a  calculation  of  consequences ; 
and  that  may  lead  to  a  change  of  measures,  and 
the  adoption  of  a  course  of  policy  that  may 
quietly  and  peaceably  terminate  this  long  con- 


320  JOHN   C.   CALHOUN. 

flict  between  the  two  sections."  This  expecta 
tion  caused  Calhoun  to  leave  the  last  decisive 
word  unpronounced.  He  had  no  positive  meas 
ures  of  any  kind  whatever  to  propose.  The  ad 
dress,  so  to  speak,  lacked  an  end.  It  was  a  long 
string  of  premises,  which  suddenly  broke  off 
without  a  conclusion.  All  the  advice  it  had  to 
give  was,  "  We  earnestly  entreat  you  to  be 
united,  and  for  that  purpose  to  adopt  all  neces 
sary  measures.  Beyond  this,  we  think  it  would 
not  be  proper  to  go  at  present." 

On  January  13,  1849,  the  sub-committee  re 
ported  to  the  committee  of  fifteen.  A  long  and 
animated  debate  ensued.  The  "Whig  members 
showed  very  little  inclination  to  follow  the  lead 
of  Calhoun,  and  they  afterwards  avowed  that 
they  had  consented  to  help  dig  the  mine  only 
in  order  to  pour  water  on  his  powder.  The  ad 
dress  was  adopted  with  a  majority  of  but  one 
vote.  Two  days  later,  over  eighty  members  of 
Congress  met  and  deliberated  with  closed  doors. 
Considerable  excitement  prevailed  in  Washing 
ton,  for  "many  of  the  most  intelligent  men" 
believed,  as  Horace  Mann  wrote  on  the  same 
day,  that  "  Mr.  Calhoun  is  resolved  on  a  disso 
lution  of  the  Union."  They  were  mistaken. 
"  We  hope  that,  if  you  should  unite  with  any 
thing  like  unanimity,  this  may  of  itself  apply  a 
remedy  to  this  deep-seated  and  dangerous  dis- 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR.        321 

ease;  but  if  such  should  not  be  the  case,  the 
time  will  then  have  come  for  you  to  decide 
what  course  to  adopt."  This  last  paragraph  of 
the  address  stated  with  perfect  truthfulness 
what  he  intended.  To  unite  the  South, — that 
was  his  purpose,  neither  more  nor  less, — to 
unite  the  South  for  good  or  for  evil,  as  the  case 
might  be.  He  "hoped"  that  the  North  would 
yield  when  it  should  be  convinced,  by  the  una 
nimity  of  the  South,  that  "  the  refusal  of  jus 
tice  "  would  be  promptly  followed  by  the  disso 
lution  of  the  Union.  This  calculation  was  not 
to  be  submitted  to  the  test  of  facts.  Washing 
ton's  anxious  expectations  came  post  festum. 
The  reception  which  the  address  had  met  from 
the  committee  had  already  proved  that  the 
South  could  not  as  yet  be  united  on  the  slavery 
question  in  such  a  manner  that  thereby  the 
Union  could  either  be  saved  or  destroyed.  The 
attempt  to  form  a  Southern  party  had  com 
pletely  failed.  The  address  was  finally  issued, 
but  among  the  signatures  were  the  names  of 
only  two  Whigs,  while  even  several  Democrats 
had  refused  to  sign  it.  The  whole  number  of 
signatures  was  forty,  just  enough  to  save  the 
movement  from  ridicule. 

If   the   private   correspondence   of    Calhoun 
should  still  exist,  and  some  time  see  the  light, 
we  shall  perhaps  be  authentically  informed  of 
21 


322  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

the  effect  which  this  signal  and  probably  un 
expected  defeat  had  on  his  mind.  His  public 
utterances  contain  no  explicit  answer  to  this 
question.  But  we  can  form  a  conception,  prob 
ably  nearly  correct,  of  his  frame  of  mind,  if  we 
direct  our  attention  principally  to  what  he  did 
not  say  and  do.  Nothing  betrays  the  least  per 
sonal  disappointment.  There  is  left  hardly  a 
glimmering  spark  of  the  fire  of  ambition,  which 
once  burned  so  fiercely  in  his  bosom,  for  he 
knows  that  he  stands  on  the  brink  of  the  grave. 
He  is  wholly  and  exclusively  devoted  to  the 
cause  with  which  he  has  absolutely  identified 
himself.  As  faithful  and  determined  as  ever, 
he  stands  at  what  he  considers  his  post  of  duty, 
—  of  duty  towards  his  section,  and  therefore 
also  towards  the  Union.  Every  device  calcu 
lated  to  hinder  the  North  yet  a  little  longer  in 
securing  a  "monopoly  "  of  all  the  Territories,  or 
to  open  a  new  chance  to  the  South,  by  means 
direct  or  indirect,  could  count  upon  his  earnest 
support,  provided  it  appeared  to  him  not  derog 
atory  to  the  honor  of  the  South,  and  to  prom 
ise  at  least  a  postponement  of  the  evil  day,  on 
which  the  balance  of  power  would  be  irretriev 
ably  lost.  Once  (February  24,  1849)  he  had  a 
sharp  passage  of  arms  with  Webster  on  the  ques 
tion  whether  the  Constitution  extends  of  itself 
to  the  Territories,  and  it  was  one  of  the  strangest 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR.        323 

incidents  in  the  strange  story  of  the  slavery  con 
flict  and  states-rightism,  to  see  the  affirmative  of 
this  proposition  sustained  by  the  "great  nulli- 
fier  "  against  the  great  "  defender  of  the  Con 
stitution."  Upon  the  whole,  he  unquestionably 
got  the  better  of  his  antagonist  in  this  contest, 
which,  short  as  it  was,  fully  proved  that  his 
mental  vigor  was  absolutely  unimpaired.  Yet  a 
certain  languor  had  evidently  taken  possession 
of  him.  The  last  weeks  of  the  30th  Congress 
were  the  stormiest  of  Folk's  stormy  administra 
tion,  but  Calhoun  refrained  from  increasing  the 
excitement  by  a  set  speech.  He  had  nothing 
new  either  to  say  or  to  propose.  Too  deeply 
was  he  convinced  of  the  justice  of  his  cause  to 
despair  of  its  ultimate  triumph ;  but  care  sat 
heavily  on  his  brow,  for  nothing  would  silence 
the  voice  which  night  and  day  whispered  the 
maddening  question  into  his  ear,  How  is  this  all 
to  end?  Every  day  he  found  himself  less  able 
to  answer  the  problem.  Yet  there  was  no  halt, 
ing ;  for  something  must  be  done,  and  he  had 
become  thoroughly  convinced  that  nothing  more 
was  to  be  expected  from  Congress,  unless  an  ir 
resistible  pressure  from  outside  was  brought  to 
bear  upon  it.  The  time  had  come  to  write  the 
omitted  end  of  the  "  Address  of  the  Southern 
Delegates  in  Congress  to  their  Constituents," 
—  to  draw  the  practical  conclusion  from  the 
premises  therein  enunciated. 


324  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

The  public  did  not  know  what  snare  he  had 
in  the  new  movement.  Even  a  leading  politi 
cian  like  Henry  S.  Foote  had  no  knowledge  of 
it,  though  he  himself  was  one  of  the  principal 
instruments  in  the  hands  of  Calhoun.  So  late 
as  February  8, 1850,  Foote  indignantly  rebuked 
Senator  Houston  for  intimating  that  "  the  sov 
ereign  State  of  Mississippi,  in  the  incipient 
movement  towards  the  Nashville  Convention, 
.  .  .  was  instigated  by  South  Carolina,  or  her 
statesmen."  And  he  added,  "  I  know  that  what 
he  has  said  will  be  understood  as  intimating, 
at  least,  that  this  Conventional  movement  of 
ours  was  stimulated  by  South  Carolina,  and  was 
the  result  of  concert  between  certain  South 
Carolina  politicians  and  certain  politicians  in 
Mississippi,  with  a  view  of  having  that  move 
ment  originate  in  the  State  of  Mississippi  in 
stead  of  South  Carolina,  in  order  to  avoid  any 
odium  that  might  thereby  arise.  I  am  sure  he 
did  not  intend  to  be  so  understood,  and  yet  he 
will  be,  if  he  does  not  correct  his  remarks."  Mr. 
Houston  replied,  "  I  can  assure  the  honorable 
senator  that  this  is  a  very  delicate  and  com 
plicated  question.  But  I  believe  that  if  South 
Carolina  had  never  existed,  and  if  it  had  not 
been  for  her  disposition  and  the  movement 
which  began  there,  Mississippi  would  never 
have  thought  of  it."  The  senator  from  Texas 


OREGON  AND    THE  MEXICAN   WAR.        325 

probably  was  not  himself  fully  aware  at  the 
time  how  true  this  assertion  was.  In  Decem 
ber,  1851,  Foote  had  to  retract  his  former  pas 
sionate  and  haughty  disclaimer,  and  to  excuse 
himself  by  stating  that,  at  that  time,  "  I  did  not 
believe  that  any  human  being  in  the  world  had 
received  a  letter  from  Mr.  Calhoun  on  the  sub 
ject,  except  one  which  I  myself  received."  He 
now  had  to  avow  not  only  that  Calhoun  had 
"had  a  pretty  extensive  correspondence  with 
persons "  in  Mississippi,  but  also  that  his 
(Foote's)  mind  had  become  satisfied  by  the  pe 
rusal  of  these  letters  "  that  the  modus  operandi 
of  the  Convention  was  more  or  less  marked  out 
by  his  great  intellect."  Nay,  he  even  declared 
with  considerable  pride,  "  It  was  through  me, 
in  the  first  instance,  that  Mr.  Calhoun  suc 
ceeded  in  instigating  the  incipient  movements 
in  Mississippi,  which  led  to  the  calling  of  the 
Nashville  Convention." 

Foote,  in  the  above-quoted  rejoinder  to  Mr. 
Houston,  Has  stated  correctly  the  reason  which 
prompted  Calhoun  to  assign  the  part  of  ostensi 
ble  leader  to  Mississippi,  and  which  made  him 
so  anxious  not  to  let  anybody  see  that  his  hand 
held  and  pulled  all  the  wires.  The  best  proof 
of  the  consummate  skill  with  which  he  played 
his  game  is  the  fact  that  even  the  chief  actors 
had  not  the  slightest  suspicion  of  their  being 


326  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

but  tools  in  his  hands.  The  details  of  the  in 
trigue  are  not  likely  ever  to  be  unveiled,  because 
the  greatest  part  of  that  secret  correspondence 
is  probably  no  more  in  existence.  The  loss  is, 
however,  of  comparatively  little  importance,  as 
one  of  those  letters,  —  dated  July  9,  1849,  and 
addressed  to  Collin  S.  Tarpley,  of  Mississippi, 
— -which  came  to  light  some  time  after  his 
death,  fully  informs  us  about  his  intentions.  He 
says : — 

"  In  my  opinion  there  is  but  one  thing  that  holds 
out  the  promise  of  saving  both  ourselves  and  the 
Union,  and  that  is  a  Southern  convention ;  and  that, 
if  much  longer  delayed,  cannot.  It  ought  to  have 
been  held  this  fall,  and  ought  not  to  be  delayed  be 
yond  another  year.  All  our  movements  ought  to 
look  to  that  result.  For  that  purpose,  every  South 
ern  State  ought  to  be  organized  with  a  central  com 
mittee,  and  one  in  each  county.  Ours  is  already.  It 
is  indispensable  to  produce  concert  and  prompt  ac 
tion.  In  the  mean  time,  firm  and  resolute  resolutions 
ought  to  be  adopted  by  yours,  and  such  meetings  as 
may  take  place  before  the  assembling  of  the  Legis 
latures  in  the  fall.  They,  when  they  meet,  ought  to 
take  up  the  subject  in  the  most  solemn  and  impressive 
manner. 

"  The  great  object  of  a  Southern  convention  should 
be  to  put  forth,  in  a  solemn  manner,  the  causes  of 
our  grievances  in  an  address  to  the  other  States,  and 
*o  admonish  them,  in  a  solemn  manner,  as  to  the  con- 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR.         327 

sequences  which  must  follow,  if  they  should  not  be 
redressed,  and  to  take  measures  preparatory  to  it,  in 
case  they  should  not  be.  The  call  should  be  ad 
dressed  to  all  those  who  are  desirous  to  save  the 
Union  and  our  institutions,  and  who,  in  the  alterna 
tive,  should  it  be  forced  on  us,  of  submission  or  dis 
solving  the  partnership,  would  prefer  the  latter. 

"  No  State  could  better  take  the  lead  in  this  con 
servative  movement  than  yours.  It  is  destined  to  be 
the  greatest  of  sufferers  if  the  abolitionists  should 
succeed ;  and  I  am  not  certain  but  by  the  time  your 
convention  meets,  or  at  farthest  your  Legislature, 
that  the  time  will  have  come  to  make  the  call." 

It  is  the  old  programme ;  only  the  way  of 
executing  it  is  somewhat  changed,  and  changed 
exactly  in  the  manner  which  he  had  repeatedly 
pointed  out  in  his  speeches  and  addresses.  It 
was  another  attempt  to  save  the  Union,  but,  at 
the  same  time,  another  step  forward  towards 
its  final  dissolution,  if  the  North  should  persist 
in  rejecting  the  conditions  of  the  South.  Cal- 
houn's  last  great  speech  in  the  Senate  proves 
that  he  had  not  intended  the  Nashville  Con 
vention  to  present  an  ultimatum  to  the  North, 
though,  for  greater  effect,  he  had  perhaps 
wished  to  see  its  propositions  clad  in  the  most 
peremptory  language.  Whether  or  not  he  woxild 
have  liked  to  come  at  once  to  "an  end  with  ter 
ror"  rather  than  to  endure  still  longer  "the 


328  JOHN   C.   CALHOUN. 

terror  without  end,"  he  knew  that  the  South 
was  not  yet  ready  to  act.  Therefore  he  did  not 
expect  from  the  Nashville  Convention  what  the 
faint-hearted  and  weak-kneed  peace  fanatics  of 
the  North  apprehended  from  it,  and  it  was  very 
far  from  fulfilling  even  what  he  expected.  He 
did  not  live  to  drink  this  new  cup  of  bitter 
ness,  but  he  lived  long  enough  not  to  derive 
any  consolation  from  the  vain  hope  that  this 
last  attempt  to  save  the  Union  by  rendering 
slavery  absolutely  safe  in  the  Union  would  be 
successful.  His  eyes  were  too  keen  not  to  see 
the  fast-accumulating  indications  that  another 
disappointment  —  more  bitter  than  all  the  dis 
appointments  he  had  experienced  heretofore  — 
was  in  store  for  him.  His  weary  limbs  longed 
to  stretch  out  and  rest,  but  he  knew  only  too 
well  that  so  long  as  his  mortal  eyes  saw  the 
light  of  the  sun  there  was  no  rest  for  him.  By 
their  very  keenness,  these  eyes  became  his  worst 
tormentors. 

How  often  had  he  told  the  country  that,  by 
everything  dear  to  man  and  making  life  worth 
living,  the  South  would  be  compelled  to  sever 
its  connection  with  the  North,  if  its  equal  rights 
in  the  Territories  were  not  recognized !  But  he 
had  never  ventured  to  assert  that,  if  this  were 
done,  the  peace  of  the  country  could  never 
again  be  disturbed  by  the  slavery  question,  be- 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         329 

cause  slavery  would  thereby  be  absolutely  se 
cured  against  all  attacks.  His  arguments  were 
always  presented  in  such  an  ingenious  form 
that  to  the  blunt  logic  of  many  of  his  hearers 
this  would  appear  to  be  the  self-evident  conclu 
sion  ;  but  though  he  certainly  deceived  himself 
to  some  extent  in  this  respect,  he  had  never  di 
rectly  and  expressly  asserted  the  fact.  On  the 
contrary,  all  his  speeches  were  replete  with  irre 
futable  arguments,  proving  that  the  slavery 
question  could  not  be  decreed  out  of  existence, 
because  the  moral,  economical,  and  political  an 
tagonism  between  slavery  and  freedom  was  a 
fact,  and  would  assert  itself  as  a  fact  in  all  eter 
nity.  The  people,  therefore,  neither  would  nor 
could  acquiesce  in  it,  if  Congress  should  attempt 
to  ignore  it,  or  even  forbid  noticing  it.  No  mat 
ter  how  high  the  "peculiar  institution"  was 
placed  on  "  the  rock  of  the  Constitution,"  the 
waves  of  the  sea  of  facts  unceasingly  beat  against 
it,  and  gradually  washed  it  away. 

In  his  great  speech  on  the  Oregon  question 
(March  16,  1846),  Calhoun  had  said :  — 

"  But  I  oppose  war,  not  simply  on  the  patriotic 
ground  of  a  citizen  looking  to  the  freedom  and  pros 
perity  of  his  own  country,  but  on  still  broader  grounds, 
as  a  friend  of  improvement,  civilization,  and  progress. 
Viewed  in  reference  to  them,  at  no  period  has  it  ever 
been  so  desirable  to  preserve  the  general  peace  which 


830  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

now  blesses  the  world.  Never  in  its  history  has  a 
period  occurred  so  remarkable  as  that  which  has 
elapsed  since  the  termination  of  the  great  war  in  Eu 
rope  with  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  for  the  great  ad 
vances  made  in  all  these  particulars.  Chemical  and 
mechanical  discoveries  and  inventions  have  multiplied 
beyond  all  former  example,  —  adding,  with  their  ad 
vance,  to  the  comforts  of  life  in  a  degree  far  greater 
and  more  universal  than  all  that  was  ever  known  be 
fore.  Civilization  has,  during  the  same  period,  spread 
its  influence  far  and  wide,  and  the  general  progress  in 
knowledge,  and  its  diffusion  through  all  ranks  of  soci 
ety,  has  outstripped  all  that  has  ever  gone  before  it. 
The  two  great  agents  of  the  physical  world  have  be 
come  subject  to  the  will  of  man,  and  have  been  made 
subservient  to  his  wants  and  enjoyments ;  I  allude  to 
steam  and  electricity,  under  whatever  name  the  latter 
may  be  called.  The  former  has  overcome  distance 
both  on  land  and  water,  to  an  extent  which  former 
generations  had  not  the  least  conception  was  possible. 
It  has,  in  effect,  reduced  the  Atlantic  to  half  its  for 
mer  width,  while,  at  the  same  time,  it  has  added  three 
fold  to  the  rapidity  of  intercourse  by  land.  Within 
the  same  period,  electricity,  the  greatest  and  most  dif 
fuse  of  all  known  physical  agents,  has  been  made  the 
instrument  for  the  transmission  of  thought,  I  will  not 
say  with  the  rapidity  of  lightning,  but  by  lightning 
itself.  Magic  wires  are  stretching  themselves  in  all  di 
rections  over  the  earth,  and  when  their  mystic  meshes 
shall  have  been  united  and  perfected  our  globe  it 
self  will  become  endowed  with  sensitiveness,  so  that 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         331 

whatever  touches  on  any  one  point  will  be  instantly 
felt  on  every  other.  All  these  improvements,  all  this 
increasing  civilization,  all  the  progress  now  making, 
would  be  in  a  great  measure  arrested  by  a  war  be- 
tweeii  us  and  Great  Britain.  As  great  as  it  is,  it  is 
but  the  commencement,  the  dawn  of  a  new  civiliza 
tion,  more  refined,  more  elevated,  more  intellectual, 
more  moral,  than  the  present  and  all  preceding  it. 
Shall  it  be  we  who  shall  incur  the  high  responsibility 
of  retarding  its  advance  ?  " 

jCould  he  altogether  refuse  to  see  how  much 
the  advance  of  this  new  civilization  was  re 
tarded  by  the  "  peculiar  institution  "  ?  The 
most  exaggerated  eulogies  on  its  conservative 
virtues  could  not  banish  from  his  sight  the 
glaring  contrasts  between  the  two  sections; 
the  most  positive  assertion  that  these  were 
wholly  due  to  the  unjust  and  unconstitutional 
economical  policy  of  the  federal  government 
could  not  conceal  the  fact  that,  no  matter  what 
this  policy  was  with  regard  to  tariffs  and  inter 
nal  improvements,  these  contrasts  became  more 
glaring  every  year.  No  ingenuity,  displayed  in 
the  attempt  to  prove  that  the  North  would  lose 
infinitely  more  by  a  disruption  of  the  Union 
than  the  South,  could  disprove  the  fact  that 
these  contrasts  indicated  the  increasing  weak 
ness  of  the  South,  not  only  morally  and  polit- 
'cally,  as  he  had  himself  avowed,  but  in  every 


332  JOHN  C.  CALHOUN 

respect ;  no  prophecy  that,  after  the  breaking 
up  of  the  Union,  the  economical  development 
of  the  unfettered  South  would  be  unparalleled, 
could  cover  up  the  fact  that  whatever  touched 
any  one  point  of  the  civilized  part  of  the  globe 
was  instantly  felt  on  every  other,  and  that  this 
economical,  moral,  and  mental  consolidation  of 
the  civilized  world  rendered  the  perpetuation 
of  the  "  peculiar  institution "  impossible,  be 
cause  slavery,  whether  in  itself  good  or  bad, 
grew  every  day  more  incompatible  with  all  the 
laws  governing  the  life  of  this  civilized  world. 
Much  duller  eyes  than  his  had  begun  long  ago 
to  be  struck  and  alarmed  by  the  fast-accumu 
lating  proofs  of  this  all-important  fact,  fur 
nished  by  the  under-currents  in  the  slave- hold 
ing  States  themselves.  The  non-slave-holders 
had  begun  to  doubt  the  heretofore  unques 
tioned  identity  of  their  interests  with  those  of 
the  slave-holders.  In  the  border  States  the  old 
creed  was  revived  that  slavery  was  a  "  mil 
dew  "  and  a  "  curse " ;  in  some  of  them  an 
earnest  agitation  for  its  gradual  extinction  was 
entered  upon.  The  old  cotton  States,  and 
among  them  principally  South  Carolina,  not 
only  bitterly  complained  of  the  heavy  drafts 
which  the  emigration  as  well  to  the  northwest 
ern  as  to  the  Mississippi  States  constantly  made 
upon  their  wealth  and  their  population,  but 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.        333 

they  also  saw  the  day  approach  on  which  a 
modified  abolitionism  would  boldly  raise  its 
head  actually  among  themselves,  if  nothing 
should  be  done  to  improve  the  miserable  condi 
tion  of  their  poor  white  people.  But  all  the 
proposed  remedies  proved,  upon  closer  exami 
nation,  to  be  deadly  poisons.  The  man  who 
had  been  the  zealous  advocate  of  the  first  great 
Southern  railroad,  and  who  still  bitterly  ac 
cused  the  federal  government  of  having  crip 
pled  the  South  economically,  now  gave  it  as 
his  opinion  that  the  South  would  commit  sui 
cide  by  introducing  factories  and  stimulating 
all  sorts  of  industrial  pursuits,  because  the  ar 
tisan  and  mechanic  aie  born  enemies  of  slavery. 
All  this  could  not  shake  in  the  least  Calhoun's 
conviction  that  slavery  was  "  a  good,  a  positive 
good."  But  how  could  he  have  seen  all  this, 
and  failed  to  perceive  that,  even  if  all  the  Ter 
ritories  were  thrown  open  to  the  slave-holders, 
the  "  peculiar  institution  "  would  be  as  far  as 
ever  from  being  safely  anchored  in  haven  ?  The 
future  was  still  completely  hidden  from  his  view, 
and  had  forever  to  remain  so ;  for,  as  his  theory 
of  slavery  had  become  with  him  a  dogma,  he 
was  determined  not  to  see  it,  and  had  become 
incapable  of  seeing  it,  unless  he  lived  to  see  the 
dogma  crushed  by  the  accomplished  facts.  But 
he  could  not  help  seeing  that  the  entanglements 


334  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

of  the  slavery  question  grew  ever  more  laby 
rinthine,  and  he  could  not  help  feeling  that  the 
whole  ground  was  thickly  strewn  with  thorns. 
Wearily  he  turned  away  from  the  facts,  which 
he  neither  would  nor  could  understand  any 
more. 

The  30th  Congress  had  expired,  leaving  the 
question  of  the  disposal  of  the  newly  acquired 
Territories  where  it  had  found  it,  and  a  Whig 
President  had  taken  possession  of  the  White 
House.  Nine  long  months  the  people  had  to 
go  about  their  business  in  this  thick  and  sul 
try  political  atmosphere,  ere  their  law-makers 
returned  once  more  to  the  well-nigh  hopeless 
task  of  solving  this  problem.  Calhoun  did  not 
pass  this  time  in  idleness.  The  world  of  stub 
born  facts  he  had  been  unable  to  master,  but 
he  still  thought  himself  able  to  prove  on  paper 
that  he  was  nevertheless  right.  In  these  months, 
the  "  Disquisition  on  Government "  and  the 
"  Discourse  on  the  Constitution  and  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  "  were  in  the  main, 
if  not  entirely,  penned.  That  he  expected  to 
exercise  an  influence  on  the  decision  of  the  im 
pending  question  by  these  essays  is  hardly  to  be 
supposed.  His  idea  seems  rather  to  have  been 
to  leave  an  authentic  exposition  of  his  political 
creed  as  a  political  testament  and  solemn  warn 
ing  to  posterity.  At  all  events,  it  is  only  in  this 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR. 

quality  that  they  can  claim  a  place  in  the  his 
tory  of  the  United  States.  Unlike  so  many  of 
his  speeches,  they  were  not  political  deeds,  and 
did  not  help  to  shape  the  course  of  events.  Be 
sides,  when  they  appeared  in  print,  he  already 
rested  in  his  grave,  and  every  day  the  futility  of 
the  attempt  to  smooth  down  the  wild  breakers 
of  realities  by  pouring  on  the  oil  of  abstract 
theories  became  more  appai'ent.  To  the  stu 
dent,  these  two  essays  will  always  remain 
among  the  most  curious  books  of  the  political 
literature  of  the  United  States,  and  they  may 
be  read  with  great  profit,  though  for  the  mos^; 
part  not  exactly  in  the  spirit  intended  by  the 
author.  The  people  have  passed  judgment  on 
them  without  reading  them ;  and  have  repu 
diated  states-rightism,  as  Calhoun  understood 
it,  that  is,  state  supremacy,  as  emphatically  as 
they  have  repudiated  the  doctrine  of  the  "  pos 
itive  good  "  of  slavery. 

When  the  31st  Congress  met,  December  3, 
184!J,  the  slavocracy  was  smarting  under  a  de- 
feaETthe  importance  of  which  could  not  be 
overestimated.  California,  with  the  informal 
sanction  of  the  President,  but  without  any  au 
thorization  from  Congress,  had  adopted  a  state 
Constitution  prohibiting  slavery  and  involuntary 
servitude,  and  this  clause  had  received  the  unan 
imous  vote  of  the  constitutional  convention, 


336  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

although  many  of  its  members  were  Southern 
ers.  This  was  a  commentary  on  the  doctrine 
of  the  "  positive  good  "  of  slavery  which  told 
more  than  all  the  abolition  speeches  ever  made. 
California  was  irretrievably  lost  to  the  slavoc- 
racy,  for  to  think  that  Congress  could  be  com 
pelled  to  force  slavery  upon  her  would  have 
been  sheer  madness.  Therefore  it  had  become 
only  the  more  necessary  to  struggle  with  the 
utmost  energy  for  the  rest  of  the  Mexican 
booty,  and  for  the  principle,  upon  the  acknowl 
edgment  of  which  those  Territories  which  might 
be  acquired  at  some  future  time  could  depend. 
The  formal  irregularities  with  which  the  pro 
ceedings  in  California  were  tainted  furnished 
the  South  with  a  position  of  sufficient  tactical 
strength  to  continue  the  struggle,  with  the  hope 
that,  after  all,  the  strenuous  exertions  would  be 
ultimately  rewarded  at  least  by  a  partial  sue. 
cess.  California  was  not  to  be  admitted  into 
the  Union  as  a  State  until  the  North  had 
made  satisfactory  concessions  on  all  the  other 
controverted  points.  At  last,  the  slavocracy  was 
apparently  unanimous  in  the  determination  "  to 
resist  the  aggressions  of  the  North  "  to  the  last 
extremity.  In  the  House  of  Representatives, 
the  very  same  Southern  Whigs  who  had  so 
recently  defeated  Calhoun  in  his  attempt  to 
form  a  Southern  party  seemed  ambitious  to 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR. 

assume  the  leadership  of  the  "  fire-eaters."  The 
gigantic  edifice  of  the  Union  trembled  to  its 
very  foundations,  and,  for  a  while,  many  patri 
ots  hardly  dared  hope  that  its  proud  pillars 
could  be  steadied  once  more.  Week  after  week, 
the  storm  of  debate  raged  on  with  unabated 
fury.  Now  and  then  the  dark  clouds  were  torn 
by  a  compromise  proposition,  but  in  the  next 
moment  they  were  again  blown  together  by  a 
counter-blast,  and  the  darkness  seemed  but  the 
greater  for  the  passing  ray  of  light. 

No  one  watched  the  progress  of  the  storm 
with  intenser  interest  than  Calhoun,  though 
his  voice  had  as  yet  hardly  been  heard  at  all  in 
the  Senate  hall.  The  hand  of  death  lay  heavily 
on  his  shoulder.  His  body  was  sadly  bent  un 
der  its  weight,  so  that  the  tears  involuntarily 
pressed  into  the  eyes  of  those  who  remembered 
what  an  image  of  strong  and  noble  manhood 
he  had  been.  A  dying  man  he  was,  though  his 
mental  faculties  were  still  unimpaired.  But  it 
was  not  hope  that  fed  the  flickering  flame  of 
his  mind,  so  that  it  shone  to  the  last  in  all  its 
original  brightness.  The  knitted  brows  and 
the  deep  lines,  which  care  had  chiselled  into  his 
fleshless  face,  told  with  most  impressive  elo 
quence  with  what  a  heavy  load  he  stepped  into 
his  grave.  Two  years  ago  he  had  repelled 
the  charges  of  Mr.  Turney  with  the  proud  as- 


• 


: 


- 


340  JOHN  C.   CALHOUX. 

—  nothing  that  the  most  sensitive  mind  can 
construe  into  a  threat.  A  "  widely  diffused 
and  almost  universal  discontent "  pervades  the 
Southern  States,  caused  by  the  belief  "  that  they 
cannot  remain,  as  things  now  are,  consistently 
with  honor  and  safety  in  the  Union,"  because 
li  the  equilibrium  between  the  two  sections  .  .  . 
has  been  destroyed,"  —  these  undeniable  facts 
are  the  basis  of  his  argument.  He  admits  that 
if  this  destruction  of  the  equilibrium  had  been 
"  the  operation  of  time,  without  the  interference 
of  government,  the  South  would  have  no  reason 
to  complain ;  "  but  he  denies  that  such  is  the 
fact. 

The  facts  and  assertions  on  which  he  based 
this  denial  are  familiar  to  us,  and  therefore 
need  not  be  repeated  here.  Nor  is  it  necessary 
to  recapitulate  his  version  of  the  story  of  the 
antislavery  movement,  and  the  reasons  why  this 
hostility  of  the  North  to  the  "  peculiar  institu 
tion  "  would  inevitably  subject  the  Southern 
States  "to  poverty,  desolation,  and  wretched 
ness,"  after  "  all  the  power  of  the  system  "  had 
been  concentrated  in  the  federal  government, 
and  the  North  had  "  acquired  a  decided  ascend 
ancy  over  every  department  of  this  govern 
ment."  He  declared  "the  views  and  feelings 
of  the  two  sections "  in  reference  to  slavery  to 
be  "  as  opposite  and  hostile  as  they  can  possi 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         341 

bly  be,"  and  he  avowed  once  more  that  "all 
the  elements  of  influence  on  the  part  of  the 
South  are  weaker."  while  "  all  the  elements  in 
favor  of  [the  antislavery]  agitation  are  stronger 
now  than  they  were  in  1835,  when  it  first  com 
menced."  He  therefore  asked,  "Is  it,  then, 
not  certain  that,  if  something  is  not  done  to  ar 
rest  it,  the  South  will  be  forced  to  choose  be 
tween  abolition  and  secession  ?  "  And  he  added, 
"  Indeed,  as  events  are  now  moving,  it  will  not 
require  the  South  to  secede,  in  order  to  dissolve 
the  Union.  Agitation  will  of  itself  effect  it, 
of  which  its  past  history  furnishes  abundant 
proof." 

This  startling  assertion  was  probably  deemed 
by  many  one  of  those  wild  exaggerations,  verg 
ing  upon  the  absurd,  of  which  he  had  so  often 
been  oniltv  in  the  eves  of  all  the  moderates  and 

O  J  J 

conservatives.  Upon  more  mature  reflection  it 
could,  however,  not  be  denied  that  the  split  in 
several  of  the  great  religious  denominations,  to 
which  he  principally  alluded,  went  far  to  warn 
the  people  that  this  opinion  was  not  a  day 
dream  of  the  diseased  imagination  of  a  fanatic. 
Just  now  he  proved,  in  a  manner  most  unex 
pected  to  most  of  his  hearers,  that  he  judged 
the  situation  with  more  calmness  and  sobriety 
of  mind  than  the  great.majority  of  them.  "It 
is  a  great  mistake,"  he  said,  "to  suppose  that 


342  JOHN  C.    CALHOUN. 

disunion  can  be  effected  by  a  single  blow. 
The  cords  which  bound  these  States  together 
in  one  common  Union  are  far  too  numerous 
and  powerful  for  that.  Disunion  must  be  the 
work  of  time.  It  is  only  through  a  long  process, 
and  successively,  that  the  cords  can  be  snapped, 
until  the  whole  fabric  falls  asunder."  The  his 
tory  of  the  next  ten  years  decided  in  an  unmis 
takable  manner  the  question  whether  he  was 
right,  or  those  who  thought  that  the  31st  Con 
gress  would  be  the  last  of  the  old  Union.  At 
the  same  time,  the  sentences  just  quoted  are 
proof  absolute  of  the  injustice  of  the  accusation 
that  Calhoun  was  consciously  aiming  at  the  dis 
solution  of  the  Union,  in  order  to  become  Presi 
dent  of  a  part,  since  he  could  not  become  Presi 
dent  of  the  whole.  Even  if  he  had  been  such 
a  black  traitor  at  heart,  he  knew  that  his  foul 
designs  could  not  be  executed  in  time  to  gratify 
such  a  mad  and  petty  ambition.  Who  can  tell 
what  "the  second  volume  of  the  history  of  the 
United  States  under  the  Constitution"  would 
contain,  if  the  conservatives  of  the  North  had 
known  as  well  as  he  knew  how  strong  the  Union 
was  ?  He  was  no  more  thoroughly  convinced  of 
the  inevitability  of  its  disruption  than  of  the 
impossibility  to  "  snap  the  cords  "  in  this  mo 
ment  and  by  one  blow.  And  so  far  from  wish 
ing  that  it  could  or  should  be  done,  his  last 


OREGON  AND   TEE  MEXICAN   WAR.         343 

bequest  to  his  country  was  an  answer  to  the 
question  how  the  Union  could  and  should  be 
saved. 

Ere  he  proceeded  to  answer  this  question,  he 
stated  how  it  could  not  be  done.  "  Nor  can  the 
plan  proposed  by  the  distinguished  senator  from 
Kentucky  [Henry  Clay],  nor  that  of  the  ad 
ministration,  save  the  Union."  The  course  of 
events  has  proved  the  correctness  of  this  opin 
ion.  Such  compromises  could  postpone  the  evil 
day,  but  the  catastrophe  became  only  the  more 
certain  and  terrible.  No  more  could  eulogies 
on  the  Union  and  appeals  to  Washington's 
warnings  in  his  Farewell  Address  avert  the 
danger.  "The  cry  of  'Union,  Union,  —  the 
glorious  Union  ! '  can  no  more  prevent  disunion 
than  the  cry  of  '  Health,  health,  —  glorious 
health  ! '  on  the  part  of  the  physician,  can  save 
a  patient  lying  dangerously  ill."  The  only  way 
to  cure  the  disease  was  to  remove  its  causes. 
Sure  enough ;  but  could  that  be  done  ?  He 
answered,  "Yes,  easily;  not  by  the  weaker 
party,  for  it  can  of  itself  do  nothing,  —  not  even 
protect  itself,  —  but  by  the  stronger.  The  North 
has  only  to  will  it  to  accomplish  it;  to  do  jus 
tice  by  conceding  to  the  South  an  equal  right 
in  the  acquired  territory,  and  to  do  her  duty 
by  causing  the  stipulations  relative  to  fugitive 
slaves  to  be  faithfully  fulfilled ;  to  cease  the 


344  JOHN  C.   CALBOUN. 

agitation  of  the  slavery  question,  and  to  provide 
for  the  insertion  of  a  provision  in  the  Constitu 
tion,  by  an  amendment,  which  will  restore  to 
the  South,  in  substance,  the  power  she  possessed 
of  protecting  herself,  before  the  equilibrium 
between  the  sections  was  destroyed  by  the  ac 
tion  of  this  government." 

Now,  if  that  was  needed  to  save  the  Union, 
and  nothing  less  would  do,  then  the  Union  could 
not  be  saved.  For  the  first  time,  Calhoun  di 
rectly  asserted  that,  if  the  North  would  but 
follow  his  advice,  "  discontent  will  cease ;  har 
mony  and  kind  feelings  between  the  sections  be 
restored,  and  every  apprehension  of  danger  to 
the  Union  removed ;  "  and  he  followed  up  this 
assertion  by  demanding  what  was  in  the  strict 
est  sense  of  the  word  impossible.  The  members 
of  Congress  from  the  North  could  not  only  con 
cede  to  the  South  an  equal  right  in  the  acquired 
territory,  VJ;  even  abandon  it  entirely  to  the 
slavocracy,  and  they  could  bid  the  people  de 
liver  fugitive  slaves  "with  alacrity,"  as  Webster 
afterwards  did ;  but  the  North  could  not  cease 
agitating  the  slave  question,  because  it  could 
not  will  it.  It  was  a  question,  as  Calhoun  him 
self  had  correctly  called  it,  and  it  is  a  physical 
impossibility  to  will  a  great  economical,  moral, 
and  political  question  out  of  existence ;  and  if 
it  had  not  been  physically  impossible,  the  North 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         345 

could  not  have  overcome  the  moral  impossibility 
to  will  what  it  actually  did  not  will ;  that  is  to 
say,  she  could  not  will  to  change  or  annihilate 
her  economical,  moral,  and  political  convictions 
relative  to  slavery,  —  she  could  not  will  it,  sim 
ply  because  they  were  convictions. 

Nor  is  that  all.  Calhoun  did  not  say  in 
his  speech  how  the  Constitution  ought  to  be 
amended,  in  order  to  restore  and  secure  to  the 
South,  for  all  time  to  come,  the  lost  equilibrium, 
but  the  answer  to  this  question  is  to  be  found 
in  the  second  of  the  above-mentioned  essays. 
He  had  the  candor  there  to  admit  that  a  con 
stitutional  amendment  would  in  itself  not  be 
sufficient.  The  necessary  preliminary  step  was 
to  expunge  from  the  statute-book  all  the  laws 
by  whieh  the  federal  Union  of  the  Constitution 
had  been  changed  into  a  national  Union.  Sup 
pose  this  was  granted:  would  the  actual  con 
solidation  of  the  Union,  with  its  nationalizing 
tendencies,  which  had  been  uninterruptedly  go 
ing  on  ever  since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  be  also  wiped  away  thereby  ?  Calhoun  took 
good  care  not  to  propound  this  question.  He 
confined  himself  to  the  statement  that  the  lost 
equilibrium  between  the  two  sections  could  not 
be  thus  restored.  But  if  it  was  impossible  to 
undo  what  had  been  done,  it  was  at  least  pos 
sible  to  prevent  the  sins  of  the  past  from  hav- 


346  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

ing  any  piactical  effect  in  the  future.  This 
he  proposed  to  do  by  giving  to  the  weaker  sec 
tion  "  a  negative  on  the  action  of  the  [federal] 
government."  He  admitted  that  the  govern 
ment  might  thereby  "  lose  something  in  prompt 
itude  of  action,"  but  he  asserted  that,  "in 
stead  of  being  weakened,"  it  would  be  "  greatly 
strengthened,"  for  it  would  "gain  vastly  in 
moral  power."  As  the  surest  and  simplest  of 
the  various  ways  in  which  the  desired  object 
could  be  effected,  he  recommended  a  reorgani 
zation  of  the  executive  power, 

"  so  that  its  powers,  instead  of  being  vested,  as  they 
now  are,  in  a  single  officer,  should  be  vested  in  two ; 
to  be  so  elected  that  the  two  should  be  constituted 
as  the  special  organs  and  representatives  of  the  re 
spective  sections  in  the  executive  department  of  the 
government  and  requiring  each  to  approve  all  the 
acts  of  Congress  before  they  shall  become  laws.  One 
might  be  charged  with  the  administration  of  matters 
connected  with  the  foreign  relations  of  the  country, 
and  the  other,  of  such  as  were  connected  with  its 
domestic  institutions ;  the  selection  to  be  decided  by 
lot.  ...  As  no  act  of  Congress  could  become  a  law 
without  the  assent  of  the  chief  magistrates  represent 
ing  both  sections,  each,  in  the  elections,  would  choose 
the  candidate  who,  in  addition  to  being  faithful  to  its 
interests,  would  best  command  the  esteem  and  con 
fidence  of  the  other  section.  And  thus  the  presiden 
tial  election,  instead  of  dividing  the  Union  into  hos> 


OREGON  AND  THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         347 

tile  geographical  parties,  —  the  stronger  struggling 
to  enlarge  its  powers,  and  the  weaker  to  defend  its 
rights,  as  is  now  the  case,  —  would  become  the  means 
of  restoring  harmony  and  concord  to  the  country  and 
the  government.  It  would  make  the  Union  a  union 
in  truth,  a  bond  of  mutual  affection  and  brother 
hood." 

That  was  the  "  conservative  principle  "  of  nul 
lification  in  its  highest  perfection,  coupled  with 
the  total  abandonment  of  the  federal  structure 
on  the  basis  of  state  sovereignty.  The  Consti 
tution,  as  has  been  stated  before,  knew  nothing 
whatever  of  sections,  and  their  actual  formation 
was  in  itself  the  first  step  towards  the  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Union.  The  Union  was  endangered, 
not  because  the  original  equilibrium  between 
the  sections  had  been  destroyed,  but  because, 
by  the  agency  of  the  slave  question,  it  had  been 
actually  split  into  two  geographical  sections,  of 
unequal  strength.  And  now  this  fact,  which 
ran  directly  counter  to  the  constitutive  principle 
of  the  Union,  as  established  by  the  Constitution, 
was  to  be  made  its  determining  principle;  that 
is  to  say,  the  disease  was  to  be  cured  by  mak 
ing  the  cause  of  the  disease  the  vital  principle 
of  the  body  politic.  Nothing,  absolutely  noth 
ing,  was  left  of  the  equality  of  the  States,  which 
was  the  basis  of  the  states-rights  doctrine,  and, 
in  a  modified  form  also  of  the  Constitution,  if 


348  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

a  permanent  minority  of  the  States  forming 
a  geographical  section  had  an  absolute  veto 
against  the  majority  in  all  federal  concerns.  It 
was  a  misnomer  —  nay,  one  might  justly  say,  it 
was  a  bold  abuse  of  the  name  —  still  to  speak  of 
a  Union,  if  the  constituent  members  of  the  com 
monwealth  were  to  be  constitutionally  consoli 
dated  into  a  permanent  geographical  minority 
and  a  permanent  geographical  majority,  which, 
in  every  question,  had  to  come  to  a  complete  un 
derstanding,  ere  the  body  politic  became  capa 
ble  of  political  action  in  any  manner  whatever. 
Calhoun's  remedy,  which  was  to  effect  the  cure 
so  "easily,"  was  in  fact  nothing  less  than  the 
actual  dissolution  of  the  Union,  thinly  covered 
by  some  artificial  contrivances,  which  could  not 
serve  any  purpose  except  to  keep  it  for  a  little 
while  mechanically  together,  and  to  expose  it  to 
the  scorn  and  ridicule  of  the  whole  world. 

"  Having  faithfully  done  my  duty  to  the  best 
of  my  ability,  both  to  the  Union  and  my  sec 
tion,  throughout  this  agitation,  I  shall  have  the 
consolation,  let  what  will  come,  that  I  am  free 
from  all  responsibility."  Those  were  the  last 
words  of  the  last  speech  of  the  great  and  honest 
nullifier.  He  could  no  more  support  himself. 
Two  friends  had  to  lead  him  out  of  the  Senate 
chamber.  Slowly  and  heavily  the  curtain  rolled 
down  to  shut  from  the  public  gaze  the  last  scene 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.          349 

of  the  grand  tragedy  of  this  brilliant  life.  For 
nearly  twenty  years  the  suspicion  and  even  the 
direct  accusation  had  weighed  on  his  shoulders, 
that  he  was  systematically  working  at  the  de 
struction  of  the  Union.  By  doing  more  than 
any  other  single  man  towards  raising  the  slavoc- 
racy  to  the  pinnacle  of  power,  he  had  actually 
done  more  than  any  other  man  to  hasten  the 
catastrophe  and  to  determine  its  character,  and 
yet  he  labored  to  the  last  with  the  intense  anx 
iety  of  the  true  patriot  to  avert  the  fearful  ca 
lamity.  But  the  last  efforts  of  his  powerful  mind 
were  a  most  overwhelming  refutation  of  all  the 
doctrines  whose  foremost  champion  he  had  been, 
ever  since  the  days  of  nullification.  It  would 
have  been  impossible  to  pass  a  more  annihilat 
ing  judgment  on  them  than  he  himself  did  in 
his  speech  of  March  4,  1850,  and  in  the  Dis- 
course^fTTEe"Constitution.  Yet  he  had  been 
absolutely  sincere  in  everything  he  had  said. 
On  March  5,  in  a  short  running  debate  with  Mr. 
Foqte,  "of  MississippT^he  declare^,  ""~2Ls  things 
now  stand,  the  Southern  States  cannot  "remain 
in  the  Union ; "  and  a  few  minutes  later  he 
asserted^  "If  I  am  judged  by  my  acts,  I  trust 
I  shall  be  fouricTas ^Urai  a  friend  ol  tGTTTmon 
as  any  man  within  it." 

Calhoun  closed  this  colloquy  with  the  remark, 
"  If  any  senator  chooses  to  comment  upon  what 


350  JO  EX  C.   CALHOUN. 

I  have  said  I  trust  I  shall  have  health  to  defend 
my  own  position."  This  hope  was  not  to  be 
fulfilled,  though  he  still  spoke  in  the  Senate  as 
late  as  March  13,  and  in  a  manner,  as  Webster 
stated  in  his  eulogy,  "  by  no  means  indicating 
such  a  degree  of  physical  weakness  as  did  in 
fact  possess  him."  On  the  last  day  of  the  month, 
the  "  magic  wires  "  earned  the  tidings  into  every 
part  of  the  Union  that  John  Caldwell  Calhoun 
was  no  more.  To  the  last  moment,  he  mani 
fested  the  deepest  interest  and  concern  in  the 
troubles  of  his  country.  "  The  South  !  The 
poor  South  !  God  knows  what  will  become  of 
her !  "  murmured  his  trembling  lips ;  but  he 
died  with  that  serenity  of  mind  which  only  a 
clear""' conscience  can  give  on  the  death-bed. 
On  February  12.  1847,  he  had  said  in  the  Sen 
ate,  "If  I  know  myself,  if  my  head  was  at 
stake,  I  would  do  my  duty,  be  the  consequences 
what  they  might."  It  was  his  solemn  convic 
tion  that  throughout  hislife  he  had  faithfully 
dotfe"  his  duty,  both  to  the  Union  and  to  his 
section,  because,  as  he  honestly  believed  slavery 
to  be  "  a  good,  a  positive  good,"  he  had  never 
been  abie  to  see  that  it  was  impossible  to  serve 
at  the  same  time  the  Union  and  his  section,  if 
his  section  was  considered  as  identical  with__the 
slavocracy.  In  perfect  good  faith  he  bad  under- 
taken  what  DO  man  could  accomplish,  because 


OREGON  AND   THE  MEXICAN   WAR.         351 

it  was  a  physical  and  moral  impossibility :  an- 
tagonistte  principles  cannot  be  united  into  a 
basis  on  which  to  rest  a  huge  political  fabric. 
Nullification  and  the  government  of  law :  state 

^^^M^M^^M"^**^*VMMM^MMMH^WMI^^^MMMMVMIVWMP  ••*••*• 

supremacy  and  a  con strtutionaj.  U mon,  endowed 
witE~fEe  "power  necessary  to  minister  to  the 
wants  of  a  great  people  ;  the  nationalization 
of  slavery  upon  the  basis  of  sfates-rightlsm  in 
a  federal  Union,  composed  principally  of  free 
communities,  by  which  slavery  was  considered 
a  sin  and  a  curse;  equality  of  States  and  con 
stitutional  consolidation  of  geographical  sec 
tions,  with  an  artificial  preponderance  granted 
to  the  minority,  —  these  were  incompatibilities, 
and"  no  logical  ingenuity  could  reason  them  to 
gether  into  the  formative  principle  of  a  gigantic 
commonwealth.  The  ^speculations  of  the  keen- 
esFpolitical  logician  the  United  States  had  ever 
ha<T~ended  in  the  greatest  logical  monstrosity 
imaginable,  because  his  reasoning  started  from 
a  contradictio  in  adjecto.  This  he  failed  to  see, 
because  the  mad  delusion  had  wholly  taken  pos 
session  of  his  mind  that  in  this  age  of  steam  and 
electricity,  of  democratic  ideas  and  the  1'ights 
of  man,  slavery  was  "  the  most  solid  founda 
tion  of  liberty."  More  than  to  any  other  man, 
the  South  owed  it  to  him  that  she  succeeded 
for  such  a  long  time  in  forcing  the  most  dem 
ocratic  and  the  most  progressive  commonwealth 


352  JOHN  C.   CALHOUN. 

of  the  universe  to  bend  its  knees  and  do  hom 
age  to  the  idol  of  this  "  peculiar  institution  ;  " 
but  therefore  also  the  largest  share  of  the  re 
sponsibility  for  what  at  last  did  come  rests  on 
his  shoulders. 

KcT~hian  can  write  the  last  chapter  of  his 
own  biography,  in  which  the  Facit  of  his  whole 
life  is  summed  up,  so  to  say,  in  one  word.  If 
ever  a  new  edition  of  the  works  of  the  greatest 
and  purest  of  proslavery  fanatics  should  be 
published,  it  ought  to  have  a  short  appendix, 

f  — the  emancipation  proclamation  of  Abraham 

I  Lincoln. 


INDEX. 


ABERDEEN ,  LORD,  dispatches  con 
cerning  annexation  of  Texas,  232- 
237. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  depreciates  Calhoun's 
administration  of  War  Depart 
ment,  43,  44,  52 ;  relations  with 
Calhoun  53-56 ;  elected  to  presi 
dency,  62 ;  his  administration  not 
aided  by  Calhoun,  64,  65  ;  talk 
with  Calhoun  about  slavery,  75  ; 
remarks  as  to  Jackson  and  Cal 
houn,  93  ;  remarks  concerning 
Calhoun  in  1842,  212. 

BANK  OP  THE  UNITED  STAKS,  bill  for 
incorporation  of,  31 ;  Buchanan. 
James,  petitions  for  abolition  of 
slavery  in  District  of  Columbia, 
134. 

CALHOUN,  JOHN  C.,  destruction  of 
papers  relating  to,  5 ;  lack  of  ma 
terial  for  personal  history  of,  6 : 
birth  and  childhood,  8;  at  Yale, 
9  ;  studies  law  in  Connecticut,  9  ; 
begins  practice  of  law,  10 ;  in 
state  Legislature,  11 ;  elected  to 
Congress,  11 ;  marries,  11 ;  on 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
15  ;  prepares  report  on  President's 
message  in  1811,  15 ;  makes  his 
first  speech,  16, 18 ;  characteristics 
of  his  oratory,  17  ;  reports  in  fa 
vor  of  war,  21 ;  advocates  repeal 
of  Non-Importation  Act,  23,  24  ; 
national  character  of  his  views  at 
this  time,  26  ;  anticipations  of  fut 
ure  wars  expressed  in  1816,  27 ; 
relations  with  New  England  Fed 
eralists  during  war  of  1812,  28; 
and  afterward,  60 ;  favors  internal 
improvements,  28-30,  35-37,  39, 
40;  reports  bill  to  incorporate 
Bank  of  the  United  States,  31-33  ; 
speech  on  the  "  New  Tariff  Bill," 
advocating  protection,  33-35 ;  be- 


comes  Secretary  of  War  in  Mon 
roe's  cabinet,  38 ;  report  on  roads 
and  canals,  38-40 ;  organizes  the 
War  Department,  41 ;  but  is 
charged  with  abuses,  43,  44  ;  deal 
ings  with  the  Indians,  45-49 ;  con 
nection  with  the  Rip-Rap  Con 
tract,  49-52  ;  criticised  by  J.  Q. 
Adams,  43,  44,  52;  relations  with 
Adams,  53-56  ;  rivalry  with  Craw 
ford,  56,  57  ;  as  candidate  for  the 
presidency  as  successor  to  Monroe, 
66-59 ;  disappointed,  60 ;  nomi 
nated  for  vice-presidency,  60  ;  sup 
ported  by  New  England,  60 ;  and 
elected,  61 ;  relationship  with  the 
Adams  and  Jackson  factions  in 
1824-25,  62-64  ;  decision  denying, 
power  of  Vice-President  to  call  a 
senator  to  order,  64  ;  feelings  to 
wards  Adams's  administration,  64, 
65  ;  reflected  Vice-President,  65  ; 
prospects  of  presidency,  65  ;  hi* 
friends  placed  in  Jackson's  cabi 
net,  66 ;  views  as  to  tariffs  of  1824, 
67 ;  admits  right  of  Congress  to 
prohibit  slavery  in  the  Territories, 
74 ;  talk  with  Adams  about  slav 
ery  and  dissolution,  75;  changes 
of  view,  75,  76,  et  seq.;  issues  South 
Carolina  Exposition,  concerning 
tariff  of  1828,  76-84;  not  a  dis- 
unionist  in  1828,  83 ;  distrusts 
Jackson  on  the  tariff  question, 
84,  85  ;  connection  with  the  Mrs. 
Eaton  imbroglio,  86 ;  rivalry  and 
relationship  with  Van  Buren,  87 ; 
injured  by  Crawford,  88  ;  takes 
part  against  Jackson  in  cabinet 
discussions  during  Seminole  war, 
89;  called  to  account  by  Jackson, 
91-93 ;  abandons  hope  of  succeed 
ing  Jackson,  94 ;  effect  of  the  dis 
appointment,  94,  95 ;  continues 
war  against  protective  tariff,  96; 
issues  "  Address  to  the  People  of 


354 


INDEX. 


South  Carolina,"  96;  follows  it 
•with  letter  to  Governor  Hamilton, 
98  ;  his  argument  for  nullification, 
98-103 ;  resigns  vice-presidency 
and  takes  seat  in  the  Senate,  104  ; 
suspicions  as  to  personal  courage, 
104,  106;  character  of  his  final 
action  concerning  the  tariff  bill, 
105  ;  views  of  the  Force  Bill,  107  ; 
declines  public  demonstrations, 
108  ;  severs  all  party  connections, 
109, 110,  185  ;  relations  with  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  110-112  ;  his 
position  and  functions  in  Congress 
during  Jackson's  terms,  112-115; 
on  the  removal  of  the  deposits, 
111,  115  ;  on  the  "  spoils  system  " 
and  the  civil  service,  116  et  seg., 
200-204  ;  sustains  the  veto  power, 
120  ;  becomes  the  preacher  of  the 
doctrine  of  state  sovereignty,  121, 
186 ;  at  first  takes  little  notice  of 
the  abolitionists,  123  ;  moves,  in 
Senate,  not  to  receive  petitions  for 
abolition  of  slavery  in  District  of 
Columbia,  124,  165,  et  seq. ;  at 
tacked  by  members  from  the  South 
for  this  action,  124,  132;  argu 
ments  on  his  behalf,  125-134  ;  ex 
tracts  from  his  speech,  129 ;  op 
poses  Jackson's  suggestion  con 
cerning  "incendiary"  publica 
tions  in  Southern  mails,  135-137  ; 
but  brings  in  a  bill  of  his  own, 
137-139  ;  new  theory  as  to  relation 
of  state  and  federal  governments, 
139 ;  his  foresight  and  opinions 
concerning  slavery,  142-150  ;  plans 
for  disposing  of  surplus  national 
income,  151 ;  views  concerning 
railroads  in  the  South,  152-155 ; 
concerning  the  public  lands,  156 ; 
concerning  the  admission  of  Mich 
igan  to  the  Union,  157-165  :  propo 
sitions  for  encountering  the  aboli 
tionists,  166-170  et  seq.,  188  et  seq.; 
proclaims  slavery  to  be  "  a  good  — 
a  positive  good,"  172  et  seq. ;  com 
pares  the  North  and  the  South, 
174  et  seg. ;  during  financial  diffi 
culties  of  1837,  182 ;  opposes  Jack 
son's  French  policy,  183;  and  the 
Sub-Treasury  scheme,  184 ;  his 
true  relationship  with  the  \Vhigs, 
184,  185,  187;  politically  inde 
pendent,  185 ;  and  the  resolutions 
of  December  27, 1837,  190-197  ;  in 
the  regular  work  of  Congress,  193  ; 
his  resolutions  in  the  case  of  the 
brig  Enterprise,  204-20D  ;  his  be 


havior  in  the  matter  01  me  Cre 
ole,  210  ;  and  commendation  of 
Webster,  210;  favors  ratifying  the 
Treaty  of  1842  with  England,  211 ; 
again  ambitious  for  the  presiden 
cy  in  1842, 212 ;  his  prospects,  214- 
216  ;  withdraws  from  the  canvass, 
217 ;  declares  dissolution  of  the 
Union  an  imaginary  danger,  219- 
221 ;  in  1836  declares  for  admis 
sion  of  Texas  to  the  Union,  222 ; 
in  1842  claims  to  be  real  author  of 
annexation,  223  ;  made  Secretary 
of  State  by  Tyler,  227 ;  reasons  for 
accepting  this  position,  227,  228; 
resumes  negotiations  for  annexa 
tion  of  Texas,  230 ;  correspond 
ence  with  Pakenham  concern 
ing  annexation,  231-237,  239-241 ; 
criticised  at  the  South  for  his  ac 
tion  in  this  matter,  242 ;  delays 
treaty  of  annexation  in  Senate, 

245  ;  proceedings  after  rejection  of 
treaty   for  annexation   of    Texas, 

246  ;   concerning  armed  interven 
tion,  248 ;    accomplishes   annexa 
tion  by  means  of  the  joint  reso 
lution,    254,  255;    relations  with 
Polk,  256,  257,  260;   offered  post 
of  minister  to  England   and  de 
clines    it,    257,    253 ;     arguments 
with   Pakenham  about   the   Ore 
gon  boundary,  261-263;   views  as 
to  policy  of  the  United  States  iu 
the  Oregon  dispute,  263,  264,  269  ; 
opposes   the  more  violent  party, 
267,  329 ;   motives   of  his  action, 
269-272,  274 ;  opposes  the  belliger 
ent   steps  of    the  administration 
towards    Mexico,    276 ;     demands 
delay  when  war  is  declared  to  ex 
ist,  277  ;  speech  after  the  moving 
of  the"  Wilmot Proviso, "280;  his 
soundness  vindicated,  283 ;  in  re 
sponse  to  accusations  he  declares 
himself   not  responsible  for  the 
Mexican  war,  2S5  ;  denies  that  he 
aspires  to  the  presidency,  287, 338 ; 
advocates  policy  of  a  "  defensive 
line"  in  the  war,  288,  291;  de 
clares  in  favor  of  territorial  annex 
ation  as  result  of  Mexican  war, 
290 ;  views  as  to  slavery  in  such 
annexed  territory,  291,  292  ;  pre 
sents  resolutions  covering  whole 
matter  of  slavery  in  the  Territo 
ries,  292-307 ;  views  on  the  subject 
again     expressed,     310-313 ;     de 
nounces  the  Missouri  Compromise, 
292,  293,  309;   comments  on  the 


INDEX. 


355 


'  Wilmot  iToviso,"  302  ;  a  strong 
opponent  of  disunion  doctrines, 
304,  320,  321,  349 ;  but  once  ex 
presses  foar  of  disunion,  349  ;  con 
sents  to  a  compromise  concerning 
Oregon,  New  Mexico,  and  Califor 
nia,  313  ;  in  December,  1848,  drafts 
"  Address  of  the  Southern  Dele 
gates  in  Congress  to  their  Constit 
uents,  317-32'J.  321 ;  be'.ief  that 
Calhoun  was  plotting  dissolution 
of  the  Union,  320  ;  debate  with 
Webster  concerning  the  Constitu 
tion  and  the  Territories,  322;  se 
cretly  arranges  the  Nashville  Con 
vention,  324-327  ;  opinions  as  to 
the  permanent  character  of  the 
slavery  question,  328 ;  writes  the 
"  Disquisition  on  Government," 
and  tlie  "Discourse  on  the  Con 
stitution  and  Government  of  the 
United  States/'  334  ;  in  the  debate 
concerning  the  admission  of  Cali 
fornia,  337,  339-343,  346,  347  ;  his 
views  criticised,  344,  345,  346 ; 
death,  SCO. 

California,  organization  of,  as  a  Ter 
ritory,  313-315 ;  adopts  a  state 
Constitution,  335. 

Cass.  Lewis,  on  the  Oregon  boundary 
dispute,  266. 

Clay,  Henry,  Speaker  of  12th  Con 
gress,  Jo. 

Comet,  case  of  the,  204. 

Crawford,  \Vm.  11.,  rivalry  with  Cal 
houn  for  presidency,  56,  67  :  in 
jures  Calhoun  in  esteem  of  Jack 
son,  88-90,  91. 

Creole,  case  of  the,  210. 

EATON,  MBS.,  the  affair  of,  85-87. 

Embargo,  recommended  by  Presi 
dent,  20. 

Encomium,  case  of  the,  204. 

Enterprise,  case  of  the  brig,  204- 
209. 

FOOTE,  HENRY  S.,  and  the  origin  of 
the  Nashville  Convention, 324, 325. 

GARRISON,  WM.  L.,  Btablishes  the 
"Liberator,"  122. 

Giddings,  Joshua,  concerning  the 
annexation  of  Texas  and  the  Mex 
ican  war,  281. 

Gilmer,  letter  of,  concerning  annex 
ation  of  Texas,  224. 

Grundy,  Felix,  on  the  embargo,  21. 

HAY.NE,  GENERAL,  elected  Governor 


of  South  Carolina,  vacates  seat  in 
Senate,  104. 

Houston,  Samuel,  concerning  the 
origin  of  the  Nashville  Conven 
tion,  324. 

INDIANS,  Calhoun's  dealings  with, 
45-49. 

JACKSON,  ANDREW,  defeated  by 
Adams  in  presidential  contest  62 ; 
elected  President,  65 ;  puts  friends 
of  Calhoun  in  his  cabinet,  66 ;  po 
sition  of,  on  tariff  question  of  1828, 
84,  85  ;  in  Mrs.  Eaton's  affair,  86  ; 
in  the  Seminole  war,  and  subse 
quent  cabinet  discussions  concern 
ing,  88-90  ;  discovers  Calhoun's 
part  in  these  discussions,  and  be 
comes  incensed,  90-93 ;  threats 
against  Calhoun,  104 ;  really  de 
feated  in  the  tariff  matter,  105, 106 ; 
suggests  law  controlling  Southern 
mails,  134  ;  policy  towards  France 
opposed  by  Calhoun,  183  ;  becomes 
engaged  for  annexation  of  Texas, 
224-225. 

LIBERATOR,  The,  established,  122. 

MADISON,  JAMES,  relation  to  the  war 
party  in  1811-12,  20  ;  recommends 
embargo,  20. 

Mann,  Horace,  reports  Calhoun  to  be 
suspected  of  plotting  dissolution 
of  the  Union,  320. 

Mexico,  negotiations  with,  preceding 
outbreak  of  war,  274,  275  ;  war  de 
clared  between  the  United  States 
and,  277. 

Michigan,  question  of  her  admission 
to  the  Union,  157-161. 

Missouri  Compromise,  denounced  by 
Calhoun,  293. 

Mix,  Elijah,  and  the  Rip-Rap  Con 
tract,  49. 

NASHVILLE  Convention,  origin  of  the, 

324. 
Nelson,  John,  connection  with  Texan 

negotiations,  230. 
New   Mexico,  organization   of,  as  a 

Territory,  313,  316. 
Non-Importation  Act,  repeal  of,  23 

et  seq. 

OREGON,  disputes  about  the  bound 
ary,  2<jl  et  seq. ;  bill  for  organiza 
tion  of,  laid  on  the  table,  307  ; 
compromise  proposition  concern- 


356 


INDEX. 


ing  organization  of,  313 ;  bill  for 
organizing,  finally  passed,  315. 

PAKENHAM  (British  Minister),  dis 
patch  to  Upshur  about  Texas,  231. 

Polk,  James  K.,  hostility  of  South 
Carolina  towards,  217  ;  nominated 
for  presidency.  244  ;  relations  with 
Calhoun,  256-260 ;  and  the  Oregon 
boundary  question,  261-266 ;  real 
wishes  in  this  matter,  273,  277 ; 
hoped  to  escape  war  with  Mexico, 
274 ;  negotiations  with  Mexico, 
and  orders  to  General  Taylor,  275  ; 
message  declaring  war  to  exist 
with  Mexico,  277  ;  subsequent 
messages,  279. 

RIP-RAP  CONTRACT,  the,  249. 

SEWARD,  WM.  H.,  action  of,  in  the 

Oregon  boundary  question,  273. 
South  Carolina  passes  ordinance  of 

nullification,  104. 
Story,  Joseph,  concerning  Calhoun, 

oy. 
Sub-Treasury,  scheme  of   the,  184 

et  seq. 

TARIFF  of  1824,  66 ;  connection  and 
bearing  of,  upon  slavery,  67-74  ; 
of  1828,  76 :  position  of  the  ques 
tion  at  the  accession  of  Polk,  217, 
218. 

Territories  of  the  United  States, 
slavery  in  the,  292  et  seq.,  310-314. 

Texas,  admission  of,  to  the  Union 
favored  by  Calhoun,  222 ;  letter  of 
Gilmer  concerning  annexation,  in 
1843,  224 ;  negotiations  between 
Upshur  and  Van  Zandt,  226 ;  nego 
tiations  resumed  by  Calhoun,  230  ; 
action  of  British  government  con 
cerning  annexation  of,  231-237  ; 
causes  requiring  annexation  of, 
237-241 ;  treaty  for  annexation  of, 
held  back  in  Senate,  243 ;  rejected, 
245  ;  annexation  a  part  of  the  Polk 
platform,  244;  in  the  campaign, 


250 ;  annexation  by  joint  resolu 
tion,  251-255. 

Turpey,  Senator,  charges  Calhoun 
with  personal  ambition,  287,  288. 

Tyler,  President,  how  induced  to 
make  Calhoun  Secretary  of  State, 
227 ;  proceedings  after  rejection  of 
treaty  for  annexation  of  Texas, 
246  et  seq.  ;  recommends  annexa 
tion  by  joint  resolution,  251 ;  and 
the  Oregon  boundary,  261-263. 

UpiHUR,  A.  P.,  made  Secretary  of 
State  in  Tyler's  cabinet,  225  ;  con 
nection  with  annexation  of  Texas, 
225,  226  ;  dies,  226 ;  formal  propo 
sition  for  annexation,  234 ;  dis 
patch  of  Pakenham  to,  231. 

VAN  BUREN,  MARTIN,  behavior  of,  in 
the  Mrs.  Eaton  affair,  86 ;  advo 
cates  Jackson's  reflection,  87;  re 
lations  with  Calhoun,  87  ;  position 
of,  as  successor  to  Jackson,  119. 

Van  Zandt,  communications  be 
tween,  and  Upshur  as  to  annexa 
tion  of  Texas,  226. 

WAR  of  1812  declared,  22. 

Webster,  Daniel,  supports  Calhoun 
for  vice-presidency  in  1824,  60; 
suspicions  of  disunion  plans  iu 
1828,  83 ;  commended  by  Calhoun 
in  the  matter  of  the  Creole, 
210;  leaves  Tyler's  cabinet,  225; 
approves  Calhoun's  policy  in  the 
Oregon  boundary  question,  273  ; 
debate  with  Calhoun  as  to  the 
Constitution  and  the  Territories, 
322. 

Whig  party,  Calhoun's  relations  to, 
under  Van  Buren,  184-187. 

Wilmot  Proviso,  so  called,  moved, 
279,  282 :  comments  of  Calhoun 
upon,  302. 

Wise,  Henry  A.,  desires  annexation 
of  Texas,  227 ;  instrumental  in 
making  Calhoun  Secretary  of  State 
under  Tyler,  227. 


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